Pyrrhic Progress by Kirchhelle, Claas

Pyrrhic Pro gress
Critical Issues in Health and Medicine
Edited by Janet Golden, Rutgers University– Camden, and  
Rima D. Apple, University of Wisconsin– Madison
Growing criticism of the US healthcare system is coming from consumers, politi-
cians, the media, activists, and healthcare professionals. Critical Issues in Health and 
Medicine is a collection of books that explores  these con temporary dilemmas from 
a variety of perspectives, among them po liti cal,  legal, historical, so cio log i cal, and 
comparative, and with attention to crucial dimensions such as race, gender, ethnic-
ity, sexuality, and culture.
For a list of titles in the series, see the last page of the book.
Pyrrhic Pro gress




New Brunswick, Camden, and Newark, New Jersey, and London
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Kirchhelle, Claas, 1987– author.
Title: Pyrrhic pro gress: the history of antibiotics in Anglo- American food production /  
Claas Kirchhelle.
Description: New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, [2020] | Series: Critical issues in 
health and medicine | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019009912 | ISBN 9780813591476 (pbk.: alk. paper) | ISBN 
9780813591483 (cloth: alk. paper)
Subjects: | MESH: Anti- Bacterial Agents— history | Drug Re sis tance, Microbial | Food 
Safety | Legislation, Drug— history | Agriculture— history | History, 20th  Century | 
History, 21st  Century | United Kingdom | United States
Classification: LCC RM267 | NLM QV 11 FA1 | DDC 615.7/922— dc23
LC rec ord available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2019009912
A British Cataloging- in- Publication rec ord for this book is available from the British Library.
Copyright © 2020 by Claas Kirchhelle
All rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or 
mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission  
from the publisher. Please contact Rutgers University Press, 106 Somerset Street, New Brunswick,  
NJ 08901. The only exception to this prohibition is “fair use” as defined by U.S. copyright law.
 The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National 
Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, 
ANSI Z39.48-1992.
www . rutgersuniversitypress . org





List of Abbreviations ix
 1 The Sound of Coughing Pigs 1
Part I USA: From Industrialized Agriculture  
to Manufactured  Hazards, 1949–1967
 2 Picking One’s Poisons: Antibiotics and the Public 17
 3 Chemical Cornucopia: Antibiotics on the Farm 33
 4 Toxic Priorities: Antibiotics and the FDA 54
Part II Britain: From Rationing to Gluttony,  
1945–1969
 5 Fusing Concerns: Antibiotics and the British Public 77
 6 Bigger, Better, Faster: Antibiotics and British Farming 92
 7 Typing Re sis tance: Antibiotic Regulation in Britain 121
Part III USA: The Prob lem of Plenty, 1967–2013
 8 Marketplace Environmentalism: Antibiotics,  
Public Concerns, and Consumer Solutions 143
 9 Light- Green Reform: Antibiotic Change on  
American Farms 163
 10 Statutory Defeat: Voluntarism and the Limits  
of FDA Power 185
viii • Contents
Part IV Britain: From Gluttony to Fear,  
1970–2018
 11 Between Swann Patriotism and BSE: Antibiotics  
in the Public Sphere 217
 12 Per sis tent Infrastructures: Antibiotic Reform  
and British Farming 232
 13 Swann Song: British Antibiotic Policy  After 1969 259







AAA Agricultural Adjustment Act
AAFC Antibiotics in Animal Feeds Subcommittee (NAFDC)
ABPI Association of the British Phar ma ceu ti cal Industry
ACMSF Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food
AGP Antibiotic Growth Promoter/Promotion
AHI Animal Health Institute
AMR antimicrobial re sis tance
APF animal protein  factor
AR Agricultural Research
ARC Agricultural Research Council
BF British Farmer
BFS British Farmer and Stock Breeder
BMJ British Medical Journal
BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy
BVA British Veterinary Association
BVJ British Veterinary Journal
BVM Bureau of Veterinary Medicine
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CAST Council for Agricultural Science and Technology
CCC Commodity Credit Cooperation
CEJ Coronado Ea gle and Journal
CIA critically impor tant antibiotic
CL Country Life
CLM Countway Library of Medicine
CSM Committee on Safety of Medicines
CVM Center for Veterinary Medicine
DaMa Daily Mail
x • Abbreviations
DARC DEFRA Antimicrobial Re sis tance Coordination
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DM Daily Mirror
DRB Drug Research Board (NRC- NAS)
DS Desert Sun
EARSS Eu ro pean Antimicrobial Re sis tance Surveillance System
EC Eu ro pean Committee
EEC Eu ro pean Economic Community
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPHLS Emergency Public Health Laboratory Ser vice
ESBL extended- spectrum beta- lactamases
EU Eu ro pean Union
FBNews Farm Bureau News
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FDC Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
FEDESA Eu ro pean Federation of Animal Health
FedReg Federal Register
FJ Farm Journal
FQPA Food Quality Protection Act
FSA Food Standards Agency
FT Financial Times
FW Farmers Weekly
FWR Farmers Weekly Review
GFI Guidance for Industry (FDA)
GRAS generally recognized as safe
GRE glycopeptide- resistant enterococcus (GRE)
HEW US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
HHS US Department of Health and  Human Ser vices
HT Healdsburg Tribune
JSC Joint Sub- Committee on Antimicrobial Substances
LF Lancaster Farming
LIN London Illustrated News
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
ME  Mother Earth
MERL Museum of En glish Rural Life
MH Ministry of Health
MMB Milk Marketing Board
MoF Ministry of Food
MRC Medical Research Council
MRSA methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus
MT Madera Tribune
Abbreviations • xi
NAFDC National Advisory Food and Drug Committee
NARA National Archives and Rec ords Administration
NARMS National Antimicrobial Re sis tance Monitoring System
NAS National Acad emy of Sciences
NDA New Drug Application
NEJM New  England Journal of Medicine
NFU National Farmers Union (UK)
NOAH National Office for Animal Health
NR National Review
NRC National Research Council (NAS)
NRDC National Resources Defense Council
NYT New York Times
OF Organic Farmer
OGF Organic Gardening and Farming
OMB Office of Management and Bud get
OTA Office of Technology Assessment
PAMTA Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act
PF Progressive Farmer
PHLS Public Health Laboratory Ser vice
PML Pharmacy and Merchants’ List
PPM parts per million
PrFa Prairie Farmer
RCVS Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons
RSPCA Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
RUMA Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture Alliance
SAP Scientific Advisory Panel (MAFF)
SBS San Bernardino Sun
SciAm Scientific American
SF Successful Farming
SGFS Steering Group on Food Surveillance
STS science and technology studies
TNA The National Archives (UK)
TSA Therapeutic Substances Act
vCJD variant Creutzfeldt- Jakob disease
VMD Veterinary Medicines Directorate
VPC Veterinary Products Committee
VR Veterinary Rec ord
VRC Veterinary Residues Committee




WHO World Health Organ ization
WP Washington Post
WSJ Wall Street Journal





The Sound of 
Coughing Pigs
In winter 2015, a door unexpectedly opened on a group of pigs. Where a moment 
before the room had been filled with the sound of grunts, squeals, and squeaks, 
the author and his wife  were greeted by an ex pec tant silence as sixty healthy- 
looking pigs turned  toward the door, sat down on their  behinds— and coughed. 
The surprisingly  human sound of sixty coughing pigs has stayed with us to this 
day. For the purposes of this book, the sound is doubly significant  because  these 
coughing pigs had not received any antibiotics. Instead, they  were part of an 
experiment by the pig farmer, who was giving us an impromptu two- hour tour 
of the farm’s facilities.
Having heard of my research, the farmer insisted that I get an inside look at 
how conventional agriculture  really works. The  family farm specializes in fat-
tening piglets and selling them for slaughter. While its capacity of 4,000 pigs 
is small compared to US concentrated animal feeding operations, the farm we 
 were touring is a fairly typical example of pig production in northern Eu rope. 
One of only two surviving farms in the village, it had formerly also produced 
crops, raised  cattle, and bred  horses. However, following the 1960s, it had 
heeded the maxim of “get big or get out” and specialized in pig production. 
While it still grows cereals to feed its pigs, the farm’s  cattle have long since gone 
and  horses are now mostly kept as lodgers paid for by wealthy urbanites. As part 
of a fine- tuned just- in- time production system, the farmer starts the day by 
checking international commodity prices on the Chicago Board of Trade’s 
website. If the price is right, pigs are bought and sold with a click. Despite 
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ingrained agricultural pessimism about market outlooks, business is  going well. 
The farmer is a well- respected member of the local community and has just built 
another high- tech pig sty. And yet, the farm’s  future seems uncertain.
One of our farmer’s main concerns is the increasing po liti cal focus on hus-
bandry practices in conventional agriculture. Getting planning permission for 
the new sty was challenging enough  because of local complaints about the smell. 
However, in an accurate premonition, the farmer is most concerned about 
mounting pressure on Eu ro pean Union (EU) regulators to restrict routine anti-
biotic use on farms. And this is where we come back to our coughing pigs: 
caught between competing expert narratives, the coughing pigs are the farm-
er’s own DIY experiment to gauge  whether antibiotics are  really necessary for 
the farm’s mode of production. It seems that they are. Although no costly dis-
ease diagnosis was made, the other piglets reaching the farm on the same lorry 
received antibiotics prophylactically and did not fall ill. In a business where 
the difference between profit and loss is de cided by the length of time and the 
amount of feed it takes to produce an animal, coughing pigs are a prob lem. 
So what is the farmer to do? Sacrifice a business model that has worked for 
more than forty years or support lobbying efforts to delay the implementa-
tion of stricter antibiotic regulations? This was the dilemma the pig farmer 
posed to us. What follows is the history of how this antibiotic dilemma came 
about.
The Antibiotic Dilemma
Antibiotics are part of a wider  family of antimicrobial drugs with activity 
against a variety of microorganisms, including bacteria, viruses, fungi, and other 
eukaryotic parasites. Revolutionizing the medical marketplace from the early 
twentieth  century onwards, modern antimicrobials comprise synthetic antimi-
crobials (e.g., sulfonamides), biological antibiotics— substances produced by 
microorganisms to act against other microorganisms (e.g., penicillin), and semi-
synthetic or modified biological antimicrobials (e.g., methicillin).1 In public 
discourse, the terms antibiotic and antimicrobial are frequently conflated. For 
the sake of simplicity, this book uses the most well- known term: antibiotic.
The modern prominence of antibiotics is hard to exaggerate. In schools, 
 children learn the story of Alexander Fleming’s 1928 discovery of the antibac-
terial qualities of the Penicillium notatum mold, museums feature exhibitions 
on “yellow magic,” and patients and doctors routinely take and prescribe anti-
biotics for vari ous ailments. So common and impor tant have antibiotics become 
that recent books even talk of an “antibiotic era”2 in  human medicine from the 
1930s onward. What is, however, often forgotten is that antibiotics have also 
come to play a significant role in food production. In fact, more than 50  percent 
of global antibiotic production is not destined for  human use.3
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The origins of non- human antibiotic use lie in the interwar period. Starting 
during this time, dramatic changes began to transform livestock production. 
Over the following decades, sizes and animal concentrations grew rapidly while 
new breeds and production systems changed the biological rhythms of live-
stock production. Although  there  were significant variations between diff er-
ent sectors and regions, growing numbers of animals dis appeared into confined 
high- input housing systems or mixed indoor- outdoor systems. Breeding pro-
grams and fierce competition resulted in the dominance of a small number of 
animal breeds that  were particularly efficient at converting feed into meat. 
Meanwhile, concentration pro cesses increased both the productivity of animal 
husbandry and the investments necessary to survive oversaturated markets. In 
a pro cess known as vertical integration, many producers now contract or work 
directly for larger corporations, which often control not only animal production 
but also feed production, slaughtering, and pro cessing.4 Changes  were particu-
larly impressive in the poultry industry. Whereas a meat- producing broiler 
chicken took 112 days to reach an average market weight of 2.8 pounds in 1935, 
it only needed 47 days to reach a live market weight of 4.7 pounds in 1995.5 
Chickens’ bodies changed accordingly. Starting in the 1950s, heavier broiler 
chickens began to replace older va ri e ties like the Rhode Island Red.6 Since 
then, poultry meat has become a cheap and popu lar food with a small number 
of companies dominating international production.7 Pig and  cattle production 
have also become more concentrated— although the pro cess was often more 
fragmented and confinement slower to develop.8 In the twenty- first  century, 
the intensive (confined and concentrated) and industrial (integrated) production 
of animals is fast becoming the global norm.9
One of the most formidable obstacles faced by expanding animal produc-
tion is infectious disease. Prior to the interwar period, farmers had already 
attempted to increase herd densities. However, despite the use of antibacterial 
compounds like organoarsenics, infectious disease remained a serious threat. 
This situation changed during the 1940s. Within a de cade, cheap antibiotics 
became routine components of the agricultural fight against bacterial infec-
tion.10 Farmers soon found that antibiotics could also be used prophylactically 
to prevent infections from spreading in the first place. A significant third  factor 
contributing to agriculture’s antibiotic adoption was that even small doses of 
some antibiotics—if fed regularly— allegedly enabled animals to metabolize 
feedstuffs more efficiently. The mechanics  behind the so- called antibiotic 
growth effect remain unclear. While postwar researchers believed that antibi-
otics optimized the microbial flora in animals’ digestive systems,11 con temporary 
theories posit (1) that by inhibiting bacterial digestion, antibiotics maximize 
the amount of available sugar, (2) that feeding antibiotics  favors vitamin- 
producing bacteria and combats toxin- producing bacteria, and (3) that antibi-
otics favorably change the acidity of animals’ stomachs.12
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Although the past seven de cades have seen consistent controversies over the 
mechanisms, extent, and very existence of the antibiotic growth effect,13 anti-
biotics’ tripartite function of combating and preventing infection and saving 
feedstuffs was a winning combination. Alongside other similarly impor tant 
interventions like new vaccines, improved housing, nutrition, and breeds,14 anti-
biotics aided a significant reduction of animal mortality. Whereas mortality 
in US broiler production was 10  percent in 1945, it sank to 8  percent in 1950, 
6  percent in 1960, and 4.8  percent in 2015. Meanwhile, feed efficacy improved 
from 4 pounds of feed consumed to produce one pound of meat in 1945 to 2.5 
pounds in 1960 and 1.82 pounds in 2018.15 Then as now, the bound aries between 
therapeutic, prophylactic, and growth promotional antibiotic use frequently 
blurred. Antibiotics also entered other areas of food production. In addition to a 
brief  career as food preservatives, they are still used to combat bacterial infections 
of crops and fruit and to protect bees.16 While it is impor tant to note that agricul-
tural industrialization would have occurred with or without their discovery,17 
cheap antibiotics thus greatly facilitated the monoculture- like concentration of 
organisms and the substitution of  human  labor in modern livestock production. 
Over time, antibiotics’ extensive use created significant infrastructure- like physi-
cal and cultural dependencies in global food production.18
While antibiotic infrastructures continue to influence con temporary hus-
bandry and disease management systems, the resulting chemical cornucopia has 
also come at a price. Agricultural antibiotics face three diff er ent strands of crit-
icism. First, according to some critics, antibiotics have enabled a neglect of 
animal welfare and allow inhumane factory farms to profit from animals’ suf-
fering. Second, many consumers and health authorities are also concerned about 
drug residues in food,  water, and the environment. Some antibiotics are aller-
genic and can  either sensitize individuals or trigger existing antibiotic allergies.19 
Allergic reactions can range from stomach irritations to the eruption of pain-
ful hives on the skin. In the worst case, allergies can trigger a life- threatening 
anaphylactic shock when antibiotics are administered in higher doses. A third 
and increasingly vocal group of critics focuses on antibiotics’ se lection for anti-
microbial re sis tance (AMR).20
Although agriculture’s exact contribution to the global AMR burden 
remains contested, bacteria’s increasing ability to “resist” antibiotics is now 
widely held to be one of the most pressing global health challenges of the twenty- 
first  century. The  causes of AMR are complex. Bacteria can be  either intrinsi-
cally resistant to an antibiotics or acquire re sis tance to it. In the case of intrinsic 
re sis tance, the natu ral characteristics of a bacterium’s biology (e.g., cell wall or 
metabolism) can make it “immune” to certain antibiotics. For example, the 
iconic penicillin G is in effec tive against most gram- negative bacteria, which 
possess double cell walls. Other bacteria may also already “naturally” possess the 
mechanisms with which to “resist” antibiotics, such as enzymes that deactivate 
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antibiotics, the ability to modify antibiotic target sites, or efflux pumps with 
which to pump antibiotics out of the bacterial cell. By contrast, acquired re sis-
tance arises from spontaneous bacterial mutations and the acquisition of 
resistance- conferring mobile genes. Increased tolerance to an antibiotic  will give 
a bacterium an evolutionary advantage over its peers the next time it is exposed 
to the respective antibiotic or to substances with similar effects (co- selection).21
Intrinsic and acquired re sis tance can pass from one bacteria generation to 
the next (vertical gene transfer). However, bacteria also possess the remarkable 
ability to “communicate” information on how to resist antibiotics among each 
other in a pro cess called horizontal gene transfer. Whereas mutations bring new 
AMR genes into the world, horizontal gene transfer is the major force spreading 
 these genes across the globe. Horizontal gene transfer can  either occur as a result 
of transduction, during which re sis tance genes (R- factors) are inserted into the 
bacterial genome by viral bacteriophages; transformation, during which bac-
teria absorb free- floating resistance- encoding DNA sequences; and as a result 
of conjugation (“bacterial sex”), during which bacteria exchange small circular 
DNA strands called plasmids, which encode R- factors.22
It is difficult to exaggerate the implications of horizontal gene transfer. 
 Because ge ne tic information can be exchanged between bacteria of diff er ent 
F IGURE A .1 Modes and mechanisms of AMR transfer.
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species, an antibiotic- resistant yet innocuous Escherichia coli (E. coli) bacterium 
can pass on its re sis tance to a pathogenic Salmonella bacterium. Significantly, 
it is often not just re sis tance against one but against several antibiotics that is 
transferred en bloque. This en bloque transfer occurs  because re sis tance genes 
tend to be stockpiled in mobile regions of the bacterial genome that are more 
easily transferred to other bacteria— the mobilome— such as plasmids and inte-
grons. Any bacterium receiving such a genomic island via horizontal gene 
transfer can immediately resist multiple antibiotics. Exposing this bacterium 
to one of  these antibiotics or related substances  will automatically co- select for 
all of the other re sis tance information encoded on the genomic island.23 Even 
sublethal concentrations of antibiotics, such as diluted antibiotics in rivers or 
in animal feeds and medicines, can select for clinically relevant re sis tance 
genes.24
Once established, resistant organisms and genes routinely cross geographic 
and species borders. With approximately 60  percent of all infectious diseases 
(and 75  percent of emerging infectious diseases) affecting  humans shared by 
other vertebrate animals, the se lection of resistant pathogens in one popula-
tion can have serious consequences for the other.25 This is not only true for 
established zoonotic pathogens but also for seemingly harmless bacteria. In 
the case of livestock- associated methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(CC398 MRSA), researchers found that the strain had originated as an anti-
biotic susceptible  human Staphylococcus aureus strain that had jumped to live-
stock, where it had acquired re sis tance to methicillin and tetracycline (prob ably 
as a result of agricultural antibiotic use) before reinfecting  humans in contact 
with farm animals.26 Horizontal gene transfer means that a similar ecologi-
cal blurring of AMR risks is also occurring  because of the spread of AMR 
genes selected in one species and geographic environment to another.
De cades of continuous antibiotic use have led to a significant enrichment 
and se lection for AMR in the global microbiome. It is uncertain  whether  there 
is a way back from this Anthropocene of the cell.27 Although the higher energy 
cost of maintaining AMR means that some bacteria may regain sensitivity once 
se lection pressure is decreased,  others may not. The case of the mobilized colis-
tin resistance-1 (mcr-1) allele serves as a warning. In November 2015, Lancet 
Infectious Diseases reported that re sis tance against colistin, a member of the old 
antibiotic class of the polymyxins, had been detected in E. coli samples from 
Chinese pigs. Polymyxins  were commonly used in Chinese agriculture but also 
serve as last- resort antibiotics in Western hospitals. Chromosomal polymyxin 
re sis tance via point mutations was well known and had relatively high fitness 
costs. What was alarming about the 2015 re sis tance detection was that the mcr-1 
allele was encoded on a plasmid (i.e., prone to horizontal gene transfer) and 
associated with significantly lower fitness costs.  Because polymyxins  were rarely 
used in Chinese hospitals, AMR in local  human populations had prob ably 
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arisen in agriculture; mcr-1 spread rapidly.28 Within a year, researchers had 
detected it in  human and animal samples from five continents. Although plas-
mids containing mcr-1 have, at the time of writing, failed to accumulate re sis-
tance to carbapenems, the other group of antibiotics used to treat resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae, this is likely only a  matter of time.29 The case of mcr-1 high-
lights the potential of untreatable pandemic strains emerging as a result of 
local antibiotic exposure in  humans, animals, or the environment.
Farmyard Realities
Faced with surging AMR and no new antibiotic classes since the 1980s, a grow-
ing number of politicians, experts, and consumers agree that the combined 
price of AMR, residues, and inadequate welfare outweighs the productivity 
benefits conferred by agricultural antibiotic use.  Others disagree. Back on the 
farm, our farmer’s answer is mixed. In the case of residue and welfare allega-
tions, the farmer denies that  there are serious prob lems. Although individual 
black sheep may ignore guidelines, strict Eu ro pean testing and new legislation 
have solved previous prob lems. The farmer is more defensive when it comes to 
AMR: Yes, AMR is a significant prob lem. But who is to say that agricultural 
antibiotics are responsible for it?  Aren’t patients and doctors more to blame for 
antibiotic overuse?  Don’t consumers drive agricultural antibiotic use by 
demanding cheap meat? And why should the farmer stop using antibiotics if 
foreign competitors continue to use them?
The farmers’ opinions are legitimate and should be taken seriously. They also 
reflect more than seventy- five years of disputes over agricultural antibiotic reg-
ulation and increasingly fragmented notions of antibiotic risk. Understand-
ing the  factors driving this fragmentation of perceptions and resulting impacts 
on antibiotic regulation is the central aim of this book. Breaking with previ-
ous historiography’s emphasis on  human antibiotic use, it provides a unifying 
lens through which to analyze the often contradictory actions and perceptions 
of multiple actors and groups. What emerges is a familiar story of spreading 
dependencies and narrowly conceived regulatory solutions. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it is also a story of how one group of substances acquired multiple mean-
ings in diff er ent communities. This second story not only complicates moralistic 
accounts of “Big Ag” or “Big Pharma,” it also serves as a cautionary tale about 
short- term thinking when it comes to current drug licensing and antibiotic 
stewardship.30
Two observations on the nature of risk and group formation help the book 
tackle its topic. The first observation is that differing risk cultures (epistemes) 
have played a crucial role in allowing global antibiotic use and AMR to rise to 
current levels.  Because risk epistemes are difficult to reconstruct by looking at 
one nation in isolation, the book compares the development of antibiotic risk 
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epistemes in the United States and the United Kingdom. Both nations  were 
key to structuring the antibiotic infrastructure underpinning modern food pro-
duction. However, the comparative analy sis shows that distinct cultural pri-
orities, agricultural infrastructures, and regulatory path dependencies produced 
very diff er ent risk epistemes. The book’s second central observation is that each 
national risk episteme was strongly influenced by how antibiotic risk was staged 
in three overlapping social spheres: the general public, the agricultural commu-
nity, and the regulatory community. Communities in each sphere developed 
their own understanding of antibiotics’ risks and benefits. Over time, diverg-
ing understandings fostered the formation of rival groups and triggered increas-
ingly fierce clashes over how agricultural antibiotics should be viewed, used, 
and regulated. Clashes occurred both within and between spheres. The wider 
national risk episteme was a continuously evolving reflection of  these domes-
tic clashes.
The book’s twin focus on risk epistemes and communicative spheres is 
inspired by sociologists Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann. In his seminal Risik-
ogesellschaft (1986), Ulrich Beck highlighted the importance of risk for driving 
societal action. According to Beck, risk is the probability- based anticipation of 
catastrophe but not the catastrophe itself. Socie ties and individuals constantly 
strive to avoid predicted risks.  Because every thing can theoretically be inter-
preted as a risk,  there is a constant strug gle over  whether a risk is real, negligi-
ble, or urgent.31 Risk’s infinite nature also means that no definitive expertise is 
pos si ble. In the virtual world of risk, “no one is an expert or every one is an 
expert.”32 As a consequence, the “objectivity of a risk is the product of its [cul-
tural] perception and [social/objective] staging.”33 Within  every society, exist-
ing inequalities mean that certain groups  will be more successful at staging their 
version of risk and distributing resulting burdens than  others. Often, the poor-
est and weakest end up bearing the greatest risk. Understanding how risk- 
based group identities emerge and interact is crucial if one wants to unravel the 
patchwork of national and international regulations that has emerged around 
antibiotic use. It is  here that the communicative sociology of Niklas Luhmann 
can serve as a useful tool. According to Luhmann,  every society comprises mul-
titudes of smaller subsystems with relatively autonomous modes of communi-
cation: the smaller the group, the more distinct its communication and 
attitudes. Each subsystem or sphere attempts to frame or stage its version of real-
ity for other spheres. A society’s values, identities, and risk definitions are the 
contingent result of this potpourri of competing worldviews.34
As the anecdotal example of our pig farmer and recent social sciences research 
show, perceptions of antibiotic risk have certainly begun to differ between farm-
ers and the wider public as well as between diff er ent countries— even experts’ 
risk heuristics have been found to be affective and culturally biased.35  These 
findings should not surprise us. Over the past three de cades, science and 
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technology studies (STS) research has revealed the rootedness of risk in 
distinct— often national— contexts. Sheila Jasanoff has described how cultural 
values,  legal systems, and differing modes of knowledge production have cre-
ated unique “civic epistemologies.”36 Historians have also explored who gets to 
decide  whether risks are relevant, can be regulated, and should be monitored. 
In this context, Alexander Schwerin has highlighted the role of national 
“risk epistemes”— the complex nexus of po liti cal interests, expert epistemol-
ogies, institutional path dependencies, and technological heuristics—in decid-
ing over the perception and management of environmental and technological 
 hazards.37
Emphasizing the role of risk evaluation and management is impor tant. In 
contrast to an unavoidable calamity, risk is both a  hazard and an opportunity. 
Historically, formal risk definitions have played a significant role in transform-
ing hazardous technologies from unpredictable dangers into calculable and 
thus manageable entities.38 Phenomena that can be predicted can be accounted 
for and integrated into cap i tal ist modes of re distribution and commodification. 
In the context of chemical and phar ma ceu ti cal regulation, numerous histori-
ans and STS scholars have pointed to the role of threshold models and bound-
ary values in allowing hazardous substances to permeate workspaces, 
environments, and  human bodies. In contrast to a zero- tolerance attitude 
 toward risk, exposure to chemicals, radiation, and other  hazards is deemed 
acceptable if it stays below a defined level. Large parts of industrial production 
now depend on the normalization of risk by a specialized regulatory branch of 
science.39 For  those who are unwilling to accept this normalization of risk, a 
lucrative market offers ways to further reduce exposure via insurance, “pure” 
food, or “safe” housing. However, not every body can afford to opt out of nor-
mal risk. In most countries, risk exposure varies significantly along familiar 
socioeconomic divides.40
What is generally accepted as normal risk can also shift. Tolerance of tech-
nologies is often linked to historically fluid cultural notions of purity and 
naturalness.41 According to Sheila Jasanoff: “The demarcation between the 
natu ral and the unnatural in any society is not given in advance but is crafted 
through situated, culturally specific forms of boundary work.”42 For regulators, 
the shifting results of public, industrial, and scientific boundary work pose a 
constant challenge: What if some experts say that the theoretical risk of a new 
technology is too  great for it to be licensed but  others disagree? Should a poten-
tially beneficial technology be licensed even if prevalent cultural sentiment is 
against it? Should one wait  until concrete proof of harm arises or should one 
listen to societal “gut instincts” and enforce precautionary bans? What if a tech-
nology is already on the market and new evidence challenges previous safety 
models? Over time, two contested philosophies have developed to address this 
epistemic challenge. One philosophy holds that concrete evaluations of proven 
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costs and benefits should decide over technological regulation. The other phi-
losophy holds that precautionary bans are justifiable if  there is strong reason 
to suspect harm— even without conclusive evidence of it having occurred.43
The long conflict about agricultural antibiotics takes us right to the heart 
of the competitive staging of risk, its distribution, and the intricacies of pre-
cautionary and cost- benefit regulation. From the 1940s onward, socie ties had 
to decide which of antibiotics’ benefits to enjoy at the cost of which risk. Mean-
while, changing conceptions of food safety and evolving AMR science 
repeatedly led to redefinitions of antibiotics’ “true risk.” Caught between 
agro- industrial interests and vocal medical, consumer, and animal welfare activ-
ists, regulators strug gled to define boundary values for safe agricultural anti-
biotic use. One person’s meat was another person’s poison. Over time, diff er ent 
risk epistemes led to divergent regulation: reacting to industry pressure and 
public concerns, US regulators focused on monitoring food and milk for anti-
biotic residues. Meanwhile, new surveillance technologies and popu lar concerns 
made British regulators prioritize AMR over residue  hazards. In 1969, the 
British Swann report recommended precautionary bans of low- dosed growth 
promoter feeds containing medically relevant antibiotics. Swann- inspired 
growth promoter bans  were subsequently  adopted in Britain and the Eu ro pean 
Economic Community (EEC) but not in the United States, where regulators 
continued to focus on preventing residues and favored cost- benefit evalua-
tions. In recent de cades, the regulatory gap has widened with the EU expand-
ing antibiotic growth promoter bans between 1997 and 2006 and announcing 
plans to ban prophylactic and forms of metaphylactic (control treatment of 
animal groups) antibiotic use by 2022 in late 2018.44 Although the effects of 
bans on AMR remain contested, EU agricultural antibiotic sales roughly 
stagnated between 2011 and 2014 with approximately 9,909 tons consumed in 
2014 before falling by about 20  percent to 7,860 tons in 2016.45 By contrast, 
the United States did not enact full statutory bans. While sales increased by 
22  percent to 15,576 tons between 2009 and 2015, voluntary feed restrictions, 
industry reforms, regulatory threats, and changing consumer preferences have, 
however, led to a significant drop of consumption by about 30   percent to 
10,933 tons between 2015 and 2017.46
This book’s four- part structure reflects its transnational scope and the impor-
tance of the three domestic spheres— public, agricultural, and regulatory—in 
shaping national risk epistemes. Each part studies a distinct phase of British 
or US antibiotic history and is divided into three chapters. Of  these, one focuses 
on the public, one on the agricultural, and one on the regulatory perception 
and management of agricultural antibiotics. Inspired by Michelle Mart’s analy-
sis of US attitudes  toward pesticides, each chapter explores dominant themes 
and mutually reinforcing discourses on antibiotics.47
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Analyzed sources include national and regional newspapers, consumer and 
activist publications, fashion and lifestyle magazines, cookery books, organic 
and conventional farming magazines, agricultural and veterinary manuals, 
industry publications, and archival material from regulatory agencies. However, 
 there remain limits to what  these sources can tell us. Many of them are elite 
and  were written about rather than by actors themselves. Meanwhile, media 
reporting on antibiotics was often monolithic and conservative in its framing 
of mainstream opinion.  There is also no guarantee that information in hand-
books, newspapers, or official publications was taken seriously by producers or 
consumers. Fi nally, the sheer wealth of material means that it is impossible to 
cover all of the nuances of antibiotic opinion. This means that depictions of 
consumers, regulators, and farmers  will often remain ideal types— a fact exac-
erbated by the book’s transnational comparison, which to a certain degree 
depends on generalizable categories. However,  these limitations should not 
deter curiosity or research. Although their coverage remains eclectic, keyword- 
searchable databases now give historians access to an unpre ce dented wealth of 
material on actors’ lives and opinions. The digital repositories informing this 
book have been chosen to reflect as many po liti cal and regional perspectives as 
pos si ble. While no single source group can fully reconstruct actors’ opinions 
and actions, grouping as many as pos si ble together provides a more detailed—
if still grainy— picture.
The book’s four parts are ordered chronologically. Following a brief intro-
duction to antibiotics and AMR, part 1 studies the emergence of agricultural 
antibiotic use in the United States. Chapter 2 describes the initial public opti-
mism about agricultural antibiotics before analyzing the effects of 1950s con-
cerns about chemical additives, carcinogens, and food purity on substances’ 
image. The chapter also highlights the divide between risk perceptions of AMR 
in medical and agricultural settings. Chapter 3 shows that antibiotics quickly 
acquired infrastructural relevance within US agriculture and  were seamlessly 
incorporated into existing feed industry marketing channels. Focusing on risk 
perceptions among conventional and organic farmers, it highlights that US 
farmers knew  little about the new miracle drugs’ effects or potential  hazards. 
Chapter 4 then describes the challenges US officials faced when regulating anti-
biotics. It shows that agricultural antibiotics’ risks  were initially deemed neg-
ligible by a regulatory matrix that focused on “classic” toxic and carcinogenic 
 hazards. Lacking resources and a coherent policy framework, regulators  later 
strug gled to enforce drug compliance and respond to AMR warnings.
Part 2 focuses on Britain. Chapter 5 reconstructs how British public percep-
tions of antibiotic risk differed from  those in the United States. During the 
1960s, traditional concerns about animal welfare and new warnings about infec-
tious re sis tance on factory farms created a power ful alliance for AMR- focused 
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reform. Chapter 6 studies antibiotics’ hesitant adoption by Britain’s diverse 
agricultural community. It discusses the importance of close corporatist ties 
between the National Farmer Union (NFU) and government officials in 
overcoming initial skepticism regarding antibiotics and ensuring that  later 
reforms did not harm farmers. Chapter 7 reconstructs how British officials first 
licensed antibiotics and then reviewed their use three times during the 1960s. 
Although their demands  were repeatedly watered down, public health experts’ 
use of a technology called bacteriophage typing to track the spread of resistant 
organisms played a decisive role in forcing officials to implement precaution-
ary yet narrow restrictions of antibiotic feeds as a result of the 1969 Swann 
report.
Part 3 returns to the United States. Chapter 8 asks why US perceptions of 
agricultural antibiotics remained relatively unaffected by Eu ro pean AMR con-
cerns. Between the 1970s and the mid-1990s, public opinion on antibiotic stew-
ardship remained divided. This division was caused by ongoing residue fears, 
concerns about “stagflation,” and the increasingly partisan nature of environ-
mentalist politics. Chapter 9 highlights how US farmers strug gled to come to 
terms with non- agricultural criticism of antibiotic use during a time of increas-
ing economic pressure. It shows how hostility  toward government intervention 
and a seeming lack of alternative production methods made most conventional 
farmers support lobbyists’ campaigns against antibiotic restrictions. Although 
the mid-1980s saw organic intensification and financial pressure facilitate a 
market- driven conciliation with conventional agriculture, it did not trigger a 
wider reform of production methods. Chapter 10 analyzes US officials’ reaction 
to new risk scenarios involving horizontal gene transfer. It shows that officials 
 were divided in their assessment of precautionary Eu ro pean bans and underesti-
mated industry opposition to antibiotic reform.  After failing to restrict agricul-
tural antibiotic use four times during the 1970s, government officials reverted to 
 earlier policies of nonstatutory reform.
Part 4 covers the era following the implementation of the Swann report in 
Britain. Chapter 11 reconstructs the 1970s fragmentation of public pressure for 
antibiotic reform, the re- emergence of concerns about agricultural AMR 
se lection around 1980, and the 1996 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
crisis’s role in reigniting national reform campaigns. Chapter 12 studies the 
 limited impact of initial antibiotic restrictions on British farming.  After a brief 
reduction during the early 1970s, agricultural antibiotic use soon recovered and 
continued to increase  until the late 1990s. Similar to the United States, most 
British farmers continued to see antibiotics as an impor tant component of mod-
ern production and risk management. It was only when corporatist decision- 
making began to fracture during the 1980s that AMR and residue  hazards  were 
discussed more extensively. Following the 1996 BSE crisis, agricultural oppo-
sition to further growth promoter bans was  limited. Chapter 13 asks why the 
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Swann report failed to curb  either antibiotic use or AMR. It emphasizes the 
importance of interministerial rivalry and corporatist ties in watering down 
many proposals of the original report. With British efforts stagnating, Eu ro-
pean integration played a decisive role in reinvigorating British antibiotic reform 
from the 1980s onward.
Returning to our farmer and the coughing pigs, chapter 14 recapitulates the 
tumultuous history of agricultural antibiotics’ perception, use, and regulation. 
It asks  whether this history can provide insights for current regulators. The 
chapter tells four cautionary stories about narrow reforms, infrastructural 
entanglements, epistemic fragmentation, and short- termism before arguing for 




From Industrialized Agriculture 
to Manufactured  Hazards, 
1949–1967
Despite antibiotics’ Eu ro pean roots, it was in Amer i ca that the “antibiotic era” 
truly began. Profiting from early and reliable access to cheap antibiotics, US 
consumers, farmers, and regulators played a crucial role in deciding which forms 
of nonhuman antibiotic use  were commercially  viable and publicly acceptable. 
The three chapters of Part One map the early highs and lows of antibiotics’ 
 career in US food production. They show that agricultural antibiotics’ rapid 
adoption was enabled by their seamless integration into agro- pharmaceutical 
supply chains, their nontoxic properties, and the neo- Malthusian framework 
of Cold War politics. The emergent antibiotic infrastructure soon began to 
cause prob lems for consumers and farmers alike. However, reforms proved dif-
ficult. Facing a growing cost- price squeeze, farmers felt unable to reduce anti-
biotic use. Attempting to reconcile consumer and producer interests, officials 
strug gled to adapt regulatory frameworks. Between the 1950s and mid-1960s, 
a lack of cohesive antibiotic policies and the prioritization of antibiotic residues 
over AMR se lection led to a “narrow” official focus on guaranteeing pure milk 
and establishing “safe” residue tolerances for meat. Although external pressure 
and new scenarios of horizontal gene transfer triggered a review of agricultural 





Antibiotics and the Public
This chapter traces the turbulent history of agricultural antibiotics’ public 
image in the United States. Analyzing newspaper reports, fashion magazines, 
and cookbooks, it shows that agricultural antibiotics’ initial status as guaran-
tors of plenty and signifiers of pro gress became double- edged during the late 
1950s. This crisis of trust began with reports of antibiotic residues in food and 
milk and was exacerbated by a series of scandals surrounding the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). Significantly, public awareness of antibiotic 
 hazards other than residues remained  limited. In the case of AMR, concerns 
centered on medical overuse and seldom touched on agricultural antibiotic use.
Euphoria
Although the use of naturally occurring antimicrobial remedies is prob ably as 
old as humanity itself, the first half of the twentieth  century saw the revolu-
tionary introduction of effective, industrially produced antimicrobial drugs. 
Launched in 1910, Paul Ehrlich and Sahachiro Hata’s antisyphilitic Salvarsan 
(arsphenamine) triggered a large- scale hunt for further “magic bullets” against 
disease. Scientists searched for substances that only targeted prokaryotic bac-
teria cells while leaving eukaryotic animal cells unharmed. In the 1930s, the 
discovery of Prontosil (Sulfamidochrysoïdine) by Gerhard Domagk and his col-
leagues at Bayer and the subsequent synthesis of chemically related drugs seem-
ingly answered this challenge. The synthetic sulfonamides cured previously fatal 
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bacterial infections and achieved prominence by saving the life of President 
Roo se velt’s son in 1936 and of Winston Churchill in 1943. Sulfonamides’ 
arrival also marked a high point for a new form of industrial phar ma ceu ti cal 
research. Housed in phar ma ceu ti cal laboratories, microbiologists screened 
compounds for antibacterial effects while chemists purified, mass- produced, 
and modified promising compounds.1
By the 1940s, many sulfonamides’ toxic properties and growing bacterial 
re sis tance resulted in a second round of antibacterial research. A growing num-
ber of researchers now grew interested in the antimicrobial substances pro-
duced by certain microorganisms, which Selman Waksman termed “anti- biotic” 
(“against- life”) in 1941.2 Of this second generation of antibiotics, penicillin is 
undoubtedly the most iconic. Isolated and refined from the fungus Penicillium 
notatum in Oxford and subsequently modified and mass- produced in the 
United States, penicillin cured many sulfonamide- resistant infections. The vast 
resources deployed by the Allies to upscale penicillin production also made it 
exemplary of a new kind of planned “Big Science.”3
With production of both sulfonamides and unpatented penicillin expand-
ing rapidly  after 1945, prices collapsed and phar ma ceu ti cal companies began 
to search for new, patentable antibiotics. They did not have to look for long: 
employing mass- screening techniques, companies experienced an antibiotic 
gold rush. In 1943, a team surrounding Selman Waksman had already discov-
ered streptomycin. In 1946, Parke- Davis isolated chloramphenicol. One year 
 later, the Lederle Laboratories branch of American Cyanamid launched aureo-
mycin (chlortetracycline). In 1949, Pfizer isolated terramycin (oxytetracycline), 
and Selman Waksman discovered neomycin. Meanwhile, Dorothy Crow-
foot Hodgkin’s decryption of penicillin’s molecular structure indicated that a 
bountiful age of tailored antibiotics might be forthcoming.4
The resulting 1950s antibiotic euphoria is best captured in a series of paint-
ings commissioned from American artist Robert Thom by drug manufacturer 
Parke- Davis in 1957. Reminiscent of Norman Rockwell’s parallel portrayals of 
American plenty, Painting 39 of Thom’s series is titled “The Era of Antibiot-
ics” and features a  woman screening inhibitory substances beneath a portrait 
of Alexander Fleming. On the other side of a glass win dow, a technician tends 
to gleaming fermentation tanks. The painting’s caption reads: “Intensive 
research continues to find antibiotics that  will conquer more of man’s micro-
bial enemies.”5 Thom’s martial confidence in antibiotics’ efficacy was indicative 
of wider enthusiasm about the alleged defeat of microbial scourges like pneu-
monia, tuberculosis, gonorrhea, syphilis, and typhoid. With reproductions of 
Thom’s paintings hanging in their offices and waiting rooms, physicians confi-
dently prescribed a rapidly expanding array of new antibiotics to patients. 
Despite reports of overprescription, allergic reactions, and the fatal side effects 
of chloromycetin (chloramphenicol), public and medical trust in the new drugs 
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remained unshaken.6 Reacting to and further stoking public demand, pharma-
cists and drug companies advertised both medical antibiotic use and suppos-
edly prescription- free antibiotic lozenges, nose sprays, mouthwash, toothpaste, 
and shaving balms in newspapers and magazines like Good House keeping.7 Bas-
tions of upper- middle- class taste like Vogue and Life soon featured adverts for 
Hi and Dri neomycin deodorants: “Fi nally . . .  a deodorant that  really works 
 because it does the job medically!”8
The rapid growth of public and medical demand was welcome news for 
major antibiotic manufacturers like Lederle Laboratories and Pfizer, the major-
ity of whose profits soon came from antibiotic sales.9 However, the flood of 
new antibiotics also increased competition. Keen to maximize profits, manu-
facturers looked for additional antibiotic outlets. The veterinary market seemed 
particularly promising. Discussed in more detail in chapter 3, sulfonamides and 
antibiotics like gramicidin had been used against bacterial udder infections in 
cows (mastitis) and gastro- enteric poultry infections since the late 1930s. While 
many of the new biological antibiotics  were initially deemed too expensive for 
use on animals, the postwar price decline meant that both pet  owners and farm-
ers could increasingly afford antibiotic treatments.10 Nontherapeutic antibi-
otic applications proved equally popu lar. Since the 1910s, medicated feeds and 
metabolism- enhancing supplements had become increasingly popu lar on 
F IGURE 2.1  The Era of Antibiotics, painted by Robert A. Thom for Parke, Davis & Co. 
APhA Foundation.
20 • USA, 1949–1967
US farms.11 This market increased dramatically during the 1940s. In 1948, the 
identification of vitamin B12 as the hitherto mysterious animal protein  factor 
(APF) and the discovery that antibiotic fermentation wastes  were B12- rich 
strengthened lucrative links between antibiotic producers and the US feed 
industry.12 This link was further strengthened in 1949 when Lederle research-
ers Thomas Jukes and Evan Ludvik (E. L.) Robert Stokstad claimed that low—
or subtherapeutic— levels of aureomycin in fermentation wastes caused 
additional gains when fed to growing animals.13
Announced in April 1950, the so- called antibiotic growth effect not only 
opened a large new outlet for the oversupplied antibiotic market but also 
received glowing coverage in national and regional newspapers across the po liti-
cal spectrum.14 In 1951, the Washington Post gushed: “Each week 80,000 
chicks are produced and moved to [Armour and Co.’s] Ches- Peake farm . . . . 
By scientific feeding, controlled temperatures, germ- killing rays,  water treated 
with such drugs as terramycin, aureomycin, and antibiotics [sic], the birds are 
ready for slaughter in three- fourths the time by ordinary methods.”15 Mean-
while, Time magazine described how Pfizer was shaking up conservative farm-
ers with the help of “synthetic sow’s milk spiked with terramycin.”16 Thanks 
to antibiotics, “platoons of  little pigs  were enjoying a peril- free infancy . . .  none 
are trampled or eaten; no luckless runts are left teatless.”17 On Pfizer farms, pig-
let mortality had declined from between 21 and 33  percent to 5  percent.18 Sows 
could be “put back to work” immediately instead of “performing no other ser-
vice than can be performed by the milking machine at the nearest dairy.”19 
Impressed by rapidly rising sales in 1954, Dow Jones Com pany– owned Barron’s 
National Business and Financial Weekly sagely predicted “a steadily rising mar-
ket for animal medicines in the foreseeable  future.”20 While American  children 
entered home- made growth promotion experiments on rats at local science 
fairs,21 penicillin co- discoverer Alexander Fleming predicted that penicillin’s 
use as a growth promoter might someday exceed therapeutic uses.22
Trust in the new “miracle drugs” was such that antibiotics’ use as food pre-
servatives and plant sprays was greeted with similar enthusiasm.23 In 1953, the 
Washington Post rejoiced: “antibiotics are becoming won der drugs to save food 
crops . . .  give us more and tastier meats, even aid in making beer and whisky.”24 
Better Homes and Gardens speculated that streptomycin could well “prove to 
be the long- heralded ‘injection’ to cure plant diseases.”25 According to the 
Desert Sun from Palm Springs, antibiotics not only “promise[d]  house wives 
food that  will keep for weeks”26 but also “toothsome  whaleburgers” and “ whale 
steaks,” which would make “ ‘mighty fine eating’ if properly preserved and pre-
pared.”27 American Cyanamid and Pfizer began to market antibiotic preserva-
tives from the mid-1950s onward. Described by Maryn McKenna, Cyanamid’s 
Acronization pro cess (dipping poultry in chlortetracycline) was celebrated in 
the national and regional media, was explic itly advertised on packaging, and 
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was awarded Good House keeping’s vaunted Seal of Approval. By 1958, more than 
half of US slaughter houses had purchased Acronize licenses. Fish  wholesalers 
soon also began using antibiotic preservatives.28
Nowhere was antibiotic enthusiasm greater than among the authors of 
Scientific American: proclaiming an “antibiotic age”29 in 1952, the magazine noted 
that the  wholesale market value of antibiotic and vitamin B12 feed supplements 
was already worth from $40 million to $50 million. With production costs of 
antibiotics like penicillin falling from $20 to 4 cents per 100,000 units between 
1943 and 1951, it was obvious that agricultural antibiotic use would continue 
to expand.30 Another article claimed that chemical technologies like antibiot-
ics would advance “agricultural efficiency at least as much as machines have in 
the past 150 years.”31 By taming capricious nature, a chemical revolution was 
fi nally allowing  humans “to  free [them]selves from the dismal philosophy of 
Robert Malthus.”32
Scientific American’s attack on “dismal” Malthusianism supported a central 
tenet of postwar US politics. According to eighteenth- century En glish cleric 
Robert Malthus, the  human population’s exponential growth would always 
exceed the linear growth of agricultural productivity. As a consequence, pop-
ulation growth would eventually be halted  either by preventive checks on fer-
tility or positive checks— such as rising mortality through famine.33  After 
reaching dismal heights during the interwar period, the 1950s saw Malthusian 
rhe toric challenged by new agricultural technologies and population control 
programs. According to the New York Times, the “chemical revolution on the 
farm” had “all but [wiped] out the Malthusian fear.”34 Significantly, providing 
plenty was also seen as an effective way to contain communism. With commu-
nist parties performing well in Eu ro pean elections and making gains in Asia, 
American planners began to equate prosperity and development with social sta-
bility and pro- US values. In his inaugural 1949 “Four Point Speech,” President 
Truman promised to “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial pro gress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas.”35 For patriotic US researchers, poli-
ticians, and journalists, promulgating agricultural plenty and efficiency- 
boosting technologies like antibiotics became a moral duty.36 Speaking at the 
1953 meeting of the National Farm Chemurgic Council, biochemist H. J. Pre-
bluda claimed that applying antibiotics in farm soil “may do for crops what pen-
icillin and other antibiotics do for animals . . .  this may solve most of the 
world’s hunger prob lems, thus eliminating one of the  causes of unrest upon 
which communism has tried to capitalize.”37 In a similar vein, major news-
papers like the New York Times and Washington Post equated rising US meat 
and antibiotic consumption with American leadership:38 “Nowadays the doc-
tor arrives with a station wagon full of hypos, stimulators, pills and penicil-
lin and Buttercup gets the benefit of modern medicine.”39 According to the 
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San Bernardino Sun, even Soviet delegates  were impressed by the extensive 
use of antibiotic growth promoter feeds (AGPs) on American farms.40
With antibiotic factories and supplies already serving as a popu lar form of 
US foreign aid, AGPs  were also mobilized as Cold War assets for  human nutri-
tion. Speaking at the 1950 meeting of the American Chemical Society, Wash-
ington State College researchers reported that young rats whose  mothers had 
been fed antibiotics grew faster  because of residues in  mother’s milk. It might 
also “be desirable to feed antibiotic concentrates to physically retarded  children 
in order to increase their growth rate.”41 Following promising domestic tests 
on navy recruits, prison inmates, and  children in  mental institutions and pub-
lic schools, antibiotic supplements  were trialed as foreign aid. During the 
1950s, US researchers trialed antibiotic diets for  children in  Kenya, Jamaica, 
Haiti, and Central Amer i ca.42 The  trials received positive regional and national 
news coverage. In 1951, Nevin Scrimshaw, founding director of the Interna-
tional Institute of Nutrition of Central Amer i ca and Panama, enthused that 
F IGURE 2.2 Life also celebrated AGPs. Art Shay, “Pigs of Different Diets,” Life, October 1953. 
©Art Shay/Art Shay Archive.
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malnourished “ children may some day be eating aureomycin candy to improve 
their diets.”43 Foreign feed  trials continued  until 1958 when the difficulty of 
assessing  whether antibiotics  were solving malnutrition or simply curing low- 
level infection led to an end of research.44
Overall, it is hard to exaggerate 1950s US optimism about antibiotics in medi-
cine and food production.  Whether one looks at Robert Thom’s paintings or 
national and regional media from across the po liti cal spectrum, antibiotics  were 
F IGURE 2.3 Cyanamid advertisement, “2,000,000 More of You to Feed,” 1953. AGPs were 
part of US campaigns against hunger and communism. Lederle, Life, February 1953.
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presented as a sign of  Western pro gress. To most observers it seemed as though the 
constant stream of new antibiotic blockbusters would not only eliminate “man’s 
microbial enemies” but also break the Malthusian trap and defeat poverty- fueled 
communism. That this antibiotic feast came at a price was rarely discussed.
Residues and Allergies
As discussed in chapter 1, agricultural antibiotic  hazards can be roughly divided 
into residues, AMR se lection, and the facilitation of welfare abuse. However, 
not all  hazards received equal attention. By far the most potent American con-
cerns about agricultural antibiotics centered on residues in food and milk. 
Residue concerns mirrored and reinforced popu lar fears about the invisible con-
tamination of food, the environment, and citizens’ bodies. The success of 
muckraking bestsellers like The Jungle (1906) or 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs (1933) 
shows that contamination concerns  were already deep- seated in Americans’ col-
lective consciousness. However, postwar research and debates significantly 
increased public wariness of long- term exposure to invisible  hazards.45
Chemical residues in food seemed particularly problematic. In 1949, Republi-
can representative Frank B. Keefe successfully lobbied for a congressional Select 
Committee to Investigate the Use of Chemicals in Food and Cosmetics. Follow-
ing Keefe’s death, Demo cratic representative James J. Delaney took over the com-
mittee’s chair.46 In 1951, the select committee’s report attacked the use of 
inadequately tested synthetic substances and demanded legislation to protect the 
public from carcinogens and latent poisoning.47 Published during a time of rising 
concern about cancer rates, the report received widespread media coverage and 
focused Americans’ attention on potential long- term  hazards of the many new 
substances being used in  houses, gardens, and food production (chapter 4).48
Although Delaney’s committee did not address mostly nontoxic and non-
carcinogenic agricultural antibiotics, this did not mean that antibiotics’ repu-
tation was safe. During the 1940s, it emerged that some  people  were allergic to 
certain antibiotics. Allergies to β- lactam antibiotics like penicillin  were partic-
ularly frequent, and allergic reactions could range from mild skin irritations 
to painful hives or a lethal anaphylactic shock. Between 1953 and early 1957, 
1,070 “life- threatening” allergic reactions to antibiotics and 1,925 “severe reac-
tions”  were reported to the FDA. The cases included 72 penicillin- related 
deaths.49 Meanwhile, studies on nurses revealed that constant antibiotic expo-
sure could lead to hypersensitivity.50
Concerns about exposure to allergenic antibiotics in hospitals  were, how-
ever, slow to spread to the agricultural sphere. In what was to become one of 
the main features of US antibiotics reporting, commentators frequently treated 
risks posed by antibiotic use in medical settings as distinct from  those posed 
by use of or exposure to the same substances in nonmedical settings. This was 
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initially also true for antibiotic contaminated food and milk.51 During the early 
1950s, publications like True Republican from Illinois warned rural readers that 
“indiscriminate use of drugs [was] dangerous”52 in medicine but did not men-
tion nonmedical forms of antibiotic use on farms. In 1951, New York Times jour-
nalist Jane Nickerson regarded antibiotic residues in milk as an “in ter est ing, if 
not too serious”53 annoyance, which merely complicated cheese production by 
inhibiting bacteria cultures.
Wider attitudes  towards antibiotic residues only began to change following 
the 1956 publication of an FDA survey, which found that up to 10  percent of 
US milk might be contaminated with penicillin. Although officials claimed 
that detected levels  were insufficient to create new allergies, residues could trig-
ger existing allergies.54 The fact that residues had been found in milk made the 
FDA survey particularly poignant. Described by Kendra Smith- Howard, milk 
held a special place in the minds of US consumers. A symbol of health, milk 
was associated with feeding the young, infirm, and vulnerable.55 Prior to the 
Second World War, mea sures to secure milk purity had centered on the eradi-
cation of pathogens like tuberculosis.56 However,  after 1945, definitions of milk 
safety and purity increasingly encompassed the absence of chemical and radio-
active adulterants. This made the FDA’s penicillin residue detections particu-
larly damaging and reduced public commentators’ previous tolerance of US 
farmers’ direct access to high- dosed antibiotics.57
In the wake of the 1956 milk scandal, US media reports on food  hazards and 
cancer risks increasingly lumped agricultural antibiotics together with other 
dubious “chemicals” like DDT and chemical dyes. Antibiotic residues also 
emerged on the prob lem radar of the surging US consumer movement.58 In 
1956, the New York Times reported on the International Union Against Cancer’s 
symposium in Rome. Speaking at the symposium, William Hueper, head of 
the US National Cancer Institute’s Environmental Cancer Section, listed 
chemical  hazards in food production. The list included dyes, thickeners, syn-
thetic sweeteners, preservatives, bleaches, fat substitutes, pesticide residues, 
chemical sterilizers, wrapping materials, estrogens, and antibiotics.59 In the 
same year, journalist James Rorty and physician N. Philip Norman published 
the second edition of their popu lar Tomorrow’s Food. The book’s preface warned 
about new  hazards posed by the “tremendous postwar increase in the use of 
highly toxic pesticides by farmers, the employment of hormone fatteners . . .  and 
the adulteration of pro cessed foods with a multitude of new and inadequately 
tested chemical additives.”60 Whereas Delaney’s committee had mostly ignored 
agricultural antibiotics in 1950, the authors now discussed the residue  hazards 
of antibiotic feeds and sprays and criticized new residue tolerances for legaliz-
ing “the ‘calculated risks’ of mass poisoning.”61
Agricultural antibiotics’ cultural association with carcinogenic chemicals 
became especially damaging when food safety concerns reached fever pitch 
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around 1960. In 1959, the so- called Delaney Clause of the 1958 Food Additives 
Amendment (chapter 4) forced the FDA to take action against millions of 
pounds of cranberries produced with the herbicide and suspected carcinogen 
aminotriazole ahead of Thanksgiving, the most impor tant date in cranberry 
growers’ year.62 Hitting the US cranberry industry hard, the scandal heightened 
popu lar fears that farmers  were abusing dangerous chemicals— including anti-
biotics. Concerns  were reinforced by the FDA’s nearly simultaneous disclo-
sure that 3   percent of analyzed US milk samples contained “substantial 
residues”63 of pesticides and that 3.7  percent contained penicillin residues.64 
With residue fears damaging the US cranberry and dairy industries, wary con-
sumers also started abandoning new antibiotic preservatives amidst complaints 
about the dubious quality of preserved produce. In reaction, some companies 
began to advertise “non- acronized” chickens.65
A series of bestselling exposés fanned the flames of public distrust of agri-
cultural antibiotic use. In 1960, journalist and  future Pulitzer Prize winner 
William Longgood published The Poisons in Your Food. Longgood’s introduc-
tion invited consumers to inspect their shopping baskets: “Then  there’s the milk 
you give the  children . . . .  But did you know the odds are . . .  one to ten it con-
tains antibiotics? . . .  Sunday’s chicken may have traces of antibiotics, arsenic and 
artificial sex hormones . . . .  The roasts or steaks prob ably have traces of hor-
mones, antibiotics and the inevitable poisons that went into the  cattle’s diet.”66 
Similar to Tomorrow’s Food, Longgood accused congressionally mandated resi-
due tolerances of legalizing “mass poisoning . . .  by granting FDA the right to 
determine how much poison residue may remain on marketed food.”67 For 
Longgood, agricultural antibiotics  were no longer miracle substances but sin-
ister contaminants. Contrary to official assurances, cooking did not destroy 
antibiotic preservatives, and the 1956 milk scandal had shown “how precari-
ous the public’s margin of safety is when a dangerous drug is placed in the hands 
of laymen . . .  who are expected to exercise their sense of responsibility at the 
risk of losing money.”68 Linking them to rising allergic reactions, Longgood 
also claimed that antibiotic residues acted as “vitamin antagonists” and masked 
disease in slaughtered animals.69
Longgood’s book provoked angry reactions. In Science, William J. Darby, 
an influential nutritionist from Vanderbilt University, attacked The Poisons in 
Your Food as “an all- time high in ‘bloodthirsty pen- pushing’ ” from the “bias 
of the non- scientific, natu ral food- organic cult.”70 Longgood’s “authorities” 
 were “the cult leaders . . .  or a few true scientists whose work or expressions have 
been taken  either out of context or out of time.”71 Dispensing with a bibliog-
raphy, some of Longgood’s claims  were indeed sketchy. However, the fact that 
his book managed to elicit a review in Science showed that the days of  wholesale 
chemical optimism  were over. In popu lar culture, the promised chemical cor-
nucopia of the 1950s was acquiring the  bitter aftertaste of invisible residues.
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Longgood was not the only one to fan concerns about chemicals and antibiot-
ics in food and the environment. Authors associated with the US organic move-
ment  were equally active. Based in Pennsylvania, publicist Jerome Irving (J. I.) 
Rodale was a long- standing critic of conventional agriculture (chapter 3). For 
much of the 1950s, Rodale’s advocacy of organic food production, healthy nutri-
tion, and self- improvement had, however, only attracted a fringe readership.72 This 
changed during the 1960s. Between 1961 and the end of the de cade, readership of 
Organic Gardening and Farming nearly doubled from 270,000 to over 500,000 
while readership of the consumer- oriented Prevention reached about 725,000.73 
During this time, antibiotics played an increasingly prominent role in Rodale’s 
criticism of conventional nonorganic agriculture. In 1961, Rodale’s The Complete 
Book of Food and Nutrition summarized several years of Prevention’s dietary 
advice. The book echoed Longgood by warning about antibiotic- contaminated 
milk but also referred to agricultural AMR se lection, spreading allergies, the 
dangers of antibiotic food preservation, and alleged links between penicillin resi-
dues and blood clots. According to Rodale’s increasingly influential publishing 
empire, healthy animal produce only came from “antibiotic  free” organic farms.74
A further reputational blow for agricultural chemicals’ image fell in 1962 
when  Silent Spring, the iconic bestseller by marine biologist Rachel Carson, 
launched a frontal attack on chemical polluters and on DDT in par tic u lar. Sim-
ilar to antibiotics, the insecticide DDT was initially regarded as a success story 
of war time science and postwar commercialization.75 DDT’s similarity to anti-
biotics did not end  here: it quickly became clear that DDT use could select for 
re sis tance in insect populations and result in residues, which accumulated in 
animal tissues. DDT concentrations  were especially high  toward the top of the 
food chain. In the case of Amer i ca’s heraldic animal, the bald ea gle, DDT 
resulted in thinner eggshells, which  were unable to support the weight of brood-
ing parents. Significantly, Carson also accused DDT and other chemicals of 
causing cancer. Of  Silent Spring’s seventeen chapters, five  were devoted to pes-
ticides’ and herbicides’ carcinogenicity.76 Profiting from  earlier bestsellers like 
The Poisons in Your Food and anarchist Murray Bookchin’s contemporaneous 
Our Synthetic Environment,77  Silent Spring’s fusion of environmental and 
health concerns led to heated American debates about regulation of private, 
official, and agricultural chemical use.78 In December 1962, the Washington Post 
claimed that  Silent Spring had turned chemical use into “the most controver-
sial non- political subject in American agriculture.”79 Resulting debates about 
DDT and per sis tent pesticides also affected the cultural framing of chemically 
unrelated substances. Although Carson did not discuss them in her book, 
American public debates about agricultural antibiotics would for a long time 
be framed according to the residue- focused language of  Silent Spring.
Growing consumer concerns about invisible chemical and antibiotic residues 
in US food  were paralleled by a series of phar ma ceu ti cal corruption scandals 
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and safety scares, which resulted in a loss of public confidence in the integrity 
of American drug manufacturers and their regulators. The 1950s had been a 
golden era for the US phar ma ceu ti cal sector. Venerated as “merchants of life,”80 
companies’ value had more than qua dru pled to $2,200,000,000 between 1945 
and 1958.81 However, companies’ be hav ior had on occasion also been question-
able. Between 1959 and 1962, investigations by the Senate’s Antitrust and 
Mono poly Subcommittee shed a harsh light on dubious mark-up prices, mar-
keting practices, and attempts to drive generic drug producers out of business. 
The most damaging findings came to light in May 1960, when Demo cratic sen-
ator Carey Estes Kefauver’s subcommittee announced that it was investigat-
ing extra income received by the head of the FDA’s Antibiotics Division, Henry 
Welch. Between 1953 and 1960, Welch had received $287,142 for his role as 
editor- in- chief of the journals Antibiotics and Chemotherapy and Antibiotic 
Medicine and Clinical Therapy. Financed by industry, the widely distributed 
journals contained articles designed to advertise antibiotic products— 
sometimes prior to their licensing by Welch’s division.82 Industry representa-
tives had even edited some of Welch’s official speeches—in one case, a Pfizer 
slogan had been written into a speech to “jazz it up.”83 A defiant Welch was 
forced to resign from the FDA in mid- May 1960.84
Although Secretary of Health Arthur Flemming ordered a review of all of 
Welch’s licensing decisions,85 the 1961 thalidomide scandal added to public con-
cerns about FDA and industry standards. In 1957, the West German com pany 
Chemie Grünenthal had launched a new substance called thalidomide as a sed-
ative and soporific suitable for pregnant  women. Despite evidence linking 
thalidomide to neural damage and fetal malformation, Grünenthal continued 
to market thalidomide  until November 1961. By then, fetal exposure to the 
teratogen was believed to have caused an estimated 10,000 malformations and 
several hundred deaths.86 Fortunately, thalidomide had not been licensed for 
US markets. Despite repeated requests, FDA reviewer Frances Oldham Kelsey 
had deemed industry data insufficient. Kelsey’s heroic story, however, also high-
lighted how lucky Americans had been. With no requirements for manufac-
turers to submit clinical  trials or report adverse effects, Kelsey’s doubts had been 
the only  thing standing between thalidomide and the US market.87 Reacting 
to the thalidomide scandal and Kefauver hearings in 1962, President Kennedy 
awarded Kelsey the President’s Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Ser-
vice88 and signed the so- called Kefauver- Harris Amendment. The 1962 amend-
ment mandated prelicensing efficacy tests of new drugs via controlled clinical 
 trials and required manufacturers to report adverse effects from 1963 onward.89
However, the reputational damage had been done. Not only had con-
temporary food, chemical, and phar ma ceu ti cal scandals revealed gaps in 
consumer protection, they had also tainted post- war narratives of agricultural 
and chemical pro gress. During the 1960s, this reputational shift led to a 
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curious divide in US reporting on agricultural antibiotics. On the one hand, 
fears of global overpopulation and communism continued to engender cross- 
party and cross- regional support for antibiotic- fueled plenty. On the other 
hand, programs of defending democracy with agricultural chemicals now had 
to be justified against a growing list of environmental and health warnings. 
Even optimistic reports on chemicals’ ability to tame nature now demanded 
that farmers contain “synthetic” substances so as not to adulterate “natu ral” 
food and bodies. In 1963, Scientific American claimed that underdeveloped 
countries still depended on Western food imports produced with the help of 
“finely calculated diets and rations, synthetic hormones, . . .  drugs and vac-
cines to control disease.”90 However, the magazine was now also forced to 
assuage consumer concerns by using the classic argument that harmless sub-
stances did not exist: “ there are only harmless ways of using them.”91
A defensive line of reasoning also began to characterize industry rhe toric. 
In 1961, the US Manufacturing Chemists’ Association published a booklet enti-
tled Food Additives: What They Are, How They Are Used. The booklet was 
designed to help physicians and nutritionists inform consumers about the ben-
efits of the ongoing “food revolution” and the role of chemical additives as “an 
impor tant ‘tool’ of food science.”92 However, this revolution was in danger. 
Although Americans  were “better fed and in better health than at any time in 
history,” “unpre ce dented population growth”93 threatened food security. Fur-
ther chemical use was key if Americans wanted to preserve a “plentiful, varied, 
nutritious, safe, eco nom ical and good- tasting”94 food supply. Attacking irra-
tional faddists and organic gardeners and employing Cold War rhe toric,95 the 
booklet praised “natu ral” antibiotic preservatives without which it would be 
impossible to feed the crews of “our atomic submarines” which “can cruise for 
months in a hostile environment without surfacing even once.”96
It is hard to judge just how seriously the average US consumer took indus-
try advice or residue warnings. On the one hand, a keyword analy sis of popu-
lar cookery books does not reveal a marked rise of chemical concerns.97 Specialist 
publications like the Princi ples of Nutrition (1959) included positive discussions 
of antibiotic growth promotion, and 1960s regional reporters continued to 
exhort readers to “give thanks to science for all that lush meat” produced by 
“pampered”98 animals. On the other hand, the flood of new US publications 
 either attacking or defending agricultural chemicals is indicative of a wider shift 
in public discourse, which also affected antibiotics. Once enjoying near uni-
versal support, agricultural antibiotics’ had become culturally tarnished via 
association with other suspicious chemicals. This association had significant 
implications for the public staging of antibiotic risk. With both the media and 
whistle- blowing bestsellers focusing on antibiotic residues in food and milk, 
other aspects of antibiotic risk like agricultural AMR se lection  were consis-
tently overshadowed.
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Re sis tance
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,  there was a surprising dearth of American 
public debates about AMR se lection on farms. This was not  because of lack-
ing knowledge. Although many AMR mechanisms  were still unknown, experts 
 were well aware of the general phenomenon. During the 1930s, physicians had 
already noted that certain bacteria developed re sis tance against sulfonamides.99 
In 1940— one year ahead of penicillin’s first clinical trial— Oxford research-
ers described penicillin- resistant staphylococci.100 Echoing  earlier warnings by 
gramicidin discoverer René Dubos,101 penicillin discoverer Alexander Fleming 
used his 1945 Nobel Prize lecture to warn about antibiotic overuse and AMR.102 
However, prior to the discovery of  bacteria’s ability to exchange genes conferring 
AMR (R- factors) via horizontal gene transfer (chapter 1), most experts remained 
confident that AMR could be contained by avoiding “irrational” antibiotic use, 
employing drug combinations, and improving infection control. If all of  these 
mea sures failed, the development of new antibiotics would eventually solve 
prob lems.103
During the 1950s, American experts and media outlets thus responded to 
rising AMR with campaigns for “rational” antibiotic use. Although most com-
mentators saw “no reason to think antibiotics are on the way out,”104 papers 
like the Madera Daily News and San Bernardino Sun warned that one could 
“develop a sort of tolerance”105 to penicillin and that “Your Neighbors’ Won-
der Drugs Can Make You Sick; Careless Use Builds Up Resistant Germs.”106 
Mid-1950s hospital outbreaks involving resistant pathogens like Staphylococcus 
80/81 added urgency to “rational” antibiotic use campaigns.107 In 1958, Surgeon 
General Leroy Burney categorized antibiotic resistant staphylococci as a “prob-
lem of national significance.”108 Described by historian Scott Podolsky, US 
infectious disease experts like Maxwell Finland from Boston City Hospital 
used the opportunity to attack sales of popu lar but inefficacious fixed dose com-
binations of multiple antibiotics as well as American physicians’ accommoda-
tiveness to phar ma ceu ti cal marketing.109 In 1959, Finland warned: “physicians 
who are overconfident of germ- killing won der drugs are living in a fool’s para-
dise where their patients may die.”110 While American medical prac ti tion ers 
ultimately escaped calls for greater statutory oversight, AMR concerns  were one 
of the reasons  behind the US government’s decision to move against ineffica-
cious products with the 1962 Kefauver- Harris Amendment (chapter 4).111
Curiously, widespread concern about AMR se lection in medical settings did 
not translate into alarm about similar pro cesses on the farm or in the environ-
ment. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, most American commentators treated 
AMR in the hospital as distinct from AMR on the farm. With the exception 
of a 1952 reader’s letter to the Washington Post,112 none of the analyzed US media 
sources addressed the fact that resistant organisms could emerge in animals and 
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spread to  humans or spread from  humans to animals.113 The closest an article 
came to addressing agricultural AMR se lection was in the Madera Daily 
Tribune in 1962. Titled “Mass Murders Have Changed Bacteria,”114 the article 
cited research by bacteriologist George Eastman according to which large- scale 
antibiotic use had allowed resistant salmonella to “overgrow”115 sensitive species 
but failed to mention instances of antibiotic use beyond  human medicine. The 
epistemic divide between  human and nonhuman antibiotic use and microbiota 
also characterized whistle- blowing bestsellers. Although William Longgood 
and Lewis Herber warned about AMR se lection in  humans as a result of resi-
dues in food and milk, they did not connect their residue- oriented criticism of 
agricultural antibiotics with AMR se lection in the environment or with con-
temporary campaigns for “rational” antibiotic use.116
It was only in 1966 that the curious epistemic divide of reporting on medical 
and agricultural AMR began to be challenged. Following reports by Scientific 
American,117 the prestigious New  England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) warned 
about the dangers of horizontal AMR proliferation on August 4, 1966. Instead of 
merely passing on re sis tance to subsequent generations, bacteria could exchange 
AMR blueprints— R  factors— horizontally across species borders (chapter 1). 
Horizontal gene transfer meant that locally emerging re sis tance could spread rap-
idly throughout the regional and global environment. Ecological proliferation 
scenarios also implied that AMR se lection on farms could be just as dangerous as 
AMR se lection in hospitals. Referring to R- factor transfer as “infectious drug 
re sis tance,” NEJM ’s editorial blamed the “precipitous rise in frequency of 
R  factors” on the “increasing use of antibiotics not only in clinical practice but also 
in the care and feeding of livestock.”118 Relying strongly on British research 
(chapter 5) and invoking what would become a standard apocalyptic genre of 
AMR warnings, NEJM specifically accused low- dosed antibiotic growth pro-
moters (AGPs) of “providing a constant se lection pressure on R  factors that can 
readily be transferred to man”— “ unless drastic mea sures are taken very soon, 
physicians may find themselves back in the preantibiotic  Middle Ages.”119
Early American media reactions to the NEJM editorial  were surprisingly 
muted. Eight days  after the editorial was published, the New York Times intui-
tively compared the potential implications of horizontal AMR warnings to the 
impact of Carson’s  Silent Spring: “the available evidence suggests that the devel-
opment of such hardy microbes is greatly facilitated by the widespread feeding 
of antibiotics . . . .  Put bluntly,  people may be paying for cheaper and better meat 
by suffering more and graver infectious diseases.”120 However, this harsh attack 
on antibiotic feeds remained exceptional. Most other US newspapers initially 
greeted NEJM ’s warnings with silence. The silence was in part due to the pend-
ing release of an FDA report on veterinary medical and nonmedical uses of 
antibiotics. Published three weeks  after the NEJM editorial, the report acknowl-
edged that antibiotics  were being misused but  limited AMR warnings to the 
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presence of residues in food. Calling for an end to antibiotic food preservation, 
stricter punishment of residue offenders, and more research on antibiotics’ 
ecological effects, the FDA report effectively refocused public attention on 
residue rather than AMR  hazards (chapter 4).121
Most media outlets followed the FDA by  either downplaying or linking con-
cerns about agricultural AMR se lection to already familiar residue- focused 
risk scenarios. Time magazine described the “contagious cuddling” between 
bacteria but relativized NEJM ’s warnings of pre- antibiotic  Middle Ages: some 
experts  were “calmly argu[ing] that laboratories are producing new antibiotics 
too fast for germs to catch up.”122 Drawing an analogy to Upton Sinclair’s best-
seller, the Washington Post criticized the FDA for having allowed an “antibi-
otic jungle”123 to spread with regards to food preservation but failed to focus 
on AMR. Further articles in the New York Times also rehashed analogies 
between antibiotics,  Silent Spring, and residue scandals.124 Equating the absence 
of residues with a reduction of AMR, a reader of the Washington Post encour-
aged farmers to capitalize on consumer insecurities: “ There are quite a few of 
us who go out of our way to buy such pure foods . . .  —at a price.”125
The 1960s  were thus a confusing time for the American public: their sense 
of risk heightened by the Kefauver hearings,  Silent Spring, and residue scan-
dals, US citizens remained exposed to an unattenuated stream of optimistic 
reports about agricultural plenty and the necessity of curbing threats like 
overpopulation- induced hunger and communism. Newspaper subscribers could 
read about chemical dangers in one issue only to encounter praise for “push-
button farming”126 and “coddled swine” getting “plenty of food, shots, pills 
[and] antibiotics”127 in the next. In terms of agricultural antibiotics, pervasive 
fears of invisible poisoning made consumer activists and the media prioritize 
risk scenarios focusing on residues and contaminated food. Although reports 
on allergic reactions gradually linked debates about penicillin exposure in med-
ical and agricultural settings, more abstract fears of AMR remained focused 
on medicine. This epistemic fragmentation between AMR se lection in  human 
and nonhuman settings would have a lasting influence on the US antibiotic 
risk episteme. Commentators only gradually connected the two spheres of agri-
cultural and medical AMR se lection following NEJM ’s popularization of 
British research on horizontal re sis tance proliferation. However, as reactions 
to the 1966 FDA report show, the dominance of residue- focused risk scenarios 
subordinated concerns about agricultural AMR se lection to fears of invisible 
antibiotic residues. As a consequence, public opposition to agricultural antibi-
otic use remained fragmented and un co or di nated. Frustrated by US consumers’ 
seeming complacency about food- related dangers in 1964, Washington Post 
journalist Sue Cronk noted: “the biggest worry the American  house wife has 
when she shops for meat is likely to be how much it  will cost— not  whether it 




Antibiotics on the Farm
This chapter reconstructs antibiotics’ adoption and ensuing conflicts in the US 
agricultural sphere.  After 1945, antibiotics  were rapidly integrated into all areas 
of US food production. This rapid introduction was facilitated by growing pres-
sure to expand and intensify agricultural production and by a sophisticated 
sales network connecting phar ma ceu ti cal producers with farms. By the early 
1960s, antibiotics had acquired infrastructural importance in many production 
sectors. Although US farmers shared public antibiotic optimism, they soon 
expressed concern about the negative effects of chemical- driven intensification 
on smaller producers. However, all- out rejection of agricultural chemicals 
remained  limited to organic farmers. While conventional farmers attempted 
to curb antibiotic residues in sensitive products like milk, growing public con-
cerns about chemicals instead provoked angry outbursts against “irrational” 
faddists. Similar to the US public sphere, AMR  hazards  were rarely discussed. 
Despite warnings by veterinary bacteriologists, most agricultural commenta-
tors did not discuss potential public health implications of AMR se lection on 
farms.
The Origins of Agricultural Antibiotic Use
US agriculture’s rapid adoption of antibiotics was no coincidence. Beginning 
in the interwar period, the Taylorian logic of Henry Ford’s factories gradually 
spread throughout the countryside. A new generation of agricultural experts, 
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officials, and producers wanted to apply the princi ples of quantification and 
mechanization to US farms. Already farming larger acreages and producing 
more animals than Eu ro pe ans, US farmers further expanded and also began 
to rationalize production. Interwar farms employed accounting techniques 
alongside new technologies like tractors, hybrid seeds, and pesticides.1 Farm-
ers also invested in more intensive ways of producing livestock. Conceptual-
izing animals as machine- like feed converters, farmers began to purchase 
premixed fortified rations from specialist producers like the Commercial 
Solvents Corporation or Pfizer. While farmers’ motivation was to produce 
more meat with less feed, manufacturers saw farms as lucrative outlets for 
industrial surplus and by- products. Connecting farmers with phar ma ceu ti cal 
manufacturers was an increasingly sophisticated network of veterinarians, 
local feed- mixers, and government extension officials.2
Rising output soon exceeded demand. Attempting to maintain incomes 
despite sinking commodity prices, US farmers increased their production by 
13  percent between 1917 and 1929. Unsurprisingly, prices continued to sink. By 
the end of the 1920s, it cost more to produce many commodities than farmers 
earned from selling them. Unable to ser vice their debts, many farmers suffered 
bankruptcy, and the US farm population declined from 32.5 million in prewar 
years to 30 million in 1930. Only very efficient or large farming operations 
remained profitable due to lower production costs. When commodity prices 
declined by another 37  percent during the  Great Depression, even the most effi-
cient producers strug gled to survive.3
Reacting to farmers’ plight, the Roo se velt administration launched a com-
prehensive program of agricultural aid. Passed in May 1933, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) was designed to reduce surpluses, stabilize prices, and 
enhance farmers’ purchasing power. The AAA allowed the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to administer adjustment payments to 
farmers, who in turn agreed to reduce production of surplus commodities. 
Together with compensated slaughter programs and other initiatives, the AAA 
was supposed to restore the relative purchasing power—parity—of agricultural 
goods to prewar levels. However, in attempting to alleviate the  Great Depres-
sion’s impact, New Deal mea sures increased agricultural intensification pres-
sure and subsidy dependence: by 1941, one- third of US gross farm income was 
derived from direct or indirect federal payments.4 Paying producers to slaugh-
ter animals and take land out of production also incentivized them to produce 
more with remaining assets— thereby putting larger farmers at an advantage. 
As a consequence, the farms that survived the  Great Depression  were cultur-
ally and eco nom ically geared to strive for factory- like efficiency, scale, and 
technological sophistication.5
When commodity prices recovered, production boomed. Reacting to 
Amer i ca’s entry into the Second World War, Congress passed the 1942 Emergency 
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Price Control Act and the Steagall Amendment. Legislators guaranteed com-
modity prices at around full parity for the duration of hostilities and for two 
years afterward to incentivize farmers to maximize production and invest in 
productivity increases. Ensuing transformations  were particularly dramatic in 
the livestock sector: whereas New Dealers had ordered the compensated slaugh-
ter of about 6 million hogs in 1934, the new price guarantees encouraged farm 
investment and a significant rise in production.6
Parallel war- induced grain, protein, and  labor shortages, however, soon 
threatened rising outputs. US researchers  were hastily commissioned to find 
solutions. Described by historian Mark Finlay, one of  these researchers was 
Damon Catron. At Purdue University’s Work Simplification Laboratory, 
Catron launched a systematic attempt to overcome shortages in the pig sector 
with efficiency increases. Farrowed in spring, animals  were fattened on pastures 
during summer and autumn, and mass slaughtered ahead of winter. The result-
ing pork glut often overwhelmed pro cessing facilities and depressed prices. By 
contrast, Catron’s vision for production resembled an integrated car assembly 
plant that divided a pig’s life into distinct stages: breeding, farrowing, wean-
ing, rebreeding, and finishing. Removed from pastures, animals  were to be 
“assembled” all- year- round in optimized indoor environments and fed tailored 
rations prior to their final disassembly in an abattoir.7
This Fordist vision of animal production faced significant challenges. While 
intensification was already underway in poultry farming, the overwhelming 
majority of US pigs  were still held in outdoor or mixed indoor- outdoor systems. 
Most US  cattle  were kept on pastures.8 Convincing  these producers to aban-
don their low- cost systems and invest in confined intensive production proved 
challenging. Disease posed another obstacle. On both sides of the Atlantic, pre-
vious attempts to increase animal densities in more confined systems had been 
stunted by a corresponding growth of disease pressure: infections had wiped 
out herds or diminished productivity.9 It was  here that the advent of antibio-
tics had a significant impact.
During the late 1930s, producers had already used organoarsenics, inorganic 
sulfur compounds, sulfonamides, and biological antibiotics like gramicidin to 
treat individual animals (e.g., mastitis in cows) or larger groups of animals. 
However, drug prices  were high, and incorrect dosages could poison animals. 
This situation began to change during the 1940s. The American poultry indus-
try was a leader of this change. In 1939, Cornell veterinarian P. Philip Levine 
reported that the only recently marketed sulfanilamide had shown efficacy 
against coccidiosis— a protozoal infection of the intestine. Researchers soon 
reported the successful use of other sulfonamides like sulfamethazine, sulfa-
diazine, and sulfaguanidine to both treat and prevent coccidiosis in poultry and 
foulbrood in bees. Developed with the support of phar ma ceu ti cal companies, 
safe sulfonamide ratios in  water and feed soon enabled the mass medi cation of 
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entire flocks and  were also used against other diseases like fowl typhoid (Sal-
monella gallinarum) and Pullorum disease (Salmonella pullorum).10 What had 
once been devastating herd and flock diseases seemed increasingly controllable.
With the end of the war easing military demand, veterinary antibiotic treat-
ments became cheaper and more widely available. Described by Susan Jones, 
ads for Lederle’s sulfathiazole began to appear in poultry magazines by 1946. 
In the same year, Merck patented sulfaquinoxaline. Originally developed as an 
antimalarial but licensed against coccidiosis in 1948, sulfaquinoxaline became 
the first antibiotic product officially approved for inclusion in animal feeds and 
proved extremely lucrative. Poultry farmers could now medicate entire flocks 
with only minimal (and often without) veterinary supervision.11
While sulfonamides paved the way for routine therapeutic antibiotic use, it 
was the nonspecific application of antibiotics that would transform agro- 
pharmaceutical relations.  There was already a lucrative market for animal feed 
supplements in the United States (chapter 2).12 However, researchers contin-
ued to puzzle over why certain feeds supported animal growth and  others did 
not. The animal protein  factor (APF— also known as anti– pernicious anemia 
 factor) was at the center of this puzzle. Nutritionists had long known that feeds 
enriched with fishmeal, cow and chicken manure, or fermentation wastes  were 
more effective at promoting growth than feeds containing cheap vegetable pro-
tein alone. Meanwhile, expensive liver extracts and cod oil had been found to 
be both effective against pernicious anemia in  humans and to promote animal 
growth.13 With animal protein imports from Japan and Norway interrupted 
during the Second World War, researchers redoubled efforts to isolate and find 
alternative APF sources.14
The APF hunt led to unexpected results: in 1946, a University of Wiscon-
sin team including Peter Moore and the colorful Thomas Donnell ( later Sir 
Samurai) Luckey reported that a combination of sulfasuxidine and streptomy-
cin increased the growth of chicks when fed alongside folic acid.15 The Wis-
consin researchers had been studying the role of B- vitamins for animal growth 
by using antibiotics to “knock out” parts of the digestive system. They had 
expected streptomycin to sterilize the gut and create a growth- retarding vita-
min deficiency. To their surprise, the opposite had happened. However, the 
Wisconsin team and other academic groups researching the feeding of waste 
products like mycellium from penicillin production failed to realize the practical 
and commercial implications of their observations.16
This changed three years  later. In 1948, research by the University of Mary-
land and Merck as well as by Glaxo in the United Kingdom led to the isola-
tion of vitamin B12 and its identification as the mysterious APF. In a lucrative 
spinoff, Merck not only discovered that Streptomyces griseus (the organism pro-
ducing streptomycin) produced B12 but that industrial fermentation wastes 
accruing  after streptomycin extraction still contained large amounts of the 
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vitamin. Far cheaper than other animal protein sources, fermentation wastes 
of biological antibiotics could be fed directly to animals as APF growth pro-
moters.  There was a particularly large market for B12/APF supplements in the 
Midwest where animal husbandry and the production of cheap vegetable pro-
tein in the form of hybrid corn and soybeans  were expanding rapidly.17
APF feeds also excited other companies. Working at Lederle Laboratories’ 
Pearl River station, Thomas Jukes and Robert Stokstad investigated  whether 
vitamin B12 produced by Lederle’s Streptomyces aureofaciens (the organism pro-
ducing chlortetracycline) could be commercialized too. Both Jukes and Stoks-
tad  were experienced B- vitamin researchers: trained as a biochemist, the group’s 
leader, Jukes, had previously studied relationships between B- complex vitamins 
and their effects on deficiency diseases and animal growth. During the 1930s, 
he had identified pantothenic acid and choline as growth  factors in chickens 
and turkeys. Stokstad was a trained animal nutritionist whose research would 
lead to the isolation of vitamin K and who had previously isolated and purified 
folic acid.18 Over Christmas 1948, Jukes and Stokstad fed chicks a deficiency 
diet consisting of 75  percent soybean meal and supplemented it with sterilized 
S. aureofaciens. To their surprise, they found that chicks eating S. aureofaciens 
feeds grew quicker than  those eating feeds only supplemented with purified 
vitamin B12. Antibiotics seemed to be “promoting” animals’ growth.
In contrast to the Wisconsin team, their previous work and commercial set-
ting made Jukes and Stokstad keenly aware of their findings’ implications. To 
their dismay, they  were, however, denied access to further S. aureofaciens, which 
was needed for Lederle’s aureomycin production. For their feed experiments, 
they turned to alternative aureomycin sources like acetone cake— dried acetone 
solvent left over from purifying aureomycin fermentation liquid— and at one 
point dug out fermentation wastes from the Lederle dump. Befriended research-
ers who received unmarked feed samples soon began to confirm “growth pro-
motion” in other species and also reported combating bloody diarrhea (scours) 
in pigs.19 The reliability of  these early studies is debatable. Although this was 
not uncommon during the period, AGP  trials  were conducted on a small num-
ber of animals for short periods of time and did not produce sufficient data to 
determine statistical significance. Results  were also not reproducible in other 
countries and  later studies (chapter 6).20 Most contemporaries, however, trusted 
Lederle’s claims.
Triggering a commercial storm, Jukes and Stokstad publicly announced the 
“antibiotic growth effect” in 1950. Despite the  earlier Wisconsin report, it was 
the serendipitous combination of their observation, commercial focus, and 
access to fermentation wastes that gave birth to a new era of antibiotic mass 
consumption. The effects of this new era reverberated around the globe. While 
it is impor tant to note that US animal production would have continued to 
intensify without them, antibiotics’ alleged ability to boost metabolisms, 
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control disease, and reduce  labor previously devoted to caring for individ-
ual animals made many agricultural commentators soon consider them 
indispensable.21
Antibiotic Infrastructure
Eco nom ically, antibiotics’ mass introduction to US agriculture could not have 
come at a better time. Between 1940 and 1945, American farmers’ average per 
capita net income had increased from $706 to $2,063.22 Feeding the United 
States and large parts of postwar Eu rope and encouraged by the Korean War’s 
promise of stable prices, farmers paid off debts and invested in new technolo-
gies.23 Expensive animal protein supplements made them particularly well dis-
posed  toward new APF sources that would help turn cheap vegetable protein 
into lucrative animal products.24
Manufacturers  were happy to oblige and launched advertising campaigns for 
“APF growth  factors,” “AGP miracle additives,” and therapeutic applications in 
farming magazines.25 Using what Rima Apple has called “reason why” and “neg-
ative appeal”26 strategies to lure or scare farmers, early AGP commercials  were 
nearly identical to previous APF and sulfonamide commercials. However, it was 
often unclear what farmers  were actually buying. Discussed in more detail in 
chapter 4, Lederle’s decision to avoid FDA licensing by marketing AGPs as APF 
with an additional vaguely specified growth  factor meant that drug concentra-
tions varied. Without conducting assays for  either B12 or aureomycin, Lederle 
sold “tankcars of brine containing residues from [aureomycin] fermentation”27 
to feed merchants, who then repackaged the wastes. This procedure caused sig-
nificant confusion. The history of the first AGP advertisement in the popu lar 
Iowan magazine Wallaces Farmer is telling. Featuring a proud farmer holding a 
feisty piglet, a June 1950 Gooch Feeds advertisement reported “amazing results” 
achieved with the new “Aureomycin APF” “wonder- worker.”28 However, it soon 
emerged that Gooch Feeds’ “Genuine Lederle Aureomycin APF”29 was not 
always effective. Two weeks  after printing the ad, Wallaces Farmer warned 
readers: “crystalline aureomycin is not available at the pre sent time to  either 
the feed industry or the farmer.”30 According to a competing merchant: “no 
statement should be made . . .  concerning the presence of the antibiotic since 
it is naturally inherent in the ingredient.”31
The story of Gooch’s advertisement is indicative of the gold rush atmosphere 
surrounding AGPs. In 1985, co- discoverer Thomas Jukes remembered: “The 
demand was such that the available supply was prorated among customers. On 
one occasion, we had to deal with a complaint from Senator Wherry of  Nebraska 
that the supplies of APF  were all  going to Iowa rather than Nebraska . . . .  In 
Austin, Minnesota, a local pharmacist purchased Lederle APF in bulk, repack-
aged it, and sold it at an inflated price. Allegedly, he made so much money 
F IGURE 3.1 Gooch’s APF/AGP Feed, Wallaces Farmer, 1950.
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that he retired and went to live in Florida.”32 Other companies  were “right on 
[Lederle’s] heels,”33 and aureomycin was soon joined by a bewildering array of 
competing AGPs. For a while, it seemed as though farmers would buy any 
feed as long as it contained preferably large doses of antibiotics. While compa-
nies like Ful- O- Pep or Kraft advertised their own antibiotic supplements,34 
Allied Mills promised that its AGP would turn a “scrawny runt” into a “husky 
hog” in “just 81 days.”35 For farmers unwilling to trust only one antibiotic, a com-
pany called Occident advertised multimycin, an unspecified “combination of 
miracle antibiotics” offering “up to 18% greater gains than with single antibi-
otic feeds.”36 Trying to ward off competition, Lederle soon claimed that aureo-
mycin was “the only antibiotic that has been proved highly effective for swine, 
poultry, calves and several kinds of small animals”.37
US farmers trusted  these claims. Although  later surveys indicated that pro-
ducers’ reasons for purchasing them  were varied (chapter 9), antibiotic supple-
ments had become standard ingredients of broiler and turkey mashes by 
mid-1951.38 Calves and pigs also received large amounts of low- dosed antibio-
tics. One year  after the antibiotic growth effect was announced, 110,000 kilo-
grams of antibiotics— about 16   percent of total US antibiotic sales— were 
already being used for unspecified nontherapeutic purposes.39 However, chaos 
over what constituted effective growth promotion and what might be thera-
peutically relevant persisted even  after the FDA introduced AGP dosage 
requirements in 1951. Initially, officials recommended antibiotic dosages of up 
to 50 grams per ton of finished feed. However, industry- sponsored  trials soon 
made some farmers disregard guidelines in  favor of higher feed dosages, which 
could also be used to prevent and treat disease. Manufacturers also experi-
mented with higher- dosed penicillin, bacitracin, and chlortetracycline 
implants. On farms, the bound aries between growth promotion and treatment 
 were fast blurring. By the early 1960s, experts resignedly noted that “legally pre-
cise [dosage] bound aries are easier to establish but not always easier to maintain 
than biologically precise bound aries.”40
Reacting to exaggerated marketing claims and widespread confusion, agri-
cultural advisors rushed to provide farmers with expertise. In popu lar farm-
ing magazines, articles promoted “rational” and cost- effective antibiotic use. 
Most experts agreed that antibiotics would reveal their true potential only 
on hygienic and modern farms. Soon familiar messages included: farmers 
should “follow- through”41 with treatments; antibiotics  were no substitute 
for good management;42 using drugs to maintain outmoded husbandry sys-
tems would not pay off— “drugs  can’t whip old lots.”43
A similar promotion of “rational” antibiotic use took place in con temporary 
agricultural manuals for both therapeutic and nontherapeutic purposes. As late 
as 1944, US pig and  cattle manuals had stressed preventive health care but 
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recommended  little in the way of effective DIY therapeutics against microbial 
infection.44 However, by 1947, newer publications like the Eastern States Farmers 
Handbook featured therapeutic sulfonamide use.45 Following the announcement 
of the antibiotic growth effect, manuals soon reclassified antibiotics as a routine 
part of animal nutrition. In 1951, Interstate’s Livestock Feeding Manual contained 
guidance and exercises for pig farmers to calculate the right amount of “vitamin 
B12 or some antibiotic”46 for feeds. In the same year, the Midwest Farm Handbook 
contained an entire section devoted to B12 and AGPs. Penicillin, streptomycin, 
bacitracin, aureomycin, and terramycin  were praised for boosting growth and 
controlling diseases like scours. Reflecting the drugs’ popularity, readers  were 
explic itly cautioned that “a deficiency symptom does not develop by omitting 
antibiotics.”47 The next few years saw a further proliferation of handbooks giving 
advice on when, how much, and how long to administer antibiotics.48 In 1952, 
Hog Profits for Farmers listed “antibiotic and B12 supplements”49 among its seven 
essentials of a complete pig ration. The drugs would also act as an “insurance”50 
against runts and many other prob lems. Government advisors joined the chorus 
with USDA and Farm Credit Administration publications praising AGPs and 
feeding antibiotics alongside cheap cottonseed rations.51
Although the bound aries between antibiotic growth promotion and treat-
ment  were always fluid, falling prices also triggered a boom of explic itly thera-
peutic applications. In pig husbandry, the postwar period saw antibiotics being 
used against atrophic rhinitis, suspected paratyphoid, edema, and respiratory 
diseases.52 In feedlots, beef  cattle  were given penicillin against bacterial foot-
rot. Antibiotics  were also used to aid artificial insemination and against infec-
tions of cows’ udders (bovine mastitis).53 Caused by several bacteria species and 
spread via hands and inadequately sterilized milking equipment, bovine mas-
titis is painful, occasionally fatal, reduces productivity, and can taint the fla-
vor of milk. Drinking tainted milk can also cause septic sore throat and food 
poisoning in  humans.54 In 1955, Farmers Weekly Review from Illinois estimated 
that preventable US mastitis losses amounted to $225 million.55 Given its bacte-
rial  causes, antibiotic mastitis treatments proved popu lar. In the 1940s, articles 
advised US farmers to “lick mastitis”56 with sulfonamide, penicillin- sulfonamide, 
or streptomycin infusions. In 1949, American Cyanamid began marketing col-
lapsible broadspectrum antibiotic tubes for intermammary mastitis control. 
“Ready- to- use- one- treatment tube[s]” could be purchased without a veterinary 
prescription and  were soon regularly advertised in US farming magazines.57 By 
1953, a USDA survey reported that American farmers had access to a wide variety 
of antibiotic treatments containing sulfonamides, nitrofurazone, tyrothricin, 
penicillin, streptomycin, aureomycin, terramycin, neomycin, bacitracin, poly-
myxin, and chloromycetin: “combinations of the vari ous antibiotics and sulfon-
amides are being widely used.”58
F IGURE 3.2 Boundaries between AGPs and therapeutics soon blurred. Pfizer advertisement, 
Farm Journal and Country Gentleman, 1956.
F IGURE 3.3  Cyanamid advertisement, Wallaces Farmer, 1949.
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Antibiotic mastitis treatments proved so popu lar that dairies and creamer-
ies  were complaining about drug residues in raw milk as early as 1948.59 Accord-
ing to Wallaces Farmer, “antibiotics not only kill mastitis germs, but also kill 
bacteria which ferment milk.”60 In April 1951, the “cheese state” Wisconsin 
ruled that mastitis ointments carry labels on drug withdrawal times. In addi-
tion to public concerns about allergies and invisible poisoning (chapter 2), agri-
cultural commentators warned that excessive antibiotic use would select for 
resistant pathogens in udders and that residues might select for AMR when 
ingested by  humans.61 However, such warnings could not dampen antibiotic 
enthusiasm. By 1956, US farmers annually used 75 tons of antibiotics against 
mastitis.62 Faced with widespread residue prob lems, Ohio State University 
researchers began to experiment with antibiotic- resistant lactic acid starter cul-
tures to produce cheese from residue- laden milk.63 Meanwhile, Canadian 
studies revealed that Staphylococci and Streptococci isolated from cheese  were 
becoming increasingly resistant against penicillin and dihydro- streptomycin— 
both popu lar mastitis treatments.64
Interestingly, US veterinarians had  little control over the rapid proliferation 
of agricultural antibiotic use. Veterinary researchers’ success in developing effec-
tive antibiotic treatments “unwittingly created difficulties for their brethren 
practicing in the field.”65 Unlike  human medicine, where antibiotics  were pre-
scription only drugs from 1951 onward, labeled drugs like penicillin could be 
sold to farmers without a prescription (chapter 4). As a consequence, phar ma-
ceu ti cal companies increasingly bypassed veterinarians by selling and advertis-
ing easy- to- use antibiotic products directly to farmers. This strategy was not 
uncontroversial. Thomas Jukes  later remembered that the decision to sell pure 
aureomycin to farmers was “strongly opposed by the veterinarians at Lederle”66 
but was supported by Lederle president Wilbur  G. Malcolm. Subsequent 
attempts by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) to con-
vince officials to restrict antibiotic access via prescription requirements simi-
larly failed.67 As a consequence, postwar veterinarians soon found themselves 
competing for farmers’ custom against phar ma ceu ti cal salesmen, feed merchants, 
and a new group of experts specializing in mass animal health management. 
Many veterinarians reacted by leaving the livestock sector.  Others expanded 
their traditional purview to include preventive ser vices against subclinical dis-
eases and for animal productivity.68
While US veterinarians had reason to feel ambivalent, agricultural scien-
tists, farming magazine commentators, and American officials all endorsed 
broadening antibiotic access and use. In 1951, Damon Catron conceded: “we 
 don’t know why antibiotics do what the experiments indicate. But we do know 
that they prevent scours, increase rate of gains and reduce feed requirements.”69 
 There was also pride in antibiotics as part of a new American- led push for agri-
cultural efficiency and nutritional plenty. According to Wallaces Farmer, AGPs 
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and new production systems enabled poultry farmers to devote only “ten sec-
onds per bird per day” and raise “flock profits by 110 per cent.“70 In Illinois, 
Farmers Weekly Review reported on awestruck British visitors’ reactions to Pfiz-
er’s “Miracle Drug Pigs,”71 new breeds of “antibiotic- age chicks,”72 and  trials of 
antibiotic- doused earth to boost crop production.73 In Pennsylvania, Lancaster 
Farming informed readers on antibiotic tree sprays and using antibiotic- doused 
bees to combat fire blight.74 Major companies like Merck, Cyanamid, and Pfizer 
did their best to promote this enthusiasm by regularly publishing glossy bro-
chures,  free manuals, and annotated biblio graphies on antibiotics’ many 
benefits.75
Antibiotics’ popularity is best expressed in numbers: around 1955, the USDA 
estimated that 50  percent of American formula feeds for poultry, hogs, and 
 cattle contained antibiotics and vitamin B12. Ninety- three  percent of poultry 
feed manufacturers, 60  percent of hog feed manufacturers, 22  percent of dairy 
feed (mostly calf feed) manufacturers, and 4  percent of beef  cattle feed manu-
facturers added antibiotics to their products. Drug concentrations ranged from 
an average of 16.5 grams and 27 grams (mostly broadspectrum antibiotics) per 
ton in pig and calf feeds to 2.7 to 3.5 grams (mostly penicillin) per ton in poul-
try feeds.76 Having focused on large businesses, surveyors believed that antibi-
otic use was even more common at the local small business level. Between 1951 
and 1960, US sales of nontherapeutic antibiotic applications grew seven- fold 
from about 110,000 to 770,000 tons. Although total US antibiotic production 
grew significantly, the proportion of total production sold for nontherapeutic 
purposes expanded from 16  percent to 36  percent.77 Resulting profits encour-
aged manufacturers to professionalize with many larger feed producers invest-
ing in new research facilities.78 By 1962, it was estimated that an astounding 
99  percent of US poultry, 90  percent of pigs, and 30  percent of beef  cattle  were 
receiving antibiotic- supplemented feeds.79
Entering nearly all areas of animal production and also entering food pres-
ervation and plant protection, antibiotics had rapidly achieved infrastructural 
relevance in US food production. The new antibiotic age was nearly universally 
welcomed. In the eyes of farmers and large parts of the US agricultural estab-
lishment, antibiotics had seemingly overcome the bacterial limitations previ-
ously imposed on the size of production facilities and the productivity of their 
inhabitants. Hardly anybody worried that the new antibiotic era might come 
at a price.
The Costs of Plenty
In 1951, US meat packer Swift sponsored large ads calling on farmers to throw 
aside fears of overproduction and produce as much meat as pos si ble. The new 
ABCs of animal nutrition— A standing for antibiotics— would guarantee rising 
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production and profits.80 According to Swift: “The prob lem’s never surplus 
meat— you  can’t raise more than we can eat.”81 This trust in American appe-
tites proved misguided.
Following the Korean War, agricultural commodity prices began to sink and 
the Eisenhower administration became concerned about overproduction and 
expensive subsidies. Between 1953 and 1954 alone, the US government’s Com-
modity Credit Cooperation (CCC) was forced to purchase $1.5 billion of agri-
cultural surpluses. However, CCC purchases  were not enough to shield farmers 
from a return of the interwar cost- price squeeze. Forced to maintain federal sub-
sidies, the Eisenhower Administration attempted to dispose of surpluses 
abroad with the 1954 Food for Peace program—an opportune side effect of 
Cold War diplomacy.82 The 1956 Agricultural Act recycled the New Deal idea 
of paying farmers to reduce production. However, agricultural production con-
tinued to grow by an annual average of 2.1   percent throughout the 1950s.83 
Concerned about annual CCC expenditure of $4 billion and daily storage costs 
of about $1 million,84 the new Kennedy administration established the US food 
stamp program and expanded the Food for Peace and lunch and milk programs 
in schools. Kennedy also reduced US acreage and the quantity of marketed 
produce.85
The re- emerging cost- price squeeze hit the rural community hard. As in the 
 Great Depression, small American farmers  were worst affected. With polls 
showing that farmers themselves  were upsizing definitions of a “ family farm,”86 
the number of US farms decreased from 3,710,503 in 1959 to 2,730,250 in 1969 
while the average farm size increased from 302.8 to 389.5 acres.87 In the livestock 
sector, developments in the poultry production  were indicative of  things to 
come: since the early 1960s, large national vertically integrated firms controlled 
as much as 90  percent of now mostly confined US broiler production.88 US pig 
production also began to change. Although confinement remained far from 
ubiquitous, a growing number of hog producers experimented with new hous-
ing systems to save  labor and reduce animal movement.89 In the beef sector, the 
1960s saw an increasing number of  cattle concentrated and fattened on large 
feedlots prior to slaughtering. This development had already gathered steam 
during the 1950s. As a result of cheap cereals and the fencing off of range land, 
a growing number of  cattle  were fed grain diets and new additives like diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES) to fatten them quicker. By February 1955, 6 million US  cattle 
 were “on feed.” During the 1960s, capital injections and conflicts over ranch-
ing on public lands facilitated the spread of commercial feedlots from Califor-
nia to Colorado, the Texas panhandle, Kansas, and Nebraska. By 1970, nearly 
two- thirds of the US calf crop was placed in feedlots prior to slaughter.90
Interestingly, most agricultural commentators did not blame new produc-
tion systems for the ensuing cost- price squeeze. Despite bemoaning  family 
farms’ decline,91 the “factory farm” remained a utopia rather than a dystopia. 
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In an age of superpower rivalry and overpopulation, technology- driven inten-
sification was presented as essential for farmers’ and the nation’s long- term sur-
vival.92 This trajectory included further increases of antibiotic use. In 1956, 
Farm Journal and Country Gentleman wrote that farmer Hugh Fussell was 
getting every thing right: “Detroit’s automobile factories have nothing on 
Hugh Fussell. This Georgia farmer raises hogs on a truly assembly- line basis. 
 Every two weeks Fussell is on the market with 50 to 60 head of No. 1 hogs.”93 
Significantly, Fussell was also a “fanatic on disease control”:  every day, each of 
his finishing barn pens was disinfected; Fussell’s pigs  were vaccinated, their 
“feeds [ were] well laced with vitamins and antibiotics.”94 With further “mighty 
new germ killer[s]”95 on their way, who could blame farmers if— for their peace 
of mind— they invested in continuous antibiotic use to reduce feed costs and 
stay ahead of their competitors and infection?96
Only rarely was antibiotic use described not as a solution but as a prob lem. 
While Lancaster Farming erroneously thought that new antibiotic food pre-
servatives would slow the advance of refrigeration,97 Farm Journal viewed them 
as a further step down the road to universal low- cost competition: “Acronize 
is  doing it. The cheaper broiler areas can now sell anywhere. . . .  It’s now one 
big national market with broiler prices, like  water, seeking one level.”98 The arti-
cle’s ambivalence is telling. Caught in a cost- price squeeze, the majority of US 
farmers, however, felt that they could no longer afford to stop and reconsider 
the antibiotic infrastructure growing around them. By the end of the 1950s, a 
path to de pen dency was emerging: falling prices led to greater herd densities 
associated with higher productivity and greater antibiotic use, which in turn 
led to a further fall of commodity prices. The price of this chemical cornuco-
pia was agricultural insecurity. When public concerns about chemical expo-
sure became more pronounced during the late 1950s, many farmers found 
themselves torn between shared health concerns and the perceived necessitude 
of further production increases and antibiotic consumption.
The 1956 scandal surrounding penicillin residues in milk was the first to 
shake public trust in agricultural antibiotic use (chapter 2). Initially, it did the 
same in agricultural circles. Attempting to restore trust, experts exhorted farm-
ers to adhere to withdrawal times and identify bacterial strains prior to using 
antibiotics. Not only would cows recover sooner, farmers would also stop pay-
ing for in effec tive antibiotics and prevent stricter regulations.99 Farm Journal 
warned that the FDA was merely asking “farmers to cooperate”: “If that  doesn’t 
work, . . .  they may  either order that drug companies put dyes in mastitis treat-
ments . . .  or put a ban on penicillin.”100 Despite mentioning allergenic  hazards, 
most commentators, however, described antibiotic residues as an isolated prob-
lem. Events seemingly proved them right. Bolstered by sinking residue find-
ings and blaming black sheep, dairy farmers averted statutory antibiotic 
restrictions.101
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Public trust proved more difficult to win back. Despite agricultural cam-
paigns to curb residue levels, US chemical criticism reached fever pitch in the 
wake of the 1959 cranberry scare and bestsellers like The Poisons in Your Food. 
Whereas agricultural commentators had formerly presented episodes like the 
1956 penicillin scandal as a credible  hazard to public health, the continuous 
expansion of public chemical fears was increasingly interpreted as a threat to 
modern agriculture. Commentators  were especially apprehensive about public 
fears leading to substance bans. In 1959, Wallaces Farmer warned that a bigger 
“clamp down on all farm chemicals” was only a question of time: “a small army of 
FDA inspectors . . .  have  orders from Washington to go from farm to farm, if 
necessary, to find [antibiotic] violators.”102 Lancaster Farmer cautioned producers 
to exercise chemical self- control: “In light of the tremendous publicity accorded 
to the recent cranberry situation, dairy industry leaders are very much con-
cerned about the  great damage which could be done to milk if FDA officials are 
forced to file lawsuits against dairies or producers in order to enforce rules.”103
Over time, ongoing public clashes about the safety of agricultural chemi-
cals led to a radicalization of agricultural rhe toric. In the US farming media, 
experts and editors increasingly resorted to painting black and white pictures 
of efficient, hard- pressed  family farmers falling victim to an “irrational” anti- 
chemistry campaign. In 1959, Wallaces Farmer accused consumers and officials 
of stirring a “Big Ruckus” about the Cranberry Scare and publicizing the “inci-
dent entirely out of proportion to the dangers involved.”104 According to 
Progressive Farmer from Alabama, FDA officials  were guilty of spreading “fear 
and disfavor for the entire production of an industry.”105 The magazine warned: 
“the nation is being harassed by a number of food cranks who insist that a 
food is good only if no chemicals  were used in growing it” and “No nation in 
the world has a more abundant food supply, one that is cleaner, safer, or more 
nutritious than ours. . . .  unless farmers look out, the ‘food cranks’ and other 
misinformed  people may pressure Congress into passing unreasonable 
restrictions— restrictions that may do serious damage to our food supply and 
to national welfare.”106 Commenting on The Poisons in Your Food, Lancaster 
Farming compared agricultural chemical use to the plowing of “virgin prairie 
sod”: “The use of hormonized and fortified feeds with antibiotics” was just as 
necessary if the “producer is to stay in meat production.”107 While other articles 
complained about official tests detecting “what is almost ‘less than zero’ amounts 
of residue,”108 Wallaces Farmer proclaimed a “ battle for farmers”109 in 1962. A 
“worrisome new movement” no longer just included cranks but also ordinary 
 people, “well- meaning for the most part, who have become overly alarmed at 
our growing use of chemicals in food production.”110
Attacks on “cranks” and overzealous inspectors did not mean that the Amer-
ican agricultural community was naïve about potential side- effects of the 
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chemical technologies it was employing. In farming magazines,  there was usu-
ally a sharp contrast between the fierce rhe toric directed against “external” crit-
ics and the concerned tone  adopted for “internal” safety advice. Reacting to 
scientific warnings, commentators promoted cost- benefit strategies to reduce 
personal health risks without foregoing chemicals’ economic benefits. “Ratio-
nal” farmers  were expected to follow labeling instructions and limit direct expo-
sure. If personal exposure remained below critical thresholds, agricultural 
chemical use was deemed safe.111 However, even agricultural expert advice could 
be contradictory. In June  1960, an issue of Progressive Farmer contained two 
very diff er ent articles: whereas one commentator advocated using vari ous chem-
icals to fight yard pests on page 76,112 page 78 contained an article warning 
about “harmful residues”113 of similar chemicals on homegrown fruits and veg-
etables. The effects of such mixed messaging on farmers’ personal attitudes are 
difficult to judge. In 1964, Wallaces Farmer conducted a poll to see  whether 
chemical warnings had changed farmers’ habits. According to the poll, half of 
farmers regularly using pesticides and insecticides reported having taken more 
precautions  because of  hazards to crop, livestock, and personal health. One 
interviewee confessed, “ These chemicals are beginning to scare me to death 
and I  wouldn’t be surprised if only experts  will be allowed to apply them in the 
near  future.’ ”114 However, with overall pesticide, herbicide, and antibiotic use 
continuing to increase,115 most producers seem to have viewed personal safety 
mea sures as sufficient to contain potential  hazards and justify ongoing use.
The only agricultural community to  wholeheartedly endorse growing pub-
lic chemical criticism  were organic producers. US organic producers  were a 
small and heterogeneous community throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Within 
the community, publications by Jerome Irving (J. I.) Rodale (Organic Farmer, 
Organic Farming and Gardening, Prevention) enjoyed high visibility. Rodale, 
a former accountant and electrical equipment manufacturer, had purchased a 
farm in Emmaus, Pennsylvania, in 1940 and turned it into an organic experi-
ment station. He also began publishing books and magazines on organic farm-
ing, personal health, and self- improvement in what would become a veritable 
publishing and direct- advertising empire. Inspired by En glish activists like 
Alfred Howard and Eve Balfour and relying on a mix of experimental evidence, 
anecdotal accounts, and pseudo- science (chapter 6),116 Rodale was convinced 
that healthy food could only grow on “living” organic soil.117 He thus promoted 
“natu ral” farming methods like composting, mulching, and crop rotation in 
opposition to “artificial” production methods involving chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, or hormones, which he blamed for prob lems ranging from polio to 
cavities.118 Although the wider ideals driving organic agriculture  were more 
complex, Organic Farmer’s subtitle “farming without chemicals” was one of the 
budding movement’s most impor tant maxims.
50 • USA, 1949–1967
 Because of their “natu ral” roots, biological antibiotics presented a classifi-
catory prob lem for post- war organic producers. Rodale and his readers initially 
interpreted antibiotics not as chemicals but as proof of the health- giving prop-
erties of “living” soil: “One variety of actinomycete is known to produce vita-
min B-12. . . .  But of far greater importance is their production of antibiotics. . . . 
 there is a very strong antibiotic action in a soil loaded with organic  matter, and 
thus many plant diseases are licked before they can even get near the plant.”119 
“Natu ral” soil’s antibiotic benefits could allegedly also be passed on to  humans 
and animals. In 1952, an Organic Farmer article noted that organic crops 
enabled a Michigan  family to ingest “the benefits of . . .  health- giving antibi-
otics from stable manures put into the soil.”120 In 1954, retired chemist Leon-
ard Wickenden reiterated some of  these claims in his popu lar Gardening with 
Nature.121 However, with antibiotic use growing in conventional agriculture, 
organic producers  were soon forced to differentiate between beneficial and bad 
antibiotic exposure. For a while, this led to confusion. In 1952, Organic Farmer 
warned that “chicks fed antibiotics can poison consumers” by developing “resis-
tant bacteria that  will give food poisoning, enteritis and typhoidal infections 
to  people eating their meat.”122 However, one year  later, the magazine printed 
a feature on antibiotic soil’s benefits for poultry: “Nature has placed, and is con-
stantly manufacturing antibiotics— germ killers—in the soil to promote the 
health of poultry. All one has to do to reap the benefits of such germ killers is 
to make sure that the range is not contaminated.”123 According to the article, 
“natu ral” antibiotics had to be distinguished from “artificially” manufactured 
antibiotics: “It is wrong to jump off the deep end in believing only in the mer-
its of synthetically produced antibiotics, for Nature has given us antibiotics for 
lo,  these many years.”124
Within the loosely or ga nized organic community, a firmer front against 
agricultural antibiotics emerged only  after the 1956 residue scandal. In addition 
to increasing attacks on “poisonous” and allergenic antibiotic residues,125 organic 
criticism also began to regularly encompass concerns about agricultural AMR 
se lection. According to a 1959 article, AGPs caused senility and sterility, upset 
breeding patterns, and destroyed natu ral disease re sis tance in animals. For 
 humans, risks resulting from agricultural antibiotic use included the destruc-
tion of sensitive organisms by “highly resistant strains of dangerous bacteria, 
notably a very lethal staphylococcus.”126 While organic farmers  were producing 
a growing supply of “safe” chemical  free meat, the conventional farmer “ will find 
himself facing economic ruin—if his own mal- nourished [sic] body  hasn’t given 
up the fight first.”127 Citing British research, Organic Farmer also began to warn 
about the on- farm se lection of tetracycline- resistant E. coli from pigs and resis-
tant mastitis in cows.128 This early joint discussion of residue and AMR  hazards 
was exceptional both within the US agricultural and public spheres.
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In conventional agriculture, only a small group of mostly veterinary bacte-
riologists warned about AMR as a public health hazard. In November 1951, 
University of California researchers Mortimer P. Starr and Donald M. Reynolds 
published a remarkable study on streptomycin AGPs’ effect on the microflora of 
turkeys. Feeding an oil meal ration containing 50 milligrams of streptomycin 
per kilogram of feed, the authors conducted sensitivity tests on E. coli isolated 
from bird’s feces. Although resistant organisms  were also isolated from control 
birds, E. coli from streptomycin- fed birds quickly proved “generally highly resis-
tant to the drug.”129 The authors noted that AMR was prob ably of  little relevance 
to poultry producers since it would be cheaper to cull than to treat flocks in 
the case of disease. However, they worried that antibiotics could foster the 
spread of resistant pathogens like salmonella. Thinking about public health 
more widely, the authors wondered “just how much indiscrimination should be 
permitted in the use of new chemotherapeutic agents.”130 AMR against peni-
cillin and sulfonamides had proven “inevitable” even with the “best planned 
scheme of drug administration”:
It would be unfortunate if a large reservoir of drug- fast enteric pathogens 
potentially harmful to man accumulated unchecked in the poultry popula-
tion. We hope that  those charged with the protection of the public health  will 
objectively evaluate the situation. . . .  We grant that the poultry industry 
cannot readily forego [AGPs’]  great economic advantages . . . .  But . . .  a few 
years of research are likely to elucidate the fundamental mechanism under lying 
this growth promoting effect and . . .  will permit agriculturalists to secure more 
rapid animal growth without inflicting potential  hazards on the public 
health.131
Corroborated by a 1953 Minnesota study on AGP- fed rats and Canadian 
research on AMR in oxytetracycline- fed pigs,132 Starr and Reynolds’ warnings, 
however, failed to inspire regulatory or agricultural action.
Instead, most commentators in conventional agriculture described AMR 
not as a general threat to public health but as an economic prob lem of ineffi-
cient overuse to be overcome not by bans but via “rational therapeutics”— a 
movement that was also gaining ground in  human medicine.133 In US veteri-
nary circles, the 1950s saw a growing number of textbooks and magazines com-
plain about “irrational” antibiotic use on farms caused by ignorance, lacking 
sanitation, and hasty disease diagnosis.134 The 1957 textbook Veterinary Phar-
macology and Therapeutics also complained about manufacturer’s “dangerous 
tendency to add excessive levels of antibiotics”135 to animal feeds. However, 
most veterinary observers did not believe that resulting agricultural AMR 
se lection was a serious health threat. Despite containing a separate section on 
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AMR in 1961, the sixth edition of Veterinary Bacteriology and Virology main-
tained that AMR was “natu ral” and not an existential threat.136
Most non- veterinary agricultural observers also remained complacent about 
AMR.137 Of thirty analyzed US farming manuals and reviews published 
between 1955 and 1966, all stressed antibiotics’ benefits, many cautioned about 
inefficient drug use, but only two warned about potential health  hazards result-
ing from AMR se lection.138 And even  these two warnings stressed that ill 
effects would be contained by rationalizing antibiotic use. According to veteri-
nary pharmacologist L. Meyer Jones, “no patient should be deprived of the 
benefit of antibiotic therapy solely  because of fear of inducing re sis tance in the 
disease germ.”139 Warning about inadequately dosed mastitis treatments and 
storing unsterilized  needles in antibiotic  bottles,140 a 1962 manual on Milking 
Machines and Mastitis similarly stressed that “rational” veterinary supervision 
would solve prob lems: “The only  people “benefiting from [inefficient antibiotic 
use] are the sellers and advertisers of antibiotics.”141
The focus on AMR as a prob lem not of health but of inefficiency was mir-
rored in con temporary debates about fluctuating AGP per for mance. Despite 
widespread endorsement in farming magazines and manuals, varying feed  trials 
 were leading some observers to speculate  whether AMR was diminishing AGPs’ 
efficacy. Industry reacted fiercely. In 1956, a Cyanamid booklet claimed that 
“reports that antibiotics are ‘losing’ their effect cannot be taken seriously.”142 
According to Cyanamid, reductions in growth promotion  were due to improved 
sanitation on farms— antibiotics simply had less bacteria to control. Three years 
 later, the com pany repeated that “ there is no evidence of a diminishing trend 
in production with time. On the contrary, the conversion of feedstuffs to pork 
has improved considerably throughout a de cade of swine feeding.”143 Taking 
stock of the situation in 1962, Farmers Weekly Review acknowledged that “cer-
tain antibiotics used in a swine herd for several months may become less effec-
tive.”144 Ignoring the potential health implications of AMR se lection, the 
article, however, noted that new antibiotics or antibiotic combinations still pro-
duced “a significant boost in rate of gain when fed to growing- finishing pigs.”145 
In 1965, Iowa State University animal nutritionist Virgil Hays emphasized: 
“antibiotics are definitely of value in 98  percent of our farm situations.”146 The 
increasing use of higher- dosed AGPs was simply due to sinking antibiotic prices.
Sales figures show that routine antibiotic use remained popu lar on US farms. 
Between 1960 and 1970, sales of antibiotics added to animal feed and other 
applications grew by 330  percent from about 770,000 to 3,310,000 kilograms 
(about 43  percent of total US antibiotic sales).147 With the exception of organic 
farmers, an overwhelming majority of agricultural experts, commentators, and 
producers remained committed to the ideal of industrialized plenty— and to 
the chemical helpers enabling it. The antibiotic- facilitated drive for efficiency 
and growth remained stable despite the re- emerging cost- price squeeze and 
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increasingly vis i ble side effects like the decline of  family farms and safety 
concerns about new agricultural chemicals. In the minds of many agricultural 
commentators, unfettered access to antibiotics had acquired almost infrastruc-
tural importance for productivity. The cultural and physical importance of 
expanding antibiotic infrastructures also meant that producers and commen-
tators reacted first with alarm and then with indignation to “irrational” exter-
nal antibiotic criticism. Mirroring public critics’ focus on residue  hazards, US 
agricultural commentators rarely touched on AMR throughout the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Although the farming media reported on resistant pathogens in 
 human medicine,148 AMR se lection on farms was mostly portrayed as an effi-
ciency prob lem to be overcome with “rational” drug use. As late as the mid-
1960s, commentators reassured farmers that antibiotic use and medicated feeds 
would produce “ little or no re sis tance, even when used over long periods of 
time.”149 This sanguine assessment seemed justified following the publication 
of the FDA’s 1966 report on veterinary and non- veterinary antibiotics (chap-
ter 4). Industry journal Feedstuffs was happy to report: “scientific data now 
available do not show reason for alarm.”150 Overall, the US agricultural com-




Antibiotics and the FDA
For the American FDA, antibiotic regulation posed unique challenges: not only 
 were regulators forced to reconcile demands for agricultural plenty with con-
sumer protection, they also had to account for antibiotics’ hybrid identity as 
medical therapeutics and nontherapeutic production enhancers, preservatives, 
and plant sprays. This chapter explores how a traditional focus on toxic  hazards 
and a “gatekeeper” mode of drug regulation facilitated the licensing of many 
antibiotic applications.  Under pressure from Congress, zero- tolerance policies 
for residues  were abandoned in  favor of thresholds below which antibiotics  were 
allowed on meat, poultry, fish, and plants— but not in milk. Ensuring that FDA 
antibiotic guidelines  were followed proved more difficult. By the late 1950s, lack 
of resources, corruption scandals, and the absence of a cohesive antibiotic policy 
resulted in an overburdening of FDA regulators and a temporary breakdown of 
antibiotic licensing and enforcement. Public pressure to reduce residues and FDA 
regulators’ focus on toxic and carcinogenic  hazards also made officials repeatedly 
downplay evidence pointing to rising AMR on American farms.
Opening the Gates
In many ways, the FDA’s preoccupation with antibiotic residues was a logical 
continuation of long- standing regulatory traditions. Reacting to the rapid 
development of novel chemicals, the late 1800s saw US officials attempt to 
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protect the public from dangerous levels of toxicity. From the beginning, offi-
cials strug gled to establish a model of substance regulation that protected the 
general public without stifling industrial growth. Following the enactment of 
the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, the USDA’s Division of Chemistry 
became responsible for enforcing new bans on the interstate sale and transport 
of “adulterated” or “misbranded” food and drugs. However, the division failed 
to win congressional support for regulations designed to force industry to 
prove that substances  were safe and would not cause acute or long- term poi-
soning.1 The rejection of this precautionary licensing approach meant that US 
drug regulation became based on a more industry- friendly philosophy of 
thresholds. Influential industrial hygienists asserted that  humans’ inevitable 
exposure to chemicals only became dangerous once it toppled the body’s “natu-
ral homeostasis.” If it remained below this threshold, chemical exposure was 
acceptable. During the interwar period, the renamed Food, Drug, and Insecti-
cide Administration— from 1930 onward Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)— thus focused on using toxicology to establish the point at which “natu-
ral” turned into “unnatural” exposure.2
In 1938, FDA competencies  were significantly strengthened by the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDC). Passed in the wake of the 1937 sulpha-
nilamide tragedy during which diethylene glycol contaminated cough syrup 
killed over 100  people, the FDC allowed regulators to ban dangerous substances 
and required manufacturers to file New Drug Applications (NDAs). NDAs 
contained information on drugs’ composition, manufacturing pro cess, intended 
use, and evidence of safety. Transferred to the Federal Security Agency in 1940, 
the FDA had at least sixty days to evaluate evidence and approve or deny NDAs.3
The FDA’s unification of responsibilities for consumer protection, food secu-
rity, and drug regulation was unique. In contrast to Eu rope where powers 
 were often divided between diff er ent ministries, FDA regulators could (a) act 
as gatekeepers for the licensing of veterinary and  human drugs, (b) define when 
food safety was threatened by microbial or chemical adulteration, and (c) eval-
uate the safety of agricultural chemicals and food additives. However, this sig-
nificant accumulation of powers stood on clay feet. Constrained by bud get 
cuts and lacking a large science department, the FDA remained heavi ly reliant 
on external research to assess NDAs. Resources  were also insufficient to guar-
antee enforcement at the retail or farm level. Regulators responded to con-
straints by emphasizing their role as premarket gatekeepers, issuing advisory 
opinions, establishing pre ce dent via targeted prosecutions, and using  legal gray 
areas to exert authority—as in the case of FDA rulings on pesticides and food 
additives, which  were not covered by NDA requirements. According to histo-
rian Dan Carpenter, a large part of early FDA power was thus exercised via 
reputation.4
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 There  were several downsides to this mode of reputational gatekeeping: reg-
ulators’ reliance on  legal ambiguities and individual rulings could  favor ad 
hoc rather than coherent risk policies. Resulting incoherence not only fostered 
contradictory rulings by diff er ent FDA departments but also led to a lack of 
oversight, which made regulators focus on curbing well- known rather than 
unfamiliar or emerging  hazards. Meanwhile, inadequate resources and close 
industry ties complicated reforms of already licensed drug use. Between the 
1940s and 1960s, this mix of  limited gatekeeping, incoherent policies, and a 
“narrow” focus on toxic and carcinogenic  hazards would not only open the 
gates for mass antibiotic use but also constrain FDA responses to resulting 
 hazards.5
With the 1937 sulphanilamide tragedy still a recent memory, the FDA first 
assessed agricultural sulfonamides and antibiotics in light of familiar toxicity 
 hazards. Initial concerns seem to have been minimal and trust in industry safety 
and efficacy claims high. In 1985, parasitologist Ashton Cukler recounted how 
he and a colleague had traveled to Washington by train in 1948 to apply for a 
license to include and sell Merck’s sulfaquinoxaline in feeds: an informal go- 
ahead was granted on the same day and formal approval followed soon after-
ward.6 However, the ensuing boom of sulfonamide use soon led to a partial 
reversal of laissez- faire regulation. Reacting to reports in 1949 that farmers  were 
using agricultural sulfonamides for self- medication and accidently poisoning 
themselves and their flocks, the FDA restricted access to larger quantities of 
pure sulfonamides and established compulsory maximum concentrations in 
premixed feeds. In a significant move, the agency also transferred existing NDA 
requirements for  human medicines to agricultural settings by mandating that 
safety labels should be attached to sulfonamide feeds and concentrates.7 Sul-
fonamide labeling served the dual purpose of exerting control without disrupt-
ing the phar ma ceu ti cal market: the mandatory attachment of guidelines on 
safe use to products containing veterinary drugs legally entitled the FDA to 
punish drug misuse. Meanwhile, the official assumption that “rational” con-
sumers would understand and follow safety labels allowed most veterinary 
drugs to stay on the market and enabled expensive farm- level enforcement to 
stay minimal. With manufacturers involved in establishing official guidelines, 
only very few veterinary drugs for which no reasonable guidelines of safe lay 
use could be developed  were restricted by the FDA and assigned prescription- 
only status, which was formally established in 1951.8
The FDA’s regulatory matrix for synthetic sulfonamides was also applied to 
biological antibiotics, which had to be accompanied by safety labels when sold 
to farmers for therapeutic purposes. However, the post-1949 boom of AGP sales 
soon forced the FDA to create new regulatory categories for “nontherapeutic” 
antibiotic products— especially since the 1938 FDC only mandated safety tests 
for drugs but not for nontherapeutic chemicals.9 As described in chapter  3, 
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Lederle had initially marketed its AGPs containing aureomycin fermentation 
wastes as B12/APF feeds to avoid “registration prob lems”10 regarding feeds’ anti-
biotic content. Lederle subsequently used the rapid uncontrolled rise of APF/
AGP sales to pre sent the FDA with a fait accompli licensing application when 
officials started to become concerned about the varying dosages of feed addi-
tives being sold in interstate commerce. Recounting Lederle’s strategy, AGP 
co- discoverer Thomas Jukes claimed that “approval was readily granted . . .  a 
most impor tant step included a conversation with Dr. Elmer Nelson of the FDA 
during which he asked what level of aureomycin should be authorized for use 
as an animal feed supplement; we suggested 50g/ton, to which he agreed.”11 
Aware of toxicity- based FDA sulfonamide regulations, Lederle representa-
tives pointed out that the daily administration of 0.5 grams of aureomycin for 
periods of up to two years had not triggered toxic reactions in  human sub-
jects. Residues resulting from AGPs  were therefore unlikely to cause prob lems. 
Although Jukes  later referred to discussions with FDA officials about AMR, 
 there is no archival evidence indicating that deliberations of potential aller-
genic or AMR  hazards took place.12
In April 1951, the FDA consented to retrospectively legalize the already 
booming AGP market. Prob ably applying toxicity oriented threshold thinking 
and trusting industry safety assurances, the agency does not seem to have con-
ducted further AMR, allergy, or toxicity tests of low- dosed AGPs. It also 
de cided to license a wide range of AGPs in bulk. In addition to Lederle’s aureo-
mycin (chlortetracycline), the 1951 Federal Register announcement licensed 
penicillin, bacitracin, streptomycin, di- hydro- streptomycin, and chloramphen-
icol (soon to be linked to aplastic anemia) for use in feeds. If marketed solely 
as subtherapeutic feed supplements and not as therapeutics,13 the listed antibi-
otics  were, moreover, exempted from both NDA and federal batch certifica-
tion requirements (see below).14 According to the 1951 guidelines of the 
Association of American Feed Control Officials, supplements  were to be ren-
dered unsuitable for  human use with denaturants and labeled “for feeding use 
only” and to include no more than 50 grams of antibiotics per ton— a weight 
limitation that could, however, be waived from 1953 onward.15 With the FDA 
focusing on toxicity thresholds, AGPs flew right  under officials’  hazard radar. 
Thomas Jukes  later noted that had the antibiotic growth effect been discovered 
in 1985, AGPs would not have been licensed.16
Strengthened by the 1951 Delaney report, which did not mention antibiot-
ics despite having heard evidence on AMR and allergenic residues (chapter 2),17 
the FDA also launched a policy of actively facilitating antibiotic access. 
The agency’s first move was to oppose perceived attempts by veterinarians to 
monopolize the antibiotic market.  After the AVMA asked the Committee on 
Public Health to review antibiotic feed additives in August 1952 (see below), 
FDA officials launched a broadside against the “movement on the part of 
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veterinarians” to restrict antibiotics and noted: “this Administration has 
always insisted that drugs for veterinary use, to the extent practicable, be not 
restricted to professional use.”18 Deputy commissioner George P. Larrick reas-
sured mill  owners: “We have consistently followed the course of placing no 
obstacles in the way of self- medication when the medicines employed can be 
safely and intelligently used by lay persons. The same princi ples apply to our regu-
lation of livestock remedies.”19 Tasked with protecting “rational” consumers, 
regulators would not intervene if drugs could be used safely— what happened if 
consumers chose to ignore guidelines and act “irrationally” was not frequently 
discussed.
The FDA also attempted to remove regulatory barriers for manufacturers. 
From 1945 onward, biological antibiotics had been regulated through a certifi-
cation procedure  under Section 507 of the FDC. Following the joint defini-
tion of standards, identity, strength, quality, and purity for an antibiotic, each 
batch of an antibiotic product had to be certified by the FDA— producers could 
choose to have their products certified or to have them treated like other new 
drugs.20 While the 1951 regulations had eliminated batch certification require-
ments for certifiable listed feed antibiotics, feed mills producing antibiotic 
feeds for purposes other than growth promotion theoretically still required fed-
eral batch certification. Initially, each batch of an animal feed “containing 
therapeutic levels of [antibiotics] for therapeutic purposes as a new drug”21 had 
to be certified individually by the Division of Antibiotics.  Because such a pro-
cedure “would be impracticable,”22 the FDA exempted low- dosed antibiotic 
feeds, which  were marketed for therapeutic purposes, from NDA and batch cer-
tification requirements in 1953.23 Other exemptions followed rapidly. By 1955, 
the list of approved combinations of certifiable antibiotics and other drugs listed 
in the Federal Register was nearly two pages long. Two years  later, the FDA 
amended its 1951 certification exemptions to include all certifiable antibiotics 
for use in properly labeled animal feeds additives.24 The bound aries between 
therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotic use  were blurring.
Normalizing Risk
The resulting expansion of US antibiotic sales took place against a backdrop 
of minimal FDA controls. Throughout the 1950s, officials not only strug gled 
to make manufacturers adhere to NDA requirements but also failed to con-
vince hesitant US attorneys to prosecute offenders.25 In 1952, a frustrated reg-
ulator confessed: “Personally, I am of the opinion that many of the therapeutic 
repre sen ta tions made for antibiotics in feed bases are exaggerated and not based 
on adequately controlled experiments.”26 Lacking resources meant that  there 
was even less control over drug use on farms. Resulting prob lems triggered 
mixed responses. While officials initially favored case- by- case rulings against 
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antibiotic residue offenders, 1950s FDC amendments led to a policy of 
“normalizing” risk by delineating bound aries within which residues  were 
“tolerated.”27  Because  there was no objective way to define the exact bound-
ary between tolerable and intolerable residues, the FDA had to strike a delicate 
balance between industry safety claims, toxicity concerns, and the cultural 
values attached to diff er ent foodstuffs— AMR was mostly ignored. As evi-
denced by residue bans in milk as opposed to tolerances in meat, fish, poultry, 
and plants, this balancing act produced paradoxical results.
In 1948, a policy announcement in the Federal Register had mandated that 
drugs effecting food animals’ physiological functions  were to be approved only 
if they did not leave deleterious or poisonous residues in food.28 This ruling gave 
FDA regulators considerable scope to dictate dosages and withdrawal times for 
antibiotic products. However, in practice, officials’ reliance on industry data 
and inability to assay many drugs meant that safeguards  were  limited. Although 
they warned that residue offenders might be prosecuted for adulteration, offi-
cials could do  little more than hope that producers would use drugs responsi-
bly and that potential residues would be too low- dosed to harm consumers. 
More coherent residue policies emerged in response to antibiotic food preser-
vatives. Faced with the prospect of intentional residues, regulators drew a red 
line. In February 1953, the Federal Register announced that “careful consider-
ation” had made the FDA decide that using antibiotic drugs as food preserva-
tives “constitutes a public- health  hazard.”29 Residues could sensitize consumers 
and “result in the emergence of strains of pathogenic microorganisms resistant 
to  these drugs.”30 Neither intentional nor unintentional residues in food could 
be deemed safe.
FDA regulators’ stand was short lived. Within a year, the 1954 Miller Pes-
ticides Chemical Amendment overthrew FDA polices. Passed in reaction to 
the recent Delaney hearings (chapter 2), the Miller amendment tasked the FDA 
with streamlining policies and establishing tolerances for many pesticide resi-
dues on raw food. As Nancy Langston and Sarah Vogel have shown, this focus 
on tolerances had an ambivalent impact. Instead of preventing exposure to 
hazardous chemicals per se, the Miller amendment enabled official risk man-
agement based on— often industry- friendly— calculations of “acceptable” 
exposure.31 In the case of antibiotics, the amendment opened the door for anti-
biotic use in food preservation, plant protection, and whaling. Starting in 1954, 
FDA officials began distinguishing between residues resulting from the use of 
antibiotics as pesticides (i.e., to control bacteria on raw agricultural commodi-
ties) and the use of antibiotics in or on pro cessed food. In the case of pro cessed 
foods, residue tolerances remained difficult to obtain  because section 406 of the 
FDC required proof that an added chemical was necessary for production. 
However, in the case of raw food, antibiotics fell  under the Miller amendment, 
and manufacturers  were allowed to apply for official residue tolerances.32
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Industry applications arrived quickly. Following a series of studies, the FDA 
overturned its 1953 residue ban and legalized the preservation of poultry meat 
with chlortetracycline (Cyanamid’s Acronize) in November 1955 and with oxy-
tetracycline (Pfizer’s Biostat) in October 1956. In order to extend their shelf 
life by as much as 50  percent,33 batches of about 200 eviscerated poultry car-
casses  were dipped for fifteen minutes into tanks of slush- ice containing 10 parts 
per million of chlortetracycline or oxytetracycline. Tolerances of 7 parts per 
million  were established on raw poultry.34 In 1959, the FDA established simi-
lar tolerances for the preservation of fish via antibiotic ice or dipping solutions. 
Scallops and shrimp could also be preserved via antibiotics.35 Preservation  trials 
for milk, beef, and eggs  were ultimately abandoned.36 Retrospectively, perhaps 
the most bizarre antibiotic application was the use of antibiotics to preserve 
 whale meat. Tested by Pfizer in Norway and Iceland, injections, harpoons, and 
the pipes used to inflate carcasses  were loaded with Biostat. Whalers  were sup-
posed to release an antibiotic equivalent of about 1 part per million of a  whale’s 
weight into its circulatory system to delay the usually rapid spoilage of slow- 
cooling carcasses. Additional antibiotic preservation was suggested in the form 
of dipping solutions and antibiotic ice. Com pany representatives hoped that 
preservatives would increase  whale meat yields for extracts and animal feeds 
by 30 to 10  percent respectively37 and allow  whale meat to “become plentiful 
in [American] grocery stores.”38
Although  whale meat failed to conquer US dinner  tables, antibiotic preser-
vatives for fish and poultry became common (chapter 2). Justifying their licens-
ing decisions, FDA officials claimed that cooking would degrade antibiotics 
and that labels on raw food would inform consumers about antibiotics’ pres-
ence.39 In effect, regulators no longer guaranteed “pure” meat but made con-
sumers responsible for preparing poultry and fish in a way that would destroy 
 legal, yet undesirable residues. On the part of manufacturers, safety concerns 
 were  limited to the fact that inadequate storage could lead to premature spoil-
age.40 Con temporary reports of strong variations in the antibiotic dosages used 
to preserve food and studies on AMR se lection on carcasses and in abattoirs 
did not lead to corrective action.41
In plant production, the Miller amendment enabled the licensing of antibi-
otic sprays and paints for use against bacterial infections. In 1946, initial tests 
of penicillin against bacterial fire blight had proven unsuccessful. However, six 
years  later, researchers using streptomycin achieved spectacular results against 
fire blight in orchards in Missouri, Mississippi, Delaware, and California.42 The 
 trials triggered widespread industry interest. Within a year of the Miller amend-
ment, the FDA was analyzing applications for mostly streptomycin- based 
sprays and paints to combat a wide range of bacterial diseases in apples, pears, 
walnuts, peaches, beans, tobacco, tomatoes, peppers, cherries, spinach, lettuce, 
F IGURE 4.1  USDA antibiotic spraying, Ben Howard, May 1959, USDA Forest Ser vice 
Region 6, Forest Health Protection. Collection: Region 6, Forest Health Protection slide 
collection, Portland, Oregon.
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and potatoes.43 Sprays  were deemed harmless as long as antibiotic residues did 
not reach consumers.
Despite the Miller amendment’s “normalization” of specified antibiotics in 
US meat, poultry, fish, and plants, not all antibiotic residues  were legalized. 
During the 1950s, FDA regulators  were faced with increasing reports of illegal 
antibiotic residues in US food. In 1955, they warned about pos si ble “exposure 
of large segments of the population to a multiplicity of antibiotics.” “It was 
discovered that tens of thousands of chickens  were being injected in the neck 
tissues with a preparation which left an insoluble residue of active drug. . . .  It 
was further found that when such antibiotic containing tissue was baked or 
fried the concentration of drug was not appreciably diminished.”44 Still rely-
ing on gatekeeper regulations and  running on 1940s bud getary and manpower 
levels,45 officials, however, strug gled to expand residue controls and prioritized 
the protection of certain foodstuffs over  others.
While expert assurances that low- dosed residues in meat would not cause 
harm facilitated relative official complacency about antibiotics in meat, poul-
try, fish, and plants,46 similar residue detections in culturally sensitive milk trig-
gered a robust regulatory response (chapter 2). The FDA had been aware of 
residue prob lems in milk since 1948 and had reformed labeling requirements 
for mastitis tubes in 1951.47 Beginning in 1954, officials reacted to growing con-
cerns by testing a variety of milk products for antibiotic residues. Initially, 
3.2  percent of samples tested positive for penicillin.48 One year  later, 11.6  percent 
of samples tested positive. Tasked by the FDA to undertake an impromptu risk 
assessment,49 medical experts warned that “the ingestion of the amounts of pen-
icillin found in milk might conceivably cause a reaction in an extremely sensi-
tive individual.”50 In 1955, an FDA official openly attacked antibiotic overuse 
in the dairy sector: “Larger and larger quantities of veterinary preparations  were 
being used, dosages  were increasing, and it appeared that some individuals  were 
marketing milk from treated cows too soon  after treatment. Furthermore, in 
some instances it was believed that unscrupulous individuals  were deliberately 
adding penicillin to milk to upgrade it.”51 The FDA also launched educational 
campaigns to curb residues. In 1956, detections fell to 6.9  percent of analyzed 
milk samples— but overall residue concentrations  were much higher. In 1957, 
the FDA responded by mandating labels on withdrawal times on drug contain-
ers and by limiting prepackaged mastitis medi cations to 100,000 units per 
dose instead of the 1,500,000 units per dose in some older products.52 Although 
only 3.7  percent of milk samples tested positive in 1958, the FDA remained dis-
satisfied.  Under par tic u lar public pressure to guarantee the purity of milk, the 
agency introduced a pioneering sanction- based interstate monitoring program 
for penicillin in milk.53 Starting in 1960, monitoring was based on a two- and- 
a- half- hour test using Bacillus subtilis, whose growth would be inhibited if 
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penicillin was pre sent.54 Other antibiotics  were not tested for. Within one 
year, penicillin detections fell to 0.5  percent of tested milk samples.55
The example of milk shows how cultural notions of purity strongly affected 
official antibiotic regulation. Resulting in the installation of residue monitor-
ing well ahead of other foodstuffs, US scientists, consumers and farmers all 
agreed that antibiotic residues in milk  were taboo. By contrast, similar antibi-
otic residues became tolerable in meat, fish, poultry, and plants. Although tol-
erances can partially be explained by the belief that antibiotics would degrade 
as a result of cooking,  these foodstuffs  were also not hedged by cultural taboos 
similar to that surrounding milk. Regulatory calculations of antibiotics’ risks 
and benefits thus mirrored and reinforced cultural perceptions of risk.
A similar bias also affected early FDA responses to AMR.  Because AMR 
did not match established cultural and regulatory priorities, 1950s officials 
repeatedly downplayed the risks posed by AMR se lection on farms and instead 
focused  limited resources on curbing residues. In August 1952, a Special Com-
mittee on Veterinary Public Health debated potential  hazards resulting from 
medicated feeds. Authored by James H. Steele, head of the CDC’s Veterinary 
Public Health Section, the committee’s report discussed pos si ble AMR 
se lection through therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotic use. However, it 
 limited warnings to traditional scenarios involving the presence of antibiotic 
residues and called for more research on wider AMR se lection. Five years  later, 
USDA and CDC officials expressed concerns about FDA plans to limit the dos-
age of commercial mastitis tubes. Lower dosages would prolong treatment 
and select for AMR. Clearly prioritizing residue over AMR  hazards, the FDA’s 
Division of Antibiotics curtly notified the other agencies that it had not 
requested their advice.56
Con temporary expertise did  little to challenge officials’ relative complacency 
about AMR. At the 1955 International Conference on Agricultural Antibiotic 
Use, Boston- based antibiotics expert Maxwell Finland upheld an epistemologi-
cal divide between AMR in  humans and animals: “In contrast to the  human 
experience, disease- producing strains have not been found to emerge among the 
types of animals that are raised primarily for market on antibiotic- supplemented 
feeds.”57 Bolstering con temporary threshold models, Finland and other experts 
claimed that AGPs in par tic u lar  were simply too low- dosed to select for harmful 
re sis tance.58
At first glance, it seems strange that a leading campaigner for “rational” anti-
biotic use in  human medicine like Finland (chapter 2) would endorse unre-
stricted antibiotic use in agriculture. Two  factors can, however, explain Finland’s 
position. The first  factor was the con temporary understanding of AMR pro-
liferation solely in “vertical” terms (chapter 1): natu ral or mutational AMR 
would only be passed on from one bacterial generation to the next. According 
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to this “organismal” scenario of AMR proliferation, containing individual 
strains and reducing se lection pressure would curb AMR. Perceived biological 
differences between animal and  human strains and spatial distances between 
farms and hospitals further reinforced an epistemic divide between risk assess-
ments of AMR in  humans and animals. A second much more prosaic  factor 
 behind Finland’s endorsement of agricultural antibiotics  were his close contacts 
with the US phar ma ceu ti cal industry.  After being asked to pre sent a critical 
review on the “Emergence of Resistant Strains in Chronic Intake of Antibiot-
ics”59 at the upcoming antibiotics conference, Finland had contacted AGP 
co- discoverer Thomas Jukes at American Cyanamid. “Tom” was only too happy 
to supply “Max” with published and unpublished data, slides, and a copy of his 
forthcoming book Antibiotics in Nutrition,60 which subsequently provided the 
“main source”61 for Finland’s bibliography. Driven from New York to Pearl 
River via com pany limousine,62 Finland also talked to other Cyanamid research-
ers and was allowed to borrow com pany figures and slides, which he failed to 
return.63 Speaking at the international antibiotics conference a few weeks  later, 
Finland in effect presented a Cyanamid- review of antibiotic  hazards.
Finland’s case was not unique. Assembling the international elite of antibi-
otic expertise, the entire 1955 NAS conference had been lavishly financed by 
the phar ma ceu ti cal industry: companies sponsored cocktail receptions,  hotel 
expenses, and a seven- day post- conference tour of the United States for speak-
ers, with diverse recreational activities.64 The first— and for a long time only— 
conference of its kind, the 1955 Conference on Agricultural Antibiotic Use had 
lasting effects on perceptions of antibiotic risk and forged an international com-
munity of mostly industry- friendly antibiotic experts.
Flying by the Seat of Your Pants
With the exception of penicillin residues in milk, the 1950s thus saw few chal-
lenges to the FDA’s gatekeeper mode of antibiotic regulation. This situation 
changed between 1958 and 1965 when new legislation, corruption scandals, and 
residue scandals stretched FDA regulators to their limits and strained formerly 
close relations with industry. Lacking financial resources, statutory powers, and 
a clear regulatory philosophy, FDA morale plummeted and regulators strug-
gled to enforce guidelines and reform drug licensing.
In 1958, the passage of the Food Additives Amendment and its so- called Del-
aney Clause placed a  great strain on FDA resources. The Delaney Clause was a 
direct result of lobbying by Congressman James Delaney, who remained dis-
satisfied with regulations resulting from his 1951 report.65 Similar to the 1954 
Miller amendment, proposed food additives regulations  were, however, watered 
down by industry. Instead of enacting a mandatory testing program for new 
substances, Congress passed a weaker bill, which required unspecified proof 
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of additives’ safety and tasked regulators with establishing new tolerances for 
additives in food.66 Any veterinary drug leaving residues in food would also be 
treated as an additive.67 The only exception to this dose- response dominated 
approach was the Delaney Clause, which established a precautionary zero- 
tolerance policy for carcinogens.68
Congress’s attempt to create a comprehensive food additives framework 
pushed the FDA to its orga nizational limits. It also cast a harsh light on the 
confused nature of previous ad hoc licensing. Since 1938, NDAs had generally 
been approved on a case- by- case basis. This meant that manufacturers had to 
file supplemental applications if they changed any component of accepted 
NDAs. In 1958, officials  were already struggling to keep up with the rapidly 
increasing number of NDAs and supplemental NDAs. The 1958 amendment’s 
demands for additional prelicensing data on the occurrence and harmfulness 
of drug residues, which would lead feeds to be assessed both as drugs and as 
additives, and the parallel introduction of efficacy reviews of drugs added to 
food and  water threatened to overwhelm FDA capacities.69 The situation was 
even more complicated regarding already licensed drugs. Fearing economic 
damage, legislators tasked the FDA with compiling a list of substances which 
 were generally recognized as safe (GRAS) via scientific consensus or long expe-
rience. GRAS substances would not require new NDA certification.70 A 
“grand father clause” also exempted NDAs licensed prior to 1958 from further 
review— a rule that caused severe prob lems in the case of carcinogenic diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES), which had been licensed as a growth promoter before 1958.71
Byzantine complexity also characterized the regulation of agricultural anti-
biotics. Although existing 7 parts per million tolerances for chlortetracycline 
and oxytetracycline  were grandfathered,72 new NDA requirements, GRAS 
exceptions, and the absence of a medicated feed rule compendium soon resulted 
in universal confusion when it came to licensing and labeling procedures.73 As 
described above, batch certification requirements had been waived for many 
popu lar certifiable antibiotics like penicillin, chloramphenicol, bacitracin, 
chlortetracycline, and streptomycin at doses below 50 grams per ton between 
1951 and 1957. Where requirements had not been waived, manufacturers had 
to file a Form 10, which was identical to an NDA but required additional proof 
of efficacy. However, a diff er ent set of regulations applied to preparations con-
taining noncertifiable antibiotics, which had to be licensed via an NDA. This 
continued to be the case for tylosin, hygromycin, novobiocin, oleandomycin, 
and nystatin. However, in the case of oxytetracycline, neomycin, and several 
sulfonamides, long- standing experience turned them into GRAS drugs. Pro-
ducers could use  these drugs according to GRAS guidelines without filing extra 
Form 10 or NDA applications.74 AGP labeling rules proved even more arcane: 
to stop producers from advertising excessive amounts of antibiotics, the 
FDA had banned quantitative AGP labels in October 1953.75 However, many 
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manufacturers did not know how new AGP labels should look76 and some 
used the absence of quantitative labeling to sell deficient feeds.77
Frustration soon ran high on all sides.  After a meeting of the Phar ma ceu ti-
cal Manufacturers Association in April 1959, a representative noted: “one feels 
that, perhaps, the prob lem of medicated feeds has been regarded as a step-
child. . . .  [and the] administration approach . . .  has been one of flying by the 
seat of your pants.”78 Manufacturers also complained about fragmented respon-
sibilities: “we now have the following groups of the administration . . .  con-
cerned with the medicated feeds: Front Office . . .  Veterinary Medical Branch, 
New Drug Branch, Division of Antibiotics, Division of Pharmacology, State 
Relations Division, and, now where a tolerance in a meat product might be con-
cerned, the Food Additives Division.”79 Fragmented responsibilities, licensing 
backlogs, and new testing requirements also meant that speeds of FDA drug 
licensing began to vary considerably.  Because the Division of Veterinary Med-
icine’s average review for a Form 1800 NDA exceeded one year, some manu-
facturers added certifiable antibiotics to products so that they could file a Form 
10 with the quicker Division of Antibiotics. With hardly anybody able to navi-
gate existing drug rules, a 1959 FDA memo dreaded new regulations  because 
 there was already “so much confusion and misinformation.”80
Facing mounting pressure to streamline licensing procedures and combat 
residues,  there was a strong temptation for the FDA to relax rather than to 
rethink regulations. By the late 1950s, officials  were increasingly forced to con-
cede that an overreliance on labels and under- resourced enforcement had 
allowed drug and feedstuff abuse to become rampant. Initial responses to non-
compliance nonetheless remained lenient. In July 1959, the FDA’s Division of 
Pharmacology warned George Larrick, who had been promoted to commis-
sioner in 1954, that reducing the amount of drugs entering the agricultural market 
would lead to misuse: it did not “take a  great deal of foresight to predict . . . 
that a veterinarian can (and no doubt  will) prescribe new drugs currently mar-
keted for  human use.”81 Mail advertisements and reports on “uncontrolled stud-
ies” would result in veterinary misuse of potent phar ma ceu ti cals— “misuse over 
which we (FDA) have very  little (or no) control.”82 Significantly, the division did 
not call for stricter enforcement but for the ability to grant exemptions from the 
1958 amendment’s treatment of veterinary residues as additives to facilitate licens-
ing if products  were deemed reasonably safe  under normal conditions of use.83 
On farms, the agency followed a similar strategy of relaxing rather than enforc-
ing rules. Although penalties for feed violations remained relatively low,84 Larrick 
publicly stressed that the FDA would not intensify prosecutions in 1959.85
The question of how to deal with increasing numbers of industry applica-
tions divided American regulators. In 1959, Mas sa chu setts’s official chemist, 
John Kuzmeski, called for a general reform of FDA drug licensing: “It is a well 
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known fact . . .  that [withdrawal warnings are] largely ignored. . . .  If a farmer 
feeds a medicated feed to his chickens up to the day of slaughter, and undesir-
able residues remain in the flesh as a consequence, you, I and a host of other 
 people  will be eating  those residues.”86  Because it was impossible for officials 
to “stand over  every farmer,” it was necessary to stop trusting in “rational” con-
sumers and “to assume that many farmers  will not heed”87 guidelines. Before 
licensing drugs, the FDA should therefore always consider “what danger to pub-
lic health exists when widespread disregard of necessary warning statements 
has been established.”88 Officials should also insist on the availability of reliable 
assay methods to discern drug levels. In 1957, an official review of thirty veteri-
nary drugs had shown that “reliable methods for analy sis in the finished feeds 
[ were] only available for less than half of them.”89  Because industry opposition 
had prevented the release of information contained in reformed NDAs to state 
feed control officials in 1958, the FDA had to ask for a voluntary industry release 
of assay methods.90
The results of lenient licensing and patchy surveillance  were thrown into 
stark relief by a  limited program of farm and feed mill inspections, which began 
in 1960.91 Inspection reports revealed that antibiotic noncompliance was ram-
pant. During a 1962 meeting with industry representatives, FDA officials 
blamed prob lems on ignorance and willful violations by the growing number 
of small feed mill operators: “Their time is  limited and often their capabilities 
to interpret the regulations . . .  are also. . . .  [Operators] have looked upon 
inspection programs with fear and distaste.92 In September of the same year, 
an FDA inspector described the breakdown of guidelines on an integrated tur-
key farm: “Field men, most of whom are not trained veterinarians, are employed 
to check the flocks [of about 300,000 birds] daily and diagnose disease condi-
tions . . .  the field men prescribe drugs and/or antibiotics for control or preven-
tion. As the medicated feeds are not resold, the firm does not apparently feel it 
comes  under the scope of the new drug or antibiotic regulations. The usual 
amounts of medi cation are not adhered to.”93 Drugs  were “frequently purchased 
in [as] large amounts as 25 kgs. penicillin.”94 It was not uncommon for “a coc-
cidiostat, blackhead preventive, and antibiotic . . .  all [to] be fed at the same 
time.”95 Drug residues in meat  were likely. However, when proactive officials 
tried to take action against violative shipments of drug premixes, the FDA gen-
eral counsel warned that the agency “w[as] not on sound  legal ground to take 
equal enforcement action against the majority of the violative shipments of 
new drug premixes and . . .  advised . . .  not [to] approve any more actions in 
this area  until the prob lem could be resolved.”96 Responding to rampant non-
compliance, an internal FDA memo suggested that  unless industry improved 
observance, legalizing illegal residues via new antibiotic tolerances might be the 
only course of regulatory action.97
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In October 1962, the FDA’s situation was further complicated by the pas-
sage of the Kefauver- Harris Amendment. The 1962 amendment tasked the 
already over burdened FDA with establishing a distinct licensing pro cess for vet-
erinary drugs and mandated the registration— and regular control—of veteri-
nary drug manufacturers and feed mills.98 Controversially, the amendment also 
contained a new feed additive law (the so- called DES- proviso) which allowed 
regulators to circumvent the Delaney Clause’s zero tolerance provision for car-
cinogens by stating that a drug was safe if  there was reasonable certainty that 
labels would be followed and it would not leave residues in food. Passed just as 
 Silent Spring was beginning to make headlines, the proviso was fiercely criti-
cized by consumer activists but supported by commissioner Larrick, who also 
launched parallel campaigns against alleged “food faddists” and the Rodale 
Press.99
The combined burden of the 1958 and 1962 amendments overstretched FDA 
veterinary drug regulation. Between 1958 and 1962, commissioner Larrick’s reg-
ulators had experienced a rapid expansion of their workload, demoralizing 
reports about noncompliance and residues, sustained public criticism, and cor-
ruption charges against se nior officials (chapter 2). Scandals and prob lems not 
only tarnished the FDA’s public image but also lowered internal morale. While 
se nior officials remained loyal to commissioner Larrick,  others warned about 
the degree to which industry and regulatory science had become intertwined.100 
For an organ ization whose power was built on reputation, the increasing chaos 
surrounding veterinary drug regulation was becoming harmful.101 It also led 
to a neglect of emerging risks like AMR.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, FDA regulators’ preoccupation with the 
increasing chaos surrounding drug compliance, licensing, and residues meant 
that the risks posed by agricultural AMR se lection remained low on their 
agenda. In contrast to Britain, where public health warnings triggered the first 
AGP review in 1960 (chapter 7), US officials downplayed studies indicating 
potential health  hazards and an increase of AMR in Staphylococci, Salmonellae, 
and E. coli on US farms.102 Complacency about nonhuman AMR risks was 
also shared by many US scientists. In 1959, John T. Logue from the University 
of Missouri insisted that agricultural AMR  hazards  were  limited to immedi-
ate exposure to antibiotics via residues or plant sprays. Although field workers 
using streptomycin plant sprays had experienced strong allergic reactions and 
transient AMR se lection, general agricultural antibiotic use was too low- dosed 
to pose an AMR  hazard.103 In 1960, a book coauthored by the soon- to- be- ousted 
head of the FDA Antibiotics Division, Henry Welch, similarly stated that “use 
of antibiotic drugs as preservatives, as crop sprays, in the nutrition of animals, 
and in the treatment or prophylaxis of disease (except mastitis) . . .  are in the 
best interests of the  people’s health.”104
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Still expressing confidence in “rational” agricultural antibiotic use, FDA offi-
cials also downplayed international AMR warnings. In 1961, Dr.  Antonio 
Santos Ocampo Jr. from Arenata University in the Philippines wrote to the 
FDA asking for advice: “For instance,  people  here are just plain crazy about the 
use of antibiotics to stimulate egg production and to prevent CRD. We are lit-
erally flooded with lit er a tures (of course by Pfizer  people) regarding the effi-
cacy. The Terramycin egg formula and the anti- germ 77 sells like hot cake 
 here.”105 However, Ocampo had “always entertained doubts as to the wisdom 
of the indiscriminate use of antibiotics.” “I fear that the microbial flora in ani-
mals might become resistant to antibiotics and when the time comes this anti-
biotic  will no longer have any value.”106 In response, the FDA assured Ocampo: 
“So far no one has produced any conclusive evidence that this is the case in 
poultry.”107
The specter of agricultural AMR se lection was raised again in response to 
British and WHO expert evaluations of AGPs in 1962 (chapter 7).108 Debat-
ing an extension of AGPs to mature animals, the FDA’s Division of Veterinary 
Medicine referred to Britain’s Netherthorpe Committee and cautioned that 
“ there may be a build-up of resistant organisms when adult animals are fed low 
levels of antibiotics continuously,  Great Britain does not allow their use for this 
reason.”109 However, no wider reform of agricultural antibiotic use resulted 
from  these deliberations. In September 1962, the FDA elaborated on its static 
assessment of agricultural AMR risks in response to a constituent enquiry sub-
mitted by Demo cratic senator Hubert H. Humphrey.110 The  future vice presi-
dent and former pharmacist was one of commissioner Larrick’s main critics and 
had coauthored the 1951 Durham- Humphrey Amendment, which introduced 
the  legal distinction between over- the- counter drugs and prescription- only 
medicines.111 Humphrey’s constituent enquiry had been authored by James S. 
Collins, a PhD in animal breeding and former employee of the feed com pany 
Nutrena (Cargill Inc.). While he was working for Nutrena, Collins had actively 
campaigned against AGPs and discovered that “our animals are now carry ing 
a heavy infection of antibiotic resistant pathogens.”112 In a remarkable state-
ment, Collins criticized the residue- centered FDA view that products  were safe 
“if no antibiotic turns up in [animals’] tissue”113 and warned: “It would seem 
to me that we are not only laying our animal population wide open for disas-
ter as well as providing reservoirs of pathogens to invade man.”114
Responding to Senator Humphrey, FDA deputy commissioner Harvey 
defended his agency’s policies: “experts regard use of drugs and chemicals . . . 
as necessary in order to . . .  assure adequate food as the Nation’s population 
increases while the acreage of productive farmland decreases.”115 Referring to 
the “indirect  hazard” of AMR, Harvey claimed that FDA “scientists are keep-
ing abreast of developments in this field.”116 The FDA had contacted the 
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British Netherthorpe Committee, which had “concluded that although  there 
are prob lems resulting from the use of . . .  antibiotics in animal feeds, such 
use should be allowed to continue.”117 Regarding over- the- counter sales of 
higher- dosed mastitis tubes, Harvey waspishly reminded Senator Humphrey 
of the wording of his own 1951 FDC Amendment: “ there is nothing in the Act 
itself dealing specifically with the question of  whether a veterinary drug may 
be restricted to veterinary prescription dispensing.”118
Interestingly, FDA AMR risk assessments  were diff er ent when it came to 
companion animals. In 1962, the Division of Pharmacology warned about antibi-
otic feeds for pets and “the pos si ble danger to man from development of trans-
missible antibiotic- resistant strains of bacteria (particularly staphylococci).”119 In 
contrast to their relatively benign assessment of AGPs in food production, regu-
lators agreed to move against “rations containing certifiable antibiotics which 
are marketed for continuous feeding to  house hold pets.”120
Antibiotic Reform
The FDA’s 1960s deadlock regarding veterinary drug regulation only began to 
loosen ahead of the retirement of George Larrick and other closely allied se nior 
FDA officials in 1965.121 Larrick’s successor, James L. Goddard, fulfilled con-
gressional demands for a medically qualified FDA commissioner and had pre-
viously headed the CDC. Starting as commissioner in January 1966 and soon 
known as “Go- Go Goddard,” Goddard embarked on a fundamental restruc-
turing of the FDA.  Under Goddard, FDA drug recalls grew by about 75  percent, 
and the NAS was contracted for an efficacy review of drugs licensed prior to 
1962— the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI).122
FDA leadership changes also affected the regulation of agricultural antibi-
otics. In February 1965, the FDA had de cided to install an ad hoc Committee 
on the Veterinary Medical and Nonmedical Uses of Antibiotics.123 Despite an 
archival gap and an elusive final report, circumstantial evidence makes it pos-
si ble to reconstruct the ad hoc committee’s proceedings. The committee had 
been formed  because of the above- mentioned FDA surveys on feedstuff com-
pliance and parallel detections of penicillin in US red meat.124 Responsible for 
meat inspections, the USDA had begun to call attention to antibiotic residues 
in 1964. According to the USDA’s inspection manual, assays (bacterial inhibi-
tion tests)  were to be conducted at the USDA’s central laboratory in Beltsville 
if carcasses showed injection lesions: “the antibiotic may have been adminis-
tered to alleviate or disguise acute symptoms of disease or as a preventive mea-
sure, but in any event, the animal is often marketed prior to complete absorption 
of the oil base antibiotic.”125 FDA officials  were also becoming concerned about 
allegations that antibiotic preservatives in fish and poultry  were selecting for 
resistant spoilage organisms and food- borne pathogens.126
Toxic Priorities • 71
Established as a result of  these concerns, the ad hoc committee was primar-
ily residue- oriented, and members initially referred to it as the “Committee to 
Consider the Public Health Implications of the Presence of Antibiotic Resi-
dues in Food and the Use of Antibiotics as Food Preservatives.”127 The com-
mittee was headed by Mark Lepper, professor of preventive medicine at the 
University of Illinois, and also counted Maxwell Finland among its members. 
Members met for the first time in early May 1965 and submitted their final 
report one year  later.128 Major changes occurred during this period: in addition 
to commissioner Larrick’s resignation, British warnings about “infectious 
AMR” fundamentally challenged existing antibiotic policies (chapter 7).129 No 
longer  limited to the vertical proliferation of resistant organisms, the horizontal 
exchange of AMR genes undermined spatial and biological differentiations 
between medical and agricultural settings.
However,  because of its focus on residues, the ad hoc committee barely 
addressed British AMR research. Although the first paper on horizontal AMR 
appeared in the Lancet three months ahead of their first meeting,130 commit-
tee members did not include it in their preparatory reading list131 but discussed 
the  matter  later on.132 Correspondence with British AMR researchers like 
Ephraim Saul Anderson also failed to sway antibiotic risk assessments.133 In 
August 1966, the ad hoc committee’s report expressed “concern” about the “pos-
sibility of microorganisms in animals developing re sis tance or of strains being 
selected that are resistant.”134 However, despite calling for more research, the 
final report reinforced traditional risk scenarios by limiting concrete AMR 
warnings to antibiotics’ immediate presence as residues in meat. According to 
the 1966 report, preservatives should no longer consist of or give rise to cross- 
resistance against therapeutically relevant antibiotics. Ideally, antibiotic food 
preservation should be banned completely. The FDA should also increase efforts 
to prevent illegal residues in edible tissues, reevaluate dosages and withdrawal 
times, and make “ ‘warning’ statement[s] used in veterinary chloramphenicol 
[chloromycetin] labeling . . .  more emphatic”135 to prevent its illegal use in food 
production. Reinforcing the US risk episteme’s traditional residue focus and 
presenting risks as containable, the report did not call for a wider revaluation 
of agricultural antibiotic use.
The FDA quickly committed to implement the report and used it to assuage 
the  limited public concerns about AMR that had emerged in the wake of the 
New  England Journal of Medicine’s 1966 attack on agricultural antibiotics 
(chapter  2). Within five days of NEJM ’s editorial, the Federal Register 
announced the following policy mea sures: producers of licensed antibiotic 
products  were to submit new data on “ whether or not such antibiotics and 
their metabolites are pre sent as residues in edible tissues, milk, and eggs from 
treated animals.”136 Should they fail to submit data within 180 days, producers 
could lose their product licenses.137 Citing AMR and hygiene concerns, in 
72 • USA, 1949–1967
September 1966 the FDA also banned the antibiotic preservation of poultry, 
fish, and shellfish and commissioned the NAS to or ga nize a conference on 
agricultural antibiotics.138 Despite barely addressing the new AMR concerns, 
it seemed as though FDA commissioner Goddard was in full control of the 
situation.
The resulting 1967 NAS symposium on the Use of Drugs in Animal Feeds 
reinforced this view by gathering many well- known antibiotic supporters from 
the 1955 NAS antibiotics conference. In his pre sen ta tion, AGP co- discoverer 
Thomas Jukes attacked the “emotional phraseology used in [the NEJM edito-
rial] . . .  that led the New York Times to . . .  threaten us with the propaganda 
device of a new  Silent Spring.”139 Meanwhile, Maxwell Finland maintained that 
 there was “ little evidence to implicate food as a source of infections caused by 
organisms resistant to antimicrobial agents.”140 Finland found it equally “dif-
ficult to implicate”141 AGPs in British reports on enteric “infective re sis tance.” 
Downplaying warnings of horizontal re sis tance transfer, most American par-
ticipants called for more research. Former FDA ad hoc committee head Mark 
Lepper acknowledged that current drug licensing was too crude. While no 
“major catastrophe” seemed to be “around the corner,” “the use of drugs in feeds 
could be influencing . . .  the background level of organism re sis tance, without 
any of us being aware of the fact.”142 Although he used the opportunity to call 
for an ambitious AMR surveillance program, James Steele, head of the CDC’s 
Veterinary Public Health Section, also confirmed that “no one is seriously rec-
ommending that use or production of antibiotics be discontinued.”143
Americans’ wait- and- see attitude was criticized by Eu ro pean attendees. Brit-
ish veterinary researcher Herbert Williams Smith noted: “ There is no essen-
tial difference between the emergence of resistant strains of bacteria as a result 
of the use of drugs in the treatment of clinical disease and as a result of the use 
of drugs as feed additives.”144 Prolonged exposure to low- dosed AGPs was espe-
cially conducive to AMR proliferation: “A strong case, therefore, exists for 
limiting the number of diff er ent kinds of drugs that can be used for ‘nutritional’ 
purposes.”145 Dutch researcher E. H. Kampelmacher similarly warned: “one 
cannot and should not deny that antibiotic addition to feeds, as applied on a 
large scale in husbandry  today, has increased the proportion of resistant patho-
genic and non- pathogenic bacteria in animals . . . .  Infectious drug re sis tance 
has complicated the prob lem.”146
However, Eu ro pean critics failed to find official US support. Most confer-
ence attendees remained convinced that global malnutrition posed a far graver 
threat than nonhuman AMR se lection. In his pre sen ta tion, commissioner 
Goddard repeated that the FDA was taking the ad hoc committee’s report 
seriously. Goddard did not dwell long on AMR and instead stressed FDA 
pro gress against antibiotic residues. Although past inaction and a lack of 
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reliable data was hampering pro gress, Goddard was proud of recent FDA 
attempts to recall residue- prone antibiotic products and of “the denial of cer-
tification for oil- based injectable penicillin products, which required an 
unrealistic withholding time” (chapter  10).147 Goddard was also optimistic 
about antibiotics’ general  future in US agriculture.  Because it was “vital to keep 
the industry moving ahead . . .  and to protect the supply of food,”148 the FDA 
would carefully consider risks but also “eliminate, wherever pos si ble, purely 
administrative delays in the introduction of new drugs for animal use.”149
With the ad hoc report justifying the FDA’s existing risk priorities, the 
agency also announced the establishment of a new national surveillance pro-
gram for antibiotic residues in meat in cooperation with the USDA in 1967. A 
mixture of targeted and random meat sampling would allow officials to gain 
an overview of contamination levels: the USDA would annually test a total of 
5,200 samples (3,900 red meat and 1,300 poultry).150 In a further step, FDA 
inspectors would randomly sample meat at the retail level. Regulators also 
launched educational campaigns warning farmers to “use medicated feeds care-
fully and wisely,” “protect the public health . . .  avoid economic loss.”151
The first program of its kind, FDA- USDA residue monitoring marked a 
decisive break with  earlier gatekeeping policies. However, it remained unclear 
 whether testing would enable the effective prosecution of offenders and  whether 
combating antibiotic residues would be sufficient to curb AMR. Interviewed 
in September 1967, the head of the FDA’s recently restructured Bureau of Vet-
erinary Medicine (BVM), Cornelius Donald Van Houweling stressed the 
importance of conducting more AMR research: “We seem to be at a stage where 
reasons can be advanced that  there  will be, or  will not be, a public health  hazard 
with continued use of medicated feeds.”152 FDA decisions would be made “on 
the basis of the best scientific evidence available.”153 Should FDA officials err, 
they would naturally do so “on the side of public protection.”154
 After eigh teen years of expanding agricultural antibiotic use, it remained to 
be seen  whether Goddard’s reformist officials would be able to reorder the frag-
mented path dependencies of 1950s drug regulation. Focusing on toxic 
 hazards, relying on industry compliance, and lacking a coherent policy frame-
work, the under- resourced FDA had failed to maintain control over the boom-
ing antibiotic market. Although officials tried to protect consumers from 
residues, the 1954 Miller and 1958 Food Additives amendments replaced nascent 
zero- tolerance policies with a system of thresholds below which antibiotics  were 
deemed safe. Once established, official residue tolerances resulted in a tempo-
rary “normalization” of antibiotics in poultry, fish, and plants— but not in cul-
turally sensitive milk. The era of normalization did not last long. By the late 
1950s, compliance prob lems, industry complaints, and public criticism led to a 
gradual abandonment of early antibiotic gatekeeping policies. Officials tried to 
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streamline drug licensing and established residue monitoring programs for milk 
and meat. Their narrow focus on residue  hazards mirrored and reinforced the 
wider US risk episteme. Agricultural AMR se lection was not considered a pri-
mary  hazard. In 1952 and 1966, official reviews called for more research but 
 limited AMR risks to the presence of residues. Despite new scenarios of hori-
zontal gene transfer and research highlighting AMR se lection on farms, the 
FDA remained committed to a narrow residue- focused rather than a broader 
AMR- oriented view of antibiotic risk.
Part II
Britain
From Rationing to Gluttony, 
1945–1969
The three chapters of this part reconstruct the development of antibiotic percep-
tions and regulations in Britain. With the exception of the dairy and poultry indus-
tries, British agriculture was comparatively slow to adopt antibiotics. AGPs  were 
only licensed in 1953. Close corporatist ties between officials and the National 
Farmers Union (NFU) subsequently played an impor tant role in overcoming 
initial agricultural hesitancy regarding antibiotics, which  were intended to boost 
national productivity and reduce imports. Similar to the United States, the result-
ing rise of agricultural antibiotic use was paralleled by increasing public ambiv-
alence regarding the new substances. Significantly, the emerging British risk 
episteme centered on AMR and animal welfare concerns rather than residues. 
Once again, the specific constellation of the domestic risk episteme had a power ful 
effect on regulatory trajectories. During the 1960s, public concerns triggered an 
impor tant review of British farm animal welfare and three separate AMR- focused 
reviews of agricultural antibiotic use. In 1969, prolonged public pressure and new 
data on horizontal re sis tance transfer led to the publication of the so- called Swann 
report. The report called for pioneering precautionary restrictions of medically 
relevant antibiotics in AGPs. However, its corporatist origins also meant that the 
Swann report tried to fix rather than reduce existing antibiotic use. By narrowly 
focusing on farmers’ direct access to antibiotics, the corporatist report ignored con-







This chapter traces how public views of agricultural antibiotics evolved in 
Britain. Following a wave of enthusiasm, perceptions of antibiotic  hazards 
developed in a nuanced fashion. Whereas US concerns focused on residues 
(chapter 2), long- standing British concerns about animal welfare and expert 
warnings about agricultural AMR se lection led to a more holistic staging of 
antibiotic risk. During the 1960s, fused concerns about horizontal AMR 
spreading from “factory farms” led to three government reviews of agricultural 
antibiotic use. Although commentators remained divided in their assessment 
of resulting  hazards, all agreed on the necessity of some kind of AMR- focused 
reform of agricultural antibiotic use.
 Great British Antibiotics
Following the deprivations of the Second World War, Britain strug gled to stem 
the costs of decommissioning large parts of her military while rebuilding the 
national industry. Trying to prevent a rise in expensive food and feed imports 
following bad harvests, the government embarked on a program of subsidized 
agricultural expansion (chapter 6). Meanwhile, public consumption was held 
in check by maintaining war time rationing. Ultimately, the prolonged disrup-
tion of international trade, costly colonial campaigns, and the Korean War 
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made postwar rationing last longer than the entire Second World War. Food 
availability actually decreased between 1946 and 1948. It was only in 1954 that 
the British Ministry of Food (MoF) was dismantled along with its rationing 
system.1 By this time, consumers  were craving meat: between 1950 and 1970 UK 
meat consumption increased by 33.1  percent.2
Similar to the United States, officials and farmers did their best to satisfy 
rising demand. However, trade deficits and currency devaluations meant that 
the government had to balance the need for expanded animal production with 
the need to reduce expensive imports like feedstuffs (chapter 7). It is thus no 
coincidence that the end of British meat rationing coincided with the legaliza-
tion of antibiotic feed supplements. In 1947, the Penicillin Act had attempted 
to curb AMR and protect  limited supplies by making biological antibiotics only 
available via medical and veterinary prescriptions.3 However, in 1953, the Ther-
apeutic Substances (Prevention of Misuse) Act (TSA) exempted the low- 
dosed nontherapeutic use of antibiotics for feed purposes from prescription 
requirements.
Initial public optimism about antibiotics’ introduction to agriculture 
matched that in the United States. Already accustomed to celebrating “Brit-
ish” miracle drugs,4 commentators had keenly followed US research and wel-
comed antibiotic use as a progressive way of increasing animal productivity and 
welfare. Following Jukes and Stokstad’s report on the antibiotic growth effect 
in early 1950, the left- leaning tabloid Daily Mirror published an article titled 
“A New Drug Speeds Pork Chops to Dining  Table.”5 In Parliament, Conser-
vative MP Rupert De la Bère immediately asked  Labour’s minister of agricul-
ture  whether AGPs would also be tested in Britain.6 Although early feed  trials 
proved inconclusive (chapter 6), British optimism about the new AGPs con-
tinued to grow. In 1951, the po liti cally conservative Times described them as a 
“strange nutrition”7 with the potential to speed up animal growth and save feed. 
By the time of Parliament’s reading of the TSA in 1953, the clause licensing 
AGPs was popularly known as the “penicillin for pigs clause.”8 Enthusiastic 
reports subsequently appeared in the left- leaning Observer and the conservative- 
liberal Financial Times.9 British commentators also greeted antibiotics’ use in 
plant and egg production as well as in fodder and food preservation.10 In 1956, 
the Times claimed that antibiotic preservatives marked “the greatest advance 
in the field of pro cessing perishable foods since the advent of refrigeration.”11 
The Financial Times covered the landing of the first antibiotic- preserved fish 
in Britain. US phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers had worked with the British gov-
ernment to trial ice containing 3 to 5 parts per million of tetracycline to retard 
spoilage and keep fleets on the  water for longer.  Trials took place aboard the 
government’s research vessel the Sir William Hardy, which would  later be sold 
to Greenpeace as the first Rainbow Warrior. Antibiotic- preserved cod, haddock, 
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and flatfish landed by the vessel  were proudly displayed in the ports of Aber-
deen, Grimsby, and Hull.12
While most media reports mirrored US enthusiasm (chapter 2),  there  were 
also subtle differences. For one, British observers tended to emphasize antibiot-
ics’ benefits for nutritional in de pen dence rather than their use against famine- 
fueled communism. Anxious about an alleged brain drain,13  others downplayed 
US contributions and viewed biological antibiotics as a quintessentially British 
technology that was now lining American pockets.14 Stagnating penicillin 
sales exacerbated this view. Following a dramatic increase of British produc-
tion between 1947 and 1950,15 the US government’s decision to increase penicil-
lin production in the face of the Korean War saturated 1950s markets. With 
revenues declining, British manufacturers had to find new antibiotic outlets. 
Major producers like Glaxo lobbied the British government to imitate the United 
States and loosen restrictions on antibiotic feeds for  humans and animals.16 
However, international competition remained stiff even  after Britain legalized 
AGPs with US broad- spectrum drugs proving more popu lar than British- 
manufactured penicillin, streptomycin, and chloramphenicol (chapter 6).
Americans’ success was in part due to skillful marketing. Responding to 
antibiotic patriotism, US producers subcontracted British companies like Boots 
to produce tetracyclines, which could now be branded as British.17 When Pfizer 
opened a terramycin (oxytetracycline)- plant in Sandwich in 1955, Pfizer’s vice 
president stressed the plant’s Britishness: “although the installation was financed 
by the United States it was partly designed and wholly built and operated by the 
British.”18 Courting clients inside and outside agricultural circles, US compa-
nies also placed expensive advertisements in national newspapers. In 1953, Led-
erle purchased a large advertisement section in the Times ahead of the launch of 
its chlortetracycline- based feed AUROFAC 2A.19 Sales personnel  were also in 
high demand: in 1956, Pfizer announced that the “world’s largest producer of 
antibiotics” was “expanding its Agricultural Sales Force” and looking for male 
British personnel with an agricultural background and experience in “modern 
sales techniques.”20 Three days  later, Lederle announced that it too was looking 
for “top- class Sales Representatives who  will sell Animal Feed additives such as 
Aurofac.”21 Celebrating its new Gosport plant in 1958, Cyanamid claimed that 
AUROFAC and other products  were “bringing untold benefits to almost  every 
sphere of life,” “Cyanamid contrives to make a new discovery almost  every day, 
transmuting the hopes of yesterday into the realities of  today.”22
Increasing antibiotic consumption and improving economic outlooks grad-
ually dispersed anti- American sentiments in the British press. By the early 
1960s, positive media reports presented both US and UK antibiotics as part of 
a safe and efficient movement to industrialize food production and to secure 
inf luence in a rapidly decolonizing world.23 In 1962, the Financial Times 
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reported on a Pig Industry Development Authority survey of 20,000 litters 
comprising about 200,000 pigs: whereas pigs fed no antibiotics weighed 38.1 
pounds  after eight weeks,  those fed antibiotics weighed 38.7 pounds. Accord-
ing to industry figures, antibiotic supplements created 1s 6d additional worth 
per piglet as a result of saved feedstuffs.24 Similar reports on an antibiotic- 
optimized era of livestock production appeared in the Times.25 Drug manu-
facturers also continued to hammer home the message of antibiotics and 
modern agriculture as preconditions to ethical, safe, and plenty food. In 1961, 
Cyanamid started an aggressive advertisement campaign for aureomycin. One 
ad showed a laughing pig exclaiming, “Yes, I’m a Scientific Pig” and presented 
agricultural antibiotics as a progressive way of improving animals’ well- being 
and farmers’ profits: “Indeed, to quote the vernacular, pigs in Britain ‘never had 
it so good’ . . .”26 Further commercials featured grateful cows cured of mastitis 
and praised aureomycin’s role in preventing any “disastrous rise of mortality”27 
in modern poultry production.
A Plethora of Concerns
Not every body was happy about the rapid expansion of agricultural antibio-
tic use. During the 1950s, three interrelated yet distinct strands of antibiotic 
criticism emerged in Britain’s public sphere: one group of critics attacked 
F IGURE 5.1  Cyanamid advertisement, “Yes, I’m a Scientific Pig,” The Times (London), 
April 14, 1961.
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antibiotics’ adulterating presence in foodstuffs; a second group of critics began 
to warn about the spread of AMR on farms; a third group condemned antibi-
otics as accomplices to the deplorable conditions of animals in intensive hous-
ing units. Depending on one’s position within the vari ous opposition camps, 
antibiotics’ image could vary from dangerous adulterator to endangered mira-
cle substance or partner in cruelty. While disparate risk perceptions fragmented 
early protest, their fusion during the 1960s would pose a far more systemic 
challenge to agricultural antibiotic use than “narrow” residue criticism in the 
United States.
A groundswell of elite British antibiotic criticism had existed even before 
the 1953 TSA. In 1951, former  Labour Parliamentary Secretary Lord Douglas 
of Barloch warned his peers in the House of Lords against “poisonous chemi-
cals in the growing and preparation of foodstuffs.”28 Focusing on antibiotics, 
DDT, and hormones, Barloch called “for strict control over all pro cesses which 
might affect the natu ral quality of food.”29 Two years  later, Barloch’s Conser-
vative colleague Lord John Justyn Llewellin expressed concern about allergic 
reactions caused by penicillin residues in meat.30 Similar fears  were voiced in 
the House of Commons. In February 1953, Conservative MP Anthony Hurd 
asked  whether  there was sufficient evidence that AGP residues would not 
endanger the public.31 One week  later, Conservative MP Dodds asked Con-
servative Minister of Agriculture Thomas Dugdale how consumers could be 
protected when “famous experts . . .  have declared that more harm than good”32 
would result from the TSA. Seconding his colleague, Conservative MP Col o-
nel Gomme- Duncan asked “ whether we have all gone mad to want to give peni-
cillin to pigs to fatten them?”33 Concerns  were not  limited to Parliament. 
Following a 1952 report on the planned TSA,34 readers of the social- liberal 
Observer worried that AGPs might destroy the intestinal flora’s capacity for pro-
ducing vitamins and lead to infertility and degeneration.35
However, in contrast to the United States, fears of antibiotic residues failed 
to dominate public perceptions of antibiotic risk. British consumers had a long 
history of remaining less concerned about invisible microbial or chemical 
 hazards than other countries.36 This does not mean that residue fears  were 
absent— they  were simply less pronounced. During the 1950s, deaths resulting 
from pesticide- contaminated Welsh flour and the radioactive contamination 
of milk following the 1957 Windscale fire did make national headlines.37 Brit-
ish supporters of “pure” and “natu ral” food had also published numerous books 
with colorful titles like Constipation and Our Civilisation38 on the dangers of 
artificial additives, chemicals, and drugs since the interwar period. However, 
as in the case of 1950s detections of penicillin in British milk (chapter 6), resi-
dues did not provoke widespread anxiety.
It was only around 1960 that agricultural antibiotics’ “toxic association” with 
other hazardous chemicals became more pronounced. Often enough, British 
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commentators imitated con temporary US coverage. Referring to American 
residue scandals, a series of articles on “What’s in our food” in the conserva-
tive tabloid the Daily Mail warned readers that  there  were two kinds of mod-
ern food- related dangers: malnutrition and the overconsumption of food 
sprayed with “poisonous insecticides and weedkillers” and produced by animals, 
which had been reared in darkness and fed “tranquilisers, antibiotics, hor-
mones.”39 In 1961, a Times interview exhorted farmers and veterinarians to 
protect consumers from drinking “diluted pus with noxious additions such as 
penicillin.”40 Media concerns about residues peaked in 1963 when the Milk and 
Milk Products Technical Advisory Committee reported that 14   percent of 
En glish and 11.6   percent of Scottish milk tested positive for antibiotics.41 
Although officials introduced US- style monitoring (chapter 7), the 1963 scandal 
triggered a longer- term increase of public criticism of conventional agriculture 
and antibiotic adulterants.42 According to the Guardian’s Michael Winstanley, 
the days of “pure” food  were gone.43 Meanwhile, purveyors of antibiotic- free 
organic food like the Soil Association and Cranks restaurant in London experi-
enced an unpre ce dented surge of media coverage— often also in conservative 
publications like the Spectator or Daily Mail.44
Residue warnings in the media  were accompanied by a series of critical best-
sellers. In 1960, physician Franklin Bicknell published Chemicals in Food and 
in Farm Produce.45 Rehashing warnings from his The En glish Complaint (1952)46 
and attacking a wide range of chemicals, Bicknell devoted a  whole chapter to 
agricultural antibiotics and the long- term  hazards of antibiotic exposure via 
milk, meat, and eggs.47 Remarkably, he also linked discussions of residues with 
warnings about wider agricultural AMR se lection: “by 1956 penicillin- resistant 
staphylococci  were pre sent in 47 per cent of samples of milk in Dorset, and resis-
tant [E. coli] strains have been found in the faeces of 36 per cent of pigs  going 
to a bacon factory. . . .  Urban  England could cynically ignore this farming prob-
lem  were not our farms still the basis of our food and therefore unavoidably a 
pos si ble source of  human infection.”48 Warning that regulators  were only 
focusing on hospitals as places of AMR se lection, Bicknell was especially con-
cerned about antibiotic preservatives’ creation of “reservoirs of resistant bacte-
ria”: “all the fish sheds and butchers’ shops and poultry packing stations  will 
harbour resistant bacteria; . . .  however carefully the use of antibiotics is in the-
ory controlled, in practice they  will just be sloshed over any food.”49 Similar 
concerns  were voiced by natu ral foods advocate Doris Grant. Quoting Bick-
nell, Grant’s House wives Beware (1958) and Your Bread and Your Health (1961) 
warned about AGPs and antibiotic preservatives. In chapters titled “Beware of 
the Dragon”50 and “The Poisons on Your Plate,”51 Grant discussed a pos si ble 
correlation between AGP use and animal illness as well as the use of antibiot-
ics to mask disease in abattoirs. According to Grant, “the only way to escape 
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this par tic u lar aspect of our twentieth- century chemical orgy is to become 
vegetarian.”52
Despite their increasing prominence, concerns about antibiotic residues, 
however, failed to displace other strands of public antibiotic criticism. Discussed 
in more detail in chapter 7, the late 1950s saw a growing number of British 
researchers point to agricultural AMR se lection as a potential  human health 
 hazard. Experts’ use of national surveillance data to demolish existing distinc-
tions between AMR on farms and in hospitals led to fierce public debates about 
who should have access to antibiotics. In contrast to the threshold- oriented 
thinking of their US colleagues, British researchers deemed low- dosed AGPs 
particularly likely to select for AMR. Veterinarians in par tic u lar highlighted 
dangers resulting from farmers’ unsupervised use of AGPs and therapeutic 
antibiotics— even though the latter  were often sold by veterinarians.53 Speak-
ing at the 1959 congress of the British Veterinary Association (BVA), the dep-
uty director of the government’s Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL), E. L. 
Taylor, warned that AGPs eliminated competing microorganisms and enabled 
resistant pathogens to spread.54 In early 1960, Britain’s Agricultural Research 
Council (ARC) suggested a general review of medical feed additives. The gov-
ernment subsequently launched a joint inquiry into agricultural antibiotic use. 
Chaired by the recently retired NFU president James Turner— now Lord 
Netherthorpe— the committee sat between 1960 and 1962.55 Although medical 
journals like the Lancet continued to print complacent and even positive reviews 
of agricultural antibiotic use,56 the rise of power ful British AMR concerns 
stood in contrast to Americans’ ongoing focus on residues.
Animal welfare concerns constituted a third distinct strand of public anti-
biotic criticism. In Britain, animal protection had a long and illustrious his-
tory. Starting in the late eigh teenth  century, an increasing number of Britons 
campaigned for the improved treatment of animals. Founded in 1824, the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) was the first or ga-
nized body for animal protection. During the second half of the nineteenth 
 century, anti- vivisectionist and animal protection campaigns for  horses and 
other animals commanded considerable public support and resulted in legisla-
tive reforms. In 1911, the Protection of Animals Act was passed to prevent will-
ful cruelty to animals in public spaces. Their interest in animals not only set 
Britons apart from other nations but also led to patriotic self- descriptions as 
being a “nation of animal lovers.” This alleged national trait was reinforced dur-
ing the two world wars with officials and campaigners emphasizing British 
compassion in opposition to German cruelty.57
 After 1945, notions of being a nation of animal lovers increasingly clashed 
with farmyard realities. Concerned about new production methods, a grow-
ing number of activists and journalists attacked antibiotics as facilitators of 
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systematic welfare abuse. Although intensive farming was not as widespread 
as activists claimed (chapter 6), the so- called factory farm soon turned into 
the main target of rising welfare criticism.58 In 1959, Observer journalist Clif-
ford Selly described the “highly artificial conditions” in which modern “ill- 
fated chickens” lived.59 Never seeing daylight, broilers  were “heavi ly drugged 
to keep them alive” and  were victims of a system “more akin to the factory 
than the farm.”60 Over the next two weeks, Selly’s article provoked passionate 
reader responses both in favour and against intensive farming. G. B. Houston 
accused the “poor, deluded city dweller” of facilitating the production of “drugged 
and misused broiler fowls”61 while F. A. Dorris Smith recommended visits to 
broiler  houses by  women’s organ izations to “bring this abomination to an end.”62 
Another reader specifically blamed antibiotics for enabling harmful practices.63 
Although establishment organ izations like the RSPCA initially distanced 
themselves from “factory farm” criticism,64 antibiotics’ association with welfare 
neglect posed a serious threat to the drugs’ public image.
By the early 1960s, three distinct strands of antibiotic criticism  were thus 
gaining ground in Britain. Readers of conservative and liberal newspapers  were 
regularly learning about the  hazards of antibiotic residues as well as about AMR 
se lection on farms. At the same time, the nation of animal lovers was coming 
to terms with antibiotics’ ambivalent capacity to provide animal welfare and 
enable its absence. However, without a common reform agenda to unite them, 
the distinct strands of public antibiotic criticism remained too disjointed to 
challenge growing antibiotic infrastructures in agriculture or ongoing antibi-
otic optimism in large parts of the media.
A Fusion of Concerns
A more holistic framing of antibiotic risks occurred between 1964 and 1966: 
British research on “infectious re sis tance” and the publication of Ruth Harri-
son’s bestselling Animal Machines65 led to a fusion of preexisting AMR and 
welfare warnings around the potent symbol of the “factory farm.” Resulting 
calls for systemic antibiotic reform  were amplified by fatal outbreaks of resis-
tant gastroenteritis among newborns.
The 1964 publication of Animal Machines was the first event to shift public 
discourse. A Quaker and vegetarian, the book’s author, Ruth Harrison, 
descended from a  family with close ties to the avant- garde Whitechapel Boys 
and author George Bernard Shaw. She had served in the Friends Ambulance 
Unit during World War II and then studied at the Royal Acad emy of Dramatic 
Art. In 1960, a leaflet against animal cruelty on “factory farms” made Harri-
son take on the cause of animal welfare and write Animal Machines. In her 
book, Harrison combined easy- to- read summaries of scientific findings with 
vivid descriptions of animals’ plight in factory- like production systems. She also 
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linked animal welfare concerns with a more general consumer and environmen-
talist critique of factory farming. Appearing one year  after the British publica-
tion of Rachel Carson’s  Silent Spring, Animal Machines not only contained a 
foreword by Carson but had in fact been edited by Carson herself. The book’s 
authority was further strengthened by a preface from Sydney Jennings, a for-
mer president of the British Veterinary Association (BVA).66
Claiming that meat eating had become an ethical and health  hazard, Animal 
Machines explic itly associated modern farmers’ antibiotic- dependency with 
animal cruelty, drug residues, and AMR.67 The book underlined its claims by 
using shocking pictures of conditions in “factory farms” and by referencing 
 Silent Spring, the recent milk scandal, and medical AMR warnings. For Har-
rison, it was “ironic to think that while authorities are steadily urging that anti-
biotics be used only with  great discrimination on the grounds of dangerous 
re sis tance building up, the agricultural authorities are encouraging even wider 
use. Perhaps,  these two should get together some time to discuss the  matters, 
before it is too late.”68 According to Animal Machines, agricultural antibiotics 
and “factory farming”  were synonymous with health, environmental, and eth-
ical prob lems. This fusion of concerns was reinforced by Rachel Carson’s fore-
word. For Carson, the days of pastoral agriculture  were over. Instead of animals 
wandering over green fields, producers had erected “factorylike buildings in 
which animals live out their wretched existence.”69 As a biologist, Carson found 
it inconceivable that such animals could produce healthy food. Establishments 
 were regularly swept through with diseases, and  were “kept  going only by the 
continuous administration of antibiotics.”70 Previously associated with promot-
ing health and spreading prosperity, agricultural antibiotics  were now por-
trayed as upholding an unhealthy and “unnatural” system of dark satanic mills.
While protracted negotiations prevented its publication in the United 
States,71 the public attention paid to Animal Machines in Britain was impres-
sive. This was in part due to a pre- publishing campaign in the left- leaning 
Observer. Titled “Inside the Animal Factories”72 and “Fed to Death,”73 articles 
by Harrison introduced readers to the main claims of her book. In her first 
article, Harrison accused the “factory farmer and the agri- industrial world 
 behind him”74 of acknowledging cruelty only when profitability ceased. As long 
as animal growth remained stable, rearing systems  were not questioned. Anti-
biotics  were “incorporated in [animals’] feed and heavier doses of drugs [ were] 
given at the least sign of flagging.”75 Focusing on poultry, Harrison claimed that 
young birds suffering from respiratory diseases or cancer often ended up on con-
sumers’  tables— the birds’ ill health masked by antibiotics.76 In her second 
article, Harrison focused on the intensive rearing of calves in darkened sties. 
Calves’ diets consisted almost “exclusively of barley, with added minerals 
and vitamins, antibiotics, tranquilisers and hormones.”77 Living in  these condi-
tions, some calves became blind and many suffered from liver- damage and 
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pneumonia: “their muscles become flabby and they put on weight rapidly, but 
they are not healthy.”78 Using more antibiotics to keep animals alive, farmers 
and veterinarians contributed to a race “between disease and new drugs.”79 
Quoting veterinary prac ti tion ers and the first Netherthorpe report, Harrison 
warned about AMR and residue- laden “tasteless meat”80 from factory farms.
Reactions to Harrison’s claims ranged from furious denial to emphatic sup-
port. Seven days  after publishing the second article, the Observer had received 
around 320 letters.81 Many expressed outrage: one reader compared animals’ 
suffering to child  labor;82 a second reader demanded labeling products from 
intensive farms;83 a third reader urged compatriots to imagine pets incarcerated 
in factory farms.84 While RSPCA Chief Secretary John Hall praised Harri-
son,85 animal health lecturer David Sainsbury accused her of presenting a 
“grossly distorted picture of what is actually happening.”86 In Wales, the dean 
of Llandaff rehashed the “nation of animal lovers” theme by comparing factory 
farms to Nazi concentration camps— thereby “othering” intensive farming as 
barbaric and anti- British: in a speech covered by both the Daily Mirror and 
Guardian, the dean also warned his congregation about antibiotic and hor-
mone residues.87 The trope of antibiotic- abuse on “farm Belsens”88 was power ful 
in both left- leaning and conservative circles.  After publishing a misogynist 
attack on the “fertile mind” of the “house wife,  mother, and vegetarian”89 Ruth 
Harrison, the Daily Mail was inundated by letters condemning its supposed 
endorsement of materialism and un- British barbarism on KZ- like farms.90 Sub-
sequent reporting in the Mail was notably more subdued.91
Although Karen Sayer and Abigail Woods have shown that intensive indoor 
farming was by no means ubiquitous,92 debates about factory farming soon pen-
etrated national politics. In Parliament,  Labour MP Joyce Butler launched an 
inquiry into the agricultural use of chemicals and residues in food.93 Public calls 
for the labeling of “factory farmed” food  were examined by the British Food 
Standards Committee.94 When opening the 1965 Royal Dairy Show, Prince 
Philip was handed a copy of Animal Machines.95 Cross- party pressure ultimately 
forced a reluctant government to launch a review of animal welfare led by 
medical scientist Francis W. Rogers Brambell.96 Published in 1965, the influ-
ential Brambell report stated that animal welfare was more than the absence 
of physical pain and also comprised  mental and behavioral aspects. Animals 
should have the freedom to stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves, 
and stretch their limbs. Although the drugs  were not included in the commit-
tee’s brief, the Brambell report commented on antibiotics’ beneficial role in pro-
tecting animals from disease but found itself unable to assess long- term effects 
on public health.97 This risk assessment was about to change.
In the same year that Animal Machines linked AMR and cruelty allegations, 
Britain’s last major typhoid outbreak in Aberdeen brought home the micro-
bial  hazards of industrialized food production. The responsible Salmonella 
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Typhi strain had spread via contaminated Argentinian meat but had proven 
susceptible to antibiotic treatment with chloramphenicol (chloromycetin).98 
However, experts worried that  future episodes might prove chloramphenicol 
resistant. Resistant typhoid outbreaks with higher fatality rates  were already 
being observed in India, West Africa, Greece, and the  Middle East.99 One of 
the concerned experts was Ephraim Saul (E. S.) Anderson. As director of the 
Public Health Laboratory Ser vice’s (PHLS) enteric reference laboratory, Ander-
son had provided expertise to the recent Netherthorpe review of agricultural 
antibiotics and advised during the Aberdeen typhoid outbreak.100 Anderson’s 
ability to draw on extensive bacteriological resources and growing skepticism 
regarding agricultural antibiotic use would play a decisive role in creating wide-
spread public support for AMR- focused antibiotic reform.
In 1965, Anderson and ge ne ticist Naomi Datta published a paper titled 
“Re sis tance to Pencillins and Its Transfer in Enterobacteriaceae” in the Lancet. 
In their paper, Anderson and Datta reported the discovery of transferable 
AMR against multiple antibiotics in Salmonella typhimurium isolates from 
 humans and a pig. S. typhimurium was a close relative of typhoid and a lead-
ing cause of food poisoning. Isolated plasmids (chapter 1) had the same AMR 
patterns and  were likely related to each other. Given pigs’ role as S. typhimurium 
reservoirs, the authors speculated  whether transferable AMR might have first 
arisen on farms and then spread to  human settings. In the laboratory, Ander-
son and Datta had also managed to transfer multiple- resistance from wild- type 
S. typhimurium isolates to sensitive Escherichia coli strains, which in turn trans-
ferred multiple- resistance to sensitive S. typhimurium cultures.101 The fact 
that bacteria could exchange ge ne tic information was not new. Joshua Leder-
berg and Edward Tatum had observed bacterial conjugation in 1946, and Tsu-
tomu Watanabe had shown that plasmids could encode re sis tance to multiple 
antibiotics during the late 1950s.102 What was new about Anderson and Dat-
ta’s 1965 paper was that horizontal re sis tance se lection and transfer also occurred 
in nonhuman settings and could cross over to bacteria in  human populations. 
Popularizing the dangers of horizontal gene transfer and nonhuman AMR 
reservoirs, Anderson and Datta warned: “Many of the drug- resistant strains of 
S. typhimurium causing  human infection may originate in livestock.”103
Three months  later, Anderson published a second paper together with M. J. 
Lewis in Nature.104 Reporting a dramatic rise of AMR in S. typhimurium phage 
Type 29, the authors linked the spread of type 29 to calf transports and warned 
against the “infective  hazards of intensive farming.”105 By the end of the 
year, Anderson published an even more direct attack on agricultural antibi-
otics in the British Medical Journal (BMJ): between December 1964 and 
November 1965, Anderson had collected over 1,200 animal (mainly calf) and 
500  human samples of type 29 S. typhimurium. Of  these, 97.6  percent  were drug- 
resistant. In contrast to  earlier papers, Anderson was able to provide concrete 
88 • Britain, 1945–1969
evidence of AMR transfer from animal to  human bacteria:  human and animal 
S. typhimurium samples showed similar re sis tance to furazolidone, a drug used 
exclusively in veterinary medicine. Anderson was certain that of the analyzed 
samples “most  human infections of undetermined source  were bovine in 
origin.”106 Anderson’s data prompted the BMJ ’s editorial to won der  whether 
the risks of veterinary ampicillin use— the other antibiotic of choice against 
typhoid— could be so  great that “it may perhaps be thought advisable to aban-
don this form of treatment.”107
The public impact of Anderson’s AMR warnings was impressive. Published 
only one year  after Animal Machines, scenarios of “infective re sis tance” under-
lined Ruth Harrison’s criticism of intensive farming and  were seemingly cor-
roborated by other international studies showing rising AMR in E. coli, 
Salmonella, and Staphylococci.108 In popu lar discourse, the “factory farm” 
became firmly connoted as a place of dubious welfare and dangerous bacteria. 
In February 1965, a Times report suggested “that antibiotics should be kept well 
away from livestock food.”109 Two months  later, the Daily Mail reported on a 
medical conference at the Yorkshire Institute of Agriculture. A panel on “chem-
ical farming”110 had called for residue curbs and AMR- focused restrictions of 
medically relevant antibiotics. By June 1965, the  Labour government was fac-
ing calls from its own MPs to investigate AGPs’ potential  hazards.111 In Novem-
ber, the Observer blamed “super- farms”112 for AMR. According to the Times, 
Anderson’s findings and new research by veterinary bacteriologists necessitated 
a wider “reappraisal of the use of antibiotics.”113 Meanwhile, another Observer 
article explic itly warned against “factory farm bacteria.”114 Whereas AMR 
warnings did not resonate strongly in the residue- focused United States (chap-
ter 2), the combined force of Animal Machines and “infective re sis tance’ led to 
the formation of an AMR- focused risk episteme in Britain.
This risk episteme also influenced Britain’s organic sector. By the late 1960s, 
publications like The Wholefood Finder referred to AMR and the “cruelties of 
factory farming”115 before detailing the Soil Association’s new definition of 
organic food. Relying heavi ly on Animal Machines and  going beyond US 
publications’ focus on residues, the Soil Association’s “ wholefood standards” 
required that animals be fed organic feeds and kept in a  free environment defined 
according to Brambell- inspired comfort regulations. Organic products had to be 
 free of antibiotics and other chemicals. On farms, antibiotics and other drugs 
should not be used routinely but only “in an extreme emergency.”116
British officials similarly revaluated existing antibiotic policies. In spring 
1965, the British government reacted to Anderson’s AMR warnings by recon-
vening its Netherthorpe committee on AGPs (chapter 7). In January 1966, the 
Netherthorpe committee called for a new committee to reevaluate agricultural 
antibiotics in general.117 While the government was slow to respond to this 
Fusing Concerns • 89
demand, new studies, ongoing media reports, and parliamentary inquiries kept 
the issue of “infective re sis tance” alive.118 In 1966, veterinary researcher Her-
bert Williams Smith published a study showing that transferable plasmid- 
mediated re sis tance against multiple antibiotics was common in pathogenic 
E. coli isolated from both  humans and pigs, calves, and fowls receiving antibi-
otics: “The high incidence of resistant strains to a large number of drugs and 
the complex re sis tance patterns of some of the strains was a disquieting feature 
of this survey, particularly as the diseases caused are acute and severe to the 
extent that they may terminate fatally if the drug with which they are first 
treated is not active against the infecting strain; the result of sensitivity tests 
cannot be awaited before commencing treatment.”119 The Guardian’s Anthony 
Tucker and Bernard Dixon from the New Scientist— both allies of E.  S. 
Anderson— used scientific warnings to press for antibiotic reform.120 Dixon in 
par tic u lar attacked “the irritating British habit of seeking expert guidance on 
a technical  matter and then pigeon- holing the advice when it comes.”121 Citing 
Anderson and Williams Smith, Dixon referred to the danger of multi- resistant 
E. coli strains causing neonatal diarrhea in babies.122 By December 1967,  these 
warnings sounded tragically prophetic. Described by Robert Bud in chilling 
detail, multi- resistant E. coli 0119 and 0128 caused a severe outbreak of gastroen-
teritis among infants in the northeastern town of Middlesbrough. Poor hospital 
hygiene and transferring infected infants to other hospitals spread the infec-
tion. Fifteen infants died.123
Although  there  were no proven links, preconditioned British readers con-
nected the multi- resistant Middlesbrough strains to intensive farming and 
agricultural antibiotic use. It seemed as though  there was no end of dangers 
accruing from factory farms. Following heated exchanges between veterinary 
science lecturers and organic campaigners,124 an article in the London Illustrated 
News linked the Teesside epidemic to agricultural antibiotic use: “one cannot 
help wondering why man should take the chance of placing himself in danger 
of returning to conditions of the pre- antibiotic era when, for example, the death 
of fourteen babies from gastro- enteritis would certainly not have made news 
headlines.”125 In February 1968, a BMJ review of the Middlesbrough outbreak 
by E. S. Anderson poured further oil onto the fire of speculation. Although he 
noted that it was not pos si ble to distinguish between R- factors of  human and 
animal origins, Anderson warned that the transferable AMR of the Middles-
brough strains might well have originated in nonpathogenic E. coli on farms:
The risk to man that arises from the too  free use of antibiotics in  human 
medicine is obvious. . . .  It should be remembered, however, that they could also 
have arisen in livestock as the result of antibiotic malpractice . . .  , which has 
made it practically certain that not only multiple- drug- resistant pathogens such 
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as Salmonella typhimurium but also multiresistant non- pathogenic E. coli are 
transmitted from livestock to man, the latter on a large- scale. . . .  It is pointed 
out that restricting of the use of antibiotics in man and animals is overdue.126
The Middlesbrough epidemic put im mense pressure on the British govern-
ment to implement the reconvened Netherthorpe committee’s suggestions and 
launch a wider review of agricultural antibiotic use.127 Appointed in July 1968 
and announcing its findings in November 1969, the Joint Committee on 
the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine— the 
so- called Swann committee— divided antimicrobial substances into thera-
peutic and nontherapeutic antibiotics.128 While therapeutic antibiotics  were 
relevant to  human medicine, nontherapeutic antibiotics  were considered medi-
cally irrelevant. Only nontherapeutic antibiotics below certain doses  were to 
be allowed in growth promoter feeds. Medically relevant penicillin, chlortetra-
cycline, and oxytetracycline  were to be banned from AGPs. The Swann com-
mittee, however, left many other areas of agricultural antibiotic use untouched: 
it merely cautioned against the use of chloramphenicol in veterinary medicine 
and did not address ongoing veterinary prescriptions of now restricted medi-
cally relevant antibiotics (chapter 7).129
Facing substantial public pressure— not least  because Michael Swann, the 
committee’s head, had noted that the Middlesbrough strains might have orig-
inated on farms— 130 the British government hastily committed to implement-
ing the Swann report. Despite protests by US manufacturers,131 the Swann 
recommendations  were endorsed by nearly all segments of the British media. 
Most commentators explic itly noted that the proposed AGP restrictions  were 
based on precautionary risk predictions rather than hard evidence of AMR- 
related harm. They  were also aware that the Swann proposals left most other 
aspects of agricultural antibiotic use unchanged. While a Times editorial lauded 
the decision to limit laypersons’ access to therapeutic substances,132 agricultural 
correspondent Leonard Amey noted that a more ambitious complete ban of 
antibiotics would have been po liti cally unfeasible and could have jeopardized 
British intensive animal production.133 This continued tolerance of many other 
forms of agricultural antibiotic use was criticized by the Guardian.134 However, 
overall, even critical voices  were satisfied that agricultural AMR se lection had 
now been successfully addressed in Britain.
On both sides of the Atlantic, the 1960s thus saw initial public enthusiasm 
about agricultural antibiotics become ambivalent. However, antibiotic percep-
tions  were not the same in the United States and the United Kingdom. Eco-
nomic constraints and accusations of US profits accruing from “British science” 
had already led to a diff er ent tone of British reporting during the 1950s. But it 
was in the field of risk perceptions that transatlantic views of agricultural anti-
biotic use differed most. In the United States, deep- seated concerns about food 
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adulteration led to a framing of antibiotic risk nearly exclusively in terms of anti-
biotics’ potential presence as invisible residues (chapter 2). A very diff er ent risk 
episteme emerged in the United Kingdom when traditional animal welfare con-
cerns fused with new “infective re sis tance” warnings  under the dystopian umbrella 
of the factory farm. This episteme framed antibiotic risk as AMR spreading from 
cruel factory farms to  humans. On both sides of the Atlantic, interpretations of 
antibiotic risk  were thus influenced by their alignment with already existing deep- 
seated cultural risk narratives. The resulting national risk epistemes exerted a 




Antibiotics and British Farming
The evolving antibiotic risk episteme had profound implications for British 
agriculture. In contrast to their market- driven introduction to US agricul-
ture, postwar constraints and power ful veterinary interests led to a more 
gradual top- down introduction of antibiotics in Britain. The diff er ent struc-
ture of British livestock husbandry and mixed feed  trials also meant that 
farmers  were more hesitant to embrace AGPs following their licensing in 
1953. Concerted pro- antibiotic campaigning by British officials, industry 
representatives, and agricultural experts only gradually overcame this hesi-
tancy. By 1960, many British farmers  were regularly using antibiotics but— 
with the exception of the poultry sector— husbandry systems remained less 
intensive and more diverse than in the United States. Meanwhile, rising 
public antibiotic criticism triggered disputes between British farmers and 
veterinarians. Veterinarians attempted to gain greater control over the ani-
mal drug market and promote preventive health schemes. Although many 
farmers shared concerns about drug residues and new production systems, 
agricultural experts and organ izations like the NFU opposed losing direct 
antibiotic access. Compromise- oriented corporatist politics subsequently 
played an impor tant role in shaping British antibiotic reform without jeop-
ardizing antibiotic access.
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The Urge to E- X- P- A- N- D
During the early 1930s, the outlook for British farming had been bleak: as 
inhabitants of the largest agricultural free- trade market in the world, farmers 
 were exposed to sinking food prices and a flood of cheap imports. Unable to 
compete, employment in the agricultural sector fell and productivity decreased 
 until 60  percent of British food had to be imported. Although it undertook 
brief forays of agricultural support during the 1920s, the British government 
only gradually abandoned laissez- faire policies: the Agricultural Acts of 1931 
and 1933 created tariff walls and marketing boards for vari ous farm products.1 
Reacting to worrying developments on the Eu ro pean continent, the United 
Kingdom established a Food Department in 1936 and began stockpiling food 
and agricultural supplies. By 1939, British officials  were propagating agricultural 
expansion to provide additional calories in the likely event of war.2
Following the outbreak of hostilities, the nascent alliance between produc-
ers and officials developed into a corporatist system of decision- making. Cor-
poratism is a system in which representative groups assume some responsibility 
for the self- regulation of their constituency in return for privileges, a close rela-
tionship with the government, and the ability to reach bargained agreements 
with state agencies. Corporatism was particularly pronounced in the British 
health and agricultural sectors.3 In the case of agriculture, farmers  were inte-
grated into War Agricultural Executive Committees, which  were controlled 
by the Ministries of Agriculture and Food. Staffed by officials and farmers, 
committees enforced ministry directives at the local level but also advised and 
graded farmers’ productivity. Unproductive or recalcitrant farmers could have 
their land expropriated. Attempting to maximize caloric output, war time 
administrators prioritized plant production and introduced guaranteed prices 
by purchasing farmers’ produce.4 While pig and poultry stocks plummeted and 
feedstuffs  were rationed, British farmers increased caloric output by 50  percent.5 
By the end of the war, farmers  were celebrated for feeding the nation during 
the Nazi onslaught.
Producers’ integration into corporatist structures had advantages for offi-
cials and farmers alike. Enabling vital government control over war time food 
production, it also fostered self- organization of agricultural interests.6 Despite 
occasional expropriations and diminished individual freedom,7 the majority of 
British farmers and their lobby, the National Farmers’ Union (NFU),  were 
 eager to continue the profitable corporatist alliance with the state  after 1945. 
Corporatist prospects  were promising. In contrast to the interwar years, most 
farmers’ coffers had been flushed by fixed war time prices and subsidized rural 
development. The postwar economic situation made the  Labour government 
equally willing to continue the corporatist alliance. In August 1945, the United 
States’s termination of the Lend- Lease agreement necessitated the repayment 
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of war time loans and left Britain critically short of foreign currency. Attempt-
ing to reduce expensive imports, the government embarked on a program of 
subsidized agricultural expansion with the Agricultural Act of 1947. Perpetu-
ating annual price reviews and intervention purchases, the act was designed to 
give farmers and farm workers fair returns and stimulate agricultural invest-
ment.8 Agricultural productivity was to be improved by the newly founded 
National Agricultural Advisory Ser vice, improvement grants, and corporatist 
marketing boards for agricultural produce.9 Farm organ izations  were integrated 
into decision- making both at the national and regional levels.  Eager to control 
government expenditure, officials soon relied on organ izations like the NFU 
to self- coordinate support by a “myriad of small in de pen dent producers”10 for 
expansion programs, disease eradication, and farm improvement. In return, the 
NFU gained an exclusive and power ful place at the  table when it came to deter-
mining price supports and the regulation of new technologies.11 According 
to Michael Winter, the NFU soon became so influential that membership 
appeared “almost ‘compulsory’ for many farmers.”12
Corporatist agricultural arrangements remained stable even  after the end of 
postwar currency shortages and rationing. Ignoring accusations of feather- 
bedding farmers, successive governments supported a system of deficiency pay-
ments, which replaced direct intervention purchases: once market prices fell 
below guaranteed official prices defined by annual reviews, the state paid farmers 
the difference between guaranteed and real prices. Similar to the United States, 
sinking international food prices and domestic surpluses soon made state 
expenditure rise dramatically in areas like beef and dairy production. Attempt-
ing to curb expenditure by improving agricultural efficiency, the Conservative 
government’s 1957 Agricultural Act allowed  limited annual reductions of price 
guarantees and shifted the emphasis from subsidies to improvement grants, which 
by 1960 constituted about 40   percent of agricultural support. The government 
also abolished powers of supervision and eviction. However, the under lying cor-
poratist consensus on further increasing production remained intact.13
During the 1950s, many farmers invested war time earnings and borrowed 
heavi ly to expand production and productivity.14 Agricultural magazines like 
Farmers Weekly and the NFU’s British Farmer  were full of advice on better 
husbandry methods, disease eradication, and basic economics for expanding 
farmers.15 Presenting technological sophistication as a badge of pride,16 agricul-
tural boosters intermixed the trope of having “fed the nation at war” with sce-
narios of global overpopulation.17 For younger farmers, the rule was “never farm 
backwards.”18 One article claimed that while “nature intended a bird to lay only 
24 eggs a season,” scientific nutrition and husbandry meant that “ there [was] no 
reason why she should not reach the 300 mark.”19 Frequently reminded to treat 
an animal “as a manufacturing unit,”20 “the urge to E- X- P- A- N- D”21 was said to 
be particularly pronounced in young ambitious and modern farmers.
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Farmers heeded the urge. While Britain produced 762,000 tons of meat in 
1947, it produced 1,713,000 tons in 1960.22 Meanwhile, the number of workers 
on British farms declined from 843,000 in 1950 to 645,000 in 1960 with total 
 factor productivity increasing from 67.5 in 1953 to 83.4 in 1963 (1973 = index 
100).23 However, not  every farm intensified production. While Andrew God-
ley and Bridget Williams have shown that vertically integrated intensive rear-
ing systems soon became common in the poultry sector,24 Karen Sayer and 
Abigail Woods have noted that intensive and confined production methods 
 were  adopted unevenly in the pig,  cattle, and egg production sectors. Contra-
dicting public notions of universal factory farming, much of British livestock 
production remained characterized by a diversity of indoor and outdoor pro-
duction systems.25 In part, this diversity had cultural reasons. Some farmers 
feared that improved efficiency would increase social divides between a shrink-
ing number of farmers and the general public while  others feared technologi-
cal alienation from animals and healthy nature.26
From Wariness to Routine
Postwar economics, corporatism, and the diverse structure of livestock produc-
tion also impacted antibiotics’ introduction to British farms. Veterinarians 
and farmers  were already familiar with therapeutic antibiotic use for individ-
ual animals. However, in contrast to their rapid demand- driven introduction 
in the United States, nontherapeutic antibiotic applications had to be actively 
“sold” to initially hesitant British livestock farmers.
Similar to the United States, the interwar period saw a growing number of 
drugs and supplemented feeds used on British farms. However, effective reme-
dies for infectious disease remained rare. As late as 1938, manuals like the 
Handbook of Modern Pig Farming had only been able to recommend a combina-
tion of preventative mea sures and culling for most diseases.27 Advertised in British 
trade journals from 1938 onward, new sulfonamides significantly enhanced 
farmers’ and veterinarians’ ability to treat disease in individual animals. The new 
drugs  later also featured in James Alfred Wight’s (alias James Herriot) popu lar 
semi- autobiographic books on his time as a veterinary surgeon in Yorkshire 
between the 1930s and 1950s.28 In Vet in Harness (1974), Wight’s character diag-
noses calves with pneumonia and convinces the farmer to use M&B 693 (sulpha-
pyridine). The recovery is miraculous: “I  didn’t know it at the time but I had 
witnessed the beginning of the revolution. . . .  The long rows of ornate glass 
 bottles with their carved stoppers and Latin inscriptions would not stand on the 
dispensary shelves much longer . . . .  At last we had something to work with, at 
last we could use drugs which we knew  were  going to do something.”29
Initially, sulfonamides  were obtainable without a veterinary prescription. 
Although interwar officials  were beginning to substitute self- regulation with 
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what Stuart Anderson has called “a medical system of control through the 
writing of prescriptions,”30 legislation remained fragmented. In 1920 and 1925, 
the Dangerous Drugs and Therapeutic Substances Acts restricted narcotics 
and mandated the licensing of producers of biologicals like vaccines and sera. 
However, so- called poisons remained available over the  counter in licensed 
pharmacies. Meanwhile, the Phar ma ceu ti cal Society of  Great Britain’s power to 
F IGURE 6.1 An early antibiotic advertisement, M&B 693, Veterinary Record, August 1940.
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determine  whether a substance was a poison and who could sell it meant that 
most new drugs— including the azo dye derived sulfonamides— continued to 
be categorized as poisons.31 The 1933 Pharmacy and Poisons Act’s “trade or busi-
ness relaxation” enabled farmers to purchase sulfonamides by signing the Poi-
sons Register of a pharmacist, who was an Authorized Seller of Poisons.32 In 
1941, sulfonamides’  legal status as poisons was both restricted and confirmed 
by the Pharmacy and Medicines Act, which listed a range of conditions that 
should only be treated by medical doctors.
Throughout the early 1940s,  actual drug availability was, however, severely 
constrained by war time shortages. This was also true for the new biological anti-
biotics. Produced by biological organisms, antibiotics like penicillin  were reg-
ulated not as poisons but as therapeutic substances. Their distribution was 
controlled by the war time Defence Regulations.  Because of AMR concerns and 
 limited supplies, prescription requirements for biological antibiotics  were 
enshrined in the 1947 Penicillin Act, which was extended to encompass chlor-
tetracycline and chloramphenicol in 1951.33 Access to sulfonamides was also 
restricted. Although full- time farmers could still purchase sulfonamides 
directly from pharmacists, the 4th Schedule of the 1933 Pharmacy and Poisons 
Act now exempted sulfonamides from prescription requirements only when 
they  were “contained in ointments and surgical dressings or in the preparations 
for the prevention or treatment of diseases in poultry.”34
Relatively unaffected by war time cuts of animal production, dairy farmers 
 were among the vanguard of 1940s British antibiotic users. Government efforts 
to increase milk output and reduce  labor inputs had led to a national drive 
against mastitis. Following veterinary diagnosis, farmers  were given access to 
subsidized sulphanilamide to treat infected udders. The strategic importance of 
war time milk production is also illustrated by the fact that precious penicil-
lin, which was still being recycled from  human urine, was donated by Howard 
Florey for experimental use against udder infections in 1941. Although doses 
remained low (about 10,000 units per treatment), veterinarians studying mas-
titis  were granted preferential penicillin access in 1943.  After 1945, penicillin 
 trials against mastitis caused by Streptococcus agalactiae in commercial herds 
fostered optimism about wider disease eradication.35
British phar ma ceu ti cal producers catered to rising veterinary demand for 
chemotherapy against mastitis. In 1946, Wellcome introduced collapsible 
single- dose mastitis tubes with penicillin G in oil- wax suspension, which did 
not require refrigeration and  were less irritating than preparations containing 
sulfonamides or gramicidin.36 Sulfonamides and biological antibiotics  were also 
used to treat pneumonia, footrot, and calf diphtheria.37 However, supply prob-
lems prevented  trials of US broad- spectrum antibiotics and streptomycin 
 until the early 1950s.38 As late as 1951, British officials complained about the 
“absolutely prohibitive”39 cost of aureomycin treatments.
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Rising agricultural demand for antibiotic prescriptions soon led to discus-
sions about what constituted “rational” drug use. Strengthened by their war-
time integration into disease control programs and 1940s prescription 
requirements, British veterinarians  were in a far more power ful position to 
influence antibiotic use than their US colleagues.40 However, veterinarians’ 
ability to prescribe and sell antibiotics also created a conflict of interest. While 
national veterinary organ izations promoted the image of veterinarians as reli-
able antibiotic stewards, local vets  were incentivized to use antibiotic prescrip-
tions to maximize income and secure the loyalty of paying customers. As early 
as 1948, articles in the Veterinary Rec ord, organ of the British Veterinary Asso-
ciation (BVA), debated responsible prescription practices: “many prac ti tion ers 
are receiving requests from their clients to leave a supply with them, to make 
provision for the immediate treatment of new cases or to be used for control 
purposes.”41  Because farmers knew how easy it was to use antibiotic tubes, many 
 were unwilling to pay veterinary fees for  every single treatment and demanded 
bulk prescriptions for self- use. The situation presented a quandary for veteri-
narians, who depended on local farmers’ good- will for their income: “Some, 
influenced perhaps by ethical considerations or by the sight of boxes of peni-
cillin tubes left lying about on the win dow ledges of cowsheds, might wish to 
read into the wording of the [Penicillin] Act the inference that on no account 
should a penicillin preparation be left for the farmer to administer himself. 
Some might go to the other extreme and take the view that penicillin may be 
freely supplied to the client.”42 Veterinarians should try to strike a balance 
between stewardship and an “unnecessary restrictive”43 prescription approach.
In practice, veterinary journals’ exhortations for “rational” prescriptions 
could be trumped by what some condemned as “rank commercialism.”44 Vet-
erinarians’ control over the increasingly lucrative drug market also exacerbated 
tensions with pharmacists.45 Writing to the Veterinary Rec ord in 1953, a Cheshire 
pharmacist noted that  little had changed since the 1947 Penicillin Act: 
“the  simple fact is . . .  the veterinary surgeon who supplies drugs in bulk for the 
farmers’ use is just as much keeping open shop as any retail pharmacist, and as 
such should not grumble if he meets competition from the pharmacist.”46 Just 
how easy it was to obtain restricted antibiotics from some veterinarians is illus-
trated by the 1956 prosecution of three Yorkshire prac ti tion ers.  After an under-
cover inspector had purchased antibiotics from an unqualified assistant, it 
emerged that it was common practice for local farmers to  either come in per-
son, send their sons, or ask for antibiotics on the phone. Drugs  were promptly 
sold without an accompanying herd inspection. According to the accused vets, 
“it would be ludicrous to run out  every time a farmer telephoned to say he had 
another outbreak of mastitis.”47
While British farmers  were happy to buy prescribed antibiotics to treat 
and prevent disease, they  were initially more skeptical about nontherapeutic 
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applications. Despite closely following developments in the United States,48 
subdued early perceptions of antibiotic growth promotion  were caused by dis-
appointing feed  trials, the diff er ent composition of British animal feeds, and 
the late derationing of commercial feeds in August 1953.49
Similar to the United States, British researchers had been interested in the 
nutritional value of antibiotic fermentation wastes since the 1948 equation of 
vitamin B12 with APF (chapter 3). Collaborating with Glaxo Laboratories at 
Reading’s National Institute for Research in Dairying, nutritionist Raphael 
Braude started feeding streptomycin liquor residues to piglets in May 1949. 
Unaware of the parallel discovery of the antibiotic growth effect, Braude and 
his colleagues tested diff er ent combinations’ impact on weight gain and B12 con-
centrations in livers. Initial results  were disappointing: no growth promotion 
was observed and pigs fed streptomycin liquor did less well than controls fed 
iron supplements.50 Following the 1950 announcement of the antibiotic growth 
effect, Britain’s Agricultural Research Council (ARC) commissioned a new 
round of antibiotic feed  trials on pigs and poultry in research laboratories in 
Reading and Northern Ireland as well as by manufacturers like the Distillers 
Com pany, Glaxo Laboratories, and the British Oil and Cake Mills (BOCM). 
However, once again,  trials with domestic procaine penicillin, streptomycin, 
and detergents proved inconclusive. In the case of pigs, antibiotics seemingly 
promoted the growth of animals fed Midwest- style vegetable protein diets but 
not of animals fed common British diets, which  were rich in animal protein. 
According to Reading- based researchers, “the effect of the addition of antibi-
otic supplements [to domestic feeds] is unlikely to be of commercial impor-
tance.”51 Positive results  were, however, achieved by adding antibiotics to the 
diets of runts and pigs suffering from scours.52  Trials on pullets at the Rowett 
Research institute in Aberdeen produced mixed results.53
Following a meeting in October 1951, the ARC de cided that initial data was 
insufficient to justify amending the 1947 Penicillin Act and commissioned fur-
ther feed  trials. This cautious approach was criticized by British antibiotic manu-
facturers, who warned about impeding commercial pro gress in “the birthplace of 
antibiotics” (chapter 5).54 Focusing on pigs, the second round of ARC- sponsored 
 trials tested US aureomycin supplements alongside British- manufactured pro-
caine penicillin solutions and B12. One group of pigs was fed an antibiotic supple-
mented diet containing vegetable and animal protein (white fish meal), which 
was considered typical for British agriculture, while the other group was fed 
an American “vegetable protein” diet. This time, both penicillin and aureomy-
cin  were found to promote animals’ weight gain by between 1.4 to 40.2  percent 
over control animals. Live weight gains  were greater on vegetable diets with 
US aureomycin slightly outperforming British penicillin. A second set of 
experiments with antibiotic creep feeds for suckling pigs led to similar results. 
However, strong variations between individual  trials made British experts shy 
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away from uniformly endorsing AGPs. In 1953, the ARC cautiously concluded 
that the average farmer “should be able to derive a more positive commercial 
benefit from the improvement of food conversion.”55 Despite ongoing uncer-
tainty about feeds’ action and per for mance, it was thought that AGPs led to 
8 to 10  percent speedier growth and about 5  percent better food conversion in 
pigs and poultry.56
A second impor tant reason for British farmers’ lukewarm endorsement of 
AGPs may well have been the ample domestic supplies of vitamin B12. As 
described in chapter 3, an oversupply of cheap vegetable protein and a coincid-
ing scarcity of animal protein supplements partially explained US farmers’ 1950s 
embrace of B12- rich aureomycin fermentation wastes. This was not the case in 
Britain where the country’s highly or ga nized fishing industry created an oversup-
ply of animal protein and commercial compounders  were legally required to add 
animal protein to feeds for young animals.57 Even before restrictions on commer-
cial feeds  were relaxed in 1953,58 British farmers had had access to relatively cheap 
animal protein via off- ration fish solubles. This access to cheap animal protein 
stripped early AGP/APF feeds of half their commercial appeal— especially since 
some commentators seemed to think that APF and AGPs  were the same  thing.59 
British antibiotic manufacturers explic itly referred to domestic B12 supplies 
in their campaign to ward off US competition. Writing for Manufacturing 
Chemist in 1952, Distillers Com pany researcher J. A. Wakelam advocated using 
British procaine penicillin in animal feeds: procaine penicillin production 
was based on the full extraction of penicillin mold and did not result in  viable 
APF wastes. For British farmers, this was allegedly an advantage since supple-
menting domestic feeds with pure penicillin would avoid inefficient US 
AGP/APF “ ’blunderbuss’ treatment[s].”60 Other researchers soon countered 
that aureomycin was more able to resist the  water and heat necessary for com-
pounding feeds than penicillin.61
In view of varying feed  trials, uncertainty about AGPs’ stability, and new 
experiments indicating no growth promotion in germ- free chickens,62 it is per-
haps unsurprising that British farmers and their lobby, the National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU), viewed antibiotic growth promotion very cautiously. Ahead of 
antibiotic feeds’ licensing by the 1953 Therapeutic Substances Act, the NFU was 
less concerned about pushing for the rapid licensing of AGPs than about secur-
ing guaranteed minimum antibiotic concentrations in feeds and official 
guidelines for safe and efficient antibiotic use.63 Lacking internal antibiotics 
expertise, the NFU relied heavi ly on information supplied by the state. As a 
consequence, government experts played a crucial role in convincing initially 
cautious farm organ izations to promote subtherapeutic antibiotic use. Follow-
ing a 1953 meeting, the NFU representative thanked officials: “The subject 
was one about which he and many other farmers  were relatively ignorant and 
he was grateful for the information and advice given. He was in general 
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agreement . . .  , but felt that caution in propaganda and in the use of antibio-
tics was necessary.”64
Even  after Britain’s Trea sury and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) de cided to license penicillin and aureomycin feeds with effect 
from September 1, 1953 (oxytetracycline AGPs  were licensed in 1954), initial 
AGP sales  were disappointing. At a symposium held shortly  after AGPs’ licens-
ing, it was noted that given “the tremendous amount of publicity and propa-
ganda that originated largely in Amer i ca, . . .  it was thought that  there would 
be a tremendous demand for them in this country.”65 However, “the demand 
had been considerably less than . . .  expected.”66 Antibiotic uptake also varied 
between livestock sectors.
In the case of pig husbandry, AGPs’ popularity was diminished by ongoing 
uncertainty about feeds’ efficacy and farmers’ disappointment when weight 
gains turned out to be lower than advertised.67 The prevalence of low- intensity 
outdoor systems may have been an additional  factor. Following the slaughtering 
off of British pigs in 1940, postwar production gains had mostly been achieved 
by small- scale outdoor producers. Although individual officials and the Pig 
Industry Development Authority (PIDA) promoted more intensive husbandry 
systems during the 1950s, their efforts  were only partially successful in the East 
of  England. In other areas of the United Kingdom, inconsistent government 
support and overproduction led to a greater per sis tence of outdoor farming and 
a more piecemeal adoption of antibiotics than in the United States.68
Pig husbandry manuals  were also skeptical of AGPs. While con temporary 
US manuals routinely recommended AGPs for indoor and outdoor herds (chap-
ter 3), early 1950s British manuals followed prewar traditions by advocating 
sunlight and cod- liver oil and fish meal supplements as “natu ral” preventatives. 
Antibiotics featured alongside serum therapy as prescribed therapeutics but not 
as nontherapeutic feed additives.69 In 1945, Pigs: Their Breeding, Feeding, and 
Management had not mentioned therapeutic antibiotics or sulfonamides.70 
Eight years  later, its revised edition discussed “experimental” AGP  trials on 
runts but cautioned: “healthy pigs on a [non- vegetable] ration do not make an 
eco nom ical response to the use of antibiotics.”71 In 1956, a new version of the 
manual maintained that feeding antibiotics to healthy pigs on “good” standard 
British rations might be unprofitable.72 Similar concerns  were voiced at Brit-
ish feedstuff conferences and in the first edition of Farm Animals in Health 
and Disease from 1954.73
Pig farmers’ AGP skepticism was only gradually overcome by phar ma ceu ti-
cal marketing and expert endorsement. In 1957, the Rowett Institute averaged 
outcomes of recent experiments to estimate that feeding AGPs to “baconers” 
could result in a 5s. profit per pig. Although procaine penicillin was effective 
at lower doses, broad- spectrum AGPs produced more consistent results.74 While 
 these figures  were bad news for British manufacturers, who tried to compete 
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against US feeds by commissioning patriotic commercials,75 American com-
panies celebrated the success of their products in the farming press. In 1955, 
American Cyanamid’s British branch boasted: “Last year, 1 in  every 10 pigs in 
the United Kingdom had AUROFAC 2A Feed Supplement throughout its 
life . . . .  This year, 1 in  every 7 pigs in the United Kingdom is being fed on 
AUROFAC 2A Feed Supplement from birth to slaughter.”76 According to the 
man ag er of Pfizer’s oxytetracycline plant in Kent, AGPs not only enabled Brit-
ish farmers to market pigs three weeks sooner but also saved enough feed to 
 free about 300,000 acres for other crops.77 Similar views  were expressed by com-
mentators in Britain’s farming press. According to the popu lar magazine 
Farmers Weekly, antibiotics  were changing the biological rhythms of British 
husbandry: instead of weaning piglets 56 days  after birth, farmers  were now 
advised to wean 24 to 28 hour old piglets with penicillin- enriched milk pow-
der. This way, even runts would survive and piglets would already weigh about 
40 pounds at their traditional weaning age.78 Invoking an ideal of optimized 
nature, the magazine described antibiotics as a “boon to mankind.”79 Another 
article, titled “Our Debt to the Chemist,”80 listed antibiotics, hormones, pes-
ticides and insecticides among the  great triumphs of twentieth- century science. 
By 1958, veterinary researcher Herbert Williams Smith estimated: “about 
50  percent of all the pigs in Britain are [fed AGPs] and that nearly all unweaned 
piglets have access to food containing tetracyclines.”81
The adoption of AGPs was more straightforward in Britain’s poultry sec-
tor. British poultry production intensified rapidly following the establishment 
of the first broiler chicken farm by Geoffrey Sykes in 1953 and Sainsbury’s mar-
keting of frozen chickens in self- service supermarkets.82 Rapid intensification 
also occurred in turkey and game bird production.83 Similar to the United 
States, the increasing size of flocks was enabled by cheap chemotherapeutics and 
in turn boosted antibiotic sales. British poultry farmers had trialed preventive 
and therapeutic sulfonamide treatments since 1947. By 1950, popu lar US prod-
ucts like sulfaquinoxaline  were also being manufactured in Britain.84 Four 
years  later, R. F. Gordon from the Animal Health Trust estimated that about 
35  percent of British poultry  were  housed intensively and routinely received 
therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotics.85
Antibiotics’ popularity was reflected in British poultry manuals. In 1946, 
the third edition of Poultry World’s Practical Poultry Keeping still targeted 
small backyard producers when it recommended a mix of  house hold remedies 
and hygiene for the prevention and treatment of disease.86 By 1952, Poultry 
Keeping for Profit explic itly targeted farmers thinking about expanding pro-
duction and recommended vaccinations and sulfonamide solutions to maintain 
birds’ health.87 In 1955, the revised fifth edition of Practical Poultry Keeping 
contained a chapter on feeds with an entire section devoted to antibiotics. 
Indicating how popu lar AGPs had become, poultry producers  were cautioned 
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that antibiotics “cannot be considered as food, but their use does have an effect 
on the way chicks are able to utilise [feeds].”88 The manual also warned: “[anti-
biotics] do not help egg production or breeding and as a rule should not be fed 
to adult birds, although some breeders claim that they help birds through 
the moult.”89 Similar to the United States, many manuals’ joint advocacy of 
F IGURE 6.2  AGPs were presented as important parts of normal feed rations. Pfizer 
advertisement, Farmers Weekly, 1960.
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routine antibiotic growth promotion, prophylaxis, and treatment meant that 
 legal bound aries between nontherapeutic and therapeutic antibiotic use quickly 
blurred in practice.90
Producers’ increasing adoption of antibiotics led to a boom of British drug 
sales. In 1954, an estimated 69,439 tons of antibiotic supplemented feeds  were 
sold to farmers. By 1959, the number had grown by over 600  percent to 445,706 
tons.91 Feeds for growing animals could include up to 100 parts per million of 
F IGURE 6.3  Antibiotic feeds were also sold as disease insurance. Cyanamid advertisement, 
Farmers Weekly, 1964.
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penicillin, chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline, and bacitracin. In practice, about 
25 parts per million of procaine penicillin or bacitracin  were usually added to 
poultry feeds. In pig production, creep feeds normally contained up to 30 parts 
per million of broad- spectrum antibiotics while feeds for older growing pigs 
contained up to 10 parts per million of the same antibiotics.92 In contrast to 
their increasing public association with “factory farms” (chapter 5), antibiotics 
 were popu lar in both intensive and nonintensive settings. In 1962, one observer 
noted that early weaning, a focus on pork production, and “rough and ready” 
housing had led to the “greatest employment [of dietary antibiotics] . . .  in the 
feeding of [British] pigs.”93 As indicated in manuals, AGPs  were being used for 
both growth promotion and therapeutic purposes. In 1957, a former industry 
representative warned that farmers “frequently feed antibiotic- containing 
feeding- stuff supplements to their stock at levels so high as clearly to be exert-
ing a therapeutic effect. Such action is taken deliberately, and it completely 
defeats one of the main objects of [the Therapeutic Substances Act], to say noth-
ing of its effect on the incomes of veterinary surgeons.”94 Phar ma ceu ti cal rev-
enues grew accordingly. Between 1948 and 1963, adjusted UK veterinary 
medicines output grew from £2,305,000 to £19,585,000  in current money 
whereas the output in animal and poultry foods grew from £50.3 million to 
£466.7 million. Meanwhile, veterinary medicines’ share as a proportion of total 
UK phar ma ceu ti cal output increased from 3  percent to 8.3  percent.95
F IGURE 6.4 Poultry producers rapidly adopted antibiotics. ICI advertisement, Farmers 
Weekly, 1951. 
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Despite farmers’ initial hesitancy, uneven adoption of drugs, and ongoing 
recourse to other disease control strategies,96 an antibiotic infrastructure of 
easy- to- use growth promoters, therapeutics, and prophylactics was becoming 
established on British farms. Similar to the United States, drug use would con-
tinue to rise over the next de cade. In 1960, about 40,000 kilograms of pure 
antibiotics  were annually estimated to be used in British pig and poultry 
F IGURE 6.5  Antibiotics were said to increase efficiency. Cyanamid advertisement, Farmers 
Weekly, 1964.
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husbandry (about 29 to 35   percent of total antibiotic consumption). By the 
mid-1960s, the percentage of total British antibiotic output devoted to ani-
mals had increased to about 41 to 44  percent.97
Early Concerns
Antibiotics’ popularity did not mean that British agricultural commentators 
 were unaware of negative side effects. Similar to the United States, the early 
1950s saw farming magazines warn producers about penicillin residues’ effect 
on cheese production and mass- poisoning resulting from off- label sulfonamide 
use.98 However, in contrast to the United States, AMR soon emerged as an 
equally prominent issue and divided opinions. Resulting agricultural debates 
centered on the risks and benefits of uncontrolled as opposed to “rational” vet-
erinary antibiotic use. Whereas animal nutritionists and NFU representatives 
followed their US counter parts by presenting AMR as a prob lem of inefficient 
drug use, veterinarians and public health experts used AMR to assert control 
over antibiotics. At stake was not antibiotic use per se but antibiotic access.
Coinciding with veterinary debates about “rational” drug use, initial AMR 
concerns centered on the overuse of therapeutic mastitis treatments.99 Around 
1950, British veterinarians began to warn farmers about a “changing ‘clinical 
picture’ which might follow the extensive use of penicillin.”100 Observed 
changes  were due to the replacement of sensitive Streptococcus agalactiae with 
resistant hemolytic Staphylococci. Having analyzed 500 udder isolates between 
1951 and 1953, researchers from the Boots Pure Drugs Division reported an 
increase of infections caused by resistant Staphylococci but noted that organ-
isms remained sensitive to high doses of penicillin.101 According to Farmers 
Weekly, the percentage of mastitis outbreaks caused by Staphylococci  rose from 
10 to 30  percent between 1944 and 1955.102 A further increase of penicillin re sis-
tance from 9 to 37   percent was detected in Staphylococci isolated from herd 
milk between 1954 and 1957.103 In reaction, British veterinarians attempted to 
shore up antibiotic control by lambasting what they saw as “indiscriminate” 
US- style drug use “without any veterinary supervision.”104
Although most agricultural commentators initially agreed that a certain 
degree of veterinary supervision was necessary to control AMR in the case of 
therapeutic antibiotic use, opinions  were more divided when it came to non-
therapeutic AGPs. Ahead of AGPs’ licensing in 1953, British veterinarians won-
dered  whether they should agree to exempt low- dosed feeds from prescription 
requirements. In 1953, a letter in the Veterinary Rec ord cited Starr and Reynold’s 
1951 study (chapter 3) to warn about feeds’ se lection for AMR on farms.105 How-
ever, other commentators argued that antibiotic dosages and blood stream 
adsorption  were too low to exert se lection pressure: “We are assured by bacterio-
logists [that AMR] is not likely  because the action of  these antibiotics appears 
108 • Britain, 1945–1969
to be a local one in the gut on the microflora  there, and . . .  the bacterial popu-
lation is being constantly expelled by normal bowel evacuation and being 
replaced by a [susceptible] fresh one, . . . .  Secondly, should the organism actu-
ally become resistant . . .  it would be a  simple  matter to attack  these supposedly 
resistant organisms by switching to another antibiotic.”106 The threshold- 
influenced distinction between higher therapeutic and lower nontherapeutic 
dosages initially reconciled many British veterinarians with AGPs.
This reconciliation was short lived. By the mid-1950s, new AMR data, boom-
ing AGP sales, and farmers’ therapeutic and preventive use of increasingly 
higher- dosed feeds to substitute expensive veterinary health care led to clashes 
within Britain’s agricultural community. The BVA’s 1956 Conference on Sup-
plements and Additives in Animal Feedingstuffs exposed nascent tensions. 
Although most speakers praised AGPs, AMR assessments varied significantly 
between industry representatives, pharmacists, and nutritionists on the one 
side and veterinary bacteriologists on the other side. According to Reading- 
based nutritionist Marie E. Coates, who had recently discovered the absence 
of antibiotic growth promotion in germ- free chickens, AMR fears  were 
“groundless.”107 This view was seconded by British- born American Cyana-
mid biochemist Robert White- Stevens. Promoting higher- dosed AGPs, White- 
Stevens claimed that antibiotics  were a natu ral companion of intensifying 
food production: “it was impossible to keep contagion down [in large intensive 
poultry flocks], even by the best methods of management; furthermore, the best 
sanitary management cost a lot of money, generally more than a comparable 
result from use of antibiotics.”108 Britain’s leading AGP expert, nutritionist 
Raphael Braude, expressed irritation at con temporary veterinary AMR warn-
ings. In a sign of growing professional tensions over antibiotic control, Braude 
“refrained from drawing analogies involving veterinary prescriptions, but as far 
as feed additives are concerned, . . .  the sole criterion as to  whether they should be 
freely allowed on the market should be . . .  that if judiciously used they are 
harmless to the health of the animal.”109 Market forces would do the rest: farmers 
would phase out AGPs if AMR diminished their efficacy.
Veterinary bacteriologists begged to differ. Using sensitivity tests and a tech-
nology called bacteriophage- typing to differentiate between bacteria strains 
(chapter 7), the Animal Health Trust’s Herbert Williams Smith had analyzed 
the microbial effects of antibiotic use on farms. His findings  were worrying. 
Responding to a paper on AGPs in pig nutrition, Williams Smith noted that E. coli 
causing calf scours (diarrhea) had become resistant  after antibiotic exposure. In 
the case of pigs, feeding AGPs had caused a sharp rise of tetracycline re sis tance in 
E. coli isolates. Resistant strains could spread to  humans: 36   percent of E. coli 
isolates from pigs entering a bacon factory had been tetracycline resistant.110
In a preview of conflicts to come, Williams Smith’s intervention led to an 
acrimonious discussion. Nutritionist Raphael Braude responded by explic itly 
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accusing veterinarians of using AMR to regain control over antibiotics: “the 
fact that the resistant bacteria existed was meaningless,  unless it could be proved 
that the resistant bacteria pre sent, and possibly growing,  were pathogenic organ-
isms, which would cause disease. . . .  Speaking bluntly, he thought it was high 
time that the authorities of the veterinary profession should accept the fact that 
 there was plenty of work to be done without worrying how the antibiotics 
acted.”111 Attempting to keep the peace, Animal Health Trust founder W. R. 
Wooldridge warned that Braude “had raised a controversial point by implying 
that the veterinary profession was endeavoring to stop the use of antibiotics in 
feeding- stuffs.”112 Wooldridge upheld veterinarians’ duty to protect animals 
and the public from resistant strains like Staphylococcus 80/81 (chapter 2) but 
maintained that it was up to agriculturalists how to use antibiotics on a daily 
basis. Attending officials followed a similar compromise strategy. Speaking for 
Britain’s Ministry of Health, Se nior Medical Officer John Marshall Ross 
warned about AMR in  human medicine but shied away from linking it to agri-
cultural antibiotic use. Instead, he focused on drug residues and antibiotic 
preservatives’ potential se lection for AMR among food- borne pathogens.113 By 
contrast, Royal Veterinary College microbiologist Reginald Lovell doubted that 
 there was any difference between the risks of therapeutic and nontherapeutic 
antibiotic use on farms: “We condemn [antibiotics’] indiscriminate use as ther-
apeutic agents and subject them to some control, if we are logical,  ought we 
not to condemn their use as dietary supplements whereby they extend their 
influence to a wider sphere?”114
Within three years of being legalized, AGPs had turned into a divisive issue 
for Britain’s agricultural community. Keenly aware of AMR on farms and in 
medicine, all sides advocated “rational” antibiotic use for therapeutic purposes 
but  were divided when it came to reinstating medical control over nonthera-
peutic AGPs. Ironically, the low doses that had made AGPs seem harmless in 
1953  were increasingly viewed as particularly dangerous  because they allowed 
bacteria to survive and adapt to antibiotic exposure. This allegation gained addi-
tional weight when veterinary bacteriologist Herbert Williams Smith and his 
collaborator W. E. Crabb published their AMR data shortly  after the 1956 BVA 
conference. Studying E. coli in pig and chicken feces, the authors reported a 
strong correlation between antibiotic use and AMR rates. AMR se lection in 
animals “would undoubtedly have an impact on the treatment of bact. Coli 
infection in  those animals and possibly other species, including man, with 
which they come in contact. It is apparent that considerations of this nature 
should be given very serious thought before any chemotherapeutic agent is per-
mitted to be used in such a widespread manner as the tetracyclines have been 
used in pig nutrition.”115
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 Battles for Control
The emerging inner- agricultural conflict over antibiotic control would escalate 
over the next de cade. During the 1960s, AMR concerns, the international cost- 
price squeeze, and an increasingly aggressive veterinary drive for preventive 
health care led to a wider revaluation of British agricultural antibiotic use and 
access.
Eco nom ically, the 1960s undermined many postwar promises of rural pros-
perity. With overall agricultural employment and government price guaran-
tees falling,  those staying in agriculture tended to work on fewer and larger 
farms.116 In livestock production, developments once again varied between dif-
fer ent sectors. While UK  cattle production stagnated, poultry production 
increased. Pig production also increased and became more intensive during the 
second half of the de cade.117
The direction of agricultural development was not uncontroversial among 
British farmers. Although many commentators continued to propagate expan-
sion,118 a growing number of articles in the farming press warned that many 
smaller producers would not survive the cost- price squeeze.119 Pointing to par-
allel trajectories in the United States, a 1962 article in Farmers Weekly predicted 
an “end in sight for the  family farms.”120 Two years  later, delegates at the NFU’s 
annual meeting clashed over a resolution to limit the size of farms. Mirroring 
public attacks on factory farms, the resolution called on the NFU to “ensur[e] 
that production of agricultural commodities remains with the farming indus-
try” and “draw a line between [agricultural factories] and what is traditional 
agriculture.”121 However, opponents argued that “the resolution was in direct 
opposition to pro gress. Hens did not need green fields to run in  these days. It 
was impor tant that some products be produced intensively.”122  After a heated 
discussion, what would have been a small revolution for British farming was 
defeated by 174 to 128 votes.
Similar to the United States, economic pressure for increased and more effi-
cient production coincided with controversies over rising antibiotic use on 
British farms. In 1960, the ARC’s decision to review AGPs in view of AMR 
warnings took many agricultural observers by surprise. According to Farmers 
Weekly, the review “condemns  those willing to take risks for what it admits can 
be considerable gains.”123 Closely integrated into government decision- making, 
British farmers could, however, be confident that their perspective would be 
taken into account— especially since the antibiotic review would be headed by 
former NFU president Jim Turner, now Lord Netherthorpe. While it was 
unlikely that antibiotic use per se would be challenged, the Netherthorpe 
review fanned inner- agricultural  battles over control of antibiotic access.
Intensifying antibiotic conflicts took place against a backdrop of veterinary 
campaigns for government subsidized preventive animal health care schemes. 
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Described by historian Abigail Woods, organ izations like the BVA  were becom-
ing concerned that successful disease eradication, productivity- oriented 
notions of animal health, and easy drug access  were eroding traditional sources 
of veterinary income. By lobbying for official veterinary preventive care schemes, 
they hoped to convert “fire brigade approaches” in which veterinarians  were 
only called to treat acute disease into a system of subsidized health checks and 
management advice for farmers. The added benefits of establishing “rational” 
medical oversight of on- farm antibiotic use and curbing AMR se lection became 
a central theme of veterinary campaigning.124
British veterinarians’ push for greater antibiotic control coincided with a 
push by livestock producers for unrestricted on- farm access to penicillin and 
other prescription- only medicines (chapter 7). Confident in their ability to 
diagnose and use drugs appropriately, a growing number of producers  were 
turning to feed merchants rather than veterinarians for advice. In 1960, Farmers 
Weekly advised a farmer facing resistant coccidiosis to “complain to your feed 
merchants of the poor results you are getting and perhaps change to some 
other kind of medicated food.”125 By contrast, the BVA’s Veterinary Rec ord crit-
icized “unthinking demands” for unsupervised access to “drugs and vaccines, 
many of them dangerous except in skilled hands and most of them too expen-
sive to be used wastefully.”126 Instead of giving into farmers’ antibiotic demands 
for fear of losing their custom, veterinarians should encourage “enlightened 
farmers”127 to seek preventive health advice. Producers disagreed. Doubting the 
necessity of paying veterinarians to treat diseases that skilled farmers could also 
 handle with appropriate therapeutics, the NFU’s Gloucestershire section 
repeated demands for expanded access to prescription- only medicine in 1962.128
In the midst of  battles over drug control, hardly anybody considered reduc-
ing overall antibiotic use. Throughout the early 1960s most agricultural com-
mentators and manuals remained confident that AMR  hazards  were an 
acceptable price to pay for the many benefits of “rational” antibiotic use and 
continued to advocate it. Although British publications mentioned  hazards 
much more frequently than con temporary US publications (chapter 3), they also 
mostly presented AMR as a management prob lem, which could be overcome 
by improving hygiene and using diff er ent drugs and drug combinations.129 The 
1962 Netherthorpe report strengthened this view.  Shaped by fierce strug gles 
between veterinarians, public health officials, and farming representatives, the 
corporatist report marked a victory for farmers and nutritionists by endorsing 
existing AGP regulations and calling for a legalization of AGPs for calves. 
However, it also strengthened British veterinarians by calling for an automatic 
restriction of  future medically relevant antibiotics (chapter 7).
The hard- won Netherthorpe compromise on antibiotic access stood in con-
trast to rising public criticism of modern farming’s overall use of agricultural 
chemicals. Although they quickly endorsed residue controls for milk in the 
112 • Britain, 1945–1969
wake of the 1963 penicillin scandal (chapter 5),130 British farming and veteri-
nary representatives faced increasing pressure from environmentalists and 
animal welfare activists throughout the 1960s.
Strategies of responding to criticism varied. In the case of rising environmen-
talist concerns about chemical use, British agricultural commentators fre-
quently downplayed domestic criticism by pointing to more extensive American 
chemical use and blaming consumer tastes for driving intensive farming.131 In 
1963, Farmers Weekly reacted to the British publication of  Silent Spring by 
claiming that Carson’s warnings  were valid but had few implications for Brit-
ish agriculture.132 Deflecting attention to the US was not pos si ble in the case 
of home- grown animal welfare criticism. British activists and farmers had two 
opposing concepts of welfare: while most farmers defined welfare in terms of 
thrift or physical productivity, campaigners extended definitions of welfare to 
encompass animals’  mental well- being.133 Since around 1960, British agricul-
tural commentators had reacted to growing public welfare criticism by portray-
ing campaigners as irrational.134 In comparison to the “pot- bellied” prewar 
animals “with staring coats,  housed in filthy hovels,”135 scientifically designed 
modern intensive systems offered animals a much better life. Tensions increased 
significantly following the publication of Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines in 
1964 (chapter 5). Reacting to Harrison’s Observer articles, the NFU’s British 
Farmer complained that the newspaper had joined the “anti- land lobby” by pre-
senting a “grossly distorted picture of British agriculture.”136 Farmers Weekly 
bemoaned the Nazi imagery of welfare criticism: “Townspeople . . .  have been 
given a horrifying picture of the ‘animal factories’ . . . .  They are given a chilling 
picture of broiler  house concentration camps and packing station Ausschwit-
zen [sic], of pig ‘sweat- boxes’; of darkened torture- chambers for calves, and of 
animals  going blind in intensive beef lots.”137 If animals  were truly suffering, 
they would not produce income.
However, Britain’s agricultural community soon found that frontal oppo-
sition would not sway domestic welfare criticism. According to Andrew God-
ley and Bridget Williams, “agriculture was pursuing intensification more 
energetically in Britain than anywhere  else outside North Amer i ca”138 but had 
much less public and economic significance. Failing to prevent the official 
installation of the 1964 Brambell committee on animal welfare, both the NFU 
and the farming press chose not to jeopardize corporatist ties with Whitehall 
and Westminster and began to moderate their rhe toric. Stressing the necessity 
of an “informed climate,”139 agricultural documentaries titled “Press Button 
Farms”140 and “Look to the Land”141 instead began to stress the quality, ethi-
cal soundness, and safety of intensive food production in Britain.
With initial outrage cooling, farming magazines even began to print occa-
sional criticism of modern production methods’ effects on animals and the 
 hazards of technologies like antibiotics.142 In the Countryman, Herbert Sinclair, 
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director of Oxford’s Laboratory of  Human Nutrition, acknowledged allega-
tions that AGPs  were illegally being fed to laying poultry.143 Although he com-
plained about  limited urbanite farming knowledge based on “comics of jolly 
pigs in trousers,”144 the chairman of the NFU’s Lincolnshire branch similarly 
cautioned that much still had to be learned about safe drug use while Farmers 
Weekly referenced diseased carcasses “sodden with antibiotics”145 in abattoirs.
Infective Re sis tance
While self- criticism in the farming press mostly centered on illegal antibiotic 
use and resulting residue prob lems, British veterinarians used public concerns 
about welfare and AMR to reignite the  battle for antibiotic control. Giving evi-
dence to the Brambell committee in June  1964, the BVA called for further 
limitations on non- nutritive feed additives.146  These calls  were soon significantly 
strengthened by high- profile warnings of “infective re sis tance” spreading on 
farms by Britain’s PHLS (chapter 5).
In contrast to the United States, the new horizontal AMR scenarios had an 
immediate impact on British public and agricultural debate. Whereas most 
British commentators had previously presented AMR as a spatially  limited risk, 
which could be overcome by better management, hygiene, and drug combina-
tions, horizontal gene transfer challenged the entire rhe toric of sustainable anti-
biotic use.  Because  every dose could select for uncontainable AMR genes, 
producers and prac ti tion ers had to ask themselves  whether they  were squan-
dering precious antibiotic resources. Answers differed. While most British 
farming manuals and articles continued to endorse “rational” therapeutic and 
nontherapeutic antibiotic use,147 commentators also acknowledged the need for 
some kind of reform. In 1965, the NFU’s British Farmer warned: “Too many 
doctors and farmers are dosing  human beings, pigs, calves and poultry with 
antibiotics for minor illnesses or as animal food additives. . . .  This can mean 
that  human beings and livestock are less easily treated for more serious epidem-
ics, including typhoid in  human beings. In short, the use of antibiotics has 
been overdone.”148 Ahead of the publication of the second Netherthorpe report 
(chapter 7), Farmers Weekly printed long reports on drug overuse, transferable 
AMR in calves and  humans, alternative therapies, and improved management. 
The overall agricultural message was clear: AMR was serious and British farm-
ers should self- limit antibiotic use.149
 Whether certain products should be banned was another question. Having 
already abandoned the 1962 Netherthorpe compromise on AGP access, Brit-
ish veterinarians pressed for sweeping AGP restrictions. In 1965, the Veterinary 
Rec ord devoted two lead articles to “infective re sis tance”: “No reasonable per-
son would now doubt the need for [a reexamination of agricultural antibiotic 
use]. They can justly point out to both the medical profession and the 
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agricultural industry that they have always been publicly opposed to the wide-
spread and indiscriminate use of antibiotics in our livestock population.”150 
Veterinarians’ cause was strengthened when Herbert Williams Smith and 
Sheila Halls published a study of AMR in E. coli in the Veterinary Rec ord in 
1966. Well over half of fecal isolates from  humans, calves, pigs, and fowls  were 
resistant to at least one antibiotic with many displaying multiple re sis tance.151 
In the case of multiple re sis tance, the complete AMR pattern was often trans-
ferable between nonpathogenic and pathogenic E. coli strains and several 
Salmonella serovars. The authors had also transferred AMR from freshly iso-
lated strains and deep- frozen nonpathogenic E. coli from 1956 to  human patho-
gens. In most cases, transferred AMR was stably integrated into recipient strains. 
According to the authors, “infective re sis tance is prob ably the most common 
form of drug re sis tance among the E. coli that inhabit the alimentary tract of 
 human beings, calves, pigs, and fowls in Britain.”152 Findings also indicated that 
the emergence of new infective AMR was not rare. The authors concluded that 
their study “greatly strengthened”153 the case against drug overuse.
Some veterinarians also saw their own profession as partially responsible for 
AMR prob lems. According to veterinary pharmacologist Peter Eyre, AMR “in 
strictly ‘veterinary pathogens’ can no longer be regarded as a purely veterinary 
prob lem!”154 As a consequence, Eyre endorsed medical calls for a complete 
review of both therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotic use: “the veterinary 
profession may have felt disquiet about the use of antibiotics as food additives 
and growth stimulants, but perhaps has never had enough scientific evidence. 
This new situation suggests that the time may well have arrived for joint action 
by the veterinary and medical professions immediately.  There must be common 
responsibility to instigate radical changes in the total use of antibacterial agents 
in treating and preventing all aspects of  human and animal disease.”155 While 
many vets  were comfortable with restricting AGPs, Eyre’s suggestion of also 
subjecting veterinary antibiotic use to medical review proved controversial. 
According to veterinarian John R. Walton, it was not overall antibiotic use but 
specific aspects like low- dosed AGPs in combination with animal transports 
and bad hygiene that  were driving AMR in rural settings. Containing AMR 
therefore required an expansion and not a review and potential reduction of 
veterinary antibiotic oversight.156
“Infective re sis tance” concerns also affected Britain’s phar ma ceu ti cal mar-
ket. In the farming media and advice leaflets, US manufacturers continued to 
promote their products for growth promotion, prophylaxis, and animal wel-
fare.157 Titled “Have Aureomycin— Will Travel,”158 a series of Cyanamid adver-
tisements from 1965 depicted calves and pigs in front of small crates and 
praised aureomycin for reducing transport- induced scouring and mortality. 
While American manufacturers tried to shore up trust in their popu lar 
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products, their Eu ro pean competitors tried to profit from public concerns 
and reports of penicillin and tetracycline AMR by marketing “safe” ersatz 
products. Risk was always opportunity. In 1963, Glaxo had already reacted 
to con temporary residues scandals (chapter  5) by printing full- page ads in 
Farmers Weekly for its “residue- safe” Q(uick).R(elease). mastitis treatments.159 
Mirroring what Christoph Gradmann has shown for Bayer’s antibiotic 
strategy in  human medicine,160 concerns about agricultural AMR se lection 
also boosted sales of allegedly medically irrelevant AGPs and of “resistance- 
proof” semi- synthetic antibiotics for therapeutic purposes. During the meetings 
of the first Netherthorpe committee, Bayer had already promoted its nonther-
apeutic virginiamycin as a safe ersatz for existing AGPs.161 Sold as Eskalin by 
Beecham in Britain, virginiamycin was subsequently praised by British Farmer 
for answering “criticisms that continuous low level feeding of an antibiotic . . . 
can induce bacterial re sis tance.”162 Beecham also used concerns about resis-
tant staphylococci to market its semi- synthetic Orbenin (cloxacillin). Com-
pany brochures praised Orbenin’s efficacy against resistant mastitis: “Orbenin 
meets the demand, it kills penicillin resistant and sensitive staphylococci and 
all streptococci.”163 Glaxo also used AMR concerns to market combination 
treatments of novobiocin and penicillin G against mastitis.164 For the mostly 
Eu ro pean producers of semi- synthetic and nontherapeutic antibiotics, the 
message was clear: AMR did not mean that antibiotic use had to be restrained. 
It simply meant that older (American) products had to be substituted with 
newer (Eu ro pean) ones.
While phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers and large parts of Britain’s agricul-
tural establishment continued to endorse routine antibiotic use on farms 
despite disagreeing on issues of access and antibiotic type, a small minority of 
producers opposed antibiotic use per se. This hard core of antibiotic critics  were 
often members of the organic Soil Association. Founded in 1946, the Soil Asso-
ciation was initially headed by Eve Balfour (niece of former Conservative 
Prime Minister Arthur Balfour) and had an often elite membership interested 
in the health- giving properties of food produced on “living soil.” The organ-
ization’s early outlook was right- wing. Editing the Soil Association’s journal 
 Mother Earth  until his death in 1963, Jorian Jenks had formerly been the agri-
cultural advisor of Edward Mosley’s British Union of Fascists.165 Although its 
member- and readership remained small compared to the US Rodale Press, the 
Soil Association’s ability to draw on influential supporters often gave it a voice 
that was out of proportion to its  actual size.166
The Soil Association had been critical of nontherapeutic antibiotic use from 
the beginning. Ahead of the 1953 Therapeutic Substances Act,  Mother Earth 
printed a long article on antibiotics in animal husbandry. Acknowledging their 
potential to increase productivity, the article wondered  whether antibiotics’ 
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popularity was not rather “a mea sure of deficiencies” in existing production: 
“ there is a grave danger that antibiotic feed supplements  will be used, as so many 
other discoveries have been, to make bad husbandry pos si ble and profitable 
instead of making good husbandry still more efficient.”167 While artificial rear-
ing might be tolerated for animals “on the grounds that death  will intervene 
before any cumulative consequences become serious,”  there remained the “sub-
tle question” of its “ultimate effect on ourselves as consumers of [animals’] 
flesh.”168 Published in 1957, Hugh Corley’s Organic Farming repeated warnings 
about “unnatural” all- meal diets and antibiotic additives: “The more varied a 
pig’s diet is, the happier and healthier he  will be. To try to provide this variety 
by putting penicillin in his pigmeal is about as reasonable as feeding  people on 
white bread plus laxatives to cancel the effects of the white bread.”169 However, 
Corley did not consider all antibiotics bad. Similar to con temporary opinion 
in the US Rodale Press (chapter 3), Corley claimed that a pig eating normal swill 
“prob ably gets all the antibiotics known to science and several that are unknown, 
for Penicilliums (of vari ous species) are among the commonest mildews on stale 
food.”170 Corley also endorsed using penicillin and other antibiotics as “quick, 
harmless and easy”171 treatments for mastitis.
British organic assessments of agricultural antibiotic use grew less ambigu-
ous during the 1960s. With prominent activists like Ruth Harrison joining its 
board, the Soil Association became more welfarist and environmentalist in its 
outlook and more out spoken about agricultural antibiotics.172 In 1968,  Mother 
Earth reported on food poisoning in fifty- nine  people in Sussex caused by the 
now notorious resistant farm- associated S. typhimurium Type 29 (chapter 5). 
In another case, a farmer had allegedly been killed by resistant pathogens car-
ried by his animals. According to  Mother Earth, restricting antibiotics would 
not only protect consumers from dangerous resistant strains but also incentiv-
ize more “natu ral” farming practices.173 Another article cited “the complex and 
obscure prob lem of infectious drug re sis tance”174 as an example of conventional 
experts’ neglect of new ecological threats. Although the Soil Association con-
tinued to endorse antibiotic treatments of sick individual animals,175 it was clear 
that industry attempts to protect production systems by switching to new or 
nontherapeutic antibiotics would not satisfy Britain’s organic community.176
Following the 1967 Netherthorpe report’s unexpected call for a wider anti-
biotic review that would also encompass therapeutic antibiotics (chapter 7), it 
seemed as though some form of official antibiotic restriction might actually 
occur. The question was  whether Britain’s third antibiotic review within a 
de cade would challenge agriculture’s growing antibiotic infrastructure or try 
to fix it. Agricultural opinions varied.
Unsurprisingly, British veterinary organ izations intensified campaigning for 
bans of prescription- free antibiotic access. Presenting evidence to the new 
Swann committee, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons called for stricter 
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AGP controls, the Veterinarians’ Union advocated a ban of all antibiotic feed 
supplements, and the BVA supported a ban of chloramphenicol, tylosin, and 
broad- spectrum AGPs.177 Repeating demands from the early 1960s, organ-
izations linked campaigning for enhanced control over antibiotic access with 
calls for a subsidized preventive health ser vice. In October 1969, out going BVA 
president Peter Storie- Pugh looked forward to a time “when his profession 
could offer farmers an advisory ser vice which could cost far less than a shelffull 
of drugs.”178 Such implicit criticism of “irrational” antibiotic use by farmers was, 
however, seldom self- reflexive. Concerned about a loss of status, British veteri-
narians staunchly resisted any attempt to control their own prescription prac-
tices. In 1969, incoming BVA president John Parsons did not mention regulation 
of veterinary prescription practices when he endorsed more state control over 
phar ma ceu ti cals and AGPs.179
In contrast to veterinarians, most feedstuff and phar ma ceu ti cal companies 
 were extremely wary about pending regulatory encroachment on Britain’s anti-
biotic market. Trying to shore up public and agricultural support against 
restrictions, manufacturers repeated old claims according to which AGPs’ 
ongoing efficacy proved that AMR was merely a theoretical  hazard.180 Ahead 
of the 1969 Swann report, the industry- sponsored Office of Health Econom-
ics (OHE) published a skillful defense of antibiotic use. Picturing quaint pas-
toral scenes on its cover, the OHE’s booklet not only stressed antibiotics’ 
economic benefits but also cited studies downplaying agriculture’s contribution 
to AMR. Hastily banning valuable antibiotics without commissioning more 
research was reckless. In the case of some disease outbreaks, more aggressive 
antibiotic use might have prevented harm: “The phar ma ceu ti cal manufactur-
ers in par tic u lar would welcome the results of studies on  these  matters, and 
would willingly cooperate with them. Nothing is more frustrating than being 
permitted  under existing regulations to do something and then being criticised 
by sincere scientists as being irresponsible for  doing it.”181 According to the 
OHE,  there remained “a lack of balanced scientific appraisal” regarding AMR: 
“this situation can and should be corrected over a period of time, within a 
framework of flexible regulations intelligently applied.”182
Similar to 1960, most farming representatives also opposed ceding antibi-
otic access to officials and veterinarians. Although Farmers Weekly cautioned 
that “confident guesses rule out many antibiotics now used”183 in October 1969, 
another article staunchly defended AGPs: if preventing the spread of resistant 
bacteria to consumers was the main concern, then bacterial transmission via 
meat and eggs was the prob lem— and not AMR se lection on farms. Better 
hygiene would be far more useful than AGP bans.184  After “inspired leaks”185 
about proposed AGP bans emerged in November 1969, commentators com-
plained that the “talk of a ‘new peril in food’ is an exaggeration of the scien-
tific prob lems presented by the increased use of  these generally beneficial 
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substances.”186 Farmers felt “harassed a bit too much” about methods “which 
have not yet been proved to be seriously at fault.”187 Concurring, the NFU’s 
British Farmer claimed that potential bans  were based on “ little convincing evi-
dence”188 and might cost farmers up to £10 million. Referring to the Manches-
ter and Teesside outbreaks of resistant gastroenteritis, another article reaffirmed 
that  there was no evidence linking the respective bacterial strains to farms.189
Significantly, however, British agricultural complaints about “purely circum-
stantial evidence”190 and pronounced tensions over antibiotic control did not 
escalate into a wider questioning of the Swann committee’s overall authority 
to propose new regulations. The reasons for this  were twofold. First, in con-
trast to the United States,  there was widespread agricultural AMR awareness 
as a result of sustained reporting in the national, agricultural, and veterinary 
press. As a consequence, most discussions in Britain’s agricultural sphere cen-
tered on the degree of threat posed by AMR and not on  whether a threat actu-
ally existed. Second, the agricultural community’s close corporatist integration 
into expert and po liti cal decision- making created greater trust in the sound-
ness of resulting verdicts. British farmers and veterinarians  were well aware that 
the Swann committee’s nine members had been carefully chosen to represent 
a balance between medical, veterinary, and agricultural interests and could be 
confident that officials would “impose a reasonable mea sure of control”191 
rather than sweeping bans. Although British Farmer warned that the Swann 
report might also influence the pending regulation of other embattled sub-
stances like DDT,192 agricultural representatives knew that favorable compro-
mise solutions  were more likely to occur in discreet corporatist committees than 
during polarizing public hearings and debates as had recently occurred in the 
wake of Animal Machines and would soon occur in the US (chapter 8).  There 
was also the danger that overly aggressive attacks on corporatist compromise 
solutions could lead to a po liti cal exclusion from  future decision- making.
Following its publication in November 1969, British agricultural commen-
tators  were thus relieved to find  little radicalism in the Swann report.193 Experts 
and officials had seemingly mastered the feet of satisfying nearly all sides: 
restricting penicillin and tetracycline AGPs fulfilled a key public health demand 
as well as veterinary aspirations for greater control over the animal health mar-
ket. However, the report also legitimized the wider existing antibiotic infra-
structure by leaving prescription- only therapeutic antibiotic use unaddressed 
and enabling farmers to switch to allegedly nontherapeutic prescription- free 
ersatz AGPs like virginiamycin (chapter 7).194
The respective communities reacted accordingly. Emphasizing the Swann 
report’s calls for preventive health care, the BVA welcomed the additional 
responsibility vested in British veterinarians and predicted an increase of the 
“veterinary profession’s contribution to productivity in the farming industry.”195 
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The Swann committee’s alleged inability to find evidence of veterinary malprac-
tice also meant that veterinarians “need not, then, be ashamed of [their] rec-
ord in using antibiotics.”196 The farming press also reported on veterinarians’ 
increased control over antibiotics. While British Farmer joked that the “rows 
of  bottles on some farm office shelves  will be seriously depleted,”197 Farmers 
Weekly printed a comment by farmer G. Armstrong, who drily observed: “My 
vet seems more pleased to sell products himself. I feel it is not in farmers’ best 
interests for a ‘closed shop’ to develop.”198 However, nobody questioned the 
overall wisdom of the Swann report. Even though it lobbied for financial com-
pensation, Farmers Weekly admitted, “no sensible farmer would wish to [con-
tinue] using a drug which . . .  could be a  later risk to public health.”199  Others 
concurred: “By mass use of low- dose antibiotics in farm animals we are creat-
ing a reservoir of drug- resistant bacteria. . . .  The range of useful antibiotics is 
 limited: we cannot afford to devalue them.”200 Rapidly adapting to the new 
rules, British livestock organ izations soon tried to turn the Swann report into 
a sales advantage by marketing British poultry and other meat products as “the 
best and safest in the world.”201 With the exception of US broad- spectrum pro-
ducers (chapters 7 and 13), most phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers also endorsed 
the Swann report. In December 1969, the development committee of Wellcome- 
owned chemical manufacturer Cooper, McDougall and Robertson noted 
that “the recommendations and conclusions of the Swann committee could not 
be faulted and  were as expected.”202 In the long term, the Swann report might 
even be a sales advantage for British products. For most parties, it was clear that 
the specific drugs used on farms would change but that the overall antibiotic 
infrastructure aiding disease management and animal productivity would 
remain intact.
The 1969 Swann report marked the end of the pioneering phase of British 
agricultural antibiotic use. During the early postwar years, structural and eco-
nomic constraints had led to a comparatively slow adoption of antibiotics on 
farms. However, by the late 1950s, the drugs had become common in both 
intensive and nonintensive settings. Although UK and US antibiotic infra-
structures gradually converged, agricultural risk perceptions diverged. Influ-
enced by the AMR- centered British risk episteme and concerns about veterinary 
incomes, agricultural factions fought fierce  battles over antibiotic control: while 
livestock producers and nutritionists pushed for drug access to increase pro-
ductivity and sidestep veterinary fees, veterinarians used AMR concerns to call 
for “rational” oversight of both therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotic use. 
Following a brief détente  after the 1962 Netherthorpe report,  battles for control 
 were reignited by mid-1960s concerns about animal welfare and “infective” 
AMR. Once again, Britain’s corporatist system of decision- making played an 
impor tant role in making resulting reforms acceptable to agricultural parties. 
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Staffed by medical, veterinary, and agricultural interests, the Swann committee’s 
1969 call for a precautionary ban of therapeutic AGPs boosted veterinary 
control over the lucrative antibiotic market but also legitimized ongoing 
unsupervised access to nontherapeutic AGPs. It also weakened American and 
strengthened Eu ro pean drug manufacturers. Satisfied by the Swann compro-
mise, nearly all agricultural camps in Britain believed that antibiotic use on 
farms was now reformed and safe.
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Typing Re sis tance
Antibiotic Regulation in Britain
This chapter explores how British officials first promoted agricultural antibi-
otic use and then tried to balance demands for ongoing antibiotic use with pub-
lic concerns about animal welfare and AMR. Focusing on the emergence of a 
national risk episteme, it emphasizes the role that enterprising public health 
officials and a technology called bacteriophage- typing had in linking agricul-
tural AMR se lection with health  hazards and driving legislative action. It also 
highlights the marginalization of residue concerns not only in the public but 
also in official circles. The chapter then uses ministerial rec ords to trace the evo-
lution of British corporatist decision- making during the three antibiotic 
reviews of the 1960s. Although the 1969 Swann report pioneered precaution-
ary antibiotic restrictions, a close examination of the report’s origins reveals how 
contingent power strug gles between diff er ent ministries and professions 
resulted in a compromise, which had been devised prior to widespread knowl-
edge of horizontal re sis tance transfer.1
Licensing Agricultural Antibiotics
In contrast to the United States, AMR concerns strongly influenced the post-
war regulation of antibiotics in Britain. In 1947, fears that AMR would reduce 
antibiotics’ efficacy had led to a restriction of penicillin and other new antibi-
otics by the Penicillin Act (chapter 6). In Parliament,  Labour’s Minister of 
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Health Aneurin Bevan had explic itly resisted calls for antibiotic deregulation: 
“it seemed to us to be highly undesirable that this very valuable substance should 
be the plaything of quacks with all sorts of ways of advertising it and selling 
it— penicillin lipstick, penicillin rouge, penicillin powder, and even penicillin 
waistbands . . . .  It would be an appalling  thing if, as a consequence of its mis-
use, the population might, in a period of years, receive no advantage at all from 
it  because it would have developed re sis tance in  those who take it.”2
The topic of agricultural antibiotic use only reappeared on British officials’ 
agenda following the 1950 announcement of the antibiotic growth effect. 
Although Whitehall was interested in US experiences with AGPs and commis-
sioned British feed  trials, officials remained ambivalent about nontherapeutic 
antibiotic use and did not immediately loosen existing restrictions. According 
to contemporaries, AMR concerns  were the “chief reason”3 for this licensing 
delay.4 In 1952, concerned Ministry of Health (MH) officials warned about anti-
biotic allergies and AMR resulting from unsupervised farm access to antibiot-
ics: “the  whole purpose of the Penicillin Act was to prevent penicillin and other 
antibiotics being used indiscriminately with a consequent danger of producing 
penicillin resistant strains of pathogens.”5 Such concerns  were fiercely opposed 
by antibiotic supporters consulted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food (MAFF), who argued that AGPs  were too low- dosed to select for 
AMR. Mirroring con temporary agricultural debates (chapter  6), consulted 
experts claimed that any “risk to health was negligible.”6 Although it was 
unclear  whether antibiotics  were “improving nutrition or curing disease,”7 pre-
senting AGPs as nutritional and nontherapeutic allowed AGP supporters to dif-
fuse medical criticism (chapter 6). In 1957, chemist J. A. Wakelam remembered:
The Ministry [of Agriculture]  were at  great pains to establish that the addition 
of antibiotics to animal feeds was not intended as therapy, but was a method of 
improving normal healthy growth. As such it was termed nutritional.  Those of 
us who had carried out work on [penicillin AGPs],  were satisfied that  these 
 were incapable of producing bloodlevels which could be considered therapeu-
tic, . . . .  If this  were not so the Penicillin Act could not have been amended, and 
the fears of [the veterinary] profession concerning the dangers of developing 
resistant strains of pathogenic organisms could not have been stilled.”8
Presenting AGPs as a lucrative nutritional sales outlet for domestic phar ma ceu-
ti cal companies and a means to boost agricultural productivity and reduce 
expensive feed imports also proved an effective argument in light of Britain’s 
con temporary balance of payments crisis. By the end of the ARC’s antibiotic 
feed  trials in late 1952, economic incentives had trumped medical concerns.9
Ahead of the 1953 parliamentary debates on licensing AGPs, Britain’s MAFF 
was thus primarily concerned not about AMR but that agricultural demand 
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for broad- spectrum AGPs might exceed domestic supplies. As a consequence, 
British officials approached US manufacturers to ensure sufficient stocks of 
antibiotics. In response, American Cyanamid offered  free aureomycin magna-
sol cake to bridge projected shortages ahead of the opening of Cyanamid pro-
duction facilities in Britain. Lederle Laboratories’ director hoped that this 
would “be the beginning of an association which  will be of mutual benefit.”10 
However, despite AGP endorsements by veterinary organ izations,11 certain 
doubts about their safety and efficacy remained. In July 1953— two months 
ahead of AGPs’ licensing— Conservative Minister for Agriculture Thomas 
Dugdale told NFU president Sir James Turner— later Lord Netherthorpe— 
that he considered AGPs to be a regulatory experiment: “Our knowledge of 
antibiotics in feedingstuffs is still comparatively in infancy, but the regula-
tions we are proposing to make  will . . .  enable all of us including both farmers 
and manufacturers to increase our practical experience.”12
Flying Blind
Coming into effect in September 1953, the Therapeutic Substances (Prevention 
of Misuse) Act (TSA) exempted ready- mixed penicillin and chlortetracycline 
feeds and self- mix supplements for pigs and poultry from scheduling. Although 
initial AGP uptake was underwhelming, promotional efforts by officials, phar-
ma ceu ti cal representatives, and agricultural experts soon led to a sustained 
expansion of antibiotic consumption (chapter 6).
However, similar to the United States, officials  were already realizing that 
they had few tools with which to control antibiotic use on farms. In Britain, 
regulators lacked sufficient facilities for assaying (testing) antibiotic concentra-
tions in feed, food, or milk.13 For assay methods, they relied on academic pub-
lications and foreign regulatory agencies— most notably the American FDA. 
Meanwhile, antibiotic enforcement remained confined to the retail level.14 
With no control over the  actual use of legally purchased and prescribed anti-
biotics, British officials had to trust that corporatist self- policing by farmers, 
veterinarians, and pharmacists would ensure compliance. The limits of this 
approach became evident during the early 1950s. Reacting to US warnings, Brit-
ish researchers studied penicillin residues’ effect on cheese production in 1951. 
Although no residues  were detected in 1,082 bulked milk samples, researchers 
reported that between 1.4 to 2.8  percent of milk churns arriving at London and 
Shropshire dairy plants  were contaminated with penicillin. In one case, resi-
dues had destroyed a starter culture mixed with 800 gallons of milk. Two years 
 later, 3.2  percent of analyzed churn milk samples  were contaminated with pen-
icillin.15 However, in contrast to the United States, where similar detections 
eventually led to FDA residue monitoring (chapter 4), British residue findings 
failed to trigger public outrage or official action.
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Official complacency about noncompliance with withdrawal times for ther-
apeutic antibiotics was matched by relative complacency about the use of 
newly licensed AGPs on farms. The reformed 1956 TSA did not improve the 
situation. While Part I of the TSA dealt with the licensing, manufacture, and 
importation of medi cations to ensure their purity, Part II again exempted low- 
dosed AGPs from scheduling and prescription requirements.16 Remarkably, 
the absence of mandatory scheduling for new substances also meant that 
recently discovered drugs like tylosin, a supposedly medically irrelevant anti-
biotic, could be sold without any veterinary or official supervision.17 Relying 
on corporatist self- policing, officials remained sanguine about this large 
loophole: as Glaxo’s former chief executive scientific officer Alfred Louis 
Bacharach put it, a “gentleman’s agreement”18 between manufacturers and the 
MAFF would prevent misuse.  Until it was replaced by comprehensive legisla-
tion in 1968, an aptly named voluntary Veterinary Products Safety Precautions 
Scheme established nonbinding guidelines for unscheduled substances.19 
According to Bacharach, a similar “gentleman’s agreement”20 initially also gov-
erned voluntary restrictions of antibiotic use in plant protection: “the vari ous 
[MAFF] officials who have to cope with one aspect or another of the [antibi-
otic] situation do so in an enlightened and cooperative way and show  great skill 
in not discouraging the enterprising entrepreneur and in si mul ta neously pro-
tecting the public.”21 In real ity, the absence of substantial monitoring facilities 
and statutory powers meant that British officials could do  little  else than coop-
erate with industry.
While antibiotic enforcement withered, expert committees bloomed:  because 
new antibiotic applications transcended traditional bureaucratic responsibilities, 
a veritable jungle of committees became concerned with their use. Originally, the 
Medical and Agricultural Research Councils (MRC and ARC) had been respon-
sible for advising ministers on agricultural antibiotics. Soon, further committees 
became involved. Among them  were the Preservatives Sub- Committee of the 
Food Standards Committee and the Scientific Sub- Committee of the Advisory 
Committee on Poisonous Substances Used in Agriculture and Food Storage. 
 These committees founded an additional joint Antibiotics Panel in 1956.22 The 
numerous committees vied for influence and frequently disagreed. As a result, 
departmental and expert responsibilities blurred and  there was no guiding 
princi ple driving British antibiotic policy. In 1967 one official complained: “I 
have been quite unable to understand the relationship between  these bodies.”23 
Another official admitted: “The situation is now so complicated that it is almost 
un- understandable.”24
Meanwhile, antibiotic licensing increased. In 1954, the Therapeutic Sub-
stances (Supply of Oxytetracycline for Agricultural Purposes) Regulations 
legalized oxytetracycline (terramycin) AGPs.25 Streptomycin and oxytetracycline 
sprays and paints for plants  were licensed four years  later.26 US manufacturers 
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also pressed officials to license antibiotic food preservation and sponsored  trials 
aboard the distant  water government trawler and  future Rainbow Warrior, the 
Sir William Hardy (chapter  5).27 The merits of antibiotic cheese, poultry, fish, 
 whale, and beer preservation  were subsequently reviewed by Britain’s Joint 
Antibiotics Panel. Following extensive testing, Britain first licensed nisin for 
the preservation of canned foods and cheeses and tetracyclines in ice and dip-
ping solutions for fish in 1964.28
Although US technologies  were often imported to Britain alongside respec-
tive FDA regulations, concerned individual officials at times modified British 
rulings. In the case of poultry, warnings about the absence of spoilage- indicating 
bacteria and AMR se lection in food- borne pathogens led to a ban of antibi-
otic preservatives. The decision was made easier by the fact that many British 
birds  were not eviscerated prior to sale, which reduced the efficacy of antibi-
otic preservation.29 AMR concerns also delayed the licensing of antibiotic plant 
sprays. Despite being endorsed by Nobel laureate and penicillin developer Sir 
Howard Florey,30 sprays  were opposed by MRC researcher Brandon Lush, who 
feared that residues might alter the  human gut flora and select for AMR.31 Con-
cerned about residues rather than AMR, the new Antibiotics Panel subse-
quently debated  whether farm workers’ tough skin would make them less 
sensitive to antibiotic allergies than soft- skinned nurses.32 Ultimately, official 
equanimity prevailed. In 1958, MAFF’s proposed labels for antibiotic sprays and 
paints only recommended washing contaminated skin while Murphy’s, the 
manufacturer applying for the spray’s licensing, recommended full- body cover 
and face- shields for workers.33
The fragmentation of public antibiotic concerns meant that laissez- faire reg-
ulations faced  little opposition throughout the 1950s (chapter 5). Trusting in 
corporatist partners’ adherence to often voluntary guidelines, officials expressed 
a certain pride in the low cost of Britain’s food security apparatus. In 1956, Brit-
ish regulators justified their refusal to establish US- style residue limits to the 
Western Eu ro pean Union Sub- Committee on Health Control of Foodstuffs: 
“The United Kingdom feels that the prob lem of consumer  hazard can be tack-
led in more than one way. . . .  The successful application of the American 
system is dependent upon the existence of the necessary governmental 
machinery. . . .  The United Kingdom del e ga tion feels that cost and scientific 
management prob lems make it impossible for them to advocate a system of con-
trol of residues on prescribed tolerances.”34 Without monitoring or statutory 
rules forcing their hand, British officials  adopted a wait- and see attitude and 
looked to data from other countries for signs of prob lems. In 1956, some offi-
cials took a positive view of US residue scandals (chapter 4): “In view of the 
enormous amount of uncooked milk consumed daily by the American popu-
lation and the propensity of penicillin to produce allergic reactions, it would 
appear that they have  here a large scale experiment already completed.”35 
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Members of Britain’s Antibiotic Panel subsequently argued that the lack of 
proven fatal American reactions to penicillin residues indirectly proved the 
safety of antibiotic food preservatives. Closely involved in corporatist decision- 
making, phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers agreed. According to Glaxo’s Alfred 
Louis Bacharach: “The number of  these involuntary and unconscious penicillin 
eaters must by now run into many hundreds of thousands.”36 However, none of 
the “somewhat sinister warnings”37 about AMR and toxicity had materialized.
British officials’ unwillingness to impose further regulations on corporat-
ist partners is all the more remarkable given worrying con temporary residue 
data. Between 1954 and 1956, spot tests of over 5,000 milk samples revealed that 
penicillin was pre sent in 3 to 4  percent of samples. An additional 2.2  percent 
of samples contained antimicrobial substances, which could not be identified: 
“It is therefore obvious that, in contravention of statutory enactments, a con-
siderable quantity of milk containing penicillin and prob ably other antibio-
tics is being marketed for consumption by the general public.”38 However, 
confidence in industry self- regulation prevailed. In 1959, a Ministry of Health 
memo maintained that “it has not yet been considered necessary to take action 
by way of statutory regulations to prevent antibiotics entry into milk as a result 
of the treatment of mastitis.”39 Instead of investing in US style monitoring, offi-
cials asked British farmers to inform milk collecting centers of treatment and 
only use one dose of an antibiotic without veterinary supervision.40 Britain’s 
corporatist Milk Marketing Board (MMB) also asked phar ma ceu ti cal manu-
facturers to print cautions on antibiotic tubes.41
The glacial pace of corporatist reform quickened only  after data on penicil-
lin residues in 14  percent of En glish and 11.6  percent of Scottish milk caused 
public outrage in 1963 (chapter 5). The 1961 survey of the Milk and Milk Prod-
ucts Technical Advisory Committee had been available to officials since mid-
1962.42 However, it was only when British newspapers picked up the story that 
officials took action. Reinforced by a critical WHO report, public outrage trig-
gered the rapid abandonment of corporatist self- policing in  favor of US- style 
penalties and a formal zero- tolerance policy for penicillin in milk.43 By Novem-
ber  1963, 10   percent of British milk was being tested at twenty- one dairies 
across the country. Warning letters had been sent to 226 producers and local 
authorities  were also testing supplies.  After hastily introducing the 48- hour 
withdrawal periods already recommended in 1959, the MMB assured MAFF: 
“We are all aware of the fact that we have a prob lem that has to be tackled with 
the utmost despatch and . . .  you may rest assured that the industry  will use its 
best endeavours to support you in your in your determination to reduce the risk 
to an absolute minimum.”44 Following the adaptation of US inhibition tests, 
the MMB announced that residue offenders would receive price deductions 
starting in March 1964.45 Antibiotics’ potential presence in British meat was not 
discussed.
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Typing Re sis tance
British officials’ relative complacency regarding antibiotic residues in food and 
milk stood in contrast to their growing concerns about agricultural AMR 
se lection. This selective focus on antibiotic risk was in part caused by public 
anx i eties (chapter 5) and in part by data supplied by Britain’s Public Health 
Laboratory Ser vice (PHLS). Although corporatist decision- making would pro-
tect producers from sweeping bans, PHLS researchers’ ability to regularly 
confront officials with robust AMR data played a crucial role in establishing 
an AMR- focused British risk episteme.
The monitoring capabilities of the PHLS rested on a technology called 
bacteriophage- typing. During the Second World War, workers of the Emer-
gency Public Health Laboratory Ser vice (EPHLS) had established a network 
of bacteriological laboratories across Britain. Tasked with warding off bacte-
riological attack and epidemics, EPHLS researchers had trialed new surveil-
lance methods. One such method was bacteriophage- typing, which classified 
and identified (typed) individual bacteria strains with the help of bacteria- 
infecting viruses called bacteriophages (phages).46 Originally developed in 
Germany, phage- typing was  adopted in Britain by EPHLS bacteriologist 
Arthur Felix.47 During the war, EPHLS workers successfully used centralized 
F IGURE 7.1 New bulked milk collection exacerbated residue problems. Gordon Craddock, 
Bulk Milk Collection, 1963. ©Museum of English Rural Life, University of Reading.
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phage- typing ser vices to trace the sources of typhoid outbreaks and developed 
new phage- typing sets for Salmonella paratyphi (paratyphoid), Salmonella 
typhimurium, and Staphylococcus aureus.48
In the de cades  after 1945, the renamed PHLS’s centralized laboratory net-
work and phage- typing capabilities provided unparalleled insight into the 
evolving microbial environment. Headquartered in London Colindale, PHLS 
phage- typers  were among the first to discern the international threat posed by 
rising AMR. In the case of  human medicine, they uncovered the global “chains 
of infection”49  behind the first identified resistant pandemic (Staphylococcus 
phage type 80/81) in 1954. In the case of agriculture, close cooperation between 
the PHLS and veterinary bacteriologists revealed the threat posed by nonhu-
man AMR se lection.50 One of the first veterinary researchers to embrace phage- 
typing was Herbert Williams Smith. During the 1940s, Williams Smith had 
briefly worked for the PHLS where he shared a laboratory bench with E. S. 
Anderson— future director of the PHLS’s Enteric Reference Laboratory.  Later 
based at the Animal Health Trust in Stock, Williams Smith adapted PHLS 
phage- typing sets for animal isolates of Staphylococci and Escherichia coli. He 
soon noticed that the strains he was typing  were becoming increasingly resis-
tant to antibiotics. Seemingly unaware of Starr and Reynolds’ 1951 American 
studies of AMR in poultry (chapter 3), Williams Smith in de pen dently identi-
fied low- dosed AGPs as major AMR selectors.51  After warning about AGPs at 
the 1956 BVA conference (chapter 6), Williams Smith used phage- typing to 
trace the spread of resistant strains from animals to  humans. In a 1960 paper, 
he compared staphylococcal isolates of 160 pigs fed tetracycline AGPs to an 
AGP- free control group. Of the pigs fed tetracyclines, 67   percent carried 
tetracycline- resistant S. aureus strains. Of fifty attendants caring for tetracy-
cline- and penicillin- fed chickens, 30  percent carried penicillin- resistant S. 
aureus, 14  percent tetracycline- resistant S. aureus, and 4  percent penicillin- and 
tetracycline- resistant S. aureus. Phage- typing showed that resistant  human and 
animal S. aureus isolates  were mostly identical.52 Williams Smith’s warnings 
about nonhuman AMR se lection  were echoed by parallel Canadian studies of 
AMR in pigs, Cambridge research on antibiotic preservatives, and PHLS sur-
veys of S. typhimurium isolates from poultry.53 In 1960, PHLS workers also 
detected higher nasal carriage- rates of penicillin- resistant Staphylococci in mil-
itary recruits from rural than from urban backgrounds, which suggested a 
link to unpasteurized milk and frequent animal contact.54
Coinciding with increasing public attacks on intensive farming and the vet-
erinary push for preventive health schemes (chapters 5 and 6), PHLS phage- 
typers effectively ended official complacency about agricultural AMR se lection. 
In the summer of 1959, Britain’s Agricultural Research Council (ARC) referred 
to still unpublished PHLS data when it demanded a general reassessment of 
AGPs’ safety.55 Taken aback, the Medical Research Council (MRC) marveled: 
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“In fact they are seriously considering withdrawing approval of the adding of 
antibiotics; in other words, they are considering putting the clock back.”56
Corporatist Compromises
Tasked with undertaking a comprehensive review of AGPs but not of thera-
peutic antibiotic use, a joint ARC/MRC committee started work in April 1960. 
The so- called Netherthorpe committee’s main body was chaired by former 
NFU president James Turner— now Lord Netherthorpe— and only met twice. 
During its first meeting in 1960, it installed a scientific subcommittee headed 
by Arthur Ashley Miles, director of the Lister Institute of Preventive Medi-
cine. Two years  later, it endorsed the subcommittee’s report.57 The subcommit-
tee met five times between 1960 and 1962 and was carefully staffed to reflect 
competing veterinary, medical, and farming interests.
Although the subcommittee’s staffing clearly aimed at producing a 
consensus- based corporatist fix of AMR prob lems, it soon became apparent 
that a fundamental rift divided members. While a medical faction consisting 
of physicians and veterinarians attacked AGPs on the grounds of AMR, an eco-
nomic faction consisting of agricultural scientists and officials pressed for an 
expansion of antibiotic use on the grounds of productivity and unproven harm. 
Mirroring agricultural strug gles over antibiotic control (chapter 6), nearly  every 
subcommittee meeting was characterized by clashes between Robert Fraser 
Gordon (veterinarian, Houghton Poultry Trust) and Raphael Braude (animal 
nutritionist, NIRD). Giving evidence in June  1960, Herbert Williams Smith 
presented new data on the spread of AMR from animals to workers: in one 
survey, 88.3  percent of Staph aureus strains isolated from the noses of veterinary sur-
geons and 21.1  percent from farmers’ noses  were penicillin- resistant—14.7  percent 
of isolates from veterinarians and 2.6  percent from farmers  were also resistant to 
chloramphenicol.58 Williams Smith warned that even the lowest level of anti-
biotic use could select for AMR.59 In response, Braude asked for conclusive 
evidence of harm resulting from resistant strains. Williams Smith conceded 
that he was unable to supply such proof. With researchers unable to specify 
 whether AMR resulted primarily from AGPs or therapeutic antibiotic use, the 
subcommittee therefore compromised on the following statement: “therapeu-
tic uses of antibiotics could lead to the production of resistant strains, . . .  the 
dangers of uncontrolled therapeutic use should be born in mind.”60 Remark-
ably, evidence submitted by the NFU showed that uncontrolled antibiotic use 
was indeed taking place. The NFU submission contained three farmers’ state-
ments: one farmer confessed having illegally fed antibiotics to breeding pigs, a 
second farmer stated that he used penicillin but had ignored “fash ion able and 
extravagant claims of the broad- spectrum manufacturers,”61 and a third farmer 
reported “certain instances where high- level doses of antibiotics have been used 
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in an attempt to offset bad husbandry practices.”62 The subcommittee’s min-
utes explic itly noted “the difference of opinion between the farming mem-
bers of the Joint Committee and the farmers whose opinion had been put 
forward as representative by the NFU.”63
In view of the division between medical and agricultural members, Profes-
sor James Howie from the University of Glasgow— and  future PHLS director— 
presented subcommittee members with three choices:
Complete prohibition of the addition of antibiotics to feedingstuffs (i.e., a 
reversion to the  earlier situation, which would be very difficult)
Maintenance of the pre sent position (on the ground that the conflicting 
evidence did not provide any basis for a change)
General permission to add antibiotics to feedingstuffs (on the ground that 
 there was insufficient evidence to justify the withholding of such permission)64
Howie’s phrasing was significant. By presenting only three choices— two of 
which  were extremes—he transformed the status quo ante into an acceptable 
compromise. Both factions could subsequently tell their supporters to have pre-
vented worse.
Yielding to Braude’s objections, the subcommittee agreed that  there was 
insufficient evidence to restrict already licensed AGPs. Acknowledging a com-
mon practice, it also recommended licensing AGPs for calves but did not 
endorse AGPs for layer birds and adult stock. Both sides called for further 
research. Significantly, the medical faction managed to push through a recom-
mendation that new AGPs should be licensed on the basis of their irrelevance to 
 human and animal therapy.65 Devised without knowledge of horizontal AMR 
transfer, the suggested distinction between medically relevant and irrelevant 
antibiotics was not new: the Antibiotics Panel of the Advisory Committee on 
Poisonous Substances had discussed such a separation as early as 1956.66 How-
ever, by inserting two- tier licensing into the subcommittee’s report, the medi-
cal faction scored a long- term victory. Changed licensing would promote the 
development of medically irrelevant AGPs. Once established,  these AGPs 
would make penicillin and tetracycline AGPs expendable. Following con-
temporary concepts of vertical AMR proliferation, reduced se lection pressure 
would also lead to a gradual return of bacterial sensitivity.
The resulting 1962 Netherthorpe report “fixed” AMR by shoring up exist-
ing  legal bound aries between nontherapeutic AGPs and higher- dosed thera-
peutic antibiotics as well as by creating new bound aries between allegedly 
medically relevant and irrelevant drugs. In a perfect example of corporatist com-
promise, the demands of all sides  were partially met: veterinarians and public 
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health experts could claim greater control over  future antibiotics while agri-
cultural representatives could proclaim business as usual. This insulated mode 
of consensus- oriented consultation had the advantage of avoiding polarizing 
public clashes over AMR. However, in a sign of  things to come, it also incen-
tivized the creation of narrow reforms via incremental rearrangements of  legal 
terminology over systematic reforms of antibiotic infrastructures.
The 1962 Netherthorpe compromise was short- lived. Although the compro-
mise was endorsed by a 1963 WHO report,67 the milk residue scandal (1963), 
Animal Machines (1964), and “infective” AMR warnings (1965) soon reignited 
antibiotic conflicts (chapters 5 and 6). One of the main  drivers of the resulting 
second and third rounds of official AMR reviews was Ephraim Saul “Andy” 
Anderson. Anderson was the son of Estonian immigrants and had joined the 
PHLS  after being stationed in Cairo during the war. In 1954, he succeeded 
Arthur Felix as head of the PHLS Enteric Reference Laboratory and took an 
active interest in the environmental spread of bacterial strains and AMR. His 
experience in reworking PHLS phage- typing to account for lysogeny (the abil-
ity of “weak phages” to integrate their DNA into the host bacterium’s genome) 
also made him appreciate the implications of recently published Japa nese 
research on plasmid- mediated (horizontal) AMR transfer for antibiotic stew-
ardship (chapter 1). In addition to studying AMR on British farms, Anderson 
cultivated useful friendships with journalists like the Guardian’s Anthony 
Tucker and Bernard Dixon,  future editor of the New Scientist. While his robust 
AMR studies and media interventions would successfully challenge the Neth-
erthorpe compromise,68 Anderson’s abrasive personality and public partisan-
ship for sweeping antibiotic restrictions would effectively preclude him from 
participating in the ensuing corporatist redrawing of “safe” antibiotic use.69
Anderson had been concerned about agricultural AMR se lection since the 
1950s. However, it was the combination of Japa nese R- factor research and the 
1964 Aberdeen typhoid outbreak that turned him into an activist scientist. 
Concerned that agricultural antibiotic use might foster multiple- resistance in 
typhoid, he began to look for mobile AMR on farms. In 1965, his first coau-
thored paper in the Lancet reported in vitro AMR transfer from ampicillin- 
resistant S. typhimurium to sensitive S. typhimurium and E. coli. The paper 
presented compelling evidence of AMR transfer taking place in nonhuman set-
tings and indicated that plasmids could also be transferred to bacteria in 
 human populations (chapter 5). Anderson’s next two coauthored papers used 
the PHLS’s unique surveillance capabilities to highlight rising AMR in 
S. typhimurium Phage Type 29 isolates from across the country and presented 
evidence of furazolidone re sis tance transfer (a drug used exclusively in animals) 
from bacteria in animals to bacteria isolated from  humans.70
Anderson’s 1965 papers triggered an impor tant shift  toward a more environ-
mental understanding of AMR  hazards and led to a recall of the Netherthorpe 
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committee amid rising public pressure in spring 1965. Asked to give evidence 
and  later accused of instigating the  whole committee,71 Anderson argued for 
immediate antibiotic bans. His team had identified a substantial rise of resistant 
salmonellosis outbreaks caused by S. typhimurium Type 29 since 1961. Type 29 
had first been identified in China in 1959 and had been isolated in Britain in 1961. 
Whereas 16.7  percent of Type 29 isolates  were antibiotic resistant in Novem-
ber 1964, the proportion of resistant strains had risen to 59.8  percent in April 1965. 
Worryingly, Type 29’s re sis tance spectrum had also increased: in 1963, Anderson’s 
team had discovered Type 29 strains with re sis tance against sulfonamides and 
streptomycin. Tetracycline re sis tance was detected in early 1964. By June 1964, 
most Type 29 cultures  were resistant to all three drugs. Ampicillin re sis tance 
appeared three months  later. Significantly, Type 29’s streptomycin, sulfon-
amide, and ampicillin re sis tance was plasmid- encoded and transferable. Using 
any antibiotic on Type 29’s re sis tance spectrum would automatically select for 
re sis tance against all of the other antibiotics.72 Writing in support of Anderson, 
Herbert Williams Smith reported that his team had analyzed two Type 29 out-
breaks that had also proven resistant to neomycin and furazolidone— drugs ini-
tially not included in Anderson’s AMR survey.73
PHLS investigations linked Type 29 outbreaks to the intensive rearing of 
male calves.  These calves  were no longer slaughtered  after birth in the dairy 
regions of the West Country but  were being sold for fattening in the grain- rich 
eastern part of  England. The calves  were often less than one week old and par-
ticularly susceptible to salmonella infections. Many  were treated prophylacti-
cally with a barrage of antibiotics. Remarkably, PHLS phage- typing traced most 
British Type 29 outbreaks to the premises of a Sussex calf dealer. This dealer 
had marketed calves together with six- week feeding kits containing many of 
the antibiotics to which Type 29 had developed re sis tance.74 It was likely that 
this practice had caused severe and occasionally fatal  human and animal 
outbreaks of resistant salmonellosis in thirty- seven counties.75 Officials, how-
ever, lacked the statutory powers to stop the recalcitrant dealer from overusing 
legally obtained— often prescribed— antibiotics and reform his livestock 
operation. Reporting on a Type 29 outbreak, which had infected cows, an 
18- month- old, and a 6- month- old, the local Medical Officer of Health com-
plained: “The most frustrating aspect of Salmonellosis in  cattle is that, having 
detected the infection and having prevented its spread to the public via the 
milk, one has no power to eradicate the disease from the herd concerned.”76
Officials’ impotence in the face of Type 29 frustrated Anderson, who increas-
ingly saw AMR as an environmental  hazard. Speaking to the reconvened 
Netherthorpe committee in 1965, he attacked the committee’s 1962 report, 
which had acknowledged agricultural AMR se lection but had thought that 
AMR se lection was  limited to the antibiotic in use. This was not true: “mul-
tiple re sis tance is now the rule . . .  I have already pointed out that the use of any 
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drug in a multiple spectrum of re sis tance protects the entire spectrum, so that, 
for example, re sis tances to ampicillin, streptomycin, sulphonamides, neomy-
cin, kanamycin, and furazolidone  will all flourish  under the umbrella of tetra-
cycline if they are associated with re sis tance to that drug.”77 The continuous 
feeding of low- dosed AGPs was creating the perfect conditions for AMR pro-
liferation. Challenging 1950s scenarios of an inevitable return to bacterial 
susceptibility once antibiotic use ceased, Anderson also warned that it was 
unclear  whether AMR would “die out in an animal population if the use of 
antibiotics was discontinued.”78 Since AMR developed in jumps, it was pos si-
ble that transferable re sis tance to chloramphenicol— a vital drug against 
typhoid— might soon emerge. In a crucial statement, Anderson noted: “the 
position was that R [resistance]- factors now have an epidemiology of their 
own, covering transfer between strains and species and also between hosts.”79 
Containing AMR was no longer just about containing specific bacteria but 
about containing genes.
Asked what steps he would take if he  were given dictatorial powers, Ander-
son called for a ban of AGPs and antibiotic preservatives, therapeutic antibi-
otic use only  after bacteriological diagnosis, and a reservation of certain 
antibiotics solely for  humans. He also called for enhanced AMR surveillance, 
antibiotic advertising bans, and improved welfare standards.80 Unsurprisingly, 
 these recommendations divided the Netherthorpe scientific subcommittee. In 
a clever move, agricultural committee members referred to the committee’s 
brief of assessing only AGPs and argued that “the use of most of the antibiot-
ics discussed [in calves] was [still] illegal without a veterinary prescription.”81 
 Because of its focus on calves and forms of antibiotic use, which  were  either 
prescription only or illegal, Anderson’s AMR data was thus beyond the com-
mittee’s purview. In June 1965, the reconvened full committee could thus merely 
call for more research and reconfirm existing regulations— including the 
planned licensing of AGPs for calves.82
For Anderson and his supporters, this status quo was unacceptable. In 
December 1965, a further recall of the Netherthorpe committee was prompted 
when Anderson’s superior, PHLS director James Howie, withdrew “his con-
currence in the recommendations of the [June  1965] draft report.”83 New 
research by Anderson had strengthened the case both against low- dosed AGPs 
and high- dosed antibiotic prophylaxis. Despite identifying a lab strain of Type 
29 whose tetracycline re sis tance was encoded on a transferable R- factor— 
designated as T”— Anderson’s team had previously thought that transferable 
tetracycline re sis tance was rare. Recently, however, they had found an R- factor 
indistinguishable from T” in a wild S. typhimurium Type 29 strain from pigs. 
Researchers already knew that the lab- based T” could transfer re sis tance to 
“almost 100  percent of recipient cells of  either S. typhimurium or Escherichia 
Coli K12 . . .  after overnight contact with a donor strain.”84 Although the wild 
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porcine Type 29 strain with T” had not spread outside the pig herd, it was pos si-
ble that the wild T” R- factor might in de pen dently escape into the wider environ-
ment by transferring to E. coli, which  were not being monitored for. Anderson’s 
findings suggested that both low- and high- dosed se lection for tetracycline re sis-
tance in all livestock sectors was more impor tant for AMR in “S. typhimurium 
than was realized  earlier.”85
With Netherthorpe subcommittee members continuing to disagree about 
AMR risks resulting from AGPs, Anderson’s renewed push for a holistic review 
of antibiotic use had an unforeseen consequence. In its final report, the sub-
committee shifted its focus from prescription- free AGPs to prescription- only 
therapeutic antibiotics and called for a new investigation of antibiotic use in vet-
erinary and  human medicine. Further recommendations included a retraction 
of the subcommittee’s previous endorsement of AGPs for calves, a rationaliza-
tion of British antibiotic committees, more research on therapeutic and prophy-
lactic antibiotic use, and turning salmonellosis into a notifiable disease.86
The subcommittee’s proposed review of therapeutic antibiotic use proved 
contentious: not only would it infringe on the jealously guarded legislative 
bound aries between the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, it also threat-
ened to delay the almost finalized 1968 Medicines Act, which would unify frag-
mented drug regulations and establish a formalized category of Prescription 
Only Medicines.87 In view of the fragile situation, MH officials and the influ-
ential antibiotic expert Lawrence Paul Garrod pressed for a deletion of all ref-
erences to  human medicine during the main Netherthorpe committee’s final 
meeting in April 1966.88 The final Netherthorpe report merely recommended a 
review of “the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry and veterinary medicine 
and its implications in the field of public health.”89 However, the subcommittee’s 
attached report stressed that evidence for AGP restrictions was inadequate.90 In 
sum, the only area to be reviewed was veterinary medicine.
Unsurprisingly, veterinarians did not take kindly to this proposal. During 
meetings with the PHLS, MAFF’s Animal Health Division resisted pressure to 
ban prophylactic antibiotic use. Veterinary officials highlighted the difficulties 
of intensive animal husbandry, stressed the need for differentiating between dif-
fer ent forms of antibiotic use, and emphasized educational reform as well as new 
codes of practice.91 Complaining about its one- sided focus on veterinarians, 
the ARC blocked the second Netherthorpe report’s publication in Janu-
ary 1967.92 Opinions within MAFF  were more nuanced: while one official down-
played the report as a “storm in a teacup,”93  others anticipated “a first- class row 
with the Royal College and the BVA.”94 Although they agreed that withhold-
ing publication could inflame public opinion, officials  were powerless to over-
ride the ARC.95 As a consequence, MAFF lobbied the MH to reextend the 
proposed review to both agricultural and medical aspects of antibiotic use. In 
 doing so, officials cited a report by MAFF’s Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP). 
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Apparently anticipating prob lems with the Netherthorpe committee, MAFF 
had commissioned the SAP with a separate review in 1965. The SAP review 
was headed by Alastair Frazer, a food additives expert with ties to industry,96 
and advised by penicillin co- discoverer Sir Ernst Boris Chain. Citing declin-
ing salmonellosis rates, it endorsed current antibiotic use but recommended 
further research and a review of control mea sures.97 Summing up the SAP 
report, a MAFF official noted: “In other words, nothing we should do should 
impede the use of antibiotics in agriculture or food, though of course they 
must be used with reasonable safeguards.”98
Following further delays, rising public pressure made  Labour’s Minister of 
Agriculture Frederick Peart become personally involved in negotiations about 
the new antibiotic review in July 1967. During a meeting with se nior advisers, 
Peart agreed that the Netherthorpe report “created some unnecessary alarm, 
and that [it] picked out veterinarians.”99 However, attempts to extend the 
planned review to  human medicine only increased interministerial tensions. 
Referring to allegations of antibiotic overuse, a MAFF bureaucrat complained: 
“ there has been a good deal of sniping from certain medical quarters . . .  , 
although I seem to recall something about ‘ people who live in glass  houses.’ ”100 
In September 1967, all involved parties published a joint press statement accept-
ing most of the Netherthorpe recommendations but rejecting national moni-
toring plans for resistant salmonellosis.101 However, despite pressure from the 
PHLS and MRC, an  actual antibiotic review remained unforthcoming.102
Similar to the establishment of penicillin monitoring for milk, it took a scan-
dal in the form of the tragic Teesside deaths to break the corporatist stalemate 
and quicken the pace of reform (chapter 5). Official concern about rising pub-
lic anger first arose when the BBC’s Twenty- four Hours linked fatalities to anti-
biotic overuse in agriculture ahead of Christmas 1967.103 Previously postponed 
by an outbreak of foot- and- mouth disease, an intraministerial meeting was 
hastily scheduled for February 13, 1968. According to an internal letter, “min-
isters are becoming increasingly vulnerable in this business and we  ought 
quickly to  settle our lines on Netherthorpe.”104 A MAFF minute warned: 
“[MH] have been preparing for the ‘ battle.’ ”105 This prediction was true. With 
the support of the PHLS,106 MH representatives argued that medical antibi-
otic use was the sole concern of their ministry and referred to the 1967 joint 
press statement’s endorsement of the second Netherthorpe report’s terms.107 
MAFF officials  later complained that the MH had treated the new review’s 
agriculture- focused terms of reference as “a sacred cow which would not be sac-
rificed at any cost.”108
The next question to  settle was the  future antibiotic review’s membership. 
Feeling that the Netherthorpe committee had been “over- weighted scientifi-
cally on the medical and para medical sides,”109 MAFF was keen to rebalance the 
new committee in  favor of agricultural interests. Another point of contention 
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was E. S. Anderson’s role: should he be a committee member, or should he func-
tion as an adviser? Both ministries  were aware of Anderson’s public and scientific 
standing but equally wary of his vocal support of antibiotic bans and his tempera-
mental character. To control Anderson, the MH suggested co- nominating 
PHLS director Sir James Howie.110 However, in his eagerness to be appointed, 
Anderson overshot his goal: in April 1968, he publicly announced that he would 
refuse to give evidence should he not be appointed to the committee.111 Ander-
son’s attempt to pressure his way into Britain’s confidential world of compromise- 
oriented corporatist expert consultation backfired. MAFF could now argue that 
Anderson would endanger the committee’s recommendations: “If the commit-
tee’s conclusions  were in line with Dr.  Anderson’s views,  there would be the 
charge that we had biased it with prejudiced members; if it went the other way, 
Dr.  Anderson would no doubt issue a minority report.”112 Even James 
Howie, who had previously refused to accept a committee position without 
Anderson’s co- nomination, now changed his mind. In May 1968, a minute by 
Jock Carnochan, assistant secretary of MAFF’s Animal Health Division, tri-
umphantly noted: “Dr.  Howie has become impatient of the Prima Donna 
approach of . . .  Dr. Anderson and is no longer prepared to support him.”113
By late May 1968, all membership decisions had been made: Anderson had 
been substituted with a Medical Officer of Health from Birmingham and the 
molecular biologist and University of Edinburgh vice- chancellor Michael 
Swann had accepted chairmanship of the committee. Fearing attacks by Ander-
son, MAFF had, however, withdrawn its nomination of Alastair Frazer. In a 
smart move, agricultural officials convinced the MH to nominate two veteri-
narians in Frazer’s stead. Comprising two agriculturalists, three veterinarians, 
and two medical scientists, the review committee was now weighted slightly 
in  favor of agricultural interests.114
The Swann Report
Eigh teen months  after the submission of the second Netherthorpe report and 
three years  after Anderson’s initial warnings, the Joint Committee on the Use 
of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine started its work 
in July 1968. The tasks facing the corporatist Swann committee  were daunting: 
it had to strike a compromise between opposing agricultural and veterinary 
interests, substantial medical AMR concerns, and the provisions of the new 
1968 Medicines Act. In contrast to previous committees, public pressure meant 
that delaying action by calling for more research was no longer an option. 
Between December 1968 and April 1969, calls for antibiotic reform increased 
further when thirty babies died from antibiotic resistant gastroenteritis in Man-
chester in a seemingly grotesque repeat of the Teesside outbreak.115
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Differences of opinion on antibiotic reform became amply clear during the 
Swann Committee’s evidence gathering phase: farmers and nutritionists 
defended antibiotic access; veterinary organ izations called for prescription- 
based controls of medicated feeds (chapter 6); medical and public health rep-
resentatives attacked antibiotic use by both farmers and veterinarians;116 and 
phar ma ceu ti cal lobbyists used the opportunity to launch a concerted campaign 
against statutory bans.
The rec ords of the British Beecham com pany allow a detailed reconstruc-
tion of industry campaigning. Concerned about its Vitamealo AGPs, Beecham 
assessed individual members’ voting preferences within days of the Swann com-
mittee’s nomination: the committee’s three animal nutritionists and agricul-
tural experts would support AGP use; the two public health experts would 
support antibiotic restrictions; and the three veterinarians would support 
expanded veterinary control over antibiotics.117 Beecham next mobilized influ-
ential supporters to defend its products. One of  these supporters was Nobel 
laureate Ernst Boris Chain, who had helped Beecham develop semi- synthetic 
penicillins and now directed Imperial College’s biochemistry department.118 
Speaking to supermarket representatives in 1967, Chain had already claimed 
that AMR could be controlled by new drugs and temporary restrictions: “It 
takes as  little as 30 minutes for a bacterium to divide, and for this reason it is 
impossible to shift the equilibrium of the bacterial population of a world scale. 
If a shift does occur within a confined area such as a hospital ward or an ani-
mal rearing unit, all one has to do is to stop the se lection pressure . . .  , open 
doors and win dows widely and wait for a week or two; . . .  and every thing is 
exactly as it was before.”119 Agricultural antibiotics’ ongoing efficacy meant that 
in vitro research on transferable AMR did not apply to field conditions: “if we 
consider the invaluable benefit which agriculture has derived from the use of 
antibiotics, it would be outright folly to ban their use . . .  acting only on [an] 
entirely hy po thet i cal chain of events.”120 Chain also accused E. S. Anderson 
and the PHLS of fueling an environmentalist anti- chemical crusade: “It is never 
risky to issue warnings. . . .  the supercautious public warners do the opposite to 
performing a public ser vice . . . .  The campaign against the use of antibiotics is, 
of course, part of the general campaign against the use of chemicals altogether in 
food production. . . .  it is the duty of  those concerned with food production . . . 
to resist the entirely irrational and emotion based campaign against [chemicals] 
use in any form.”121 Beecham  adopted this rhe toric by claiming that  there was 
 little evidence of harm resulting from agricultural AMR se lection: the  human 
reservoir of resistant bacteria might “in theory” be influenced by agricultural 
antibiotics but in practice seemed “to be fully capable of self- proliferation.”122 
Antibiotics should remain available to treat clinical and “sub- clinical” conditions, 
which posed infectious  hazards and  limited animal per for mance.
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In May 1969, Beecham joined other members of the Association of the Brit-
ish Phar ma ceu ti cal Industry (ABPI) for a confidential meeting with the 
Swann committee. During the meeting, representatives from Beecham, Cyan-
amid, Elanco, Smith Kline and French Laboratories, Pfizer, Parke Davis, and 
the industry- sponsored OHE defended antibiotic use. According to Cyana-
mid’s Keith Grainger, farmers  were already shifting away from nontherapeutic 
growth promotion. Much less concentrate was sold for home- mixing and poul-
try producers  were replacing penicillin with higher- dosed broad- spectrum, 
copper, and arsenical products. In general, available prescription- free antibiotic 
feeds  were used less for growth promotion and more as prophylactics against 
stress.123 Banning AGPs would thus harm animal health. Beecham’s represen-
tative added “that transfer of re sis tance was not a new phenomenon and that it 
could well have always been the main type of re sis tance, and besides bacterial 
populations  were dynamic and in a perpetual state of change.”124 Considering it 
“very obvious”125 that the Swann committee was debating restrictions, ABPI 
members strongly opposed banning AGPs or antibiotic advertisements to farm-
ers: “[AGP bans] would turn the veterinary surgeon into a pharmacist . . . .  Each 
material should be considered on its merits and the range of antibiotics available 
for animal therapy should not be restricted so that the veterinary surgeon’s 
armamentarium was diff er ent to the doctor’s for treating  human disease.”126 
Manufacturers also warned that AGP bans could harm about £97.3 million of 
British antibiotic exports, raise the price of antibiotics for  human medicine, and 
“might induce a manufacturer to choose an alternative place of manufacture 
on the Continent of Eu rope.”127
Faced with a plethora of contradictory demands, Swann committee mem-
bers strug gled to find an acceptable compromise on antibiotic reform. The ques-
tion was which common denominator the committee’s individual factions 
would be able to agree on. Submitted in November 1969, the Swann report 
clearly acknowledged that agricultural antibiotics contributed to AMR and had 
“caused some difficulties in veterinary practice and [had] caused harm to  human 
health.”128 En bloc AMR transfer increased the likelihood of a “massive and 
rapid propagation of antibiotic resistant organisms”129 as had already happened 
in the case of S. typhimurium Type 29. Although it claimed that horizontal 
AMR transfer was only a prob lem in Enterobacteriaceae, the report refused to 
accept that twenty years of use had proven agricultural antibiotics safe.  There 
was sufficient evidence to take action without allowing the “cry for more 
research” to “hold up implementation of our recommendations.”130 Echoing 
previous reports, the Swann committee advised the government to cut the num-
ber of advisory bodies, install a permanent committee on all aspects of antibi-
otic use, ban antibiotic advertising to laypersons, and fund further AMR 
research and preventive veterinary epidemiology at universities.131 Most sig-
nificantly, the report recommended extending the 1962 distinction between 
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medically relevant and irrelevant antibiotics to already licensed AGPs: antibi-
otics should be used as growth promoters only if they  were of economic value, 
had  little or no application as therapeutic agents, and did not impair therapeutic 
antibiotics. This latter recommendation also included scenarios in which re sis-
tance to AGPs was “part of a multiple re sis tance pattern transferable en bloc.”132
In concrete terms, the Swann report advocated a ban of penicillin and tet-
racycline AGPs. It also advocated assigning prescription- only status to the still 
unscheduled macrolide tylosin  because of cross- resistance to erythromycin, 
which was used in  human medicine. Prescription- free sulfonamide and nitro-
furan feeds should also be restricted due to their se lection for multiple- resistant 
organisms. The availability of nontherapeutic AGPs like bambermycin, virgin-
iamycin, and zinc bacitracin meant that the proposed feed restrictions would 
not cause economic harm.133 Taken by itself, the first part of the Swann report 
marked a milestone in the history of precautionary substance regulation. Its 
recommendations  were based on the strong likelihood— but not quantifiable 
evidence—of harm.
However, when it came to addressing the wider antibiotic infrastructure of 
British agriculture, its corporatist roots made the Swann report far less ambi-
tious. In the case of prescribed therapeutic antibiotics, it shied away from 
challenging veterinary antibiotic use. The Swann report criticized veterinary 
attempts to control salmonellosis with antibiotics and strug gled to “find any 
excuse in logic or theory” for the “prophylactic treatment of farm animals in the 
absence of infection.”134 However, it refrained from recommending statutory 
reform and instead emphasized “that the veterinary surgeon and practitioner, 
like his medical counterparty, trea sures the freedom . . .  to prescribe as he 
thinks best in the interest of his patient.”135 Veterinarians  were merely cau-
tioned to “temper credulity with a more critical analy sis of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the antibiotics they prescribe.”136 It was clear that this tame 
criticism had been controversial within the Swann committee. In the case of 
chloramphenicol, the report noted that its decision not to call for an end of vet-
erinary prescription rights “may prove to have been mistaken.”137 One official 
 later acknowledged that “issues other than the purely scientific”138 had influ-
enced debates.
By giving into veterinary pressure, the Swann committee missed its chance 
to break the narrow AGP- focused mold of the Netherthorpe reports and chal-
lenge wider antibiotic infrastructures.  Whether  limited Swann- style bans 
would solve AMR was doubtful. Conceived of in the late 1950s, partial antibi-
otic restrictions  were supposed to contain the vertical proliferation of resistant 
organisms but offered  little protection against what E. S. Anderson had already 
described as the “umbrella- like” se lection and ecological proliferation of mobile 
re sis tance genes. What would prevent a medically irrelevant AGP from select-
ing for re sis tance against medically relevant antibiotics if re sis tance against both 
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drugs was encoded on the same plasmid? Why was the higher- dosed use of 
a drug in a prescribed feed safer than the marginally lower- dosed use of the 
same drug in a prescription- free feed? British decision- makers had attempted to 
“fix” AMR— but in a way that would not alienate corporatist stakeholders. The 
result was a report that was revolutionary in its precautionary ambition but 
tame in its outcomes.
The publication of the 1969 Swann report ended the first era of antibiotic 
reform. Although AMR dominated British concerns from the 1940s onward, 
postwar pressures and the belief that low- dosed drugs would not select for re sis-
tance resulted in policies, which prioritized antibiotics’ economic benefits 
over potential risks. Relying on loose gentlemen’s agreements and corporatist 
self- regulation, British officials  were slow to respond to emerging side effects 
of expanding antibiotic use. Unlike the residue- focused FDA, Britain only 
mandated milk surveillance  after a public scandal in 1963— meat escaped reg-
ulations and would only be monitored from the late 1970s onward (chapter 13). 
Gradualism also characterized official responses to spreading AMR. Although 
insulated corporatist decision- making was capable of addressing a systemic 
challenge like AMR without allowing conflicts of interest to spill into the pub-
lic arena, its compromise- oriented nature produced conservative outcomes. 
 Under pressure from public concerns about factory farming and medical AMR 
warnings, the 1960s thus saw two carefully staffed expert committees lay the 
groundwork for the next three de cades of both British and Eu ro pean antibi-
otic regulation. Differentiating between high- and low- dosed antibiotic use and 
between medically relevant and irrelevant drugs, the Netherthorpe and Swann 
committees legitimized public concerns about agricultural AMR se lection but 
constructed and reinforced narrow  legal bound aries to contain resulting 
 hazards. Wider antibiotic infrastructures remained unaddressed.
Part III
USA
The Prob lem of Plenty, 
1967–2013
The third part of this book explores the widening transatlantic divergence of agri-
cultural antibiotic use and regulations following the 1960s. In contrast to Britain, 
AMR se lection on farms never turned into a common denominator of public risk 
perceptions in the United States. Chapter 7 explores how the 1970s “toxicity 
crisis” and the fracturing of bipartisan support for environmentalism sidetracked 
calls for AMR- focused antibiotic restrictions. Reform efforts  were further under-
mined by sophisticated industrial counter- science and lobbying. Despite a resur-
gence of AMR concerns during the 1990s, public pressure remained insufficient to 
trigger statutory reform and was further fragmented by the boom of organic and 
antibiotic- free products. Chapter 8 studies how US farmers reacted to public con-
cerns about antibiotics. It shows how ongoing public criticism, economic pressure, 
and bans of DDT and DES fostered an agricultural fortress mentality against 
antibiotic restrictions. This opposition to statutory mea sures persists despite 
the partial “greening” of agricultural discourse and methods since the 1980s. 
Chapter 9 analyses US regulators’ attempts to curb AMR and residues  after 1967. 
During the 1970s, the FDA attempted to implement Swann- style AGP restric-
tions three times. Its efforts failed  because of lacking public and po liti cal sup-
port, internal divisions, and the US  legal system’s increasing insistence on proof 
of harm and cost- benefit analyses rather than precautionary reasoning. Follow-
ing prolonged stagnation, a resurgence of antibiotic reform  under the Obama 






Antibiotics, Public Concerns, 
and Consumer Solutions
This chapter traces the evolution of agricultural antibiotics’ public image in the 
United States from the 1960s to the pre sent. In contrast to Britain, concerns 
about residues, AMR, and welfare never fused in the US public sphere. Instead, 
the “toxicity crisis” of the early 1970s prolonged the residue- focused antibiotic 
risk episteme. It was only  toward the late 1970s that a significant number of pub-
lic commentators began to express concern about agricultural AMR se lection. 
However, an increasing partisan divide on “green” issues and attacks on over-
regulation soon diluted calls for wider antibiotic reform. The market stepped in 
where the state  stopped. Concerned about food purity rather than AMR, a 
growing number of US consumers turned to antibiotic- free or organic produce. 
By the 1990s, organic food had become mainstream. The effects of this develop-
ment  were ambivalent. While concerned consumers could switch to antibiotic- 
free food, the creation of a market niche for “safe food” fragmented pressure for 
systemic antibiotic reform. Green consumerism’s emphasis on purity also rein-
forced the existing US focus on residues over AMR  hazards. Meanwhile, higher 
prices for organic produce led to a class- based distribution of risk whereby 
wealthier consumers could purchase a sense of safety that was not available to 
poorer citizens.
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Epistemic Divides
The second half of the 1960s did not change Americans’ cultural prioritization 
of residue over AMR  hazards. Following the recommendations of the 1966 ad 
hoc committee on veterinary and nonveterinary antibiotics, the FDA acknowl-
edged potential risks posed by “infective re sis tance” but focused on residue- 
oriented goals by banning antibiotic preservatives and establishing a national 
residue- monitoring program for meat (chapter 4).
The FDA’s policy of only partially acknowledging the risks of horizontal 
AMR transfer mirrored divided assessments in the public sphere. With regard 
to  human medicine, all major US newspapers supported campaigns for “ratio-
nal” antibiotic use and expressed concern about antibiotic resistant infections.1 
However, the extent of AMR threats remained contested. In the New York 
Times, Vernon Knight of Baylor University claimed that  there “was no com-
pelling evidence that a dark age of medicine, bereft of antibiotics, lies ahead.”2 
By contrast, R- factor discoverer Tsutomu Watanabe predicted a “pre- antibiotic”3 
era in the Washington Post. Unsurprisingly, commentators  were even more 
divided in their assessment of AMR se lection on farms. While experts like 
Watanabe and David Smith from Boston’s  Children’s Hospital attacked agri-
cultural antibiotic use,4  others called for concrete proof of harm, differentiated 
between AMR in  human and animal populations, and continued to praise anti-
biotics’ economic benefits in food production.5  After initially equivocating 
between US and Eu ro pean risk assessments,6 the New York Times was the only 
major US paper to firmly condemn AMR as an environmental threat to “Space-
ship Earth”7 and endorse Britain’s Swann report in 1969. Without a broad 
co ali tion of supporters from diff er ent communities, the issue of AMR- focused 
reforms of US agriculture languished in the US public sphere.
The Toxicity Crisis
Americans’ relative complacency about nonhuman AMR se lection stood in 
contrast to ongoing concerns about “unnatural” antibiotic residues in food 
(chapter 2).8 The late 1960s and 1970s saw a “toxicity crisis”9 exacerbate this pri-
oritization. The crisis was triggered by scandals and high- level proceedings 
against toxic and carcinogenic substances like chloramphenicol, DDT, and 
DES, which damaged trust in regulatory agencies. It also coincided with ris-
ing popu lar environmentalism, the high point of the US consumer protection 
movement, and the countercultural rejuvenation of the organic movement.10 
Politicians on both sides of the aisle  were keen to capitalize on the toxicity cri-
sis and a coinciding wave of what Lizabeth Cohen has termed “Third- Wave 
Consumerism.”11 Attempting to appeal to a public that was being divided into 
lifestyle and value segments by polling experts, Demo crat and Republican 
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administrations strengthened regulatory science and consumer protection, 
withdrew hazardous substances, and created new federal agencies like the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (1970). During its heyday between 1967 and 
1973, it seemed as though the combined effects of the toxicity crisis and third- 
wave consumerism might trigger a value- driven environmentalist de cade.
American journalists played an impor tant role in reinforcing growing con-
sumer concerns about antibiotic residues and other chemical  hazards in agri-
culture and the environment. Employing the subjective narration of New 
Journalism, reporters revealed gaps in US food and phar ma ceu ti cal controls and 
attacked industry attempts to  water down existing regulations.12 In July 1967, 
the Washington Post warned that the “meat lobby” was attempting “to sidetrack 
or modify a bill providing for the inspection of meat, . . .  which has been ped-
dled off on unsuspecting  house wives for a good many years.”13 “Peddling” was 
pos si ble  because federal inspectors did not target meat sold within state bor-
ders where officials  were working “hand in glove with the meat packing inter-
ests.” “[Meat] has been pro cessed with such extras as hog’s blood . . . .  Even 
eyeballs, lungs, and chopped hides have been used in pro cessed ham to increase 
its protein content. Detergents have also been used to freshen up the meat, while 
such antibiotics as aureomycin have been injected as a substitute for sanita-
tion.”14 Allegations of kowtowing also affected the FDA. In 1967, the Wash-
ington Post’s investigative journalist Morton Mintz bemoaned the “thundering 
silence of drug consumers,” which was enabling phar ma ceu ti cal companies to 
subvert consumer protection: “Who speaks for the fetus, whose concern with 
chemicals extends beyond drugs to food additives and pesticides among other 
 things?”15 Mintz was especially concerned about the antibiotic chlorampheni-
col (chloromycetin).16 Although the link had been known since the 1950s,17 new 
data suggested that aplastic anemia occurred ten times more frequently  after 
chloramphenicol use than previously thought.18 Worryingly, the FDA seemed 
powerless to effect change.  After it failed to ban chloramphenicol in early 1968,19 
FDA commissioner Charles Goddard claimed to be at his wit’s end20 and was 
widely criticized for failing to protect citizens from a drug that was popu lar in 
both medicine and agriculture.
Public trust in the FDA eroded further over the next two years. Succeeding 
Goddard in July 1968, commissioner Herbert Ley launched withdrawal pro-
cedures against forty- nine fixed drug combinations and filed price- fixing 
charges against major manufacturers.21 However, in the midst of Ley’s  battle 
against inefficacious and overpriced drugs, the FDA was shaken by allegations 
that it had manipulated data on the carcinogenicity of popu lar cyclamate sweet-
eners.22 Commissioner Ley’s perceived hesitancy to proceed against cycla-
mates infuriated public opinion and resulted in his effective sacking by the new 
Republican secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Robert Finch 
in 1969.23 Shortly afterward, Ley claimed that he had been  under “constant, 
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tremendous, sometimes unmerciful pressure,” sometimes spending “as many 
as six hours fending off representatives of the drug industry.”24 Attempting 
to restore trust, Secretary Finch appointed former Booz Allen Hamilton con-
sul tant Charles  D. Edwards as FDA commissioner in 1970. Edwards was 
experienced in public relations and announced a revitalization of the FDA: 
drug recalls would be accelerated, consumer involvement increased, bad 
advertising and prescription habits targeted, and regulatory science capabili-
ties strengthened.25
Within months of being appointed, Edwards had to deal with a new set of 
food safety allegations. In June 1970, the Washington Post reported the results 
of the USDA’s recently established national residue monitoring program. While 
randomized monitoring indicated low overall contamination, targeted testing 
had revealed antibiotic residues of sufficient concentration to trigger allergic 
reactions in consumers.26 Officials’ response was hardly reassuring. Cornelius 
Donald (C. D.) Van Houweling, head of the FDA’s Bureau of Veterinary Med-
icine (BVM), claimed: “You  can’t put an inspector at the shoulder of  every 
farmer, veterinarian and meat packer in the country.”27 However, five months 
 later, even  limited existing controls seemed  under threat when it emerged that 
monitoring for antibiotic residues was to be cut by 74  percent and for DES by 
50  percent.28 The planned cuts seemingly confirmed the allegations of a new 
generation of vocal consumer crusaders. Headed by James Turner, the Ralph 
Nader Study Group on Food Protection and the FDA published The Chemical 
Feast in 1970. The book contained a scathing review of US food production and 
consumer protection against drug residues and food- borne pathogens.29 Nader’s 
group also attacked the trustworthiness of con temporary regulatory science and 
reliance on expertise provided by external “groups, such as the [NAS],” whose 
members “are themselves  either employed by or con sul tants to the food indus-
try.”30 Attacks by investigative journalists and Nader’s activists  were effective in 
damaging public trust in FDA oversight. In 1971, the New York Times noted: 
“ These days [the FDA is] just lurching from crisis to crisis”; “In the last year, 
headlines have proclaimed mercury in fish, botulism in pizzas, pesticides in tur-
keys, arsenic in chickens, antibiotics in cheese, hormones in meat, salmonella in 
soup, cyclamates in soft drinks and DDT in practically every thing.”31
The Organic Moment
The US organic sector was the main profiteer of the toxicity crisis and sinking 
public trust in food safety and— more importantly— purity. The late 1960s saw 
the fusion of the established organic sector with younger countercultural and 
environmentalist movements. Throughout the United States, co- ops and com-
munes with names like the Hip Salvation Army began producing and selling 
organic or “natu ral” food.32 Producers and consumers of “natu ral” food  were 
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united in their concern about the poisoning of food, bodies, and the environ-
ment by “unnatural” chemicals— most prominently DDT, DES, and antibiot-
ics. Despite agreeing on this ex negativo definition of “pure” and thus “natu ral” 
food, organic production philosophies varied: while some producers saw the 
commercial potential of supplying rising public demand for “natu ral” food, 
 others fused ideals of organic production with Jeffersonian concepts of self- 
sufficiency and returning to the land.33
The informational needs of the alternative community  were served by a 
growing number of publications. Starting in the late 1960s, new magazines like 
Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Cata log and  Mother Earth News targeted mostly 
younger technophile dropouts and back-to the- landers interested in small- 
holdings or self- sustaining communes.34 In addition to  these newer publica-
tions, the Rodale Press continued to target both organic consumers and 
producers.  Under the leadership of Robert Rodale (J. I.’s son), the Rodale Press 
recast organic food as part of a wider— flexibly defined— green lifestyle. In 
 doing so, it helped forge a form of what Andrew Case has called do- it- yourself 
“marketplace environmentalism,”35 which placed responsibility for a healthy 
and safe life in the hands of paying individuals. Citizen consumer action rather 
than state regulations and traditional politics  were presented as solutions to 
environmental woes. Sales soared. Between 1968 and 1971, the circulation of 
Rodale’s consumer magazine Prevention almost doubled to nearly 1 million, 
while Organic Gardening and Farming had 500,000 subscribers.36
The rejection of chemical helpers was common to nearly all countercultural 
and organic publications. In the case of antibiotics, the focus was very much 
on food that was pure (residue  free) rather than food whose production would 
not select for AMR. Published in 1972, Rodale’s The Basic Book of Organically 
Grown Food noted: “A big change is taking place in the way  people think about 
naturally and organically grown food. No longer are you an oddball or a fad-
dist if you buy or sell an apple that  hasn’t been sprayed. Every body is concerned 
about pollution, and many  people now believe that food is one  thing that we 
should be able get in unpolluted form.”37 The Rodale Press remained deeply 
skeptical of wider FDA and USDA policies and attacked practices like the sal-
vaging of edible parts from condemned carcasses: “We won der how one 
removes the part affected by drug residues and passes the rest as clean.”38 If 
AMR  hazards  were discussed, they  were often conflated with residue  hazards. 
According to The Basic Book, using agricultural antibiotics “can build a trans-
ferable re sis tance to the drug into the meat tissues.”39
Inspired by environmentalist bestsellers like The Limits of Growth (1972) and 
the con temporary oil crisis, supporters emphasized organic agriculture’s sus-
tainability. In 1973, Rodale’s The New Food Chain presented organic agricul-
ture as a solution to the “expansionist, over- chemicalized, over- plasticized, 
over- additived, over- dumped society.”40 The importance of pure food was also 
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emphasized in countercultural restaurants and cookbooks. In 1973, the Whole 
Earth Cookbook from Santa Cruz, California, warned about antibiotics and pro-
moted sustainable food: “The modern feedlot techniques . . .  are so unhealthy 
that one cattleman commented to us, ‘I raise a private stock for my own use.’ ”41 
Readers should only buy meats “which are not injected with chemicals”42 and 
encourage farmers to readopt “natu ral” production methods. Citing Frances 
Moore Lappé’s Diet for a Small Planet (1971),43  others argued for meat- free 
diets by mixing concerns about chemical food with warnings about a global 
protein crisis.44
The rejuvenated organic movement received national press coverage. Publi-
cations ranging from Harper’s to the The Jewish Press from Omaha described 
“natu ral” foods’ alleged health and environmental benefits.45 With organic res-
taurants and grocery stores appearing across the United States,46 the New 
York Times published a Natu ral Foods Cookbook in 1971.47 Journalists  were 
intrigued not only by organic purity claims but also by the movement’s “weird-
ness.” In a 1971 article on “Organic Food Cult” guru J.  I. Rodale, the New 
York Times enumerated the many groups “loosely clustered  under the organic 
movement’s antichemical umbrella”: “food cultists, from old- line vegetarians 
to youthful Orient- oriented ‘macrobiotic’ dieters . . .  , plus reactionaries yearn-
ing to turn back all clocks, urban dropouts . . .  , ecologists . . .  , Dr. Strangelove 
paranoids . . .  and, increasingly, rather ordinary [ people] to whom pronounce-
ments about [chemical perils] . . .  , have stirred a wariness about all man- made 
chemicals.”48 In 1973, the newspaper printed a similar feature on 69- year- old 
nutritionist Adelle Davis, “chief showwoman for health foods, a $1- billion- a- year 
business catering . . .  to a rapidly growing ‘organic nation’ of health- food devo-
tees.”49 According to the New York Times, Davis’s vision of pure food was rep-
resentative of both “archetypes of South California, the  little old lady in tennis 
shoes and the young, barefoot, bearded ex- radical.”50
Celebrity endorsements played an equally impor tant role in spreading the 
message of antibiotic- free purity to middle- class consumers. Starting in the mid-
1960s, magazines like Vogue, Cosmopolitan, and Life began to report on fash-
ion able “natu ral” products. Celebrity organic devotees featured by Vogue 
included Yehudi Menuhin, the Marquess of Londonderry, Habib Bourguiba, 
and Bruno Walter.51 Ordering meat only from a farm “where they use no sprays 
and chemicals,” performer Carol Channing noted, “Princess Margaret was 
 dying to have my plain roast lamb . . .  , and I think the Kennedys invited me to 
the White House just to see what I would bring.”52 Advocating surprising 
amounts of alcohol as part of a healthy diet, Cosmopolitan agreed that organic 
was not just healthy but tasted better.53 In 1970, Life printed a large feature on 
“the move to eat natu ral.”54 According to the magazine, “true devotees” went 
to “ great lengths to ensure, that all their food be grown organically, that is with-
out artificial help of any kind”— “natu ral” meat could only come “from animals 
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raised without benefit of antibiotics.”55 As arbiters of taste, Vogue, Life, and 
Cosmopolitan agreed that “natu ral” diets  were rejuvenating, fash ion able, and 
ethical— and defined by the absence of antibiotic residue rather than AMR 
 hazards. They also reinforced the notion that antibiotic reform was a ques-
tion of individual consumer choice rather than traditional politics and state 
intervention.
The increasing public visibility of organic agriculture provoked fierce 
responses from supporters of conventional agriculture. Holding fast to scenarios 
of overpopulation and famine- induced communism, they defended Amer i ca’s 
mission to produce plenty with the help of modern technologies— including 
antibiotics. In 1971, USDA secretary Earl Butz attacked organic producers’ 
chemical- free message: “Without the modern input of chemicals of pesticides, 
antibiotics, of herbicides, we simply  couldn’t do the job. . . .  Before we go back 
to an organic agriculture in this country somebody must decide which 50 mil-
lion Americans we are  going to let starve or go hungry.”56 Regional perceptions 
also remained mixed, with student newspapers from Texas emphasizing that 
organic was not always safer and the Desert Sun from Palm Springs complaining 
about “neurotic”57 chemical criticism. Despite mourning the demise of Jefferso-
nian  family farmers,58 the conservative National Review was equally skeptical of 
efforts to “de- chemicalize’ agriculture: “The Topsy- Turvy  labors of the Whole 
Earth Cata log brigade go on and on, with no apparent end in sight. We have 
become accustomed . . .  to the efforts of ecologists and their friends in govern-
ment to slap  every conceivable sort of regulation on American business in the 
name of preserving the environment. . . .  Some of the horror stories previously 
noted . . .  include the ban on leaded gasolines, the holy war against DDT, and a 
rather improbable attack on penicillin.”59 Influential within the budding neo-
conservative movement, the National Review’s equation of antibiotic criticism 
with eccentric hippies and leftist regulation- excess did not bode well for parallel 
FDA attempts to curb agricultural AMR se lection.
AMR Complacency
Public interest in organic food production stood in stark contrast to the rela-
tive lack of attention paid to nontraditional chemical  hazards like AMR. With 
the toxicity crisis focusing attention on invisible residues, few American com-
mentators reported on early FDA efforts to implement Swann- style AGP bans 
in the United States.
In 1970, the FDA had commissioned an expert task force to review agricul-
tural antibiotic use (chapter 10).  After two years of deliberation, the task force 
published its report. In January 1972, the FDA announced that it would install 
a “program that should lead to removing some antibiotics from animal feeds 
as dangers to  human beings.”60 The antibiotics in question  were penicillin and 
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the tetracyclines. Amid rumors that the sixteen- member task force had argued 
bitterly, manufacturers  were given two years to prove that drugs  were safe. 
Se nior FDA officials also did not sound particularly convinced of planned AGP 
bans. Speaking at the 1972 press conference, BVM director C. D. Van Hou-
weling announced that FDA deadlines could “be extended depending on the 
drift of safety research in pro gress.”61 Commissioner Edwards explic itly stated 
that “the agency had no information that would warrant calling the feeds an 
‘imminent’  hazard”62— which would have necessitated bans.
Officials’ ambivalence about British- inspired AGP bans was mirrored in the 
American media. Reporting on the FDA press conference, the Washington Post 
highlighted the discrepancy between task force recommendations for bans and 
ambivalent FDA statements.63 In contrast to its 1969 endorsement of the Swann 
report, the New York Times also waivered about  whether to support AGP bans. 
In February 1972, it quoted the president of the pro- industry Animal Health 
Institute (AHI), James G. Affleck, who maintained that he did not know of “a 
single case of untreatable bacterial disease in man”64 caused by AGPs. Five days 
 later, another article compared agricultural AMR se lection to the pandemics 
conjured in Michael Crichton’s 1969 The Andromeda Strain but failed to reach 
a definite verdict on the proposed bans: AGPs’ alleged economic benefits of 
$500 million per year  were tangible whereas agricultural AMR  hazards 
remained science- fiction- like and contested.65 This logic of costs and benefits 
was echoed by Robert Bleiberg, editor of the Dow Jones owned Barron’s 
National Business and Financial Weekly. According to Bleiberg, the FDA task 
force had exaggerated dangers and mobilized left- wing environmentalists for 
a general assault on modern agriculture and “scientific pro gress.” “Dollars- and- 
cents aside, [cracking down on antibiotics and sulfonamides] would turn back 
the clock in agribusiness by a generation or more, risk the eruption of devas-
tating epidemics among the nation’s herds and flocks, escalate the cost of liv-
ing and, in the end, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, perhaps 
go a long way  toward making the Malthusian nightmare grim real ity.”66
With the public jury on FDA AGP bans remaining out, US media interest 
faded fast. By late 1972, articles on infective AMR and antibiotic overuse 
reverted to simply ignoring agricultural re sis tance se lection.67 In spring 1973, 
the announcement of an unspecified delay of FDA antibiotic bans received only 
scant attention. During the FDA’s press conference, C. D. Van Houweling 
merely announced that data submitted so far “[had] not been developed  either 
to prove or disprove the existence of a serious threat.”68
More sustained US media interest in the environmental dimensions of infec-
tive AMR arose in the wake of the 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant 
DNA.69 Using restriction enzymes and plasmids, researchers  were now able to 
insert foreign DNA— including re sis tance genes— into bacteria.70 While trans-
ferable re sis tance turned into a valuable laboratory tool, critics used the public 
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focus on “mutant lab bacteria” to renew attacks on agricultural AMR se lection.71 
Reporting on Asilomar in March 1975, the Washington Post’s Stuart Auerbach 
quoted British PHLS researcher E. S. Anderson, who emphasized that the 
“widespread use of antibiotics in agriculture”72 was a far more dangerous source 
of resistant pathogens than lab- based bacteria strains. Anderson’s warnings 
seemed verified three months  later when Auerbach reported on an AHI- and 
Pfizer- funded study by a research team  under microbiologist Stuart Levy. Hav-
ing trained  under R- factor discoverer Tsutomu Watanabe,73 Levy had traced 
the spread of plasmid- mediated AMR from tetracycline- fed animals to a farm 
 family with biochemical markers.  After six months, 31.3  percent of the  family’s 
weekly fecal samples had contained substantial amounts of tetracycline- resistant 
bacteria with some bacteria resistant to three or more antibiotics.74 Levy’s team 
celebrated the end of the study by barbecuing the experimental animals. Some 
neighbors had, however, “balked at eating the chickens  because they feared they 
would develop a re sis tance to antibiotics.”75
Published between 1975 and 1976, Levy’s findings had a profound impact 
on American AMR debates. In what would become a lifelong campaign for 
antibiotic stewardship, Levy warned: “The rise in frequency of resistant organ-
isms in our environment is the obvious result of antibiotic usage. The only means 
to curtail this trend is to control the indiscriminate use of  these drugs. . . .  These 
data speak strongly against the unqualified and unlimited use of drug feeds in 
animal husbandry.”76 For microbiologists and liberal commentators, the situa-
tion seemed increasingly clear. AGPs’ economic benefits no longer justified the 
medium- to long- term ge ne tic, microbial, and health costs of their use. The 
question was  whether this relatively narrow and partisan co ali tion of antibi-
otic critics would be able to convince  others to support their cause. A slow-
ing economy and growing po liti cal divides on environmentalist regulation and 
substance bans meant that this was no easy task.
Resisted Regulation
Amid a fresh burst of AMR reports, the FDA’s new commissioner— and for-
mer microbiologist— Donald Kennedy announced statutory bans of penicillin 
and tetracycline AGPs in April 1977 (chapter 10).77 Kennedy’s plans  were ambi-
tious. Initial AGP bans “should be viewed as a first step  toward FDA’s ultimate 
goal of eliminating, to the extent pos si ble, the nontherapeutic use in animals of 
any drugs needed to treat disease in man.”78 Although the FDA estimated that 
its mea sures would only cost five cents per person per year, it also cautioned that 
industry and po liti cal opposition might delay the implementation of AGP bans. 
This prediction was correct.
Kennedy’s AGP bans not only won him few friends in Washington but 
also occurred parallel to unpop u lar withdrawal procedures against saccharin 
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sweeteners, which the FDA had been forced to launch following new carcino-
genicity data.79 Popu lar support for his initiatives was also mixed. Since the 
early 1970s, a growing number of media commentators had blamed allegedly 
excessive FDA regulation for creating a so- called drug lag in terms of US drug 
availability. Referring to neoliberal economist Milton Friedman, the National 
Review claimed in 1978 that thalidomide and DDT had produced “something 
akin to hysteria”80 among FDA regulators. Shared concerns about stagnating 
economic growth and inflation (stagflation) also made more liberal publications 
like Harper’s and Time join neoconservative attacks on environmentalist “his-
trionics.”81 Industry campaigners skillfully exacerbated rising regulation wari-
ness by casting doubt on scientific warnings. Employing a well- tested strategy of 
“agnogenesis” (the creation of ignorance), lobbyists used carefully curated “neu-
tral expertise” to undermine uncomfortable data in areas ranging from climate 
science to cancer research. The goal of this directed research was to  counter or 
delay regulatory action by creating the impression of scientific uncertainty and 
the need for more research. The public credibility of counter- science was main-
tained by financing “friendly” scientists, creating “neutral” research institutes, 
and designing studies so that results would foster uncertainty.82
In the case of AGPs, industry protest was led by the AHI, livestock producer 
associations, and the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology 
(CAST). While phar ma ceu ti cal and agricultural organ izations lobbied Con-
gress and or ga nized letter campaigns against FDA antibiotic restrictions (chap-
ter 10), CAST specialized in providing  counter science. With two- thirds of its 
 later $265,000 bud get consisting of industry donations, CAST or ga nized pan-
els of reputable experts, whose reports  were submitted to a small group of core 
staff for final editing and publishing.83 Since its founding in 1972, this strategy 
had worked well and CAST was able to convince many scientists that it was 
providing sound research in the murky field of chemical risk assessment. In 
1977, CAST reacted to FDA AGP bans by inviting external experts to assess 
AGPs. However, experts proved difficult to control and CAST’s scientific cred-
ibility was severely damaged when the six external microbiologists on its AGP 
panel discovered that their findings  were being used in a biased way. Tensions 
between CAST’s editorial board and its AGP panel turned into a full- blown 
éclat in 1979 when an edited version of the panel’s final report contained mis-
leading information that had been added without experts’ consent. Alarmed 
by the misuse of their findings, the six microbiologists resigned from the AGP 
panel and drew scientific and media attention to CAST’s dubious practices. 
Subsequent high- profile controversies between CAST- member Thomas Jukes 
and Richard Novick, one of the six microbiologists, further damaged CAST’s 
credibility.84
However, by this time, FDA antibiotic reform had already come undone. 
Unable to mobilize large- scale public support and hampered by drawn- out 
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withdrawal procedures (chapter 10), the FDA was outmaneuvered by antibi-
otic supporters. In 1978, Congress and the Car ter administration reacted to 
concerted industry protests and pro- antibiotic lawmakers threatening to hold 
the US bud get hostage by imposing a moratorium on FDA bans and calling 
for more research.85 American lawmakers next commissioned the NAS, whose 
experts had previously supported AGPs, with an in de pen dent review of anti-
biotic feeds’ costs and benefits. Noting the FDA’s loss of momentum, the 
Washington Post reported that “many farm state congressmen”  were question-
ing “the need for any FDA action”86 at all. The loss of FDA momentum was 
exacerbated by Kennedy’s resignation in June 1979. According to the New York 
Times, the FDA had “lost its best commissioner in a long time.”87 When Ken-
nedy had come to the FDA in 1977, the “agency was torn by internal dissen-
sion and charges . . .  that it had become chummy with the industries it regulates. 
Morale has been raised and the FDA’s reputation is decidedly one of in de pen-
dence.”88 This in de pen dence had, however, come at a po liti cal price: “[Kennedy] 
lost some big  battles of regulation. Congress refused to let him ban saccharin. 
It impeded his drive against the indiscriminate use of antibiotics in animal 
feeds. [HEW] Secretary Califano . . .  blocked . . .  efforts to phase out nitrites 
in meat. Several states ignored his warnings against laetrile . . . .  [Kennedy] was 
prob ably right on all  these issues.”89
Fighting on many fronts, Kennedy’s FDA had failed to transform the 
residue- focused US risk episteme into one focusing on AMR. Ten years  after 
the Swann report, agricultural AMR se lection not only failed to excite wide-
spread anxiety but was increasingly seen as a partisan issue. The eclipse of third- 
wave consumerism and rise of stagflation concerns spelled further bad news. 
Defeated  under a Demo crat administration, it was unlikely that AGP bans 
would be viewed more favorably by the increasingly neoconservative Republi-
can party. In 1981, the election of the Reagan administration diminished hopes 
for state- led antibiotic reform. Shortly afterward, the new FDA leadership pro-
posed to expand the number of licensed agricultural antibiotics for the first 
time in a de cade.90
Mirroring wider developments in US environmentalism,91 a co ali tion of 
non- state actors filled the void left by the state’s departure from antibiotic 
reform. Around 1980, new mystery diseases like AIDS and the reemergence of 
resistant scourges like syphilis and tuberculosis undermined many of the opti-
mistic postwar prognoses of improved disease control. Concerned about regu-
latory stagnation in the face of rising AMR, environmental NGOs, campaigning 
scientists, and liberal media outlets attempted to transform the public’s micro-
bial anx i eties into momentum for renewed antibiotic reform.92 In August 1981, 
Stuart Levy or ga nized a multinational conference during which 150 doctors 
from twenty- five nations warned about AMR proliferation in  human and non-
human settings. Founded in the same year, Levy’s nonprofit Alliance for the 
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Prudent Use of Antibiotics (APUA) continued the campaign.93 Two years  later, 
the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) tried to reignite official 
antibiotic reform. Signed by 300 governmental and nongovernmental experts, 
an NRDC petition to Ronald Reagan requested the enactment of the FDA’s 
still stalled 1977 AGP bans.94
The NRDC’s case was significantly strengthened in 1984 when CDC epi-
demiologist Scott Holmberg published two papers in Science and the New 
 England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). While Holmberg’s Science paper 
presented a medium- term epidemiological analy sis of US fatalities caused by 
resistant Salmonella outbreaks,95 his NEJM paper used newly developed molec-
ular plasmid profiling to link agricultural AMR se lection to a recent case of 
 human harm.96 In early 1983, Holmberg’s team had identified eigh teen persons 
infected with a multi- resistant strain of Salmonella newport. Eleven patients 
had been hospitalized and one had died. By comparing plasmid profiles of all 
 human S. newport isolates from the six- state area and all national isolates from 
animals for eigh teen months, Holmberg’s team had linked  human infections 
to hamburgers made from antibiotic- fed beef  cattle in South Dakota.97 To 
most US observers, this was an impor tant breakthrough  because it seemed 
to prove that agricultural AMR se lection not only posed a theoretical threat to 
health. Writing in the same NEJM issue, Stuart Levy renewed calls for AGP 
bans: “ Every animal or person taking an antibiotic . . .  becomes a factory pro-
ducing resistant strains . . . .  Since  there are two or three time more livestock 
than  people in the United States, the number of animals fed antibiotics at sub-
therapeutic levels . . .  is enormously greater than the number of  people taking 
antibiotics in therapeutic amounts . . . .  We must reserve  these resources for 
fighting microbial disease.”98 Holmberg’s study was widely reported, tempo-
rarily depressed  cattle  futures at the Chicago Board of Trade, and prompted 
the NRDC to upgrade its petition and call for an immediate ban of AGPs 
 because of imminent harm to health.99
Although the FDA’s renamed Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) 
promised to review Holmberg’s findings, public attacks on regulatory inaction 
intensified. Californian journalist Orville Schell emerged as one of the most 
vocal antibiotic critics. In his 1984 bestseller Modern Meat, Schell accused agri-
business, scientists like Thomas Jukes, and the FDA of downplaying infective 
AMR  hazards.100 Trust in FDA officials’ ability to critically evaluate AGPs was 
further undermined by charges of bias against CVM director Lester Crawford. 
Crawford had previously worked as a con sul tant for American Cyanamid but 
had also supported the NRDC’s 1983 petition. Exposing himself to criticism 
from both sides, Crawford added to the controversy by first condemning AGPs 
and then claiming, “I suppose I could change my mind [on antibiotics].”101 The 
New York Times reported that Crawford’s pre de ces sor C. D. Van Houweling 
had also changed his mind on AGPs  after becoming a con sul tant for the 
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National Pork Producers Council.102 Between 1984 and 1985, congressional and 
FDA hearings further polarized American debates over antibiotic bans.103
In the end,  little changed. With po liti cal positions on antibiotic reform 
reflecting Washington’s growing partisan divide, mostly liberal calls for anti-
biotic bans failed to convince se nior regulators. In November 1985, Republi-
can Secretary of Health and  Human Ser vices Margaret Heckler rejected the 
NRDC petition as one of her last actions in office. FDA reviews had failed to 
reveal an “imminent  hazard” requiring “emergency action.”104 Despite formally 
leaving Kennedy’s 1977 AGP withdrawal proposals in place, Heckler’s decision 
effectively ended 1980s hopes for statutory restrictions. Unable to formally 
prove an imminent  hazard, antibiotic critics had failed to mobilize sufficient 
public support to break the partisan deadlock that had emerged around anti-
biotic reform. Over the next de cade, new data on links between agricultural 
antibiotic use and AMR would trigger an almost cyclical ebb and flow of US 
reform debates, cost- benefit analyses, and calls for more research.
Purity Pays
Stalling antibiotic reforms encouraged growing numbers of American consum-
ers to seek private ways of protecting themselves from perceived prob lems in 
conventional agriculture. Ignoring expert warnings, most consumers contin-
ued to fear drug residues more than agricultural AMR se lection. Marketplace 
environmentalism’s promise of “safe” and “pure” food reinforced popu lar resi-
due concerns. The growing market for antibiotic- free produce had ambivalent 
effects: despite producers’ best intentions, wealthy consumers’ ability to selec-
tively opt out of conventional production fragmented societal pressure for stat-
utory antibiotic reform. Resulting increases of organic production  were also 
too small to protect consumers of pure food from more serious ecological AMR 
 hazards. As  later noted by Stuart Levy and allied scientists, the residues in meat 
should be of least concern to most  people.105
Con temporary surveys strengthen the picture of an ongoing public priori-
tization of residue over AMR concerns. According to a 1985 survey of 500 US 
 house holds by the National Live Stock and Meat Board, most consumers stated 
“ either a mild or strong health concern about antibiotics in meat.” “[Antibiot-
ics] ranked near the  middle of 13 concerns. . . . . Sixty  percent of the respondents 
said they had a strong health concern about antibiotics. However, only 15  percent 
 were concerned about the bacteria developing re sis tance. . . .  17  percent men-
tioned no specific concern, 9  percent  were concerned about transfer of antibi-
otics to  humans through meat, and 17  percent wanted more information. Only 
21  percent reported some familiarity with the issue.”106 The existing residue- 
focused risk episteme was reinforced by a string of scandals. In 1984, the Wall 
Street Journal reported that sulfonamide levels in US veal exceeded official 
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tolerances by as much as a hundredfold and that 6  percent of US pork samples 
contained sulfonamide residues. Testing also revealed that American veterinar-
ians  were prescribing chloramphenicol although the drug was banned for 
food- producing animals.107 In 1988, residue concerns resurfaced amid reports 
that withdrawal times  were being ignored on farms and the detection of anti-
biotic residues in US milk samples.108 Using a new test called CHARM II, FDA 
officials found drugs in over 50  percent of seventy supermarket samples.109 Many 
samples  were contaminated with sulfamethazine, which had been illegally 
administered to lactating cows. Problematically, the FDA did not publish this 
data but de cided to reevaluate CHARM II positives with less sensitive high- 
performance liquid chromatography— thereby negating many CHARM II 
positives.110 This retesting of CHARM II results came to light in 1990. Amid 
parallel outrage about Alar residues on apples, congressional hearings high-
lighted that existing FDA monitoring for antibiotics in milk was only highly 
effective for penicillin. Speaking to Congress, FDA chemist Joseph Settepani 
accused his agency of “[ignoring] reliable tests”111 for other antibiotics.
Residue scandals’ effects on US consumer attitudes  were predictable. A 1990 
mail survey with 706 respondents from New York State found that 28  percent 
considered agricultural antibiotics and hormones to pose a serious  hazard, 
43  percent considered them to pose something of a  hazard, and only 9  percent 
considered them to pose no  hazard. While only 44  percent of respondents  were 
willing to pay more for milk produced without antibiotics, 75  percent favored 
introducing labels for milk produced with antibiotics.112 Two years  later, the 
Food Marketing Institute’s annual trends survey found that only 12  percent of 
US consumers  were completely confident that food was safe: concerns about 
pesticide and herbicide residues  were closely followed by concerns about anti-
biotic and hormone residues ahead of concerns about nitrites, irradiated foods, 
preservatives, and artificial coloring.113 AMR did not feature prominently in 
 either survey.
Residue and health concerns made a growing number of American consum-
ers turn to allegedly safe food. Many turned to “natu ral” or organic food. 
During the 1970s, organic food had often been a hip lifestyle choice. By the 
1980s and 1990s, many media reports presented  going organic as a wise response 
to con temporary food scares. Even regional papers like the Healdsburg Tribune, 
which had previously defended conventional agriculture, reported positively on 
the alleged benefits of organic food.114 With subscriptions of Rodale magazines 
like Prevention and Organic Gardening reaching rec ord numbers,115 rising 
demand soon stretched American organic food supply chains to their limits.116 
The result was a dramatic expansion of organic production. Between the 1980s 
and 1990s, now familiar companies like Stonyfield, Celestial, and Whole Foods 
Market turned into semi- industrial operations for pure food (chapter 9).117 
Although “organic” and “natu ral” remained ill- defined categories,118 sales of 
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organic food grew by 250  percent to $3.5 billion between 1990 and 1996.119 A 
1999 survey of 26,000 consumers found that about a third of the US popula-
tion selectively purchased organic produce, with concerns about personal safety 
and environmental protection listed as prime motivations.120
Ongoing “purity” concerns also made many US consumers react furiously 
to attempts to  water down organic definitions. Released  after seven years of 
deliberation, the USDA’s 1997 organic standards permitted the use of bio-
technology, irradiation, sewage sludge, and a  limited amount of antibiotics; 
organic labels would also contain no information on production methods.121 
The new standards triggered one of the largest consumer write- ins in US his-
tory. During the four- month comment period, the USDA was inundated by 
about 150,000 letters and cards. The scale of protest forced Secretary of Agri-
culture Dan Glickman to promise a revision of organic standards.122 Estab-
lished in 2000, the National Organic Program banned the use of ge ne tic 
engineering, irradiation, and sludge in organic production. The new regulations 
also banned organic livestock from receiving antibiotics of any kind. Should 
an animal fall sick, it could be treated with antibiotics but could no longer be 
sold as organic.123
With organic produce still accounting for less than 4  percent of total food 
sales, consumers’ impressive reaction to USDA proposals stood in contrast to 
their relative passivity regarding lax antibiotic regulations for the remaining 
96  percent of US food.124 This was not  because of a lack of warnings. Despite 
the NRDC’s 1985 defeat, activists continued to campaign for antibiotic restric-
tions. During the 1990s, a new wave of media reports and bestsellers like Stu-
art Levy’s The Antibiotic Paradox (1992) warned about resistant infections.125 
In August 1992, Science featured an Hieronymus Bosch– inspired cover on a 
“post- therapeutic  future” with an accompanying editorial on “Microbial Wars” 
past and  future.126 Data from the field was worrying. While CDC studies 
showed rising AMR in community- acquired salmonella infections,127 a 1993 
outbreak of multi- resistant E. coli 0157:H7 at Jack- in- the- Box restaurant sick-
ened 600  people and killed four  children.128
The Jack- in- the- Box outbreak highlighted AMR  hazards, hygiene prob lems, 
and the need for an overhaul of USDA meat inspection.129 Resistant outbreaks 
like the 1993 episode also brought home the dangers of an empty drug devel-
opment pipeline.130 Following a “Golden Age” between the 1940s and 1960s, 
only a few new antibiotic classes had entered the market— the most recent class 
of the fluoroquinolone antibiotics had been licensed during the 1980s. The dry 
antibiotic pipeline was not due to a lack of promising compounds but due to 
phar ma ceu ti cal companies’ increasing focus on more profitable “lifestyle” 
drugs.131 Most of the new antibiotic products licensed during the 1990s and 
2000s  were modifications of older drugs against which re sis tance had already 
developed.132 With reserve antibiotics failing, predictions of a post- antibiotic 
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age became increasingly common.133 In 1995, the Coronado Ea gle from Califor-
nia featured an ad by a group of what can best be described as post- antibiotic 
preppers: “Scientists say antibiotic- resistant microbes could kill large numbers 
of  people at any time. Learn what you can do to increase health and energy. Join 
a small group of dedicated individuals seeking solutions and alternatives.”134
Short- lived outbreaks and apocalyptic warnings, however, failed to translate 
into a societal antibiotic reform movement. Although potential  hazards of agri-
cultural AMR se lection  were now widely discussed, American consumers’ 
clear prioritization of residue  hazards, increasing ability to buy “safe” organic 
food, and ideological divides over federal regulation continued to fragment the 
public sphere. In contrast to Eu rope (chapter 12), agricultural antibiotics did 
not emerge as a dominant and unifying symbol of modern agriculture’s envi-
ronmental and health  hazards.
This lack of societal reform pressure was reflected in official licensing deci-
sions (chapter 10). During the mid-1990s, the FDA licensed the fluoroquinolones 
sarofloxacin and enrofloxacin (Baytril) against E. coli in poultry despite known 
cross- resistance to the reserve antibiotic vancomycin. Officials announced that 
AMR would be monitored and fluoroquinolones banned if necessary.135 The 
decision was criticized in the liberal media.136 Fears of a resulting increase of fluo-
roquinolone re sis tance  were confirmed in 1997 when Minnesota’s Department 
of Health reported that 70 to 90  percent of raw poultry samples from supermar-
kets  were contaminated with Campylobacter strains—25  percent of which  were 
resistant to fluoroquinolones.137 However, no immediate bans of  either sarafloxa-
cin or enrofloxacin ensued. US regulators also failed to emulate the Eu ro pean 
Union’s 1998 decision to ban five of eight remaining AGPs  because of AMR 
concerns (chapter 13). Despite media criticism and parallel CDC and FDA ini-
tiatives to curb AMR in  human medicine,138 FDA officials merely announced 
AMR testing requirements for new livestock drug applications from 1999 
onwards. In response to ongoing scientific warnings that this would not target 
already licensed products,139 Deputy commissioner (ex- CVM head) Lester 
Crawford  later defended the FDA’s approach: “We think it’s far better to look at 
the real risk . . .  instead of just disallowing a category of uses.”140
It soon became clear that the FDA’s partial reforms would protect neither 
already licensed nor new drugs. In 2000, the Washington Post reported that 
the efficacy of Synercid (quinupristin- dalfopristin), the new hope against 
vancomycin- resistant Enterococci (VRE), was endangered prior to its licensing 
 because of its close relation to virginiamycin, a popu lar nontherapeutic AGP 
used since 1974: as much as 50  percent of US supermarket chicken, turkey, and 
pork already carried virginiamycin- resistant bacteria strains.141 One year  later, 
further increases of fluoroquinolone re sis tance forced FDA officials to reeval-
uate fluoroquinolone use in poultry production. The ensuing  legal  battle high-
lighted the prob lems of restricting already licensed drugs. While sarofloxacin 
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was withdrawn voluntarily, phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturer Bayer opposed 
restrictions of its enrofloxacin (Baytril).142  Because of Baytril’s similarity to 
Bayer’s reserve antibiotic Ciprofloxacin (Cipro),143 Baytril restrictions became 
a  matter of national security when a series of letters containing anthrax spores 
 were posted to politicians  after 9/11. Described as “Cipromania,”144 panicked 
Americans purchased gas masks, vaccines, and the entire national stock of 
Cipro to ward off mostly illusive anthrax spores.145 Despite clear AMR data and 
power ful new calls for bans,146 FDA officials still needed over four years of  legal 
proceedings to withdraw Baytril.
The Synercid and Baytril episodes clearly highlighted the risks of agricul-
tural AMR se lection as well as problematic drug withdrawal powers on the part 
of the FDA. However, their impact on public opinion was  limited. With media 
outrage following partisan lines and polls indicating that most consumers con-
tinued to  favor choice- based market solutions such as labels for antibiotic- 
produced meat, wider drug reform remained unforthcoming.147 It was only 
following the 2008 election of the Obama administration that hopes for anti-
biotic restrictions reemerged. In 2009, Demo crat Representative Louise Slaugh-
ter proposed legislation to reduce nonhuman antibiotic use.148 Slaughter’s move 
received out spoken support from the AMA and from media outlets like the 
New York Times and Scientific American, whose editors accused agribusiness of 
protecting “a narrow set of interests over the nation’s public health.”149 Despite 
initial endorsement by the Obama administration,150  legal objections by indus-
try soon threatened the Preservation of Antibiotics for Medical Treatment Act 
(PAMTA). In April 2010, former FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy warned 
New York Times readers: “More than 30 years ago, when I was [FDA commis-
sioner], we proposed eliminating the use of penicillin and two other antibiotics 
to promote growth . . . .  When agribusiness interests persuaded Congress not to 
approve that regulation, we saw firsthand how strong politics can trump wise 
policy and good science. . . .  It’s 30  years late, but Congress should now pass 
[PAMTA], . . .  we  don’t have the luxury of waiting any longer to protect  those at 
risk of increasing antibiotic re sis tance.”151 However, in what must have seemed a 
bizarre repeat of history to Kennedy, antibiotic reformers failed to mobilize 
enough po liti cal and societal support for PAMTA’s enactment.
By late June 2010, it became clear that the FDA would not support statu-
tory bans and propose “extremely modest”152 voluntary reforms. Instead of pur-
suing enforceable statutory bans, post- Baytril  legal concerns about officials’ 
ability to withdraw drugs and fierce opposition from the USDA made the FDA 
propose guidances for antibiotic use  under veterinary supervision.153 Activists 
 were dismayed. Similar to 1984, the NRDC and a co ali tion of other NGOs 
reacted to stalling statutory reform by filing a lawsuit requiring the FDA— and 
not industry—to prove that AGPs  were safe. Although the lawsuit was approved 
by two district courts,154 the FDA announced only voluntary AGP bans in 
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December 2013— a move that was welcomed by industry, livestock producers, 
and veterinarians.155 In 2014, a two- to- one decision by the US Second Cir cuit 
Court of Appeals in New York strengthened the FDA by stating that it was 
not required to hold AGP safety hearings. In the same year, President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13676 boosted funding for antibiotic research and stewardship. 
It also proposed to eliminate medically relevant AGPs— but did not specify 
statutory bans.156
Market Solutions?
Four years  after PAMTA, thirty- seven years  after Donald Kennedy’s failed 
AGP bans, and over fifty years  after the first warnings about infective AMR 
se lection on farms, Washington and the US public remained divided over the 
need for statutory antibiotic reform. One immediate reason for this was the 
increasing partisan divide of US politics. Since the 1980s, green topics like AGP 
bans had  either been attacked or ignored in conservative media like the National 
Review, and few Republicans supported precautionary policies.157 Lengthy and 
complicated withdrawal procedures as in the case of the 1977 bans and Baytril 
also played an impor tant role in diluting popu lar pressure for antibiotic reform 
in the wake of scandals. However, by themselves, po liti cal and regulatory  factors 
are not enough to explain why de cades of warnings about agricultural AMR 
se lection did not incite more decisive statutory action in the US.
Asking why modern health concerns did not reduce US pesticide consump-
tion, historian Michelle Mart has claimed that this paradox was driven by 
four cultural  factors: (1) an emphasis on acute poisoning; (2) abstract long- term 
cancer  hazards; (3) the belief that risk was best mea sured in terms of individ-
ual health, and not collectively or environmentally; (4) a rejection of precau-
tionary regulation in  favor of cost- benefit assessments.158 The story of the 
American public’s antibiotic risk episteme has many parallels: from the 1950s 
onward, deep- seated concerns about toxic residues repeatedly detracted from 
more abstract AMR  hazards. Residue  hazards  were well suited to short- term 
technical fixes like monitoring and mandatory withdrawal periods. By contrast, 
the collective and environmental nature of AMR  hazards required sustained 
precautionary antibiotic reductions or restrictions. The potential long- term 
benefits of  these mea sures  were not always apparent when evaluated through 
the more short- term lens of economic cost- benefit analyses. Distinct perceptions 
of AMR in  human and nonhuman settings further fragmented the US risk 
episteme. In February 2017, a Harris Poll asked 1,768 respondents, who knew 
“at least a  little about Superbugs,”159 which types of antibiotic use are among 
the most significant  causes of drug- resistant superbugs: 65  percent listed doc-
tors prescribing antibiotics inefficaciously, 62  percent listed patients needlessly 
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demanding antibiotics, 44  percent listed antibacterial soaps, and only 40  percent 
listed farmers selecting for AMR.
For American consumers, who remained concerned about antibiotic 
residues— and increasingly about agricultural AMR se lection— the market has 
gradually replaced the state as a de facto driver of antibiotic change. Validat-
ing Lizabeth Cohen’s concept of US democracy as a Consumer’s Republic,160 
agro- pharmaceutical opposition to state intervention has allowed a highly reg-
ulated private market for pure and “secure” food to flourish. Risk is always an 
economic opportunity. This privatization of antibiotic risk has met with 
approval from an at first glance unlikely alliance of actors. Historian Andrew 
Kirk has noted how neoliberals’ emphasis on market- driven solutions for envi-
ronmental and societal prob lems was ideologically compatible with strong liber-
tarian strands within the US environmentalist and countercultural movement.161 
This was certainly true regarding agricultural antibiotics.
Over the past four de cades, both the conventional and organic sectors have 
benefited from the defeat of state- led reform and the privatization of antibi-
otic risk. In October 2015, a Harris Poll found that 53  percent of 2,225 surveyed 
consumers considered the question of  whether a product was “antibiotic and 
hormone  free” to be “impor tant“ or “very impor tant” when shopping.162 Con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for “pure” and “safe” produce has had an impor tant 
impact on American food production. Despite ongoing controversies about the 
appropriate scale of sustainable organic production,163 the US market for “pure” 
organic food quintupled between 1997 and 2009.164 According to the Organic 
Trade Association, organic sales in the US amounted to over $47 billion 
(5.3  percent of total food sales) in 2016— with sales of organic meat and poultry 
accounting for $991 million. This was an increase of 8.8   percent since 2015 and 
compared favorably to the 0.6  percent growth of overall US food sales.165 Surveys 
indicate that most new organic consumers  were motivated by personal health 
rather than ecological concerns. Described by Robin O’ Sullivan as a “convention-
alization” of organic farming, steady profits have not only made larger corpora-
tions like Heinz or Nestle develop or acquire organic product lines of their own166 
but also created lucrative market niches for “safer” versions of conventional food. 
Since the early 2000s, companies like Tyson Foods, Purdue Farms, Foster Farms, 
McDonald’s, and Chipotle Grill have attempted to attract environmentally and 
health conscious consumers by phasing out AGPs167—or at least claiming to do so 
given the absence of official definitions of “antibiotic  free” other than adherence to 
drug withdrawal times.168 For many companies, phasing out AGPs without sub-
scribing to stricter organic rules for therapeutic antibiotic use is an effective way of 
demanding better prices while avoiding higher production costs.
Growing sales of “antibiotic- free” produce are already helping reduce total 
US antibiotic consumption (chapter 12). However, they also make it easier to 
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pre sent antibiotic stewardship as a question of individual consumer choice 
rather than an issue of collective social responsibility. According to recent Farm 
Bureau statements (chapter 9),  there is no need for further po liti cal interven-
tion since concerned citizens can already buy antibiotic- free produce. Mar-
ketplace environmentalism is taking care of antibiotic  hazards by providing 
diff er ent products for risk- takers and risk- evaders.169 Reifying Ulrich Beck’s 
concept of risk as a force for socioeconomic stratification and po liti cal fragmen-
tation, marketplace solutions are, however, seldom fair.170 Not every one can 
access safe organic or antibiotic- free produce. Given AMR’s ecological dimen-
sions, the efficacy of individualized safety solutions is also questionable. Cur-
rent antibiotic- free niches like organic food remain small in comparison to 
conventional livestock production.171 This means that buying antibiotic- free 
meat  will not necessarily lower personal microbial risks. In 2013, a study of 
kosher and organic chickens found that levels of resistant E. coli on organic and 
conventional chicken  were virtually indistinguishable.172 When it comes to 
AMR and our interconnected microbiomes, effective stewardship  will require 




Antibiotic Change on 
American Farms
This chapter explores the development of antibiotic use and perceptions in US 
agriculture. During the 1970s, animal concentrations and antibiotic use in 
American livestock production increased significantly. Perceiving antibiotics as 
an essential disease insurance in times of diminishing profits, producers opposed 
external interventions into agricultural practice. Concerns about agricultural 
AMR se lection  were far less pronounced than concerns about drug residues. 
While industry- coordinated farmer protest toppled 1970s AGP restrictions, an 
economic crisis, ongoing environmentalist criticism, and organic farmers’ com-
mercial success led to a “greening” of agricultural discourse from the 1980s 
onward. This greening was, however, not accompanied by wider reforms of pro-
duction systems or of antibiotic infrastructures. Although con temporary sur-
veys indicate that many farmers  were not as antibiotic dependent as claimed by 
parts of the national press, the agricultural media and farm lobby organ izations 
joined phar ma ceu ti cal companies in calling for a rollback of federal regula-
tions during the 1990s. Outcomes  were mixed: while official intervention has 
been minimized and antibiotic access mostly defended, smaller producers 
have been forced out of a market increasingly dominated by a small number of 
vertically integrated corporations.
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Planting from Fencerow to Fencerow
Eco nom ically, the years around 1970  were a good time for US agriculture: farmers’ 
incomes increased  because of rising commodity prices,1 the 1970 Agriculture 
Act enshrined federal support, and USDA Secretary Earl Butz secured an unpre-
ce dented federal appropriation of $8.1 billion in 1971. Emboldened by neo- 
Malthusian scenarios of overpopulation and Soviet grain purchases, Butz exhorted 
US farmers to plant “from fencerow to fencerow.”2 This message was passed on via 
farm magazines. Progressive Farmer speculated that the 1970s would be “the time 
when American agriculture strikes out on a bold new course of influence and 
prosperity.”3  Family farmers would, however, only survive if they fully engaged in 
“a new, aggressive, agricultural capitalism”4 and became more efficient.
Butz’s exhortations for aggressive efficiency increases occurred against a 
backdrop of dramatic changes that had occurred in US farming and livestock 
production since around 1960. Between 1959 and 1969, annual  cattle and calf 
sales had increased by about 45.6  percent to over 74 million animals, hog and 
pig sales by about 10.4  percent to over 89 million animals, and broiler and meat- 
type chicken sales by about 71.8  percent to over 2.4 billion animals. During 
the same period, the number of  cattle and calf farms had, however, decreased 
by almost a million to 1,719,403, hog and pig farms by over a million to 686,097, 
and broiler producers by almost 10,000 to 33,757. Remaining farms  were not 
only producing greater numbers of animals but also faced rising expenses for 
feedstuffs, wages, and chemicals.5
Over the next de cade, ongoing pressure to improve the efficiency of produc-
tion methods and stay in control of expenses would have a significant impact 
on farm animals, environments, and owner ship. According to historian Chris 
Mayda, American hog production was increasingly dominated by specialized 
operations: “economic breeding . . .  limited the breeds in production, so that 
hogs, like some crops, developed into monoculture.”6 Attempting to increase 
feed efficiency and minimize disease, producers created “closed herds” in ven-
tilated buildings. The cost of necessary investments also meant that external 
investors and vertically integrated larger companies began to make inroads into 
the pork sector. Volatile markets and shifting consumer preferences also began 
to transform 1970s beef production with an increasing amount of animals being 
fattened in concentrated feedlots.7 Of all US livestock sectors, the poultry sec-
tor was by far the most intensive and integrated with large corporations con-
trolling as much as 90   percent of broiler production from the early 1960s 
onward. Concentrated in the US South, carefully bred and medicated birds 
 were fed cheap soy or corn meal in large- scale confined operations, which would 
further intensify throughout the 1970s.8
Agricultural intensification and expansion caused tensions between US 
farmers and environmentalists (chapter 7). During the early 1970s, the Nixon 
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administration’s attempts to burnish its environmentalist credentials by creat-
ing the EPA and banning the insecticide DDT proved particularly contentious.9 
Although some farmers expressed health concerns about chemical production 
helpers,10 the wider agricultural community rejected precautionary bans in 
 favor of already familiar cost- benefit evaluations (chapter 3): DDT and other 
chemicals might be dangerous, but if used responsibly according to industry 
labels, benefits outweighed risks. In 1970, Progressive Farmer claimed, “millions 
of  people now living in good health would be dead or anemic cripples if it  were 
not for DDT.”11 Most agricultural commentators  were thus appalled when the 
EPA banned DDT in 1972.12 According to Kenneth Hood of the American 
Farm Bureau, the “disaster lobby” was “working overtime”13 to deprive up to 
50 million Americans of food by banning chemical pesticides, herbicides, fer-
tilizers, and drugs.  Others warned that the DDT ban might be a first step 
 toward mandatory organic farming.14
Defending Antibiotics
Farmers’ perceived defeat over DDT had significant implications for simulta-
neous FDA attempts to restrict AGPs. Whereas British corporatism relied on 
agricultural self- policing and moderation in exchange for participation in 
compromise- oriented problem- solving (chapter  6), US farm organ izations 
lacked incentives to tone down public attacks on “overzealous” regulators. 
Throughout the 1970s, domino scenarios according to which any substance ban 
would engender further bans made organ izations like the American Farm 
Bureau support phar ma ceu ti cal companies’ polarizing  battles against AGP 
bans. With US veterinarians failing to harness AMR concerns to gain control 
over antibiotic access,15 the only sustained inner- agricultural criticism of anti-
biotics came from organic farmers.
Ensuing  battles over antibiotic access took place against a background of 
rapidly expanding consumption on US farms. The con temporary growth of 
nontherapeutic antibiotic use was particularly dramatic. According to FDA 
figures from 1978, 4.16 million pounds of antibiotics had been produced in the 
United States in 1960, of which about 1.2 million pounds (about 29   percent) 
 were added to feeds. Ten years  later, about 7.3 million pounds of antibiotics 
(about 43.1  percent of total production)  were added to feeds. By 1975, industry 
figures indicated that nonmedicinal usage accounted for 48.6  percent of total 
US antibiotic production.16 Although data on therapeutic antibiotic use is 
 limited and the NAS published higher historical estimates of nontherapeutic 
antibiotic use in 1980,17 it is likely that total nonhuman use overtook US  human 
antibiotic use during the 1970s.
Antibiotic consumption varied between livestock sectors. According to 
con temporary manuals and USDA data, US broiler rations contained between 
166 • USA, 1967–2013
4 and 10 grams of antibiotics per ton of feed. Hog rations usually contained one 
or more antibiotics (usually penicillin, chlor- and oxytetracycline, or bacitra-
cin). Piglets would receive 44 milligrams of antibiotics per kilogram of diet, 
growing pigs 11 to 22 milligrams per kilogram of diet, and finishing pigs around 
11 milligrams per kilogram of diet.18 A significant increase of antibiotic con-
sumption occurred in US  cattle production. Starting in the mid-1950s, inten-
sive feedlots expanded from the grain- rich Corn  Belt to locations across the 
United States. Whereas 7,535,000  cattle  were “on feed” in 1960, the number 
increased by about 75  percent to 13,190,000 in 1970. Feedlot conditions  were 
conducive to antibiotic use. During the 1950s, higher- dosed antibiotic injections 
 were used to treat footrot (infected sores on legs) and other infections in indi-
vidual animals. However, in a departure from  earlier recommendations, the sec-
ond half of the 1960s saw antibiotics like chlortetracycline, oxytetracycline, 
and zinc bacitracin routinely included in  cattle rations at about 20 to 25 mil-
ligrams per 100 kilograms of live weight per day. Antibiotic feeds  were said to 
counteract meat quality prob lems caused by the popu lar hormonal growth pro-
moter DES. At concentrations of 70 milligrams per head per day, antibiotics 
 were also used to prevent liver abscesses caused by high- grain diets. Cyanamid’s 
AS-700 (350 milligrams chlortetracycline and 360 milligrams sulfamethazine) 
proved popu lar against “shipping fever” and was also used to accustom new 
cows to feedlot conditions. Antibiotic consumption also increased in replace-
ment herds with most dairy and veal calves receiving medicated milk replacers 
and calf starters.19
Despite declining  cattle numbers, antibiotic use increased throughout the 
1970s. This was due to a new group of antibiotics called ionophores. The iono-
phore monensin (Coban/Rumensin) was first approved as a coccidiostat for 
poultry in 1971 and then as a feed additive against bloat and coccidiosis in  cattle 
in 1975. Ionophore additives increased propionic acid production in cows’ 
rumens and improved the fermentation and conversion of high- roughage and 
high- grain diets. Within ten years of monensin’s licensing, ionophores  were fed 
to over 90  percent of US feedlot  cattle.20
In all livestock sectors, routine therapeutic and nontherapeutic antibiotic 
use continued to be promoted by agricultural manuals, farming magazines, and 
the phar ma ceu ti cal industry.21 According to Lancaster Farming, antibiotics 
 were part of a modern farmer’s identity: “A farmer is a paradox. He is an ‘over- 
alled’ executive with his home his office; a scientist using fertilizer attachments; 
a purchasing agent in an old straw hat; a personnel director with grease  under 
his fingernails; a dietitian with a passion for alfalfa, animals and antibiotics, a 
production expert faced with a surplus, and a man ag er battling the cost- price 
squeeze.”22 In contrast to regular warnings in British farming publications 
(chapter 6), US commentators rarely discussed AMR  hazards. If AMR was 
mentioned, it was usually in the context of drug residues in food or the need 
F IGURE 9.1 The 1970s saw significant increases of antibiotic use on US cattle feedlots. 
Cyanamid advertisement, Farm Journal, 1979.
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for more efficient antibiotic use or drug combinations to control infections.23 
According to mainstream opinion, antibiotics’ prime  hazard consisted of resi-
dues and inefficient use.
Many agricultural commentators  were thus shocked when the FDA task 
force recommended AGP bans in early 1972.  Unless they  were proven safe and 
efficacious, low- dosed tetracycline, penicillin, streptomycin, dihydrostreptomy-
cin, and sulfonamide feeds would be banned for poultry on January 1, 1973, 
and for sheep,  cattle, and swine on July 1, 1973. Other medically relevant anti-
biotics would be restricted  after December 31, 1973.24 Taken aback, Wallaces 
Farmer acknowledged, “Evidence indicates using antibiotics in food- producing 
animals promotes Salmonella and the development of the R  factor (resistant) 
bacteria.”25 It seemed unlikely that bans could be averted by industry safety 
 trials: “it  doesn’t seem likely that FDA  will back off much.”26 Iowa State nutri-
tionist Vaughn Speer agreed with the FDA: “I think the recommendations that 
certain antibiotics be reserved for  human use is a good one. I  can’t argue with 
that.”27
Initial agricultural shock was soon replaced by preformulated industry pro-
test. Since the 1969 Swann report, companies like American Cyanamid had 
prepared for potential FDA action by commissioning  counter science.28 Dur-
ing a time of growing public distrust of industry influence (chapter 8), phar-
ma ceu ti cal manufacturers, however, knew that classic po liti cal lobbying would 
only go so far. To be effective in Washington, they also had to mobilize a broader 
popu lar alliance among farmers, agricultural organ izations, and the agriculture- 
minded public. Founded in 1941 and funded by companies producing more 
than 90  percent of US veterinary phar ma ceu ti cals and feed additives, the 
Animal Health Institute (AHI) soon emerged as the most impor tant voice 
defending AGPs among rural audiences. In magazines like Lancaster Farming, 
AHI experts “emphatically disagree[d] with most of ” the FDA task force 
report: “If one accepts the Task Force premise that the presence of resistant bac-
teria in animals constitutes a potential  human health  hazard . . .  then the 
removal of recognized effective prophylactic use of antibacterial agents creates 
a real potential  human health  hazard, since it follows logically that such removal 
 will lead to an increase in incidence of vari ous animal bacterial diseases.”29
Amer i ca’s agricultural establishment soon joined phar ma ceu ti cal compa-
nies’ pro- antibiotic campaign. “Reaffirming their abiding faith in American 
constitutional government, the private enterprise system, and man’s inalienable 
right to worship God,” the 1972 Farm Bureau assembly voted to oppose “a com-
plete ban on the use of any agricultural drug and chemical  unless it can be 
demonstrated positively . . .  that the use of such product represents a clear and 
pre sent danger to health or that such use would seriously jeopardize our envi-
ronment.”30 Or ga nized opposition to AGP bans spread quickly. Merging with 
preexisting criticism of environmentalism, reporting in the US farming press 
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became almost homogenous in its criticism of statutory restrictions. Seven 
months  after endorsing the FDA’s AGP bans, nutritionist Vaughn Speer sud-
denly claimed, “[the] possibility [of AMR transfer] has been thoroughly exam-
ined and  there is no scientific evidence that re sis tance is transferred this way.”31 
Meanwhile, magazines like Farmers Weekly Review encouraged readers to send 
written objections to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW).32
AGP bans  were also criticized by the USDA (chapter 10). According to 
USDA Secretary Earl Butz, banning antibiotics and other chemicals would 
force organic agriculture and starvation on the United States.33 Responding to 
the 1972 task force report, the USDA’s Agricultural Research Ser vice (ARS) 
published its own antibiotic review. The ARS review recapitulated AGPs’ 
alleged economic advantages and maintained that it was unclear  whether resis-
tant organisms and genes in animals constituted a health threat. Failing to 
cite landmark British AMR publications, the ARS noted that long- term direct 
exposure of  humans to low- dosed antibiotics had not resulted in harm. It was 
true that AMR could be transferred between enteric bacteria. However, AGPs’ 
ongoing efficacy and the isolation of resistant organisms from animals unex-
posed to antibiotics indicated that agricultural AMR was “natu ral,” widespread, 
and therefore not an impor tant public health  hazard.34
Despite mounting agro- industrial pressure, it initially seemed as though the 
FDA would follow through with AGP withdrawals. In July 1972, Progressive 
Farmer warned, “stricter regulation of antibiotics in feed look[s] 99  percent cer-
tain.”35 In September, Farm Bureau members proposed voluntary drug com-
pliance certification to ward off further federal intervention: “Federal 
authorities have taken DDT away from your use completely. . . .  If livestock pro-
ducers are to continue benefitting from animal health products, they must use 
them properly and certify that they are  doing so.  England’s Swann Report and 
the United States’ FDA Task Force Report challenged the ability of farmers 
and ranchers to carry out this responsibility.”36 However, all was not lost. Fol-
lowing the 1972 DDT ban, agricultural observers  were beginning to discern 
cracks in federal agencies’ willingness and ability to impose substance restric-
tions. Se nior FDA officials’ lackluster support for AGP bans and indecisive 
 handling of con temporary DES bans played an impor tant role in maintaining 
agro- industrial morale.37 Bombarding officials and agricultural- minded mem-
bers of Congress with letters and critical reviews, antibiotic supporters  were 
relieved when the FDA quietly loosened AGP safety review requirements in 
1973 (chapter 10).
Victory over FDA bans coincided with darkening economic outlooks. In 
1973, the oil crisis and rising inflation brought a return of the agricultural cost- 
price squeeze. Between 1973 and 1975, US farmers’ net income declined from 
$34.3 to $25.5 billion. Livestock production was hit hard. Although broiler sales 
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continued to increase, sales of  cattle, calves, and pigs declined.38 Faithful to Earl 
Butz’s motto “get big or get out,” producers  either participated in a further 
round of agricultural intensification or left agriculture altogether.39  Those 
remaining increased their antibiotic use. In 1978, US livestock producers used 
about 5.58 million kilograms of antibiotics (excluding sulfonamides) in feeds 
and for other nontherapeutic applications (about 48  percent of total US anti-
biotic production).40 Higher- dosed therapeutics also remained popu lar. In 1978, 
veterinary county agent Alan Bair resignedly recounted the case of a young 
farmer who used several antibiotics at once, did not read labels, and purchased 
“what ever the feedman thought was best that week.”41 Bair’s description of 
mass- antibiotic use was no exaggeration. In 1977, a Wallaces Farmer reader poll 
found that 67  percent of farmers regularly fed drugs to growing pigs and only 
7  percent did not feed drugs at all. In a matter- of- fact statement, one farmer 
noted: “I need drugs to help with production. Keeping the hogs healthy is the 
only way we can make a living and provide consumers with meat.”42
Inner- agricultural criticism of rising antibiotic use remained minimal. Most 
farming commentators emphasized that antibiotic access was absolutely “vital 
to [the] production of food.”43 Phar ma ceu ti cal lobbyists also continued to 
mobilize against potential restrictions. In 1974, Philip Connell, president of 
American Cyanamid’s Agricultural Division, warned about threats to the “web 
of technology”44 underpinning global food production. AGP bans would force 
US consumers to pay $2.1 billion more for meat (about $10.26 per person) per 
year. Farmers would need 1.3 million additional acres to maintain 1970 levels 
of beef and pork production.45 USDA Secretary Earl Butz echoed industry 
warnings about threats to global food security: “ Every new regulation that ham-
pers agricultural production . . .  drives another nail into the collective coffin of 
mankind.”46  There was even a certain pride in the amount of antibiotics being 
consumed in the United States. In 1978, Lancaster Farmer described an impres-
sionable West German del e ga tion’s visit of Pennsylvania farms. During one 
tour, “more than a few Germans pointed excitedly at a bucketful antibiotics that 
they found in the swine producer’s ser vice room. ‘That’s forbidden in Germany,’ 
they announced emphatically.”47 The restrictive nature of German regulations 
was then elaborated.
Although AMR was increasingly mentioned as a driver of federal interven-
tion, it was rarely acknowledged as a genuine  hazard. Mirroring public concerns, 
agricultural commentators instead focused on residue prob lems resulting from 
sulfamethazine contaminated feeds, drugged “downer  cattle,” and more sen-
sitive USDA testing.48 Livestock manuals similarly  either failed to mention 
AMR or downplayed  hazards.49 In 1978, the fifth edition of Stockman’s Hand-
book noted: “Some folks object to the continued use of low levels of antibiotics 
in feeds on the ground that resistant pathogenic strains of microorganisms 
might develop . . . .  Although it is true that microbial re sis tance to antibiotics 
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does occur,  there is no scientific evidence that more virulent pathogens have 
evolved . . . .  As a  matter of fact, the evidence shows that resistant strains are 
nearly always less virulent.”50
Without an adjustment of risk perceptions, US agricultural circles not only 
remained complacent about growing antibiotic infrastructures but also sup-
ported phar ma ceu ti cal campaigning against renewed FDA attempts to ban 
AGPs in 1977 (chapter 10). Their previous victory over the 1972 task force report 
had equipped campaigners with an effective set of protest tools. With only few 
readers and commentators voicing AMR concerns,51 farming magazines por-
trayed FDA proposals as an irrational attack on “scientific” production. Com-
mentators warned about antibiotic bans’ effect on inflation and global food 
supplies, criticized inefficacious AGP substitutes, and challenged AMR 
research.52 Ignoring that American veterinarians’ economic decline had been 
facilitated by unrestricted drug access, agro- industrial representatives also 
argued that  there  were too few veterinarians to prescribe antibiotics  after AGP 
bans. While some called on the FDA to allow “feed manufacturers to fill pre-
scriptions at doses not prescribed by law,”53 American Cyanamid warned that 
banning AGPs would harm 210,000 smaller farmers without veterinary ser vice 
contracts.54 Similar to 1972, lobbyists maximized pressure by calling on farm-
ers and rural communities to send preformulated protest letters to officials and 
politicians in Washington.55
Victory over FDA mea sures seemed close  after Congress stalled AGP 
bans in mid-1978. By early 1979, farming magazines  were encouraging readers to 
pressure representatives to oppose all three con temporary FDA proceedings 
against nitrites, DES, and antibiotics.56 Despite FDA attempts to convince 
producers of antibiotic restrictions, the farming media consistently priori-
tized information supplied by industry think tanks like CAST.57 According 
to Progressive Farmer, CAST researcher Virgil Hays did not “cotton much to 
the theoretical possibility that resistant organisms . . .  may be transferred to 
man.”58 Even articles addressing the difficulties of treating resistant infections 
on farms did not problematize the reasons  behind AMR proliferation and 
focused on advocating hygiene and diff er ent drugs.59
Coordinated agro- industrial re sis tance was effective both in maintaining 
agricultural cohesion and in achieving po liti cal goals.  After two years of intense 
conflict with the FDA, American farmers only lost the  battle over DES (chap-
ter 10). In April 1980, Farm Journal announced that a congressionally mandated 
NAS antibiotic review had concluded that “the test prob ably  doesn’t exist that 
can prove or disprove the safety of using low levels of penicillin or tetracy-
clines.”60 According to the USDA’s Farmline journal, “pos si ble  legal opposi-
tion, and the need for further study”61 should delay any regulations for at least 
several years. However, victory came at a price. In contrast to corporatist Brit-
ish decision- making (chapters 6 and 12), aggressive public opposition to FDA 
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restrictions fractured already porous ties between the agricultural community 
and US regulators and AMR experts. Access to AGPs had been defended by 
using  counter science and personal attacks to undermine data, critical scien-
tists, and the authority of public institutions. By allying with the phar ma ceu ti-
cal industry and propagating a polarizing mix of regulation hostility and distrust 
in microbiological findings, agricultural organ izations, commentators, and pro-
ducers missed an opportunity to rethink the entwined path- dependencies of 
intensification and growing antibiotic infrastructures. Chances for  future antibi-
otic compromise and level- headed encounters with critics had diminished. Fur-
ther conflict seemed likely.
A Crisis of Intensification
Ongoing AGP access did  little to alleviate an emerging economic crisis. Dur-
ing the 1980s, overproduction and sinking commodity prices triggered a long 
agricultural downturn. Despite its antiregulatory agenda, the Reagan admin-
istration was repeatedly forced to expand subsidies to alleviate farmers’ plight. 
Between 1980 and 1985, the total cost of the US farm program  rose to more 
than $20 billion. However, deficit purchases and storage programs failed to 
raise commodity prices and stimulated further overproduction. Being able to 
decrease production costs by increasing efficiency became a determinant of agri-
cultural survival. In many cases, necessary investments  were made by taking 
on debt. Whereas US farm debt had totaled $60 billion in 1972, it totaled an 
astonishing $216 billion in 1983.62 Unable to ser vice debts, many farmers  were 
 either forced to leave agriculture or become employees of agribusiness corpo-
rations. By the late 1980s, the fabric of US farming had changed: similar to the 
Dust Bowl era, 42  percent of farmland was operated  under rental agreements, 
and corporations and investors had taken over many farm operations.63
In the US livestock sector, the economic crisis catalyzed existing trends 
 toward confined, concentrated, and integrated production. In pig husbandry, 
so- called hog factories became common. Whereas producers raising 1,000 or 
more animals per year accounted for about 7  percent of US hog production in 
1964, this number had already risen to 40  percent in 1979.64 By 1986, seven out 
of ten Iowa hogs  were raised in confined systems.65 New total confinement units 
mirrored Damon Catron’s 1940s fantasies of Fordist animal production:  housed 
according to life stages and function (breeding or fattening), pigs  were fed tai-
lored diets and progressed down an assembly line from one specialized build-
ing to the next (farrowing, nursery, grower, and finisher) before being 
transported to the abattoir.66 Accelerating 1970s trends, expensive new high- 
tech facilities  were often financed and built by large corporations with whom 
farmers contracted to produce animals they no longer owned.67 This form of 
vertical integration was already commonplace in the US poultry sector with 
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the same companies often supplying chicks, specifying housing, producing 
feeds, and slaughtering and pro cessing animals.68 By the mid-1980s nearly all 
US chicken broilers and 80  percent of eggs and turkeys  were being produced 
in vertically integrated operations.69
Although accelerating intensification triggered renewed clashes with envi-
ronmentalists and concerned consumers, aggressive agro- pharmaceutical rhe-
toric did not always match producers’ personal views. During the mid-1970s 
and 1980s, economic pressure made growing numbers of smaller conventional 
producers realize that farming’s  future would be for the few and not for the 
many. Ignoring ongoing attacks on organic farming by agricultural officials and 
commentators, they began to pay attention to the booming market for “natu-
ral” food (chapter 7). Growing mainstream interest gradually carried over into 
the agricultural press. In 1975, Lancaster Farming from Pennsylvania began to 
print articles by local farmer— and publisher— Robert Rodale on organic gar-
dening and lifestyle. Initially,  these articles  were followed by disclaimers dis-
tancing Lancaster Farming from Rodale’s views.70 With organic farming 
becoming more conventional regarding its supply chains and business models, 
the need for such disclaimers diminished. In 1981, Indiana Prairie Farmer 
told readers not to “dismiss organic farming as merely a fad or joke”— organic 
methods could reduce use of “insecticides, herbicides, growth regulators, and 
fertilizers.”71
A 1980 USDA review played a significant role in changing wider conven-
tional attitudes  toward organic methods. Despite questioning organic health 
claims, the review gave a balanced overview of the organic sector. While most 
organic farms  were relatively small (10 to 50 acres), some larger operations 
(100 to 1,500 acres) had also  adopted organic methods. The review debunked 
conventional clichés by noting that most organic farms  were well managed, 
productive, and had not regressed to prewar standards. In terms of pesticide 
management and crop rotation, organic farmers often adhered to best manage-
ment practices, although farms’ overall ratio of  labor input to yield was worse 
than in conventional systems.72 In the case of livestock production, most organic 
farmers did not feed hormones and only used antibiotics to treat individual ani-
mals. The size of an organic farm’s grain and hay production usually dictated 
the scale of animal production. Most notably, organic farmers did not “push” 
animals to achieve the highest rate of gain and market them in the shortest pos-
si ble time: “A number of farmers reported that with previous chemical- 
intensive programs they had often incurred a higher rate of birth mortality, 
decreased reproductive efficiency, and increased respiratory ailments among 
their livestock, resulting in lower production, and higher veterinary costs.”73 
According to the USDA’s reviewers, organic methods warranted serious atten-
tion from agricultural officials and conventional producers alike. One year 
 later, an organic research bud get was integrated into the 1981 farm bill.74
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Growing agricultural ac cep tance of organic farming as a tolerable market 
niche was paralleled by a plurality of opinions regarding other conventional pro-
duction methods. In the case of agricultural antibiotics, two 1980s surveys 
indicate that American conventional farmers’ reasons for opposing antibiotic 
bans and attitudes  toward antibiotic use  were far more nuanced than the uni-
form public front of agro- pharmaceutical lobbyism suggests. The first industry- 
sponsored survey of 1,051 Missouri livestock producers was conducted in 1981: 
14  percent of respondents said that they always purchased feed with antibio-
tics, 48  percent claimed to sometimes do so, and 24  percent said that they never 
did so (surprisingly, 14  percent did not know  whether their feeds contained 
antibiotics or not). Mirroring official consumption statistics, responses varied 
according to livestock sector: 14  percent of beef producers always and 50  percent 
sometimes purchased antibiotic feeds (64  percent total); 19  percent of poultry 
producers always and 51   percent sometimes purchased antibiotic feeds 
(70  percent total); 27  percent of pork producers always and 58  percent some-
times purchased antibiotic feeds (85   percent total). Interestingly, large pork 
producers tended to buy antibiotic feeds less frequently than smaller or 
medium producers. The survey also asked farmers about the impact AGP bans 
would have on their business. Answers  were very diff er ent from the apocalyp-
tic picture being painted by industry lobbyists. Of surveyed farmers, only 
24   percent said that bans would have a serious impact on their operations; 
47   percent did not think bans would have serious effects; and 29   percent 
thought that bans would have no effect. Farmers’ risk perceptions  were diffi-
cult to judge. When asked  whether they believed that using antibiotics under-
mined  future antibiotic treatments, 48   percent responded “ don’t know,” 
32  percent said yes, and only 20  percent said no. Of the 24  percent of farmers 
who did not purchase antibiotic feeds, 48   percent believed that “more harm 
than good” resulted from antibiotic use, 19   percent believed that AGPs  were 
not effective, and 29  percent believed that they  were too expensive.75
A 1982 survey of 642 New York livestock producers confirmed many of  these 
findings. Cornell PhD Gilbert Wayne Gillespie Jr. discovered that trust in AGP 
efficacy for growth promotion was far smaller than suggested by agro- industrial 
lobbyists and that farmers purchased AGPs— which had initially been licensed 
as subtherapeutic additives—as a cheap risk insurance against disease. He also 
found that American farmers’ opposition to AGP bans and support of indus-
try campaigning was primarily ideological: “Ideology appears to be a major 
source of opposition to government regulation of agricultural chemicals and 
phar ma ceu ti cals in general, with the impor tant antecedent variables being per-
ceptions of negative side- effects from use of  these substances, po liti cal liberal-
ism, and an orientation  toward accepting economic risk in farming. Farm debt 
is the only structural variable with a significant effect.”76 Similar to Missouri, 
New York poultry and swine producers used the most AGPs. Larger swine, 
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dairy, and beef producers tended to use more antibiotics than smaller produc-
ers while large poultry producers with modern facilities used less drugs than 
medium- sized ones. Gillespie also found that antibiotic users  were more 
opposed to government regulation, less liberal, and tended to express more feel-
ings of powerlessness than non- users.77 When asked why they used antibiotics, 
swine producers  were most likely to cite productivity increases and disease pre-
vention. Poultry producers cited disease prevention. Most livestock producers 
purchased AGPs as insurance against disease and not for growth promotion. 
Less than one- tenth of surveyed farmers believed that AGPs did more harm 
than good— AMR knowledge correlated with an endorsement of bans. Most 
non- users, however, simply thought that they did not need expensive AGPs.78
Although many US farmers did not believe that AGP bans would seriously 
affect business, post- DDT domino theories of substance restrictions and their 
ideological distaste for statutory interference made them support—or at least 
fail to oppose— aggressive agro- pharmaceutical defense of unrestricted antibi-
otic access. Responding to the NRDC petition and Scott Holmberg’s 1984 
link of resistant salmonellosis to antibiotic feeds, phar ma ceu ti cal companies, 
CAST, the AHI, farm organ izations, and supportive USDA officials launched 
a familiar broadside of economic doomsday warnings and  counter science to 
prevent restrictions (chapter 10).79 In 1985, Farm Bureau News (FBNews) ques-
tioned Holmberg’s link between antibiotic use and  human illness: “other  factors 
could have caused the outbreak, . . .  a direct link was never shown (The resis-
tant Salmonella apparently came from an adjacent dairy farm, where no anti-
biotics  were used).”80 In Congress, Farm Bureau representatives claimed that 
farmers would immediately abandon AGPs if their harmfulness was proven: 
“If the potential  hazard to  humans is as  great as some  people claim, why  haven’t 
 there been more cases of  human illness.”81  Others noted that banning AGPs 
but leaving therapeutic antibiotic use— primarily in  human medicine— 
unreformed would be in effec tive. For FBNews, it seemed likely that rising 
AMR was less due to on- farm use and “prob ably more due to [antibiotics’] pro-
lific use for treating and preventing  human infection.”82 The failure of British 
AGP bans to curb AMR was similarly mobilized.83
Not all conventional and phar ma ceu ti cal producers thought that opposing 
AGP bans was in their best interest. Similar to Britain (chapter 7), companies 
producing nontherapeutic AGPs had no incentive to protect penicillin and tet-
racycline AGPs at all costs. In 1984, American Hoechst, the com pany market-
ing flavomycin (bambermycin), complained that the medicated feed controversy 
was giving all antibiotics a bad name.84 Suffering from consumers’ increasing 
preference for “healthy” poultry meat and less reliant on medically relevant AGPs, 
 cattle producers also attempted to gain a sales advantage by discontinuing the 
use of antibiotic classes that  were not crucial to production. In 1985, the National 
Cattlemen’s Association announced that members would discontinue the 
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feeding of tetracyclines— but not of penicillin— “ until it can be resolved  whether 
their use  causes health prob lems in  humans.”85 Eliciting hostile responses from 
other livestock groups,86  cattle producers, however, stressed that they would con-
tinue to oppose federal statutory bans to discourage anti- chemical activists: “If a 
product can be taken off the market by inference instead of fact, why would any-
body invest another $70 million to create a new product?”87
Margaret Heckler’s 1985 rejection of the NRDC petition prevented further 
agricultural discord. Although opposition to antibiotic- free market niches had 
weakened, US farmers and their representatives remained opposed to formal 
AGP bans. This opposition was less grounded in the belief that bans would 
harm production and more in a general ideological rejection of statutory inter-
ference. Most producers  were relatively unconcerned about AMR and primar-
ily viewed AGPs as an insurance against disease. Although trust in  actual 
growth promotion was weakening, antibiotic feeds remained in demand. AHI 
figures indicate that US farmers used about 11 million pounds of antibacterial 
compounds in feeds in 1985 with tetracyclines proving the most popu lar.88
A Light- Green Rollback
US agriculture’s antibiotic infrastructures faced no further statutory challenge 
 until the late 1990s. During the intervening period, economic pressure and 
changing consumer preferences nonetheless incentivized a gradual rapproche-
ment between conventional farmers and external critics. The result was what 
Michael Bess has called a “light- green” transition whereby green ideas  were par-
tially absorbed into agricultural discourse and practice but also trimmed and 
jettisoned should they threaten core production models or statutory interven-
tion. Both producers and environmentalists “emerged [neither] wholly satisfied 
nor utterly dismayed”89 from this pro cess. By the end of the millennium, 
conventional farmers  were happily marketing antibiotic- free produce but still 
resisting statutory antibiotic reform.
The “light- greening’ of US agriculture coincided with ongoing intensifica-
tion and integration. Between 1987 and 1997,  cattle and calf sales increased by 
about 2  percent to over 74 million animals, pig and hog sales grew by over 
47  percent to over 142 million animals, and meat- type chicken sales increased 
by over 54  percent to over 6.7 billion animals. Animal increases  were accom-
panied by a further decline in the number of farms producing milk, pork, and 
poultry and by rising production costs.90 Change was particularly dramatic in 
hog production where vertical integration, specialization, and economies of 
scale accounted for most productivity gains. Between the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the share of farms with 2,000 animals or more increased from less than 30 to 
86  percent while farm numbers fell by over 70  percent from over 240,000 in 
1992 to about 71,000 in 2009. Varying US state laws also fostered a geographic 
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concentration of large- scale pig operations in sparsely populated low- income 
regions.91
Low profit margins, health warnings, and changing values made a growing 
number of conventional farmers partially reevaluate production methods. In 
1990, Wallaces Farmer surveyed 200 farmers’ pesticide use. Of the 85  percent 
who reported changing pesticide management, 94  percent claimed to have done 
so for economic reasons, 80  percent  because of environmental concerns, and 
79  percent  because of health concerns.92 Acknowledging that environmental-
ist values  were becoming embedded in public opinion, farm organ izations also 
launched major efforts to promote an image of US agriculture that was green 
and responsible.93 This greening was “light”: environmental mea sures  were 
 adopted if they did not threaten core practices or production philosophies. In 
some cases, agricultural commentators also tried to reframe environmentalism. 
According to FBNews, the term environmentalist was often used to describe 
“someone who  favors locking up natu ral resources and opposes the use of chem-
icals,” however, it also meant “someone who cares about the environment”— 
“Then certainly you could apply the term to farmers and ranchers.”94
In the case of antibiotics, light green farming led to a renewed focus on “ratio-
nal” drug use— but  little criticism of wider antibiotic infrastructures. During the 
early 1990s, magazines like Successful Farming reacted to rising AMR warnings 
(chapter 9) by rehashing 1960s criticism of “irrational” antibiotic overuse as an 
inefficient waste of resources.95 Veterinary manuals also promoted improved 
diagnostics for more targeted antibiotic use.96 Although some advocated mak-
ing farming less antibiotic dependent,97 most commentators focused criticism 
on individual abusers and saw no reason for wider reform. In 1992, the seventh 
edition of The Stockman’s Handbook continued to promote routine therapeutic 
and nontherapeutic antibiotic use. Claiming that eight of ten US food animals 
received drugs during their life and failing to mention resulting AMR risks, 
the manual noted that the list of approved agricultural antibiotics was long 
“and growing longer.”98 Although manuals targeting smaller producers fea-
tured more balanced risk assessments, they also emphasized “rational” drug use 
by enlightened producers rather than explicit antibiotic reductions.99
The light- greening of antibiotic use occurred parallel to ongoing Farm 
Bureau attacks on “environcrat”100 regulations and critics. Farmers and their 
representatives  were happy to partially rethink and rebrand production systems 
but remained ideologically opposed to statutory regulations forcing them to 
do so. When Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Republican revolution” ended the Demo-
crats’ fifty- two- year hold on Congress, the Farm Bureau seized the opportu-
nity to push for a rollback of  limited precautionary regulations in  favor of 
“flexible” cost- benefit assessments.101 Speaking to the Senate Agriculture Com-
mittee in 1995, Farm Bureau representatives blamed rural plight on a “federal 
regulatory juggernaut”: “[The Farm Bureau] supports four major regulatory 
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reforms: risk assessment . . . ; cost- benefit analy sis . . . ; private property compen-
sation when Congress decides to override private interests . . . ; and redirec-
tion of regulatory resources into worthwhile private sector incentives.”102 With 
Republicans controlling both  houses and the Clinton administration favoring 
deregulation, industry pursued a strategy of shifting risk assessment burdens 
from officials to “rational” consumers on the private market.
Formidable aspects of US consumer legislation soon began to topple. In 
1996, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) and abolished 
the Delaney Clause. Environmentalists and consumer advocates supported the 
FQPA  because it ended the distinction between residues on raw and pro cessed 
food, established low tolerances of a one- in- a- million cancer risk, introduced 
right- to- know provisions, and required reviews of existing standards. However, 
the FQPA also marked a significant victory for industry  because it simplified 
regulatory procedures and ended zero- tolerance policies in  favor of negotiable 
risk- benefit calculi.103
In the same year, industry also celebrated the passage of the aptly named 
Animal Drug Availability Act (ADAA).104 The ADAA had been heavi ly influ-
enced by petitions from the AHI and American Veterinary Medical Associa-
tion. Streamlining regulatory procedures, it redefined and reduced the number 
of efficacy and safety studies required for new animal drug applications. 
Although drugs  were still prohibited from leaving nontolerated residues in 
food, the ADAA  limited the time FDA officials had to review applications and 
mandated the creation of new tolerances.105 Significantly, the ADAA also loos-
ened the extra- label provisions of the 1994 Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clar-
ification Act. Whereas unsupervised extra- label drug use had previously been 
banned, new Veterinary Feed Directives (VFDs) enabled the extra- label addi-
tion of often higher- dosed drugs— like antibiotics—to commercial animal feeds 
 after veterinary consultation. In effect, federal responsibility for defining safe 
medicated feed use via labels was handed over to individual veterinarians 
(chapter 10).106  Whether  these veterinarians would always prioritize long- term 
public health interests over more immediate productivity concerns was unclear. 
American veterinarians  were often employed by integrated feed and meat com-
panies and studies showed that health- centered perspectives learned at school 
 were often diluted in  favor of productivity- centered perspectives once prac ti-
tion ers began working on farms.107 Similar to  human medicine, what consti-
tuted “rational” veterinary antibiotic use was highly context dependent.
Voluntarist Victories
The loosening of US regulations coincided with new Eu ro pean AGP bans 
(chapter  13). By the late 1990s, the combination of diverging transatlantic 
regulations and new national AMR surveillance capabilities had ended the 
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post-1985 status quo of antibiotic regulation in Washington. The result was a 
further wave of voluntarist light- green agricultural reforms. Although antibi-
otic consumption continued to increase and producers remained united in their 
opposition of statutory bans, they also reacted to consumer concerns by expand-
ing antibiotic- free market niches. In public, agro- industrial lobbyists no longer 
categorically denied AMR  hazards but instead pointed to market- driven ways 
of improving antibiotic stewardship and curbing AMR.
Occurring during a time of mass farm closures, renewed antibiotic conflicts 
made many smaller producers embrace market niches for antibiotic- free pro-
duce. In 1998, Wallaces Farmer published a survival guide for pig farmers: “This 
is a difficult column to write. We’ve always tried to keep a positive attitude and 
pre sent ways producers can become more efficient, productive or profitable. But 
nothing we print  will change the fact that the pork industry is  going through 
a critical time. . . .  some producers are finding a high- value niche for organically 
raised, antibiotic- free pork. It’s not for every one, but it may be an idea to con-
sider.”108 Successful Farming described how conventional livestock farmers had 
downscaled and transitioned to “all- natural” and antibiotic- free production.109 
According to the magazine, this transition was not being driven by ideology 
but occurred “all in the name of survival.”110 A converted dairy farmer empha-
sized that  there was no animosity between conventional and organic farmers: 
“ we’re just selling milk  here, folks.”111 If it occurred voluntarily,  going “natu-
ral” was fully accepted within the agricultural community. Despite sales 
increases, its small size also meant the organic livestock sector did not seriously 
threaten the much larger conventional sector. By 2011,  there  were 106,181 cer-
tified organic beef  cattle, 254,771 organic milk  cattle, and 28,644,354 organic 
broilers in the United States.112  These numbers paled in comparison to the bil-
lions of animals produced on conventional farms.
For the large majority of producers remaining in conventional agriculture, 
further intensification usually entailed rising antibiotic consumption. However, 
in contrast to previous de cades, data provided by the new National Antimi-
crobial Re sis tance Monitoring System (1996) made it increasingly difficult to 
deny farming’s role in selecting for AMR. Public fears of resistant “superbugs” 
also spread within the agricultural community. In 1999, an illustrated article 
on rural health in Successful Farming cited a CDC expert, who noted that agri-
culture was partially responsible for creating resistant microbial environ-
ments: “The same drugs prescribed for  human health are widely used in 
livestock production . . . .  Almost half of the 50 million pounds of US- produced 
antibiotics is used in animals, with the largest share mixed into feed to promote 
growth.”113 Faced with hard AMR surveillance data, agro- pharmaceutical lob-
byists also shifted gears. Instead of claiming that  there was no  hazard, they 
launched a sustained  battle for voluntarist instead of statutory solutions. While 
antibiotic stewardship was impor tant, US agriculture would improve at its own 
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light- green pace. Eight months  after printing its AMR article, Successful Farm-
ing quoted the AHI’s Richard Carnevale on the necessity of continued antibi-
otic use. While Carnevale supported AMR research, he maintained that fifty 
years of experience had shown that farmers  were capable of responsible anti-
biotic use and that AGPs did not constitute an immediate threat to public 
health.114
The new agro- industrial strategy of voluntarism rested on three pillars. The 
first pillar consisted of developing technical solutions to AMR. During the late 
1990s and 2000s, farm and USDA journals discussed options ranging from 
AGP substitutes, disease- resistant animal breeds, vaccines, competitive inhibi-
tion, engineered antibodies, irradiated feeds and food, and bacteriophage 
therapies.115 Reacting to microbial vulnerabilities, concentrated livestock oper-
ations also enacted ever stricter biosecurity protocols. The last three de cades 
have seen large integrated corporations remold indoor animal environments 
as well as the habitats and habits of surrounding  human populations. In some 
areas of the United States, entire post- anthropocentric landscapes now center 
on maintaining the health of isolated animal monocultures.116
In addition to biosecurity and antibiotic substitution, the second and third 
pillars of industrial voluntarism consisted of stressing “rational” antibiotic use 
and using  counter science. In 2002, FBNews noted: “ There’s been a lot of cluck-
ing in recent years that livestock and poultry producers are using antibiotics 
willy nilly so they can crowd their animals together and farm on the cheap. The 
fact is antibiotics, like most drugs,  aren’t cheap. . . .  Farmers use [antibiotics] 
when  they’re needed, and they should be able to continue  doing so.”117 Similar 
to previous de cades, lobbyists stressed the costs and  limited benefits of statu-
tory intervention. In 2008, a study in the Review of Agricultural Economics 
noted that AGP bans would marginally reduce feed efficacy but increase mor-
bidity and mortality in pig husbandry and raise treatment costs in suboptimal 
rearing environments.118 Agricultural organ izations used the study to oppose the 
Obama- era push for antibiotic restrictions (chapters 8 and 10). In 2009, FBNews 
warned that Danish AGP bans had resulted in greater mortality, morbidity, and 
antibiotic use for pigs. Significantly, the magazine also claimed that organic food 
had resolved the need for statutory intervention in the United States: “If, how-
ever, a consumer still does not trust food from animals treated with antibiotics, 
 there’s already a way to avoid it. To be certified organic  under USDA’s National 
Organic Program, animals  can’t be given antibiotics. . . .  if someone just wants to 
avoid products from animals that have been given antibiotics, they can already do 
that.”119 Farm Bureau president Bob Stallman even claimed that “the possibility 
of re sis tance from antibiotics in livestock is declining.”120
In the US farming press, commentators’ opinion on AMR became more 
ambivalent: while some continued to deny that agricultural antibiotic use was 
contributing to  hazards,  others endorsed cautious reform— but no statutory 
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intervention. In 2001, Successful Farming had already reported on the hospi-
talization of a 12- year- old Nebraskan, whose resistant infection was linked to 
a salmonellosis outbreak and antibiotic use on his  father’s  cattle farm. The 
infection had been resistant to Rocephin (ceftriaxone) and was being used by 
the FDA to argue for a ban of Baytril in poultry production (chapter 10).121 In 
2010, Farmers Weekly Review participated in the CDC’s antibiotic awareness 
week for  human medicine but downplayed agricultural AMR  hazards: “Anti-
biotics mean healthier livestock. Healthier livestock means higher quality 
food.”122 Wallaces Farmer also advocated “rational” antibiotic use but advised 
farmers to “keep telling our story”: “antibiotic re sis tance in bacteria is a natu-
ral part of the evolutionary pro cess. . . .  But we also know that underdosing, 
incomplete treatment or choosing the wrong antibiotic . . .  can increase the rate 
of re sis tance.”123 Should farmers find themselves “defending an indefensible 
position,” then it was time to “take a serious look at abandoning that par tic u-
lar practice.”124 Responding to a reader, who feared that AGP bans might “erase 
my profit margin and force me out”125 in 2010, the magazine’s expert panel was 
surprisingly relaxed: two experts reminded the reader that therapeutic antibi-
otic use would remain  legal, and the third expert noted that hogs  were still 
“being produced profitably in Eu ro pean countries.”126
What US farmers themselves thought of AMR  hazards is more difficult to 
say. A 2015 study by the USDA’s Economic Research Ser vice indicates ongo-
ing reliance on antibiotics for disease prevention but a gradual phasing out of 
AGPs, which  were now estimated to raise productivity by only 1 to 3  percent. 
In the hog sector, the number of producers using AGPs to finish animals fell 
from 52 to 40  percent between 2004 and 2009. Although most producers 
used antibiotics for prophylaxis and treatment, ignorance about  whether 
antibiotics  were being fed to promote growth, however,  rose from 7 to 
22  percent— perhaps indicating the spread of integrated operations and dimin-
ished agency on the part of individual producers. Similar trends  were apparent 
in nursery operations where 62  percent (5  percent ignorance) of producers  were 
using antibiotics for disease prevention, 65  percent (5  percent ignorance) for 
disease prevention or growth promotion (5   percent ignorance), and only 
33  percent (8  percent ignorance) solely for growth promotion. Overall use was 
lower in integrated operations. By 2009, 83  percent of American nursery hogs 
and 64  percent of finishing hogs  were removed  under contract.127 In the broiler 
sector, twenty large integrators accounted for 96  percent of US production in 
2011. Already skeptical of growth promotion during the 1980s, about 48  percent 
of broiler operations reported only giving antibiotics to animals when they  were 
sick (up from 33  percent in 2000 and 2  percent in 1995). However, 32  percent 
of surveyed operations also claimed that they did not know  whether they used 
antibiotics for purposes other than disease treatment. Self- limiting antibiotic 
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use was becoming more common due to rising demand for antibiotic- free 
poultry.128
Larger  cattle producers defied trends in the pig and poultry sectors. In 1994 
and 2011, more than three- quarters of American feedlots with at least 1,000 
head (0.2  percent of producers, 8  percent of overall production in 2012) pro-
vided antibiotics in feed or  water, mostly for the purpose of growth promotion. 
More than ninety  percent of larger feedlots fed ionophores to promote growth, 
almost 75  percent added antibiotics other than ionophores and coccidiostats 
to feed, and 44.7  percent added a coccidiostat. AGPs proved less popu lar among 
smaller  cattle producers. In 2011, only 28.7  percent of smaller feedlots used ion-
ophores and only 26   percent used other antibiotics. Of cow- calf operations 
surveyed in 2007/2008, 15.8  percent reported feeding antibiotics to prevent dis-
ease and/or promote growth.129 In dairy farming, 90.1   percent of surveyed 
producers used antibiotics for disease prevention in 2007.130
Although USDA data reveals  little about farmers’ personal risk perceptions, 
it indicates wider changes in the agricultural antibiotic market. During the first 
de cade of the new millennium, many producers gradually phased out inefficient 
AGPs. Some also turned  toward the antibiotic- free market. However, most pro-
ducers still invested in routine prophylactic and therapeutic antibiotic use. 
With antimicrobial sales for food- producing animals increasing to over 14.859 
tons in 2013,131 the majority of US farm animals  were still receiving antibiotics 
at some point in their lives.
Most conventional farmers thus continued to support agro- industrial cam-
paigning against Obama- era moves for statutory antibiotic restrictions— even 
if this entailed voluntarily abandoning AGPs. In April 2013, Wallaces Farmer 
reported that the AHI was pressing for compliance with formerly suspect FDA 
guidances to avert “what happened 10 years ago in the Eu ro pean Union, when 
the use of [AGPs] was  stopped via regulation.”132 Although some commenta-
tors compared accepting voluntary antibiotic guidances to Israel’s withdrawal 
from Gaza,133 the AHI’s strategy of voluntarist reform seemed validated by the 
FDA’s abandonment of statutory restrictions in the same year (chapter 10).
Resulting voluntary restrictions’ impact on the physical and cultural anti-
biotic infrastructures on American farms seems to have been light. According 
to the Pew Charitable Trusts, FDA guidances allowed farmers to administer 
one- quarter of drugs at the same dosages and with no limits on treatment dura-
tion for the prevention and control of disease.134 Despite a recent decline of total 
antibiotic use and more radical reductions by large poultry producers like Per-
due (chapter 10),135 open- ended prophylactic use of former AGPs continues to 
occur in  cattle production.136 Voluntary bans have also failed to weaken or ga-
nized agro- industrial re sis tance to statutory reform. During Iowa’s 2014 annual 
swine day, ex- USDA Undersecretary of Food Safety Richard Raymond asserted 
that knowledge about the  causes of bacterial re sis tance remained in flux and 
Light- Green Reform • 183
that AMR could not be blamed on agricultural antibiotic use: “ there is no 
proof that low doses are any more likely to cause re sis tance than high doses of 
antibiotics.”137 The Farm Bureau also maintains that “rational” antibiotic use is 
unproblematic. In a 2015 policy statement, it expressed “serious concerns 
about the effects of removing impor tant antibiotics and classes of antibiotics 
from the market, which would handicap veterinarians and livestock and poul-
try producers in their efforts to maintain animal health and protect our nation’s 
food supply.”138 In December 2016, Scientific American highlighted significant 
efforts by the National Chicken Council and the AHI to topple new antibiotic- 
related legislation. Tasked with deciding over PAMTA’s final fate (chapter 8), 
half of the Health Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee had received donations of more than $15,000 by phar ma ceu ti cal com-
panies or farming organ izations. Larger corporations are also being accused of 
using biosecurity protocols and fines to keep critical researchers and journal-
ists away from production facilities.139
Over the past de cades, this dual strategy of resisting statutory reform and 
stressing voluntarist mea sures has been remarkably successful in defending US 
agricultural antibiotic use. Since the 1970s, pharma- led agricultural lobbying 
defeated multiple statutory interventions and even expanded drug access dur-
ing the 1990s. Part of this success has rested on compartmentalizing antibiotic 
prob lems: beginning with the 1972 task force report, agro- industrial commen-
tators dismissed AMR concerns by claiming that popu lar products like AGPs 
remained efficacious, confusing AMR and residue issues, blaming AMR on 
medical overuse, and focusing on individual aspects rather than wider struc-
tures of drug use. Compartmentalization made prob lems seem reformable via 
new drugs, antibiotic substitutes, market niches for pure food, improved bios-
ecurity, and narrow restrictions—as in the case of AGPs. It also helped main-
tain inner- agricultural cohesion and unified opposition against excessive state 
intervention. Despite internal doubts about AGP efficacy and varying con-
sumption patterns, the US agricultural alliance for broad antibiotic access has 
remained firm. While voluntary restrictions and antibiotic- free product lines 
have undeniably reduced total antibiotic use since 2013, control over the shape 
of  future reforms seems to rest in the hands of industry— and not of the offi-
cials tasked with regulating it.
From the historical perspective, it is debatable  whether further victories over 
state intervention are in US farmers’ best interest. Helping the phar ma ceu ti-
cal industry ward off FDA action has committed organ izations like the Farm 
Bureau to an ideological rear- guard defense of antibiotic use that  will continue 
to face external criticism. Weaker US regulations may also give a long- term 
advantage to Eu ro pean producers, who have already adapted to production 
without AGPs and are now preparing for likely restrictions of prophylactic drug 
use. In the long term, stricter statutory regulations may aid Eu ro pean markets 
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by allowing producers to sell “safer” produce and argue for barriers against 
American food produced with less stringent standards (chapter 12). Eco nom-
ically, polarized antibiotic  battles are moreover contributing to a situation 
in which American farmers’ representatives defend a system of industrial 
production that is consistently pushing in de pen dent producers into industry 
contracts or out of farming altogether. Since antibiotics’ mass introduction 
to agriculture, the number of US farms has declined by over 60  percent from 
5,388,437  in 1950 to 2,109,303  in 2012.140 Although antibiotics did not cause 
intensification, they facilitated the rise of a new mode of integrated food pro-
duction, which is unlikely to increase—or even sustain— existing farmer num-
bers. Arguing for state support to protect the antibiotic commons via alternative 
production methods might. At several moments in history, an open agricultural 
debate on antibiotics’ long- term costs and benefits could have stimulated a wider 





Voluntarism and the Limits 
of FDA Power
This chapter explores why the American FDA strug gled to assert authority over 
antibiotics. As the two previous chapters have shown, the FDA’s failure to 
implement statutory AGP bans in 1972, 1977, and 2013 was in part due to agro- 
industrial re sis tance, regulation wariness, partisan divides, and consumers, 
who feared residues more than AMR. However, the agency’s ambivalent rec-
ord was also caused by official factionalism, in effec tive enforcement, and a 
weakening of the FDA during the 1980s. Amid polarizing public debates about 
antibiotics’ costs and benefits, officials strug gled to defend  limited bans in 
courts and Congress. Precautionary reasoning was repeatedly defeated by indus-
try’s insistence on proof of harm. From the 1990s onward, officials reacted to 
the defeat of statutory interventions by attempting to improve antibiotic stew-
ardship via AMR monitoring and voluntary guidelines. Similar to Eu rope 
(chapter 13), resulting voluntarist reforms initially narrowly focused on AGPs 
and left wider antibiotic infrastructures intact.
Institutional Change
Following the 1965 resignation of commissioner George Larrick, heightened 
responsibilities, complicated drug withdrawal procedures, and growing po liti-
cal interference resulted in a rapid succession of FDA commissioners and 
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bureaucratic turmoil.1 Characterized as a “wild- eyed crusader with a battle-ax 
flailing boldly,”2 Larrick’s successor, James Goddard, was soon damaged by the 
chloramphenicol scandal. Following Goddard’s resignation in 1968, the less- 
outspoken physician and bacteriologist Herbert Ley became the last FDA com-
missioner to have risen through the agency’s ranks.3 Both Goddard and Ley 
oversaw a significant rise of FDA responsibilities and capabilities  under the 
consumer- oriented Johnson administration: whereas the FDA had employed 
800  people in 1954, Goddard’s agency employed 4,441  people. In 1968, the 
FDA was also incorporated into the HEW’s new Consumer Protection and 
Environmental Health Ser vice (CPEHS), which aimed to create a “super 
bureau” capable of research- based  hazard prevention.
However, the era of consumer- oriented reform was brief. In 1969, the cycla-
mate scandal (chapter 8) not only led to a sacking of Ley but a sea- change in 
the FDA’s organ ization and outlook. The newly elected Nixon administration 
responded to industry and medical demands by separating the FDA from the 
only recently created CPEHS and by prioritizing substance regulation based 
on flexible tolerances rather than zero- tolerance rules.4 A HEW review also rec-
ommended a reor ga ni za tion of the FDA along product rather than function 
lines. The Bureaus of Science, Medicine, and Compliance  were subsequently 
replaced with the Bureaus of Drugs, Foods, Pesticides, and Product Safety.5
Although responsibilities  were now divided between three bureaus, the 
Bureau of Veterinary Medicines (BVM), which had already been made in de-
pen dent of the Bureau of Drugs in 1967, oversaw most aspects of American agri-
cultural antibiotic regulation. The BVM’s authority was further strengthened 
by the 1968 Animal Drug Amendments (ADA).6 Supposed to redress the “step- 
child treatment” of animal drugs, the ADA streamlined licensing procedures 
by creating the category of a “new animal drug.” New animal drug applications 
(NADAs) could be handled  under  human drug procedures. In the case of most 
antibiotic feeds, products no longer needed to be cleared separately as new drugs 
(Section 505), food additives (Section 409 FDC), and antibiotics (Section 507). 
NADAs had to prove that a product was safe and efficacious if used according 
to label directions and had to include assay methods. FDA officials had 180 days 
to review a NADA or ask for additional information. A further 90 days  were 
allowed to pro cess applications for inclusion of new animal drugs in commer-
cial feeds. The goal was to have new feed additives on the market in nine instead 
of fourteen months.7 The ADA was supported by the AHI, the American Vet-
erinary Medical Association, and the feed industry, who argued that more 
drugs would improve animals’ health, increase meat supplies, and reduce 
consumer bills.8 In 1970, the FDA’s BVM was formally placed in charge of 
pro cessing NADAs.9
The streamlining of drug licensing contrasted with the complexification of 
drug withdrawals. With the exception of the Delaney Clause’s zero- tolerance 
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policy for carcinogens, the main FDA safety standard for additives and animal 
drugs remained the reasonable certainty of no harm, which was often inter-
preted as “relative safety.”10 This requirement of “no harm” was, however, replaced 
with a requirement of “no significant risk of harm” in 1971.11 If the FDA wanted 
to withdraw a substance, it now had to provide affected individuals and organ-
izations with 60 days to register protest. Should complaints reveal differences 
on “ matters of substance,” the FDA was required to hold formal administra-
tive hearings on substances’ safety, which  were often lengthy, expensive, and 
inconclusive. The only way administrative hearings could be avoided was if 
FDA commissioners declared that a substance posed an “imminent  hazard”. 
 Because affected parties  were entitled to challenge such a move, officials could, 
however, end up defending substance bans on the grounds of an “imminent 
 hazard” in regular courts. Losing a public trial was not only embarrassing 
for the FDA but could also lead to very expensive compensation payments to 
plaintiffs.12
The growing difficulty of withdrawing substances incentivized the FDA to 
avoid polarizing all- out public confrontation with industry. During the 1970s, 
officials used interim regulations to circumvent formal withdrawals. Interim 
regulations permitted the ongoing use of a suspect substance while safety ques-
tions  were being resolved. The FDA justified interim regulations with refer-
ence to the increasing amount of substances being challenged and the rising 
burden of evidence required to prove safety. What exactly “safety” was and 
 whether a substance’s benefits outweighed  limited risks was not just de cided 
by regulators.13 In courts and Congress, the authority of FDA science faced ris-
ing challenges by industrial or activist  counter science.14 Polarizing  battles 
over proof of harm would almost inevitably result in officials being accused of 
 either inaction or overreaction.
Proof of Harm
Complicated and antagonistic withdrawal procedures did not bode well for US 
antibiotic reform. Proving harm was already complicated in the case of known 
carcinogens and toxicants. Implementing precautionary bans of entire sub-
stance groups on the basis of abstract AMR scenarios would be exceedingly 
difficult— especially, since the issue was not high on the public agenda. Unsur-
prisingly, many 1970s FDA regulators  were thus reluctant to endorse calls for 
British- style AGP bans.
Officials’ hesitancy to act on “infective AMR” warnings was exacerbated 
by their con temporary strug gle to restrict a  limited number of therapeutic 
antibiotic products on the grounds of residue  hazards. In April 1968, commis-
sioner Goddard had announced FDA proceedings against drugs likely to 
leave hazardous residues in food or milk. However, in the absence of proof of 
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“imminent harm” resulting from residues, withdrawal proceedings left the 
FDA on thin  legal ice. Following Goddard’s departure in mid-1968, indus-
try re sis tance first led to an extension of the official comment period on 
withdrawals to 120 days and a subsequent abeyance of FDA proposals for a 
further two years to wait for results of new industry residue research. The 
 legal stalemate only ended when companies  stopped resisting FDA with-
drawals following passage of the industry- friendly 1968 ADA.15 In May 1969, 
the FDA published new regulations for labeling indicating withdrawal peri-
ods,  limited several residue- prone antibiotic products to veterinary prescrip-
tion, and banned bacitracin as well as oral chloramphenicol solutions, which 
 were proving popu lar as unapproved growth promoters, from use in food 
animals.16
The difficulty of withdrawing products causing mea sur able residues made 
BVM director Cornelius Donald Van Houweling reluctant to contemplate fur-
ther AMR- inspired regulatory action. Appointed in 1967, Van Houweling 
had previously directed programs in what would turn into the USDA’s Ani-
mal and Plant Health Inspection Ser vice.17 Faced with a con temporary break-
down of drug compliance on US farms and feed mills, Van Houweling instead 
focused  limited BVM resources on curbing residue and salmonellosis  hazards.18 
In 1967, officials informed Demo cratic Senator Birch Bayh that “infective” 
AMR was not an immediate policy priority: “At pre sent  there is only one anti-
biotic available for animals which is not used in  humans. Even this antibiotic 
 causes cross- resistance . . .  however,  there is no definitive evidence linking anti-
biotic resistant organisms of animal origin to  human disease or allergies. Con-
sequently, we are not contemplating any [antibiotics bans].”19 Echoing the FDA’s 
1966 ad hoc report, officials maintained that reducing direct  human exposure 
to antibiotic residues was the most effective way of curbing AMR risks. To 
determine the “real  hazard to man”20 [emphasis in the original], the FDA autho-
rized $25,000 for research on “resistant organisms resulting from medicated 
animal feeds.”21 Initial studies  were inconclusive. Pigs and chickens fed chlor-
tetracycline developed a predominantly resistant flora. However, resistant bac-
teria had already been detected in animal stomachs, feeds, and farm soils prior 
to the feed experiments.22
The BVM’s wait- and- see attitude was criticized by other FDA bureaus.23 In 
1968, FDA Papers published an attack on AGPs by David Smith from Boston’s 
 Children’s Hospital. Questioning AGPs’ efficacy, Smith warned that resistant 
Salmonella  were already causing prob lems in the United States: “All strains of 
S. typhimurium isolated before 1948, when antibiotics  were seldom used on 
farms,  were sensitive to tetracycline; 30  percent of strains isolated from poul-
try in 1962  were resistant to tetracycline, while 94  percent and 57  percent of 
strains isolated from  cattle and hogs  were resistant to tetracycline.”24 Coincid-
ing with the 1969 cyclamate scandal and commissioner Ley’s sacking, the 
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publication of Britain’s Swann report exacerbated inner- FDA tensions. Asked 
to summarize the situation in light of media enquiries, Van Houweling stated: 
“It is reliably estimated that approximately 40 million tons of animal feed con-
taining drugs was consumed in 1968. Also, that almost 80  percent of the meat, 
milk, and eggs consumed in the United States comes from animals fed medi-
cated feeds. The [AHI] reported that $72.5 million of antibiotics went into ani-
mal feed last year.”25 While the FDA’s Bureaus of Science and Medicine  were 
“acutely aware” of “the pos si ble ecological effects of using  these large amounts 
of antibiotics in animal feeds,” the BVM maintained that  there was no evidence 
that “such re sis tance has caused difficulties in treating diseases in animals or 
man in the United States.”26 Two new studies  were underway to assess  hazards: 
the FDA was attempting to trace resistant Salmonella outbreaks back to three 
farms but had been unable to “pro cess all the culture received,” and William G. 
Huber at the University of Illinois College of Veterinary Medicine was study-
ing resistant bacteria in animals and  people who had contact with farm ani-
mals.27 In the absence of watertight proof of harm, Van Houweling advised 
against launching legally uncertain AGP withdrawals.
Over the next de cade, this situation would repeat itself numerous times: 
while a reluctant BVM led by Van Houweling would warn about  limited proof 
of harm, external AMR warnings would make other FDA officials push for 
antibiotic bans. Each of the three 1970s FDA commissioners would use a dif-
fer ent approach to solve this dilemma: the first would try to displace internal 
AGP conflicts by seeking external expert validation of restrictions; the second 
would try to stage- manage external endorsement of AGP withdrawals; and the 
third would try to withdraw AGPs unilaterally. All three attempts ended in 
defeat.
Attempt Number One: Seeking External Endorsement 
(1970–1974)
Taking over as FDA commissioner shortly  after Van Houweling’s 1969 AMR 
memorandum, the trained surgeon and former con sul tant Charles Edwards 
faced a difficult situation: he had to restore trust in FDA consumer protection 
while not antagonizing superiors in the more industry- friendly Nixon admin-
istration.28  There  were plenty of fires to put out regarding antibiotic regulation: 
medicated feedstuff controls had broken down, USDA monitoring was reveal-
ing residues in food, and FDA officials had to respond to the British Swann 
report. Between 1970 and 1972, Edwards de cided to use  limited BVM resources 
to tackle residues and displaced the issue of AMR by commissioning an expert 
review to evaluate AMR  hazards and AGPs. In 1972, a resulting opportunity 
for reform quickly disintegrated in the face of industry opposition,  counter 
science, and FDA factionalism.
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Announced in April 1970 and corresponding with a general increase of FDA 
reliance on external expertise,29 the FDA Task Force on Antibiotics in Animal 
Feeds was chaired by Van Houweling and was composed of officials, industry 
representatives, and experts on infectious disease, microbiology, and veterinary 
medicine. Consumer representatives  were not invited. The task force was 
charged with undertaking an “in- depth review of the usage and  actual value 
of antibiotics in animal feed”30 and assessing health  hazards. Between 1970 and 
1972, the task force met nine times. During its first meeting, members de cided 
“that while  there was not enough evidence to indicate an imminent and imme-
diate health  hazard,  there was sufficient data to assure that  there is a potential, 
if not probable, health  hazard associated with feeding of antibiotics to ani-
mals.”31 Separate expert groups  were formed on antibiotic research,  human 
health prob lems, animal health prob lems, and antibiotic effectiveness. The task 
force also called for a moratorium on AGP licensing for the duration of their 
review. Over the next year, members gathered evidence across the United States 
and attended a “Conference on the prob lems of AMR” in New York in Octo-
ber 1970 where they met Eu ro pean experts and industry scientists like former 
Cyanamid- employee Thomas Jukes (chapter 13).32
In early 1971, eight task force members also embarked on a fact- finding mis-
sion to Britain. Between February 1 and 3, the US del e ga tion met with British 
agricultural and health officials.33 The meetings exposed significant differences 
with the British prioritizing precautionary risk scenarios and AMR and the 
Americans focusing on proof of harm and residues. US delegates  were partic-
ularly surprised by the lack of post- Swann AMR surveillance in Britain.34 Dur-
ing frank exchanges, British officials conceded that the Swann report “could 
be criticized for the absence of references and for its lack of attention to the 
prob lem of residues.”35 They even “accepted that some of the conclusions of the 
Report had been based on inadequate evidence.”36 However, they maintained 
that AMR scenarios  were based on logical extrapolations and that precaution-
ary AGP bans  were necessary. The implementation of other British antibiotic 
reforms seemed surprisingly weak. Although veterinary guidelines had been 
reformulated according to the princi ple of “sharp, short and high,”37 low- 
dosed antibiotic prescriptions remained  legal.  There would also be “no ‘army’ ”38 
checking  whether guidance was being adhered to.39
On February 3, task force members met PHLS director James Howie and 
E. S. Anderson, the researcher  behind the 1965 “infective” re sis tance warnings 
about S. typhimurium. According to Howie, British AMR concerns  were 
increasingly centering on AMR se lection in coliforms rather than in salmonella 
where infections  were usually self- limiting. In a significant statement, he also 
noted that the Swann committee had been primarily concerned not so much 
about AGPs but about “farmers prescribing and using antibiotics in therapeutic 
and near therapeutic levels in all kinds of stock.”40 Agro- pharmaceutical data 
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in  favor of using antibiotics against vaguely defined stress had been the “most 
pitiful scientific evidence presented before Swann.”41 E. S. Anderson warned 
US colleagues about neglecting AMR— even if detected re sis tance seemed 
insignificant. Although “ little re sis tance” developed in response to ampicil-
lin use on farms, this use was prob ably  behind most ampicillin re sis tance in 
Staphylococci isolated from disease outbreaks.42 When asked  whether Britain’s 
S. typhimurium Type 29 epidemic had been unique, Anderson noted that 
Type 29 had provided a pre ce dent: “Other strains of S. typhimurium [like 
phage types U29 and U163] are transferred from animals to man, and follow 
this same model but [the] kinetics may not be so explosive.”43  There was no rea-
son to believe that agricultural AMR  hazards  were unique to S. typhimurium— 
the prob lem was ecological:
[Anderson]  didn’t in the past and  doesn’t now distinguish between growth 
prophylactic and therapeutic doses of antibiotics. He cannot tell the difference 
in numbers of resistant strains arising in man as a result of  these three regi-
ments and apparently the bacteria also do not distinguish amongst  these 
three regiments. . . .  Dr. Anderson considers the entire prob lem of transferable 
re sis tance as microbial ecol ogy and for example he pointed out that low level 
transferable ampicillin re sis tance was first found in his laboratory and was 
almost certainly of porcine origin.44
Questioned about a recent paper by British veterinary researcher and 
early AGP critic, Herbert Williams Smith, who had swallowed resistant organ-
isms but had not been able to detect a permanent change of his gut 
flora, Anderson maintained that “transfer and colonization could occur.”45 
Despite expressing confidence that AGP bans would reduce AMR, Ander-
son attacked antibiotic prophylaxis and proposed a complete separation of 
 human and animal antibiotic use. Accompanying Anderson to his labora-
tory, an anonymous task force member commented on Anderson’s forceful 
personality— which extended to changing the American’s cough syrup— 
but also described the “incredible amount of data” the British had accumu-
lated on AMR:
The surveillance of Salmonella strains both in animals and in man that is 
carried out is truly astounding since not only are organisms phage typed and 
sera typed but a hunt for re sis tance patterns is routinely followed in all organisms 
coming to the laboratory’s attention. In  those instances where an organism in 
Dr. Anderson’s opinion seems a  little strange, . . .  an enormous amount of work 
goes on in transferring or attempting to transfer this re sis tance from one 
organism to another . . . .  It was truly an impressive demonstration which I 
think is unique.46
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Interviewed by the task force on February 4, Herbert Williams Smith also 
regretted that the Swann report had not gone further. Following his recent self- 
experiment, he “believed that  human beings are the major source of R- factors 
for other  human beings”47 but worried about the large reservoir of mobile re sis-
tance genes being selected for in animals. Ongoing se lection pressure might 
eventually result in R- factors that could transfer to  humans more readily. Exist-
ing R- factors against tetracycline acted as “catalysts” for further AMR by 
allowing other R- factors and virulence and toxicity genes to “hitchhike.”48 In 
the United Kingdom, AMR was already leading to tetracycline treatment 
failures for bacteremia in swine and poultry: “if we  don’t need to have the ani-
mal reservoir of R- factors we are better off without it.”49
Tasked with summarizing the FDA task force del e ga tion’s UK visit, John V. 
Bennett, head of the CDC’s Bacterial Diseases Branch, again highlighted dif-
ferences between precautionary British reasoning and the US focus on proof 
of harm. Bennett was particularly frustrated by the “absence of solid, factual 
data on many issues” under lying British decision- making: “ After a review of the 
available data I am convinced that  there is not an imminent  human or animal 
health prob lem resulting from current animal husbandry and veterinary prac-
tices in the United States. Though a non- imminent prob lem prob ably does 
exist, its magnitude has not been sufficiently defined to justify pre sent action 
that might have substantial economic, po liti cal, and professional impacts.”50 
Bennett thus advocated commissioning studies to test AGPs’ efficacy and their 
potential to select for AMR against medically relevant drugs. If effective drugs 
without medical relevance could be found, then only they should be permit-
ted for prescription- free use as AGPs. Should only medically relevant drugs 
prove efficacious as AGPs, then studies would have to document that their use 
did not cause therapeutic prob lems and residues. AMR concerns also made 
Bennett propose reviewing US veterinary prescription rights for chloramphen-
icol and gentamicin.51
Bennett’s proposals proved controversial with both medical and agro- 
industrial task force factions. Following the del e ga tion’s return, the FDA task 
force drafted an intermediate report in late February and a final report in Octo-
ber 1971.52 Fierce conflicts characterized both drafting stages. While all sides 
agreed that medically relevant AGPs could be withdrawn from poultry, restric-
tions for other species led to significant disagreement. Antibiotic supporters 
 were or ga nized in the task force’s subcommittee on antibiotic effectiveness and 
critics in the subcommittee on  human health aspects. The subcommittee on 
veterinary medical aspects remained divided. In early 1971, the first draft report 
recommended a two- year phase- out of most AGPs and of prophylactic antibi-
otic use but allowed “safer” antibiotics to remain on the market  until users could 
switch to other drugs or devise alternative solutions. This proposal failed to 
satisfy  either antibiotic critics or supporters. By April  1971, both sides had 
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compiled minority reports forcing BVM director Van Houweling to redraft 
the main task force report. Conflicts continued. In November 1971, Food Chemical 
News reported that a preview of the second draft report had “degenerated into a 
donnybrook  after [commissioner Edwards] and his staff departed.”53 A last- 
minute compromise was eventually brokered by proposing AGP bans but allow-
ing industry to prove products’ safety first.54
Passed with a thin margin but signed by all members, the final task force 
report was released in January 1972. It cautioned that the “efficacy and safety 
of long- term feeding of subtherapeutic levels of antibiotics for animal disease 
control and prophylaxis [had] not been adequately demonstrated.”55 In 1970, 
antibiotics had been worth $414,135,000 to livestock producers and phar ma-
ceu ti cal companies had earned $64,030,323 from selling them between 1968 and 
1969. Estimating the impact of AGP restrictions was not pos si ble  because “some 
antibiotics  will undoubtedly continue to be available for growth promotion 
purposes.”56 Significantly, the final report concluded that AGPs’ se lection for 
AMR posed a “not fully documented” but logical health  hazard: “Evidence sug-
gests that the use of certain antibiotics in food- producing animals promotes 
an increase in the animal reservoir of Salmonella . . .  the use of some antibiot-
ics in animals produces a marked increase in the prevalence of R- factor con-
taining bacteria which may be transmissible to man’s enteric flora.”57 It was “the 
consensus of the task force that it would be highly desirable that in the  future, 
a group of antibacterial agents be reserved exclusively for  human use.”58 The 
task force advised restricting tetracyclines, dihydrostreptomycin, sulfonamides, 
penicillins, and “all other approved antibiotics”59 to prescription- only status if 
producers failed to prove their safety and efficacy. The task force also endorsed 
existing feed restrictions for chloramphenicol, semi- synthetic penicillins, gen-
tamicin, and kanamycin. FDA proposals based on the task force report  were 
published in the Federal Register on February 1, 1972.60
The Federal Register announcement did not end controversies. The subse-
quent publication of contradictory task force minority reports instead triggered 
significant disagreement between officials and agro- pharmaceutical represen-
tatives as well as between government departments and American scientists.61 
At the government level, agricultural regulators  were displeased with the FDA’s 
proposed bans. While state officials warned that it would be difficult to enforce 
AGP restrictions,62 the USDA’s Agricultural Research Ser vice could not find 
definitive evidence of harm in April 1972 (chapter 9).63 The review’s recommen-
dations for more research  were echoed by a cautious USDA working paper on 
antibiotic bans’ economic effects for turkey and broiler production.64 US aca-
demia was also divided over AGP bans. The 1972 annual meeting of the Amer-
ican Society for Microbiology exposed significant scientific and ideological rifts 
between an older generation of neo- Malthusian experts and younger, more 
industry critical scientists. While microbiologist Stanley Falkow warned that 
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agricultural antibiotic use might compromise  human therapy, American Cyan-
amid’s Gordon Kemp stated that  there was “absolutely no evidence”65 that 
R- factor transfer was impairing treatment. AGP co- discoverer Thomas Jukes 
emphasized that potential prob lems with AGPs would have materialized long 
ago. Falkow disagreed and pointed to diarrhea outbreaks among swine, which 
had been caused by E. coli made resistant by feeds. This assertion was attacked 
by animal scientist James Leece, who claimed that outbreaks had been caused 
by a virus. Proceedings got tense when task force member Arthur  K. Saz 
declared: “It is a microbiological monstrosity to have an ever- replenishing pool 
of antibiotic- resistant organisms being fed to the population.”66 Jukes responded 
in style: “This has been my life, improving growth in animals with antibiotics. 
To feed the world’s population we need  every trick we know.”67
Determined to defend AGPs, well- connected older American scientists also 
used their position as government advisors to attack FDA AMR warnings. In 
June 1972, the NAS commissioned a hostile review of the FDA task force report. 
The NAS review was chaired by infectious disease specialist Maxwell Finland. 
A friend of Thomas Jukes, Finland had already endorsed AGPs at the 1955 anti-
biotic feeds conference and as a member of the FDA’s 1965 ad hoc committee 
(chapter 4). Despite campaigning against inefficacious antibiotics in  human 
medicine, Finland “remain[ed] unconvinced”68 that infective AMR scenarios 
undermined existing agricultural antibiotic use. The NAS Division of Biology 
and Agriculture had already published a critical position paper on AGP restric-
tions. However, NAS president Philip Handler wanted the Drug Research 
Board to review this paper before sending it to the FDA. Asked to conduct this 
review by Drug Research Board secretary Duke Trexler, Finland was allowed 
to nominate other reviewers and was supplied with task force files and a hos-
tile letter, which Thomas Jukes had recently written as a member of the Presi-
dent’s Science Advisory Committee.69  After less than four months deliberation, 
Finland’s committee recommended approving the NAS position paper against 
AGP bans and funding research on AMR and medically irrelevant antibiotics 
solely for agriculture.70
The rushed NAS report attracted scientific criticism not only from former 
task force members but also from pharmacologists, who had been members of 
Finland’s internal review.71 In a sign of how polarized academia had become, 
letters between Jukes and Finland discussed the degree to which opponents 
 were ignoring the “facts.” Jukes particularly disliked the “zealot”72 David H. 
Smith, who had headed the FDA task force’s  Human Health  Hazards Com-
mittee. Finland agreed: “It was only  after [Smith] joined the task force that he 
was ‘converted’ or perhaps brainwashed.”73 Controlling influential positions 
within academia, Finland and Jukes may not have been able to prevent critical 
studies but had sufficient power to undermine their opponents’ standing.
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Emerging academic and bureaucratic rifts weakened FDA reformers, who 
 were encountering well- organized agro- pharmaceutical opposition (chapter 9). 
 After proposing AGP bans in February  1972, the FDA received over 380 
responses within the mandatory 60- day comment period— formal hearings 
would now be necessary.74 In August 1972, NAS president Handler exacerbated 
reformers’ loss of po liti cal momentum by personally asking commissioner 
Edwards to delay regulatory action  until Finland’s ad hoc review had completed 
its work.75 Worried by the extent of industry protest and weak public support 
of AGP bans (chapter 8), Edwards informed Handler that he was willing to 
defer action and consider the NAS review. Writing to Finland, Drug Research 
Board secretary Trexler described Edwards’ move as a “volte face.”76 Victory 
over FDA AGP bans was close.
Commissioner Edwards now faced a dilemma. NAS, USDA, and industry 
opposition had successfully undermined AGP bans’ po liti cal momentum. 
Although Edwards had never actively pushed for restrictions himself, the FDA 
had, however, publicly committed to implementing the 1972 task force propos-
als in the Federal Register. The only way out seemed to be a loophole in the 
task force report itself. As a result of pro- industry lobbying, manufacturers had 
been allowed to prove that their products would not: cause a significant increase 
of resistant pathogenic and multiple resistant bacteria in  humans, animals, and 
feed; prolong the shedding of resistant bacteria or increase their pathogenic-
ity; result in cross- resistance to other therapeutics.77 However, decisions over 
the design of appropriate testing protocols had been left to the FDA. The solu-
tion to Edwards’s dilemma lay in drastically narrowing AGP safety reviews’ 
scope. In December 1972, the FDA’s associate commissioner for medical affairs 
informed Edwards: “The previous documents . . .  approach the prob lem in a 
broad way, considering that antibiotics per se in this par tic u lar use might con-
stitute a  hazard . . . .  [A new BVM draft] narrows this scope considerably by 
restricting the studies of  human  hazard (aside from the possibility of salmo-
nella reservoir increase) to drugs which are (1) used in  human clinical medi-
cine, and (2) which promote gram negative transferable re sis tance.”78
Modified safety reviews  were announced in the Federal Register in April 1973. 
According to the FDA, AGPs constituted an imminent  hazard if they signifi-
cantly increased the Salmonella reservoir in animals and food.79 Ignoring Brit-
ish warnings, the FDA claimed that  there was “less agreement on the  hazard 
to  human health presented by other animal- source bacteria (e.g., coliforms)”80 
and R- factor transfer. It also referenced Finland’s NAS review and noted that 
AGPs appeared “safe  under the conditions of use.”81 Manufacturers  were given 
one year to produce “an assessment of the effects of subtherapeutic levels of [tet-
racyclines, streptomycin, dihydrostreptomycin, the sulfonamides, and peni-
cillin] on the salmonella reservoir.”82 Producers would also have to submit 
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studies “concerning (1) the colonization and R- factor transfer from animals to 
man and (2) increased pathogenicity due to toxin- linkage with R- factor.”83 Con-
tinued AGP use was enabled by an interim regulation that would remain in 
place  until evidence of safety or harm was provided. Proving safety did not 
“require complete certainty of the absolute harmlessness of a drug, but rather 
the reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists that it is not harm-
ful, when balanced against the benefits to be obtained from the drug” [emphasis 
added].84 By downplaying AMR’s ecological dimensions, narrowing risk assess-
ments to Salmonella and allegedly subtherapeutic dosages, and including cost- 
benefit evaluations in its safety review, the FDA quietly began to abandon its 
first attempt at precautionary antibiotic restrictions.
The results of industry- led safety reviews  were predictable. By 1974, eight 
manufacturers had submitted twenty- one in vivo studies of AGPs’ impact on 
the Salmonella reservoir.  Behind the scenes, FDA scientists expressed dismay 
about the quality of industry data: “omissions, deficiencies, or areas which raise 
questions [existed] in almost  every study.”85 An external review of three indus-
try salmonella studies also warned that they would provide no suitable base 
for regulatory action: “ these are the kinds of data for the most part that  will 
say what ever one wishes them to say . . .  if the salmonella data are not clear, the 
other [E. coli] studies  will only ‘muddy the  waters’ more.”86 Having reached a 
similar conclusion about four additional extramural studies in March 1974,87 
FDA and Canadian officials traveled to Britain to enquire  after the Swann bans’ 
impact. However, the stagnation of British AMR monitoring dashed hopes for 
supportive findings (chapter 13).88 Referencing the lack of reliable AMR data 
and the need for more research, the BVM de cided against pursuing AGP bans 
in August 1974 and formally ended proceedings following the final deadline 
for industry studies in April 1975.89
Attempt Number Two: Stage- Managing Endorsement 
(1975–1977)
The regulatory respite caused by the abandonment of the 1972 task force 
proposals was short lived. In 1974, a Eu ro pean WHO working group report 
recommended reserving medically relevant antibiotics for  human use.90 In the 
US, two University of Illinois studies also revived pressure for reform. Both stud-
ies analyzed AGPs’ effects on the  human and animal gut flora on 30 farms. 
According to the first paper from 1974, AGPs’ effects on animals’ fecal flora 
 were significant with many isolates proving resistant to oxytetracycline, strep-
tomycin, dihydrostreptomycin, and ampicillin. Transferable re sis tance to oxy-
tetracycline, dihydrostreptomycin, ampicillin, neomycin, chloramphenicol, 
and cephalothin was detected.91 The second paper from 1975 compared fecal 
samples from (1) 22  people working on 16 farms using antibiotics, (2) 20  people 
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residing on 13 farms with no direct exposure to animals, (3) 18  people treated 
with antibiotics for salmonellosis, (4) untreated  people residing with treated 
individuals, and (5) untreated  people with no exposure to farm animals. Unsur-
prisingly, samples from groups 1 and 3 contained the highest and group 5 the 
lowest proportion of resistant gram- negative enteric organisms. However, AMR 
levels  were also elevated in groups 2 and 4, which suggested that AMR se lection 
in medicated animals and  humans could also alter untreated adjacent enteric 
flora.92 Concerns seemed verified one year  later by Stuart Levy’s research on 
AMR transfer from farm animals to a farm  family (chapter 8).
The new AMR data made FDA officials relaunch AGP withdrawal efforts. 
Learning from his pre de ces sor’s failure, new FDA commissioner, Alexander M. 
Schmidt, however, de cided to use existing advisory committees rather than a 
further potentially polarizing expert review to legitimize AGP bans. During 
the 1960s, the FDA had created national advisory committees to enhance trans-
parency and public trust. The committees  were composed of officials, experts, 
and consumer and industry representatives. If staffed “correctly,” they offered a 
covert way to create external support for FDA- led change. In early 1975, FDA 
general counsel Peter Hutt suggested using the National Advisory Food and 
Drug Council (NAFDC) to circumvent a further task force– style review.93 The 
NAFDC’s “neutral evidence” could be used to fend off industry challenges to 
formal AGP withdrawals. Industry opposition would “come in the form of for-
mal litigation, . . .  congressional inquiries and committee hearings.”94 The FDA 
would staff a “friendly” special NAFDC subcommittee with three NAFDC 
members and select con sul tants to bolster its regulatory authority.95
Chaired by commissioner Schmidt, the NAFDC established an Antibiot-
ics in Animal Feeds Subcommittee (AAFC) in June 1975.96 Eigh teen months 
 later,97 the AAFC recommended banning tetracycline and penicillin AGPs. 
 Going beyond the 1972 task force report, it also called for penicillin bans in 
disease prevention if effective substitutes  were available. Tetracycline and sul-
faquinoxaline use was to be  limited “to  those periods of time for which the pres-
ence of the drug in the feed . . .  is necessary due to the threat of animal 
disease.”98 Although it did not completely heed internal FDA guidance,99 the 
AAFC report seemed to provide FDA officials with robust external endorse-
ment of statutory antibiotic restrictions.
However, in a surprisingly blow, the main NAFDC rejected the AAFC’s 
recommendations. During a one- day session in early 1977, the NAFDC 
accepted the proposed penicillin and sulfaquinoxaline restrictions but rejected 
tetracycline restrictions. The committee also called for more research and rec-
ommended that the FDA’s position be “reevaluated within three years.”100 
According to one observer, three  people had influenced the NAFDC’s break 
with the AAFC: “(one the Chairman of the Board of a drug firm, another the 
President of a feedlot) whose sweeping generalities  were not based on scientific 
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fact and nevertheless went unchallenged.”101 Microbiologist Rosa Gryder 
recalled how, ahead of the meeting, some NAFDC members admitted not hav-
ing read the background material supplied to them while “ others did not 
clearly understand it.”102 Having been consulted by the AAFC, microbiologist 
Stanley Falkow fumed:
Without mincing words, to accept the recommendations on the restriction of 
penicillin and sulfonamide and to  table the [AAFC] recommendations on 
tetracycline simply reflects the ignorance of the full Committee . . .  , the action of 
the full Committee was an insult to [AAFC members], . . .  it is no exaggeration to 
say that the ecol ogy of the enterobacteria, and recently other bacterial groups . . .  has 
been changed by the pattern of antibiotic usage in man and his domestic animals.103
For antibiotic reformers, the NAFDC rejection could hardly have come at 
a worse time. Following Jimmy Car ter’s 1976 election victory, the FDA was 
headed by an interim commissioner and resources  were strained by the fact that 
the Delaney Clause was forcing officials to proceed against popu lar saccharin 
sweeteners.104 For a while, it was unclear  whether the agency would remain 
committed to antibiotic restrictions.
Attempt Number Three: Unilateral Restriction (1977–1985)
Taking office in April 1977, the new FDA commissioner Donald Kennedy faced 
a considerably more hostile climate than his pre de ces sors had. In Congress, 
fears of “stagflation” and the “drug lag”  were tempting an increasing number 
of politicians to attack FDA regulations (chapter 8).105 The Car ter administra-
tion further complicated  things by strengthening external oversight and intro-
ducing fiscal restraints such as mandatory inflation impact assessments for 
any regulatory action projected to cost more than $100 million. Some observ-
ers worried  whether Kennedy, who had no prior po liti cal experience, would be 
able to strike a workable balance between regulatory action and Washington’s 
campaign to reduce the bureaucratic footprint.106
Breaking with his pre de ces sors’ attempts to gain external expert endorse-
ment, Kennedy’s unilateral campaign for AGP bans heightened such concerns. 
Eleven days  after taking office, Kennedy announced that he considered the 
NAFDC’s decision nonbinding and would ban penicillin and tetracycline 
AGPs. Justifying his course, Kennedy referenced ecologist Garett Hardin’s 
“tragedy of the Commons”:107
In short, the evidence indicates that enteric microorganisms in food animals 
and man, their r- plasmids and  human pathogens form a linked ecosystem of their 
own in which action at any one point can affect  every other. . . .  the 
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vulnerability of microorganisms to antibiotics is a kind of “commons”— a 
resource which if we consume it by the use of antibiotics for non- medical 
purposes in animals, is diminished in man.108
According to Kennedy, the long- term benefits of antibiotic restrictions out-
weighed short- term economic costs.109
Kennedy’s disregard of the recent NAFDC AGP endorsements was aided 
by parallel Government Accountability Office (GAO) criticism of his 
pre de ces sor’s use of the NAFDC to circumvent formal safety reviews.110 How-
ever, his actions divided FDA officials. In a 1977 memorandum, BVM director 
Van Houweling had warned that banning all nonprescribed uses of penicillin 
and the tetracyclines would “have the approval of that segment of society repre-
sented by the consumer activist, scientists and  those members of the medical 
profession who feel that action should be taken.”111 BVM officials, however, 
worried that such bans had the “potential for causing the greatest change in US 
animal food production.”112 Van Houweling reported: “five out of seven scien-
tists from the staff of the BVM Antibiotics in Feeds Group and the Veterinary 
Research Division are willing to compromise and adopt the recommendations 
of the [AAFC].”113 One BVM member supported the NAFDC endorsement of 
tetracyclines, “while another individual and the FDA Office of Science“114 pre-
ferred strict tetracycline limitations to therapeutic use. Advising that the FDA 
follow AAFC recommendations to ban penicillin AGPs but permit more 
restricted prophylactic use of tetracycline AGPs, Van Houweling noted: “Po liti-
cally, the Subcommittee position lies between the extremes desired by diff er ent 
segments of the American public.”115
Other officials warned about congressional and industrial insistence on 
proof of harm. In June  1977, a memorandum cautioned: “we may not have 
enough [evidence] to avoid a hearing since  there may well be substantial and 
material issues of fact.”116  Future BVM director Lester Crawford  later remem-
bered that the agency “simply stated in the [official FDA argument in the 1978] 
Congressional rec ord that  there was a theoretical chance of a compromise of 
 human therapy. In fact we labored for almost a year over the choice of the term 
‘theoretical,’ or the alternative of presenting direct evidence.”117 This lack of 
direct evidence soon came back to haunt the FDA in the face of impressive 
agro- pharmaceutical protest (chapter 9). In the American National Archives in 
College Park, the large moving boxes containing the FDA’s general correspon-
dence between 1977 and 1979 are close to bursting with private, industrial, 
congressional— and occasionally USDA118— letters opposing AGP restrictions.119 
In April  1977, a Cyanamid News Release claimed that “banning [all] antibiot-
ics”120 would annually cost consumers a staggering $2.1 billion. Readers  were asked 
to make their “voice heard”121 and contact their representatives with a list of argu-
ments and writing tips provided by Cyanamid:
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Make it known at the start of your letter that you think the proposal is harm-
ful, and that you disagree with it.
Tell how long you have used tetracycline antibiotics on your farm, and the 
benefits you have reaped that could not have come from any other 
source.
Stress that you have seen no indication of adverse effects, to  either animal 
or  human, from tetracycline use.
Say that you want to keep using tetracycline antibiotics, and what your 
operation would be like without them.
When writing your Congressman and Senator, urge him to protect his 
constituents’ interest.
You should also consider writing to your state Commissioner of Agricul-
ture. . . .  When writing a letter to a Representative, Senator, or any 
government official,  there are rules of etiquette . . . .  When writing a 
Congressman, the envelope is properly addressed to “The 
Honorable.”122
The agro- industrial letter campaign was extremely effective. In June 1977, com-
missioner Kennedy complained about the volume of hostile correspondence 
he was receiving: “The majority originate from a campaign orchestrated by a 
major antibiotics producer.”123 According to a con temporary BVM memo, the 
scale of opposition was entirely predictable. In 1977, the US AGP market was 
worth about $118.1 million. Fierce competition in the phar ma ceu ti cal sector 
would make “companies such as American Cyanamid Com pany, Pfizer, Inc. 
and  others . . .  vigorously resist any change in use.”124 Similar to farmers (chap-
ter 9), phar ma ceu ti cal companies mostly opposed FDA regulations  because of 
the “belief that this is a prelude to other restrictions and more control by the 
government.”125 Companies had spent much “time and money” on “defensive 
research” and had anticipated FDA action “since about 1970 when the Antibi-
otics Task Force was formed”— “what to do when the change comes, has prob-
ably been in the planning for several years.”126
Official withdrawal proposals for penicillin in animal feeds and for subther-
apeutic tetracycline use  were published in the Federal Register four months 
 after Kennedy’s initial announcement in August and October 1977.127 How-
ever, by this time, AGP bans  were already showing signs of stalling: Congress 
had just indicated its readiness to intervene in FDA affairs by mandating an 
eighteen- month “breather” on saccharin regulations;128 Canada had reneged 
on parallel AGP bans;129 and FDA AMR assessments  were  under attack from 
other government agencies and industry scientists.
Similar to 1972, the increasing prominence of external reviews constrained 
the FDA’s ability to make authoritative and rapid decisions in the name of pub-
lic health. In addition to diluting FDA authority, they also tended to deflect 
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po liti cal attention from long- term AMR  hazards  toward more short- term eco-
nomic calculations. The result was a  battle of often questionable cost- benefit 
estimates. While American Cyanamid used 1975 estimates to claim that 
restricting all AGPs would cost $801.7 million,130 FDA officials pointed to 1976 
Office of Planning and Evaluation and in- house estimates that producers using 
substitute antibiotics would only incur a cost increase of between $65 and 
$74 million— both well below Car ter administration thresholds for a “major” 
inflationary impact.131 In a September  1977 paper, the USDA’s Economic 
Research Ser vice (ERS) also reassessed antibiotics’ benefits and  hazards. Erro-
neously claiming that “it was not observed  until 1955 that bacteria could develop 
re sis tance to antibiotics,”132 the ERS stated that banning AGPs  because of the-
oretical  hazards would cause real economic costs. However, it also noted that 
industry estimates of costs between $1.6 and $1.9 billion resulted from models 
that assumed static 1970 production levels, a ban of all AGPs, or a significant 
ensuing production decline. Models assuming partial bans and a dynamic adap-
tation of production showed that consumer costs  were  either non ex is tent or 
very low.133 Competing industry and official cost estimates made the USDA 
and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry commis-
sion additional reviews of drug and chemical feed additives.134 In Novem-
ber  1977, FDA officials warned that  these new reviews would likely be 
unfavorable and that formal withdrawal hearings would delay regulatory action 
“ until late 1978 at the earliest.”135
Aware that time was not working in its  favor, the FDA de cided to create a 
“done deal” in December 1977 by establishing a new category of prescription- 
only restricted medicated animal feeds, which would include penicillin, chlor-
tetracycline, and oxytetracycline feeds— something that was eventually 
implemented via voluntary guidances  after 2013. The new feed category prom-
ised to restrict AGP access to veterinary prescription and licensed feed 
mills well ahead of what  were likely to be drawn- out and uncertain statutory 
withdrawal procedures for subtherapeutic feeds. Although FDA projections 
showed that AGP restrictions to prescription- only status would only cost 
$15.6 million— “well below the criterion for a major economic impact”136—
it was clear that Congress would interpret the so- called Controls Document 
as an attempt to bypass its authority.
During informal FDA hearings following the publication of the Controls 
Document in January 1978,137 prominent critics attacked FDA plans138—174 
witnesses opposed prescription- only restrictions and only 15 supported them.139 
Congress also reacted quickly. Representative Jamie Whitten, a Mississippi 
Demo crat chairing the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture 
and Rural Development, vowed to hold the US bud get hostage if AGP restric-
tions proceeded. A deal was brokered with the Car ter administration whereby 
FDA action would be put on hold  until further research provided more clarity 
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on AMR  hazards.140 In February 1978, a resolution was introduced to the Sen-
ate directing the FDA to refrain from restrictions pending the outcome of new 
studies. The FDA first attempted to appease critics by extending the comments 
period on its Controls Document to June 1978. However, in May, the BVM 
warned that extensions would not be enough “in view of Congress’s increas-
ing tendency to [take] action where administrative agencies have taken unpop-
u lar stands on issues having significant public impact.”141 This prediction was 
correct. In July 1978, following hearings during which twenty- six of twenty- 
nine witnesses rejected FDA restrictions, Demo crat Charles Rose, chairman 
of the Subcommittee on Dairy and Poultry of the House Committee on Agri-
culture, proposed a resolution to stall FDA action.142 The resolution would force 
the FDA to await the outcome of a new NAS study for which Congressman 
Whitten’s Appropriation Committee had earmarked $250,000 two months 
 earlier.143 Ahead of the final vote, Rose showed a film highlighting the costs of 
FDA action and featuring industry and CAST experts claiming that no AMR 
prob lems had emerged since the 1950s. Rose also claimed that FDA bans would 
annually cost approximately $2 billion. His resolution was passed unanimously 
and endorsed by the Senate in September 1978.144
Despite the publication of more favorable external assessments of AGP bans 
by the Office of Technology Assessment and the USDA,145 FDA officials  were 
powerless to take further action ahead of the congressionally mandated NAS 
review. Its narrow terms of reference, pre- selected membership, and  limited rec-
ommendation options made it very unlikely that this review would support 
FDA action. Tasked with assessing “the scientific feasibility of additional epi-
demiological studies”146 and focusing only on “subtherapeutic” penicillin and 
tetracycline feeds below 200 grams per ton, NAS reviewers  were primed to call 
for more research. In September 1979, the NAS review’s staff director indirectly 
acknowledged this by stating that reviewers could make only three recommen-
dations: specific further studies are needed, no further studies are needed, or 
 there is no way of devising further studies. Review members had moreover been 
selected to avoid public charges of bias. As a consequence, both CAST scien-
tists and many renowned experts who had worked on critical FDA, WHO, and 
OTA panels  were omitted from the NAS review.147
Published in March 1980, the NAS report predictably prolonged the status 
quo by concluding “that the postulated  hazards to  human health from the sub-
therapeutic use of antimicrobials in animal feeds  were neither proven nor dis-
proven.”148 Although it proposed additional studies of local AMR transmission, 
the NAS report cautioned that conclusive data on AMR  hazards caused by 
subtherapeutic antibiotic use alone was unlikely to emerge: “it is not pos si-
ble to conduct a feasible, comprehensive epidemiological study of the effects on 
 human health arising from the subtherapeutic use of antimicrobials in animal 
feeds.”149 This assessment was, however, ignored by Congress, which provided 
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$1.5 million for a “definitive epidemiologic study of the antibiotics in animal 
feeds issue”150 for the fiscal year 1981. Ahead of taking any regulatory action, the 
FDA was to study the effect of both therapeutic and subtherapeutic antibiotic 
use on plasmid- mediated re sis tance in enteric organisms in animals; com-
pare the enteric flora of vegetarians and meat eaters; study how exposure to 
animal bacteria affected slaughter house workers and their contacts; and ana-
lyze  whether carriage of resistant fecal flora was associated with increased 
morbidity or mortality from urinary tract infections.151 Interim regulations from 
the 1970s would permit ongoing AGP use  until final certainty on AMR  hazards 
emerged.
Not all members of Congress  were willing to further postpone FDA action. 
In June 1980, Demo crat Representatives Henry Waxman and John Dingell pro-
posed a bill (H.R. 7285) that would allow the secretary of health to limit anti-
biotic feeds if they did not meet a “compelling need.”152 The Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment held hearings on AGPs. Boycotted by the National 
Pork Producers Council,153 the hearings highlighted ongoing differences 
regarding statutory intervention and AMR  hazards. The American Medical 
Association could not “state at this time that  there is sufficient evidence of the 
transfer of disease- causing antibiotic resistant bacteria from animals to  humans 
to warrant alarm.”154 Having only recently defended physicians’ autonomy to 
prescribe antibiotics,155 the organ ization opposed legislative mea sures, which 
would reduce regulators’ ability to deal with AMR flexibly. Joyce Lashof from 
the US Office of Technology Assessment disagreed:
Our [1979] conclusion was that the increasing pool of resistant bacteria is a 
serious health risk to  humans, and that the contribution from low- level 
antibacterial use in animal feeds played a significant part in increasing the 
general pool of genet ically resistant organisms. . . .  We also pointed out that it 
was not relevant that the therapeutic use in  humans of  these same antibacteri-
als may be a larger contributor to the development of re sis tance, as long as 
animal feed use was in itself a significant contributor to re sis tance.156
The new BVM director Lester Crawford also endorsed banning medically rel-
evant antibiotics from use as AGPs.157 However, without the support of Tim 
Lee Car ter, ranking Republican member of the subcommittee, H.R. 7285 failed 
to make it past the “marking up” stage of legislation.158
Chances for FDA- led antibiotic restrictions decreased further  after Ronald 
Reagan’s 1980 election victory. Between 1981 and 1989, the FDA’s workload 
grew significantly while its bud get stagnated and workforce declined. Enforce-
ment dropped from 1,041 annual actions between 1977 and 1980 to 577 
actions in 1981.159 In a significant move, the Reagan administration also changed 
decision- making within the renamed Department of Health and  Human 
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Ser vices (HHS). Taking over as HHS secretary in 1981, former Republican 
Senator Richard Schweiker acquired significant powers. Following 1981, 
FDA regulations had to be personally signed by Schweiker, who was intent on 
reducing “overregulation” and the “drug lag.” The new FDA commissioner 
Arthur Hayes was equally unlikely to push for AGP bans. Hayes enjoyed a 
close relationship with phar ma ceu ti cal producers and had to resign in 1983 for 
accepting financial honoraria.160 Even if the FDA and HHS had approved 
AGP restrictions, it was unlikely that they would have passed the Office of 
Management and Bud get (OMB). In February 1981, Executive Order 12291 
required all federal agencies to submit cost- benefit analyses on regulatory 
actions for OMB approval. The order increased the possibility of external inter-
ference on regulatory decision- making and disincentivized officials from 
pressing for substance bans.161
Weakened FDA officials could do  little  else than administer the stagnation 
of American antibiotic reform. Between 1980 and 1984, the FDA neither acted 
on nor withdrew the 1977 notice of hearings on AGPs. In response to NRDC 
and industry pressure to drop or pursue bans, officials referred to ongoing AMR 
research and licensed a  limited number of penicillin and tetracycline premixes 
so as not to disadvantage companies that had not marketed  these products prior 
to the 1973 interim regulations.162
The next round of congressionally mandated AMR research was published 
in August 1984. Despite finding significant overlaps in  human and animal Sal-
monella and Campylobacter populations, the Seattle- King County Depart-
ment of Public Health study validated the 1980 NAS report by neither proving 
nor disproving harm caused by AGPs. It seemed likely that antibiotic support-
ers would again be able to delay regulatory action by calling for more research. 
However, within a month, now familiar regulatory delays  were unexpectedly 
jeopardized by Scott Holmberg’s CDC study on links between resistant sal-
monellosis and antibiotic- fed  cattle. Responding to Holmberg’s findings, the 
NRDC upgraded its 1983 petition for hearings on stalled FDA bans to a request 
for the immediate suspension of all penicillin and tetracycline AGPs  because 
of imminent harm (chapter 8).163
Despite Holmberg’s data and NRDC pressure, chances for statutory AGP 
restrictions remained slim.164 During hearings by Al Gore’s Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight in December 1984, the formerly supportive direc-
tor of the renamed FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), Lester 
Crawford, dampened hopes for rapid FDA action. Battling charges of bias 
(chapter 8), Crawford cautioned that a suspension of AGP- marketing would 
still necessitate formal evidentiary hearings on drug withdrawals.165 Other 
se nior officials  were equally hesitant to endorse CDC AMR warnings. Remark-
ably, the USDA’s Donald L. Houston claimed that the USDA had no position 
on AMR.166 Gore responded: “I understand why USDA is reluctant to get 
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involved in this. . . .  I understand the po liti cal pressures that are brought to bear. 
Believe me, I do.”167 While se nior officials failed to support AGP withdrawals, 
expert witnesses cautioned that Britain’s partial AGP bans had failed to reduce 
AMR or antibiotic use. Having recently traveled to London, one expert noted: 
“The recommendation of the Swann committee was held with— and actually 
laughed at  there—as being grossly in effec tive.”168
Following public hearings in early 1985, FDA commissioner Frank Young 
did not find that AGPs’ se lection for AMR in Salmonella posed an imminent 
harm to health. In October 1985, the FDA recommended rejecting the NRDC 
petition to HHS secretary Margaret Heckler, who formally rejected the peti-
tion in November.169 Although Donald Kennedy’s 1977 notice of hearings for-
mally remained in place, Heckler’s announcement effectively ended FDA- led 
statutory proceedings against AGPs.170
Regulation in a Time of Deregulation
Despite cyclical pressure from concerned scientists, the CDC, and individual 
Demo crats, the next ten years would see US antibiotic politics stagnate. In an 
age of deregulation,  there was  little po liti cal support for new antibiotic rules—
or a coordinated defense of existing regulations. Tasked with administering the 
ongoing status quo, FDA officials focused  limited resources on fire brigade 
responses to microbial and chemical food safety scandals.
The stagnation of official antibiotic reform took place against a backdrop 
of worsening drug compliance. In December  1985, Demo crat Ted Weiss’s 
F IGURE 10.1 The 1980 NAS review compiled the first historical antibiotic consumption 
statistics for the US (excluding sulfonamides). “The Effects on Human Health of 
Subtherapeutic Use of Antimicrobials in Animal Feeds” (Washington, DC: NAS, 1980).
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Intergovernmental Relations and  Human Resources Subcommittee pub-
lished a scathing review of FDA medicated feed oversight. Internal FDA 
 estimates indicated that “as many as 90   percent or more of the 20,000 to 
30,000 new animal drugs estimated to be on the market”171 had not been 
approved as safe and effective. Noncompliance encompassed the entire agribusi-
ness community: “Illegal veterinary drug sales are of such magnitude and perva-
siveness that they threaten the ‘credibility of the veterinary drug approval 
and regulatory pro cess.’ ” On one two- week road trip in Iowa, an FDA inves-
tigator was able to make 40 illegal buys out of 43 attempts.172 According to 
one CVM official, growing po liti cal pressure for rapid drug approvals was also 
leading to rash FDA licensing.173
Although a major corruption scandal, supreme court rulings, and a blue- 
ribbon review allowed the FDA to shake off some of its 1980s shackles, drug 
compliance and residue prob lems continued to haunt the agency during the 
1990s.174 Appointed in August 1990, FDA commissioner David Kessler had to 
contain the emerging scandal about allegedly carcinogenic sulfamethazine resi-
dues in milk (chapter 8). The scandal focused public and congressional atten-
tion on the joint prob lem of insensitive drug assays, inadequate official 
enforcement of rules, and increasing extra- label drug use by veterinarians. In 
Congress, the already familiar Ted Weiss accused FDA officials of not “ really 
keeping up with scientific advances” and not being “diligent enough nor aggres-
sive enough in pursuing  those  people who use and prescribe  those drugs, 
unlawfully.”175 In 1992, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) and 
external experts similarly warned that monitoring programs for milk  were 
unable to detect many residues: “Fifty- three drugs have been approved by FDA 
for use in dairy animals; 25 drugs have been reported to be used in an extra- 
label fashion. Only a small number of drugs are looked for in the milk supply; 
of  these, only 6 drugs have confirmatory procedures.”176
FDA officials responded by promising improved monitoring but also 
defended the large US market for over- the- counter drugs and existing extra- 
label drug guidance: “[The 1968 Animal Drug Amendment] required us . . .  to 
make drugs available to lay persons, if adequate directions for use could be writ-
ten. So 80  percent of the therapeutic drugs for use in food- producing animals 
are legally sold over the  counter.”177 A voluntary FDA guidance from 1984 dealt 
with extra- label drug use: veterinarians  were advised to prescribe and sell drugs 
for nonlicensed applications only if an animal was suffering or its life was threat-
ened. Clients should be informed regarding responsible drug use and with-
drawal times.178
Food safety and residue prob lems  were not  limited to milk. Following the 
1993 Jack- in- the- Box outbreak of resistant E. coli (chapter 8), Washington’s nar-
row focus on drug residues appeared increasingly outdated. In 1994, a GAO 
report pressed for new risk- based microbial inspections at neuralgic points of 
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the food chain.179 Shortly afterward, a second GAO report criticized the 
USDA’s National Residue Program for meat. Random monitoring was not ran-
dom and  there was no appropriate risk ranking for priority testing of up to 
two- thirds of “367 compounds already identified as being of potential con-
cern.”180 The GAO also criticized FDA enforcement. Between 1989 and 1992, 
the FDA had only investigated about 20  percent of 21,439 reported residue vio-
lations. Only one prosecution, 12 injunctions, and 383 warning letters had 
resulted from investigations.181
Passed by Congress in 1994, the Animal Medicinal Drug Use Clarification 
Act (AMDUCA) attempted to solve compliance and residue prob lems by 
defining rules for extra- label drug use within a formal veterinarian- client- 
patient relationship. Extra- label prescriptions  were permitted when the health 
and life of an animal  were threatened or when the animal was suffering. Extra- 
label use was not allowed to result in dangerous residues or residues above 
 legal tolerances. In a significant move, compounding of extra- label prescriptions 
in feed was banned and a  limited number of drugs like chloramphenicol and 
the nitrofurans  were excluded from extra- label use altogether.182 However, the 
tightening of compounding rules proved short lived. Following industry lob-
bying, the fittingly named 1996 Animal Drug Availability Act (ADAA) loos-
ened recent restrictions by creating the new  legal category of Veterinary Feed 
Directive (VFD) drugs. VFDs nominally increased veterinary supervision over 
new animal drugs but also relegalized the compounding of extra- label drugs 
in commercial feed mills (chapter 9).183 Foreshadowing  future US responses to 
AMR, attempts to impose rules on the veterinary drug market had been 
thwarted by replacing statutory bans with supervision by often industry- 
employed veterinarians.
Prob lems with US drug enforcement and food poisoning  were paralleled by 
ongoing scientific warnings about agricultural AMR se lection. In 1987, the 
FDA had financed further AMR research. Narrowly briefed with focusing on 
subtherapeutic tetracycline and penicillin AGPs’ effects on foodborne patho-
gens and  human health, the resulting report had, however, been able to do  little 
more than call for more research.184 External pressure for more aggressive action 
increased during the 1990s. Commissioned by Congress to assess AMR in 
1994,185 the Office of Technology Assessment had already supported the FDA’s 
1977 AGP bans and its advisory panel included renowned critical microbiolo-
gists like Stuart Levy and Nobel- laureate Joshua Lederberg. The 1995 OTA 
report identified AMR as a serious economic and po liti cal  hazard. Although 
studies showing “a direct connection between agricultural use of antibiotics and 
 human illness or death” remained “sparse and difficult to obtain,”186 the report 
noted that agricultural antibiotic use could turn farmers into carriers of resis-
tant bacteria and select for environmental AMR. Over 40  percent of the US 
population already harbored resistant bacteria in their colons.  These could cause 
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harm following ingestion of antibiotics for other reasons. Concerned about a 
further rise of AMR, OTA experts cited CDC warnings against licensing 
reserve antibiotics like the fluoroquinolones for agricultural use.187
However, in a sign of prevailing regulation hostility, calls to increase drug 
availability proved more power ful than OTA warnings. Facing a concerted 
agro- industrial campaign to roll back regulatory barriers for farm chemi-
cals, the FDA ignored warnings and licensed sarofloxacin and enrofloxacin 
(Baytril) in poultry in 1995 and 1996 (chapters 8 and 9). With  little public 
momentum for wider antibiotic reform, American officials felt unable to 
refuse industry applications highlighting agricultural antibiotics’ short- 
term economic benefits despite the more significant long- term costs of AMR 
se lection.
The Era of Voluntarism
Ongoing US deregulation contrasted with a concerted push for antibiotic 
restrictions in Eu rope (chapter 13). Responding to EU policies and AMR warn-
ings, US regulators attempted to improve antibiotic stewardship with the help 
of voluntary industry compliance. This voluntarist strategy yielded mixed 
results.
In November 1998, EU AGP bans and domestic warnings about rising fluo-
roquinolone re sis tance made FDA regulators propose a cautious framework for 
“evaluating and assuring the  human safety of the microbial effects of antimicro-
bial New Animal Drugs.”188 Industry applicants for new antibiotic licenses 
would have to submit data on products’ effects on animals’ gut flora and  human 
exposure to resistant bacteria, R- factors, and pathogens.189 Resistance- prone 
drugs would not be licensed, and licensed drugs would be evaluated via post- 
licensing surveillance. Critics, however, bemoaned that FDA proposals would 
not necessarily apply to previously licensed drugs and that post- licensing 
surveillance had already failed to trigger regulatory action (chapter 8).190
Established in 1996, the National Antimicrobial Re sis tance Monitoring 
System (NARMS) tested Salmonella (1996), Campylobacter (1997), E. coli and 
Enterococci (2000) as sentinel organisms for susceptibility to seventeen antibi-
otics.191 NARMS relied on interagency collaboration. The FDA and CDC 
monitored retail level isolates and the USDA monitored isolates collected at 
slaughter, from sick animals, and from a  limited number of healthy farm ani-
mals.192 The number of NARMS isolates (about 4,000 in 1998) was, however, 
insufficient to detect slight changes in antimicrobial susceptibility or to iden-
tify rare but impor tant resistant phenotypes. Agricultural AMR monitoring 
was moreover accused of prioritizing poultry isolates and over- relying on pas-
sive surveillance.193 Even if NARMS revealed emerging AMR prob lems, com-
plicated drug withdrawal procedures meant that official action to reduce 
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se lection pressure was slow and uncertain. Despite acknowledging clear AMR 
warnings, the FDA licensed fluoroquinolone use for beef  cattle in 1998 and 
needed five years to withdraw the drugs  after eventually launching formal 
procedures in 2000.194
 There was  little hope that statutory drug withdrawals would become easier 
in the near  future. Despite supportive WHO reports, congressional bills aim-
ing to restrict AGPs failed to gain support between 1999 and 2003. Meanwhile, 
federal stewardship initiatives  either ignored or proposed voluntary solutions 
for nonmedical antibiotic use.195 Instead of pursuing new uncertain statutory 
drug withdrawals, FDA officials reacted to past defeats and the Baytril experi-
ence by trying to control agricultural antibiotic consumption via a mix of vol-
untarism, educational programs, and updated licensing procedures. In 2003, 
the FDA released voluntary Guidance #152 for “Evaluating the Safety of Anti-
microbial New Animal Drugs with Regard to Their Microbiological Effects 
on Bacteria of  Human Health Concern.” Based on the 1998 framework, Guid-
ance #152 instructed licensing applicants for animal drugs on preparing an 
AMR  hazard characterization of their product. Officials and producers would 
next co- develop an official risk assessment and the FDA would fi nally deter-
mine appropriate conditions of use.196 Success was  limited: evaluated by the 
GAO in 2004, the new licensing and surveillance framework failed to address 
sales of older antibiotics and did not monitor  actual antibiotic use. Voluntary 
mea sures’ impact on AMR was uncertain.197
More decisive reforms seemed likely following the 2008 election of the 
Obama administration and the introduction of the Preservation of Antibiot-
ics for Medical Treatment Act (H.R. 962).198 Po liti cally, the context for anti-
biotic restrictions had not been so promising since the 1970s: a Demo crat 
president could count on the support of two Democrat- controlled  houses of 
Congress. Antibiotic restrictions  were also endorsed by a 2008 PEW report on 
Industrial Farm Animal Production, which recommended a licensing stop and 
phasing out of nontherapeutic antibiotics as well as significant improvements 
of federal AMR surveillance and the official collection of antibiotic sales data.199 
Congress subsequently required drug sponsors to submit an annual report for 
each approved antimicrobial drug sold or distributed for use in food- producing 
animals. From 2010 onwards, officials would know how much antibiotics  were 
being used on US farms.200 In 2009, updated versions of PAMTA (H.R. 1549; 
S. 619) contained clauses that would have required US authorities to withdraw, 
within two years, the approval of any “nontherapeutic use” in food- producing 
animals of a “critical antimicrobial animal drug”— a category that encompassed 
any kind of penicillin, tetracycline, macrolide, lincosamide, streptogramin, 
aminoglycoside, or sulfonamide.201
Scarred by three de cades of stalled AGP withdrawals, FDA support for 
PAMTA was mixed. Speaking to Congress in 2008, CVM director Bernadette 
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Dunham had been hesitant about EU- style AGP bans.202 One year  later, dep-
uty commissioner Joshua Sharfstein stated, “both [commissioner Margaret 
Hamburg] and I strongly support action to limit the unnecessary use of anti-
biotics in animals to protect the public health.”203 For Sharfstein, it was clear 
that “the use of antimicrobials should be  limited to  those situations where 
 human and animal health are protected”204— but not  limited further. Sharfs-
tein also called for a restriction of antibiotic use to situations where  there was 
veterinary supervision, evidence of efficacy, and no “reasonable alternative.”205 
Although the FDA supported PAMTA’s aim of AGP restrictions, it did not 
explic itly endorse it but instead called on Congress to provide relief for the 
under lying statutory prob lem of “burdensome”206 drug withdrawals.
When this statutory relief did not prove forthcoming, FDA regulators 
deemed the burden of mass AGP withdrawals too  great and broke with 
PAMTA. Ignoring protest in the scientific and liberal media, FDA officials pro-
posed alternative voluntary policies in June  2010 (chapter  8). A voluntary 
draft guidance had been co- developed with the USDA to reduce consumption 
of medically relevant antibiotics on farms but avoid statutory restrictions of 
“judicious” antibiotic use.207 Similar to the 1996 abandonment of extra- label 
compounding restrictions, formal feed restrictions  were circumvented by plac-
ing veterinarians in charge of both nontherapeutic and therapeutic antibiotic 
use. In 2011, the FDA also officially dropped Donald Kennedy’s 1977 proposal 
to withdraw approvals for penicillin and tetracycline AGPs.208 One year  later, 
it formally released Guidance for Industry #209 (GFI #209) on the “Judicious 
Use of Medically Impor tant Antimicrobial Drugs in Food- Producing Ani-
mals.”209 GFI #209 extended the voluntary pre- licensing princi ples of GFI 
#152: already licensed products containing medically impor tant antibiotics 
should now be  limited to uses “necessary for assuring animal health”  under 
“veterinary oversight or consultation.”210 Following  legal  battles (chapter 8), the 
FDA released Guidance for Industry #213 (GFI #213) in December 2013. GFI 
#213 recommended voluntary label changes for medicated feeds and  water so 
that products could be used only  under veterinary supervision. Claims for 
increased weight gain or feed efficiency  were no longer considered suitable.211 
Officials threatened statutory action if,  after three years, “we determine that 
adequate pro gress has not been made.”212 All FDA Guidances  were to be fully 
phased in by 2017.213
It was at times easy to forget that—in contrast to PAMTA— FDA reforms 
 were voluntary. Similar to the 1969 Swann bans, some “medically irrelevant” 
AGPs would also remain available over the  counter while access to restricted 
AGPs was pos si ble via veterinary prescription. Speaking at London’s Chatham 
House in 2014, commissioner Hamburg nonetheless claimed that FDA Guid-
ances  were a success: twenty- six phar ma ceu ti cal companies  were in the pro cess 
of revising labels and thirty individual over- the- counter preparations had 
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already been withdrawn. Aware of considerable skepticism in the audience, 
Hamburg presented FDA voluntarism as a pragmatic response to de cades of 
regulatory defeat: “Experience has shown us that this in fact is the quickest, 
most efficient way to reach our collective goal— considerably faster than a man-
datory ban that would have required dozens of individual  legal proceedings 
on each product.”214 Trusting in industry cooperation and reinvigorated anti-
biotic development, Hamburg, however, remained vague on how the FDA 
would ensure compliance and how therapeutic antibiotic use could be reformed 
in the absence of uniform, statutory regulations.
The impacts of FDA voluntarism have been mixed. In September 2014, jour-
nalists reviewed over 320 “feed tickets” detailing practices in Tyson Foods, Pil-
grim’s Pride, Perdue Farms, George’s, and Koch Foods: “antibiotics  were 
given as standard practice over most of the life of the chickens . . .  the doses  were 
at the low levels that scientists say are especially conducive to the growth of so- 
called superbugs.”215 Continuous “prophylactic” use of former AGPs also 
occurred in the US  cattle industry.216 Se nior politicians pressed for further 
reforms. In December 2014, Demo crat Senators Elizabeth Warren, Kirsten 
Gillibrand, and Dianne Feinstein warned “that the FDA may lack the author-
ity to ensure veterinarians adhere to the criteria for determining an appropriate 
preventive use . . .  , that the FDA does not have a clear mechanism for collect-
ing the data necessary to evaluate  whether its policies effectively reduce the 
public health threat, and that the administration has no clear metrics or bench-
marks that  will be used to determine success or a need for  future action.”217
Establishing  these benchmarks is not easy. In the case of AMR, US data 
collection remains patchy. In 2014, the CDC estimated that more than 
2  million Americans annually fall ill with resistant infections, with 23,000 
resulting fatalities. Excess associated health care costs range between $20 bil-
lion and $35 billion per year (2008 US dollars). On a ranking from urgent to 
serious and concerning threats, AMR in agriculture- associated nontyphoidal 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, extended spectrum beta- lactamase (ESBL) produc-
ing E. coli and Klebsiella, as well as vancomycin- resistant Enterococcus faecium 
(VRE)  were listed as serious. According to Laura Kahn, US health care costs 
resulting from resistant nontyphoidal Salmonella and Campylobacter alone 
could amount to $2.6 billion.218 However, gathering more fine- grained AMR 
data and assessing the microbial effects of voluntary AGP bans is difficult. 
Despite NARMS, US officials have strug gled to track the sources of resistant 
organisms and genes in the field. Surveillance resources are  limited. In 2015, 
the FDA, USDA, and CDC discussed collecting more on- farm AMR data. 
However, the FDA received none of the $7.1 million it requested to study 
AMR in animals in the fiscal year of 2016.219
In contrast to AMR, the establishment of mandatory sales reporting in 2008 
has made it far easier to mea sure antibiotic consumption trends on US farms. 
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At the point of writing, published FDA data covers the period between 2009 
and 2017.  After consistently rising to 15,577,940 kilograms in 2015, the amount 
of antimicrobial drugs sold for use in food- producing animals declined by 
almost 33  percent to 10,933,367 kilograms in 2017. This is an impressive shift of 
consumption. In contrast to previous years, only 51  percent of sold antibiotics 
 were considered medically impor tant, with  cattle (42  percent) and swine pro-
duction (36  percent) consuming the majority of  these antibiotic classes. Driven 
by industry- led change, FDA guidances, and shifting consumer habits, reduc-
tions of antibiotic use have been particularly impressive in the US poultry sec-
tor. However, certain caveats remain concerning this data.  Because of the 
removal of production indications from feed labels in 2017, all sales of medi-
cally impor tant drugs  were officially recorded as being for therapeutic indica-
tions only. This is an unlikely increase from 2016 when only 31   percent of 
medically impor tant antibiotics  were sold for therapeutic indications and likely 
masks ongoing nontherapeutic antibiotic use on farms.220 Prescribed extra- label 
drug use is also not adequately captured in current statistics.
Despite the substantial and commendable drop of American antimicrobial 
usage to levels last seen during the early 2000s, it not only remains to be seen 
how sustained reductions  will be but also  whether they  will be sufficient to curb 
AMR levels. Reliable benchmarks for regulatory success remain rare. It is 
equally unclear how American officials  will react if overuse of prescription- only 
antibiotics emerges as a prob lem—as occurred  after Eu ro pean AGP bans 
(chapter 13). In 2019, the New York Times reported that drug producer Elanco 
was urging US pig producers to administer antibiotics daily for prophylactic 
purposes.221 In contrast to AGPs, controlling veterinary prescription practices 
without recourse to statutory interventions  will be difficult.
Fifty- three years  after the FDA ad hoc committee first debated horizontal 
gene transfer, US regulators are thus still struggling to develop a coherent 
approach to agricultural AMR se lection. During the late 1960s,  limited 
resources, bureaucratic turmoil, and the prioritization of residues slowed FDA 
responses to “infective” AMR. Regulators only cautiously began to push for 
narrow, Swann- inspired AGP restrictions during the 1970s. The highpoint of 
this campaign was Donald Kennedy’s 1977 attempt to statutorily withdraw tet-
racycline and penicillin AGPs. Similar to previous efforts, Kennedy’s bans 
 were, however, checked by a mix of  counter science and cost- benefit assessments, 
congressional interference, public regulation wariness, and— perhaps most 
importantly— proof- of- harm requirements for drug withdrawals, which  were 
unsuited to nonlinear AMR  hazards. Another prob lem was the narrow nature 
of proposed AGP restrictions, which had already failed to solve prob lems in 
Britain.  After the defeat of the 1984 NRDC petition, regulators embraced a 
strategy of voluntarism to curb AMR. Over the past thirty years, this strategy 
has produced mixed outcomes. Between 1985 and 2015, antibiotic consumption 
Statutory Defeat • 213
increased significantly while Washington’s focus on deregulation led to the 
licensing of reserve antibiotics and extra- label drug use. Although the FDA’s 
2013 strategy of voluntary AGP withdrawals has helped to significantly reduce 
total drug consumption, it still fails to address wider therapeutic antibiotic 
infrastructures. Eu ro pean experience shows that fragmented reforms of anti-
biotic use  will not curb AMR (chapter 13). Almost half a  century  after its 1972 
task force report, it is worrying that the FDA still feels unable to implement 
broad, transparent, statutory regulations covering all aspects of agricultural 
antibiotic use. Leaving guardianship of the antibiotic commons to consumer 




From Gluttony to Fear, 
1970–2018
This part explores how British antibiotic perceptions and regulations developed 
 after the 1969 Swann report. Chapter 11 reconstructs how the enactment of 
 limited AGP bans fragmented 1970s antibiotic protest  until a series of residue 
and salmonellosis scandals reignited popu lar demands for antibiotic reform 
around 1980. Coinciding with rising demand for antibiotic- free food, public 
pressure for sweeping reforms of intensive animal production and antibiotic 
use reached fever pitch  after the 1996 bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) cri-
sis. Between 1998 and 2006, Britain supported EU- led antibiotic reform and 
the phasing out of remaining AGPs. Chapter 12 shows that British agricultural 
antibiotic use was not significantly altered by the Swann bans. Although Brit-
ish corporatism reduced tensions between farmers, regulators, and antibiotic 
critics,  battles over antibiotic control continued to be fought between the vet-
erinary and medical communities. Following a partial “greening” of British 
agriculture during the 1980s, the 1996 bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) 
crisis fragmented agricultural support for AGPs. While farmers and veterinar-
ians still defend routine therapeutic antibiotic use, opposition to EU AGP 
restrictions was  limited. Chapter 13 reconstructs the watering down of many 
of the Swann report’s recommendations during the 1970s. Although Britain 
enacted AGP bans and exported its ”Swann gospel,” officials resisted calls for 
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enhanced monitoring of antibiotic use, re sis tance, and residues. While EEC 
pressure eventually led to residue monitoring for meat and Britain committed 
to AGP bans in the wake of BSE, official impulses for statutory reforms of ther-








This chapter explores the development of public perceptions of agricultural 
antibiotic use  after 1969. During the 1970s, the AMR- and welfare- focused risk 
episteme that had driven previous antibiotic reform fractured and gave way to 
a complacent sense of “Swann patriotism.” It was only around 1980 that resi-
due scandals, resistant salmonellosis outbreaks, and concerted reforms in other 
Eu ro pean countries triggered renewed societal pressure for antibiotic reform. 
Concerns about agricultural AMR se lection  were heightened by medical 
reports about mystery diseases like AIDS and failing reserve antibiotics. Simi-
lar to the United States, consumer fears also drove the rapid expansion of 
antibiotic- free market niches. As a result of the moral panic triggered by the 
cataclysmic 1996 bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, antibiotic 
bans reemerged as a common denominator of national reform calls. Ensuing 
Eu ro pean AGP restrictions  were widely praised in the British media. The per-
sis tent focus on nontherapeutic AGPs, however, means that  there has been 
considerably less public pressure for statutory reforms of allegedly therapeutic 
antibiotic use.
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Fragmented Pressure
 After the publication of the Swann report in late 1969 and ensuing bans of 
penicillin and tetracycline AGPs, the unified risk episteme driving late 1960s 
British antibiotic reform fragmented and gave way to a new form of Swann patri-
otism. Whereas antibiotics had previously functioned as a common denominator 
of environmentalist, ethical, public health, and consumer concerns, framings of 
antibiotic risk once again split along the familiar lines of residues, AMR, and ani-
mal welfare.
Fragmented antibiotic concerns  were soon displaced by other popu lar issues. 
Similar to the United States, the early 1970s  were characterized by an explo-
sion of new activism. Dismissive of the “ ‘softly- softly’ reformism of the 1960s,”1 
a younger generation of activists often operated outside traditional structures 
and favored symbolic protest designed to provoke media interest. Although 
prob lems relating to modern food production featured prominently, single- 
issue campaigning fragmented activist agendas.2 Concerns about  limited 
resources, overpopulation, and technology- focused Western growth models 
 were amplified by a number of British bestsellers like Barbara Ward’s Space-
ship Earth (1966), the Ecologist’s Blueprint for Survival (1972), and Small Is 
Beautiful (1973). Arguing for a fundamental ecological reform of politics, all 
three books focused on new models of agriculture but mostly glossed over 
 hazards relating to agricultural antibiotic use.
Diminished interest in antibiotic risk was also apparent in media reporting. 
Although they defended the Swann report against attacks from US phar ma-
ceu ti cal manufacturers (chapter 13), British newspapers printed only a small 
number of articles addressing agricultural antibiotic use.3 Many of  these arti-
cles expressed national pride in the pioneering nature of the Swann report. Sim-
ilar to what historian Frank Uekötter has described as “green patriotism” in 
the case of post-1970s German environmentalism,4 this Swann patriotism could 
lead to complacency about the  actual state of affairs. Reporting in the Times is 
a good example for complacent Swann patriotism: during the early 1970s, the 
newspaper warned about AMR se lection in  human medicine and laboratories 
and lambasted countries like Ireland or Mexico for failing to implement Swann- 
style legislation.5 When typhoid with plasmid- mediated chloramphenicol 
re sis tance emerged in India and Mexico in 1972, the Times condemned “indis-
criminate” Mexican antibiotic use and reminded readers that “few other coun-
tries”6 had introduced Swann standards. The newspaper, however, forgot to 
mention that prescribed chloramphenicol use remained  legal in Britain; it 
remained sanguine when veterinarians challenged plans to limit its use; and it 
continued to print advertisements for both  human and agricultural antibiotics.7
Popu lar Swann patriotism stood in contrast to reports indicating that 
British AGP bans  were failing to curb  either antibiotic consumption or AMR. 
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Published in Nature in 1975, a study of British pigs by Herbert Williams 
Smith showed that all animals carried resistant organisms with many isolates 
proving resistant to restricted tetracyclines.8 Meanwhile, an article in the 
BMJ attacked ongoing “indiscriminate”9 antibiotic use on farms. In 1976, 
former Netherthorpe committee member and antibiotic supporter Raphael 
Braude claimed that the Swann report’s “only positive achievement” was its 
removal of “public anxiety.”10 According to Braude, a temporary post- Swann 
drop of antibiotic consumption had been reversed by increased use of medi-
cally irrelevant nontherapeutic AGPs and lucrative higher- dosed veterinary 
antibiotic prescriptions. Although his numbers have to be taken with a 
grain of salt, Braude estimated that prescribed post- Swann therapeutic anti-
biotic use had annually increased by about 15  percent between 1973 and 1975.11 
Other observers warned that a lucrative black market had sprung up to meet 
ongoing antibiotic demand on British farms.12
Although  there  were numerous signs that the 1969 Swann report had failed 
to “fix” British agricultural antibiotic use or AMR  hazards, interest in seeing 
 these signs was  limited not only among antibiotic supporters (chapter 12), but 
also among former critics. In contrast to 1960s reporting on systemic AMR 
 hazards, 1970s journalists instead focused on more  limited lifestyle- related risk 
scenarios involving antibiotic residues in food and the ethical implications of 
eating antibiotic- produced meat. Writing for the Times in 1974, French jour-
nalist Josée Doyère warned about the dangers of illegal “hawking”13 of feed 
additives and hoped for common EEC residue limits. One year  later, the Brit-
ish Consumers’ Committee called for improved residue monitoring of British 
milk. Committee members  were concerned that official tests  were too slow to 
stop drug- contaminated milk from being sold.14 In contrast to purity- focused 
US reporting (chapter 8), British journalists often linked warnings about anti-
biotic residues with wider ethical concerns about conventional livestock farm-
ing. With media interest in animal welfare heightened by con temporary 
conflicts about new concepts of animal rights,15 articles on residues also blamed 
antibiotics for enabling “unnatural development”16 on factory farms, whose 
products  were held to be both morally and physically tainted.
Nightmarish popu lar visions of factory farming played an impor tant role 
in stimulating interest in food that was both “pure” and ethical. Despite Daily 
Mail articles mocking eccentric health nuts and hippies,17 the 1970s saw an 
increasing number of British stores, restaurants, cookbooks, and handbooks 
promote “natu ral” and ethical food. In 1971, even the Good House keeping 
Institute publishing its own Wholefoods Cook Book.18 The absence of antibiot-
ics and factory methods in animal rearing was usually viewed as a precondi-
tion for “natu ral” and organic food.19 Although it also mentioned transferable 
AMR se lection, Doris Grant’s Your Daily Food— Recipe for Survival (1973) pri-
marily described antibiotics as part of a “chemical flood”20 that was poisoning 
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British consumer with invisible residues and enabling production on ethically 
“desensitizing” factory farms. Printed in 1975, the Eco Cookbook of Friends of 
the Earth expressed similar concerns about residues and the “horrors of factory 
farming”: “In the pro cess of intensive feeding, animals take in a  great amount 
of hormones, antibiotics, and other chemicals; they become concentrated in the 
meat, since animals have no way to pass such substances out of their bodies.”21
With diff er ent publics once again focusing on diff er ent aspects of antibiotic 
risk, the broad 1960s consensus on antibiotic reform had come to an end. In 
the absence of a unified risk episteme, fragmenting popu lar risk perceptions 
failed to create sufficient momentum for renewed societal action around 
antibiotics.
Reemergent Crises
The post- Swann complacency about British antibiotic use on farms only began 
to ebb around 1980 when a long series of residue- and AMR- related scandals 
began to undermine trust in existing regulations. Facilitated by the growing 
bipartisan endorsement of green values, antibiotic reform gradually reemerged 
as a prominent issue in the public arena.
In May 1979, the cover of the Radio Times showed a friendly piglet lying on 
straw. While the headline asked, “Should this  little piggy go to market?” a sec-
ond caption read: “Health Warning. Meat and Poultry May Seriously Affect 
Your Health.”22 The health warning referred to a popu lar BBC program called 
Brass Tacks, whose upcoming episode was titled “It  Shouldn’t Happen to a 
Pig.”23 Asking “ whether it is time to choose between safe meat and cheap 
meat,”24 Brass Tacks featured a Phar ma ceu ti cal Society spokesman, who 
claimed: “ there is a substantial black market involving at least £500,000 worth 
of antibiotics, compared with the estimated £20 million worth used by farm-
ers each year.”25 Three months  later, the Government Chemist’s annual report 
seemed to confirm Brass Tacks’ allegations. According to the Guardian’s 
Anthony Tucker, “itinerant ‘con men’ ”26  were endangering public health. Often 
operating out of plain vans, dealers sold phar ma ceu ti cals with forged brand 
labels. Using mislabeled drugs could result in animals’ death, residues in meat, 
and AMR. In 1978, antibiotics including chloramphenicol had been found in 
two- thirds of 350 confiscated samples of illegal merchandise. Guardian warn-
ings  were echoed in the conservative Spectator. The magazine accused agricul-
tural officials and veterinarians of turning a blind eye to antibiotic abuse and 
linked prob lems to a con temporary surge of resistant salmonellosis: “The abuse 
of  these ‘miracle’ drugs by farmers, vets and phar ma ceu ti cal salesmen is an obvi-
ous danger to every one’s health; and, knowing the Ministry mind, it is 
remarkable that such abuse has not already been made a criminal offence. Per-
haps it would comfort the relatives of the next victims if the gravestones could 
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be marked with the words. ‘He perished to make British farming more 
efficient.’ ”27
Over the next years, black market scandals involving antibiotics continued 
to occur with worrying regularity. In a 1983 interview for the Daily Mirror, the 
head of the Phar ma ceu ti cal Society’s law department, Gordon Applebe, 
described the challenges of monitoring Britain’s black market with only twenty 
inspectors and twelve additional staff from MAFF. In Applebe’s opinion, Brit-
ish authorities  were “prob ably only scratching the surface of the prob lem.”28 
In 1984, the Guardian estimated that the British phar ma ceu ti cal black mar-
ket was worth about £3 million, with the bulk of supplies coming from Ire-
land.29 One year  later, it emerged that British veterinarians  were involved in 
illegal marketing too. Suspected of extending from the West Country to 
Cheshire, a drugs ring was accused of flooding farms with “illegal supplies of 
antibiotics amounting to more than £1,000 a week.”30 According to the Phar-
ma ceu ti cal Society, stopping the drugs ring was the “biggest operation in the 
society’s 140- year history.”31
Scandals about illegal antibiotic sales occurred parallel to growing concerns 
about resistant gram- negative infections and heightened tensions between Brit-
ish physicians and veterinarians.32 In 1980, a BMJ paper by PHLS microbiolo-
gist Eric John Threlfall analyzed the spread of multi- resistant S. typhimurium 
types 204 and 193 from  cattle to  humans. In 1979, the strains had caused 290 
cases of salmonellosis in Britain and killed an el derly patient and a three- year- 
old. According to Threlfall, the rise of types 204 and 193 had been facilitated 
by agricultural antibiotic use. Phar ma ceu ti cal advertisements for prescription- 
only drugs had increased agricultural demand for veterinary prescriptions of 
therapeutic antibiotics, which had in turn selected for AMR in salmonella. 
Focusing only on AGPs, “current regulations have failed.”33 An anonymous 
BMJ editorial reinforced  these claims and blamed “over- enthusiastic represen-
tatives of phar ma ceu ti cal firms,” “black market operators,”34 and farmers for 
resistant salmonellosis. Swann was doomed to fail  because it had left British 
veterinarians and large parts of the antibiotics sales infrastructure un regu la-
ted. Unsurprisingly, the BMJ articles provoked angry reactions. In addition to 
veterinary attacks on antibiotic overuse in  human medicine (chapter 12), Her-
bert Williams Smith complained that the Swann report could not be blamed 
for salmonellosis in bovines since feeding antibiotics to them had never been 
permitted. As the report’s adoption by “many other countries” showed, Brit-
ain should “take some plea sure in having initiated it.”35
Such pride in the Swann bans seemed increasingly out of place during a time 
of rising concerns about antibiotic resistant threats to British food security. 
In October  1981, Bernard Rowe, director of the PHLS Enteric Pathogens 
Division, warned that Britain was threatened by a “food super germ.”36 
S. typhimurium type 204 had reached “a disgraceful level of drug re sis tance.”37 
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According to the Times, notified British salmonellosis cases  rose from 10,000 
to 17,000 between 1977 and 1983 with resulting deaths rising from 25 to 65 
between 1972 and 1982.38 In public discourse, fears of antibiotic resistant food 
poisoning, lacking hygiene, and drug residues fused into general uncertainty 
about British food safety. While the Telegraph warned about microbial “death 
risk[s]”39 posed by salmonella- tainted hospital food, the Daily Mail reported 
that a police investigation codenamed Operation Meathook had found up to 
100 tons of contaminated meat being used to produce con ve nience food per 
week. Using “devious plans and odious skullduggery,” dealers  were selling sick 
cows pumped full of antibiotics: “only when the animal is killed  later that night 
 will the buyer realise what has happened. Often he  will not admit what has hap-
pened to the meat inspector, but  will push it through with the rest.”40 By 1985, 
the Guardian noted: “food additives and residues from pesticides, hormones 
and antibiotics now rival AIDS as the number one health issue.”41 One year 
 later, Jan Walsh’s The Meat Machine blamed antibiotic overuse and AMR on 
“the unnatural conditions of intensive rearing units” where disease spread “like 
wildfire.”42
Unsurprisingly, 1980s food security concerns further boosted public inter-
est in allegedly safe and pure food. In 1981, the Observer noted that the organic 
movement was fast discarding its image of “dirndl, beads, sandals and an atmo-
sphere of folkloric guitar strumming”43 in  favor of professional marketing and 
sales networks. The opening of new organic venues was commented on in the 
national media. In 1984, the Daily Mail published an enthusiastic review of an 
affordable cash- and- carry center for organic produce.44 Similar reports on 
Wholefood Butchers and other organic vendors appeared in the Guardian.45 
In British book stores, the message of safe, pure, and ethical food was promoted 
by a new wave of guides and cookery books ranging from The Cranks  Recipe 
Book to publications by Britain’s  Women’s Institute.46 According to Good 
House keeping, organic  wholefoods  were “not just an upper- class fad . . . 
 wholefood shops are becoming the norm in local high streets and shopping cen-
tres and even supermarkets are more aware of the public demand for this type 
of food.”47 Organic food also received celebrity endorsement from Andrew 
Lloyd Webber, Prince Charles, and Paul Eddington, star of the popu lar TV 
series Yes, Prime Minister, who delivered organic food to Margaret Thatcher 
in 1990.48
Similar to the United States, the amount of public attention paid to alter-
native agriculture bore no resemblance to  actual sales of organic food. Although 
all sectors of organic produce grew rapidly during the 1980s and a survey found 
that 72  percent of consumers  were willing to pay more for organic food, organic 
sales accounted for only 1  percent of overall British food sales in 1989.49 This 
does not mean that media interest in organic food was a mere hype. Instead, 
1980s organic reporting was indicative of an impor tant gradual shift of 
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Britain’s wider public risk episteme with regard to conventional agriculture. 
Although only small parts of the public  were willing to spend money on selected 
organic goods, a majority of consumers and media commentators began to 
expect that conventional agriculture should also abandon unpop u lar practices 
and become greener.
Reporting in the Times is indicative of this parallelism between organic 
endorsements and reform demands for conventional agriculture. Starting in the 
mid-1980s, the newspaper joined the chorus of organic praise  after breaking 
with over thirty years of neo- Malthusian overpopulation warnings (chapter 2). 
In 1985, agricultural correspondent John Young claimed that an alliance of 
“doom- mongers”50 had exaggerated Malthusian scenarios. According to the 
UN World Food Council, population growth had not outpaced cereal pro-
duction. Global hunger was “po liti cal, not economic.”51 Following this concep-
tual shift away from productivity- oriented neo- Malthusian theories, Times 
articles not only began to praise organic agriculture but also intensified criti-
cism of conventional technologies like agricultural antibiotics.52 In 1986, the 
newspaper printed a positive review of Peter Cox’s Why You  Don’t Need Meat.53 
According to the Vegetarian Society’s former chief executive, antibiotics had 
changed the way British agriculture worked. An anonymous veterinarian com-
plained: “once vets  were  people who looked  after the well- being of animals . . . . 
But now, we just suppress the disease  until it’s time for the animal to be killed.”54 
Focusing on AMR, the Times also printed a three- part series on “The Global 
Overdose”55 in 1987. Titled “The  Bitter Harvest,”56 the third part of the series 
showed a piggy bank filled with pills. The newspaper accused physicians and 
veterinarians of shunning responsibility for AMR rather than jointly improv-
ing antibiotic stewardship.
The steady rise of concerns about antibiotic abuse on British farms peaked 
between 1987 and 1989. In 1987, the Guardian reported that British farmers 
 were adding the enzyme penicillinase to milk to obscure illegal penicillin resi-
dues. Hard hit by recent EEC quota cuts, a West Country farmer noted, “I  can’t 
afford to throw away a 250 gallon tank of milk at 80p a gallon. Enough peni-
cillinase to neutralise the prob lem only costs me £8.”57 Although the NFU and 
MMB claimed that penicillinase was harmless, Joe Collier, a pharmacologist 
at St George’s Hospital in London, warned that neutralized penicillin could 
still trigger allergic reactions.58 Illegal residues  were not only detected in milk. 
In January 1988, health inspectors found antibiotic residues in sixteen of eighty- 
eight carcasses at a Bradford abattoir.59 Trying to maintain customer trust, 
supermarkets Marks & Spencer and Waitrose announced that they would stop 
buying meat produced with AGPs.60 In February 1988, the Daily Mirror asked, 
“What has gone wrong with our food laws?”61 and referred to resistant patho-
gens and inadequate hygiene controls before calling for a complete review of 
food controls.
224 • Britain, 1970–2018
Food safety concerns reached fever pitch levels ten months  later. On Decem-
ber 3, 1988, a large- scale outbreak of multiple resistant Salmonella enteritidis 
P4 prompted Ju nior Health Minister Edwina Currie to warn British TV view-
ers to avoid “all raw egg products like mayonnaise, home- made ice cream, and 
even lightly cooked eggs.”62 Reacting to Currie’s announcement, Richard Lacey 
from the government’s Veterinary Products Committee confirmed 450 recent 
cases of S. enteritidis– induced food poisoning.63 However, following another 
televised warning by Currie, Lacey corrected the number to approximately 
3,000 infections with one resulting fatality  every week.64 Overall, the number 
of salmonella infections had increased by 152  percent over 1987.65 The substan-
tial number of antibiotic- resistant infections prompted a national debate on 
food controls and agricultural drug use.66 In Parliament, Sir Richard Body, 
Conservative MP for Holland with Boston deplored “the over- use of antibi-
otic drugs in hatcheries”67 and unsupervised antibiotic use by farmers. With 
egg sales dropping nearly 15  percent ahead of Christmas, the NFU threatened 
to sue Currie for her alleged alarmism. Dubbed “Eggwina” by the media, indus-
try pressure forced Currie to resign on December 16, 1988.68
Currie’s resignation did  little to curb the mounting wave of public alarm 
about chemical and microbial food  hazards. Although the Thatcher adminis-
tration promised a new Food Safety Act,69 media reports on “food danger[s] 
from ‘barbaric’ factory farms”70 continued to appear. In April 1989, the head 
of the Government’s Institute for Food Research warned that “food poison-
ing in Britain is out of control.”71 With articles titled “Not Even Fit for Our 
Pigs”72 and “Cages of Cruelty,”73 the Daily Mirror launched a series of attacks 
on the methods of modern intensive livestock production : “[animals] are born 
and reared in the dark and the dirt. They are pumped full of hormones and 
antibiotics. . . .  They are the next potential food poisoning timebomb. . . .  And 
no Tory Government has dared to take on its masters, the agriculture lobby.”74 
Food poisoning statistics added to public unease. Despite the culling of infected 
flocks and reformed hygiene protocols, the total number of all confirmed sal-
monellosis cases  rose from 27,478 in 1988 to 29,998 in 1989. Cases caused by 
multiple- resistant S. enteritidis P4  rose by a further 25  percent to 16,151 in 1990.75 
 Actual incidence was likely higher. Experts believed that salmonellosis was 
underreported by as much as 100  percent.76
Resistant salmonellosis and a de cade of residue and black market scandals 
dealt a severe blow to Swann patriotism and undermined trust in British anti-
biotic regulation. Whereas antibiotic- related concerns had been fragmented for 
much of the 1970s, 1980s media reports revived the specter of not only ethi-
cally but also microbially hazardous factory farms. Similar to the 1967 Tees-
side outbreak (chapters 5 and 7), a major scandal would soon catalyze and fuse 
concerns about agricultural antibiotics into a new national reform movement.
Between Swann Patriotism and BSE • 225
BSE and Moral Panics
Since the second half of the 1980s, a new disease called bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE or mad cow disease) had been causing growing concern 
among British veterinarians and public health officials. First examined before 
Christmas 1984 and officially identified in 1986, BSE is believed to be caused 
by misfolded proteins— so- called prions— that accumulate as plaque fibers in 
brain tissues and cause death.77 Significantly, BSE is transmissible to  humans 
in the form of the equally fatal variant Creutzfeldt- Jakob Disease (vCJD). 
While  there are competing theories on the origins of BSE, the disease was prob-
ably spread by feeding meat and bone meal to herbivore  cattle.78 In other 
words, the spread of BSE was inherently linked to the efficiency- focused (re-)
processing logic of intensive agriculture and the “factory farm.” With officials 
only slowly addressing growing scientific concerns,79 the 1996 confirmation of 
a link between BSE and vCJD caused a “moral panic” in Britain during which 
charged public reactions triggered agricultural reforms that  were much broader 
than any specific threat posed by BSE. Although they did not cause BSE, anti-
biotics’ preexisting image as a particularly suspect tool of conventional livestock 
husbandry meant that they  were publicly singled out for stringent regulation.80
In British popu lar culture, associations between antibiotic and BSE risks had 
been growing since the early 1990s. Writing for the Guardian in 1990, Lucy 
Ellmann complained that intensive farming had “given a new meaning to the 
term, fast food: the  cattle themselves grow unnaturally fast on their diet of pig’s 
blood, sheep offal, decaying chickens, chicken shit, hormones and antibio-
tics . . . .  Writing this piece has given me such a headache . . . .  Oh, what the 
hell, might as well finish myself off with a chicken sandwich.”81 Public criti-
cism of factory farming not only mixed with con temporary warnings about 
superbugs (chapter 8) but also with controversies about American companies’ 
planned introduction of the synthetic growth hormone BST and of the genet-
ically modified “Flavr Savr” tomato to British agriculture.82 Coinciding with 
public clashes over “frankenfoods” and artificial AMR, Compassion in World 
Farming or ga nized a well- publicized conference on factory farming in 1992 dur-
ing which six veterinarians including a former RCVS president and a former 
MAFF assistant chief veterinary officer criticized intensive farming’s disease 
risks.83 Although some commentators soon grew tired of the “media hype” sur-
rounding the “same old story with the ‘killer bug,’ ”84 Hollywood movies, TV 
series, and bestsellers like The Hot Zone further fueled public anxiety about a 
coming post- antibiotic era.85
With AMR fears increasing and trust in conventional livestock produc-
tion wearing thin, agricultural antibiotics  were already re- emerging as a com-
mon denominator of diff er ent protest camps: physicians blamed agricultural 
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antibiotics for fatal infections; tabloids attacked them for facilitating animal 
abuse; and organic farmers, who  were beginning to sell their produce in major 
supermarkets, pointed to antibiotics’ absence as a marker of quality and safety. 
In contrast to the United States, this criticism did not follow partisan lines. 
Similar to the 1960s, antibiotics’ status as a common denominator of diverse 
strands of agricultural criticism made them vulnerable to wider moral pan-
ics about British farming— even if prob lems had nothing to do with residues 
or AMR.
Such a moral panic occurred on March 20, 1996, when the British govern-
ment confirmed a pos si ble link between BSE and  human vCJD. The follow-
ing weeks and months saw officials and farmers face unpre ce dented outrage and 
embargoes that threatened to destroy Britain’s beef sector.86 Writing for the 
Guardian, Patrick Holden, president of the organic Soil Association, described 
BSE as “testimony to the breathtaking arrogance of 20th   century western 
agricultural science.”87 Significantly, Holden’s subsequent criticism immedi-
ately targeted agricultural antibiotics: “When, inevitably, the animals get sick, 
farmers use antibiotics to prevent infectious diseases taking hold. This is like 
trying to put a cork in a  bottle that is actively fermenting—it cannot possibly 
work for very long.”88 The Observer also interpreted BSE as a systemic failure 
of conventional agriculture and criticized antibiotics’ role in facilitating dan-
gerous practices on factory farms.89 According to the Daily Mirror, Britons had 
“mad farming disease.”90 BSE was described as the tip of an agro- industrial ice-
berg kept afloat by antibiotics. Having only recently criticized “Euro- law” for 
raising the cost of veterinary antibiotic use,91 the Daily Mail now expressed 
understanding for continental embargoes of British animals “awash in antibi-
otics, additives and hormones.”92 In the Times, Clive Aslet, editor of Country 
Life, noted that BSE justified consumers in turning to antibiotic- free food. 
From the ruins of BSE, “Britain must build a system of agriculture that is 
acknowledged as the safest and most humane in the world.”93 Faced with a 
widespread moral panic about British agriculture and parallel outbreaks of 
resistant E. coli 0157, staphylococci, and salmonellosis,94 commentators through-
out the po liti cal spectrum agreed that BSE necessitated antibiotic reform.
Reform
This message was not heard by the Conservative government. Trying to lift the 
EU boycott of British beef, it resisted con temporary Scandinavian- led EU ini-
tiatives to ban AGPs in Eu ro pean agriculture (chapter 13). British officials’ 
defense of alleged national interests not only underestimated public opinion 
but also failed to convince EU partners.
In December 1996, Britain’s representative in the EU’s animal food commit-
tee referred to lacking evidence of harm before voting against a proposed ban 
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of the popu lar growth promoter avoparcin. The vote on avoparcin had been 
filed by EU Commissioner for Agriculture Franz Fischler  after Eu ro pean data 
indicated that the drug could select for re sis tance against the reserve antibiotic 
vancomycin (chapter 13). Highlighting Britain’s increasing po liti cal isolation 
in Eu ro pean  matters of food security, the vote ended fourteen to one against 
Britain and an EU ban of avoparcin was announced in February 1997.95
The restriction of avoparcin was the opening salvo of a new ambitious 
Scandinavian- led round of EU antibiotic reform. Having banned all AGPs in 
1986,96 Sweden had negotiated a three- year exemption from mandatory anti-
biotic compliance following its 1995 EU accession. With the three- year exemp-
tion about to expire, the Swedish government announced that it would not 
lift its domestic AGP ban.97 Linking AMR and BSE  hazards, se nior Swedish 
officials actively promoted AGP bans with newspaper articles, letters, and adver-
tisements in other EU member states.98 Although Swedish letters failed to 
convince Britain’s embattled Conservative Party, they struck a chord with Tony 
Blair’s  Labour Party. Winning a landslide victory in May 1997 and mention-
ing the BSE crisis three times in its election manifesto, the New  Labour gov-
ernment was not only keen to avoid further damaging agricultural conflicts 
within Britain but also  eager to regain the trust of its EU partners.99
The Blair government’s resolve for reform was almost immediately tested 
when German, Danish, and Finnish ministers expressed grave concerns over 
AGPs during a meeting of the EU Council of Agriculture Ministers in Novem-
ber 1997.100 Coinciding with domestic reports on vancomycin resistant MRSA, 
allegedly pan- resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and multiple- resistant food- 
borne pathogens, precautionary bans of low- dosed growth promoters  were 
widely supported in the British media.101 In early 1998, a unilateral Danish ban 
of virginiamycin and a voluntary phasing out of all AGPs  until 1999 by Danish 
livestock associations increased pressure for British support of far- reaching 
EU restrictions. In Britain, influential reports on antibiotics and AMR by com-
mittees from both Houses of Parliament also endorsed bans (chapter  13).102 
Following an international conference in Copenhagen in September 1998, 
twelve of the EU’s fifteen agricultural ministers de cided to ban four of the 
remaining eight AGPs. Two years  after voting against the avoparcin ban, Brit-
ain now supported much more sweeping AGP bans.103 Following US pre ce dent, 
EU governments also agreed to establish a European- wide AMR surveillance 
system (chapter 13). Sensing a permanent shift of antibiotic politics, the Finan-
cial Times began to print investment advice for companies producing probi-
otic substitute feeds.104
Although Pfizer’s chairman criticized them as a return to “the Dark Ages, 
where witchcraft and sorcery are prevailing,”105 the 1998 AGP bans bore tes-
tament both to the BSE crisis and to Eu ro pean consumers’ increasing power 
over agricultural policy. By the late 1990s, consumers’ ability to vote against 
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controversial production methods was impacting both the organic and con-
ventional sector. Profiting from unified labeling and nearly two de cades of 
food scandals, Britain’s organic food sector grew from £40 million in 1987 
to £267 million in 1997. Sales  were projected to grow to over £1 billion by 
2000.106 Although they still only accounted for about 1  percent of total British 
food and drink expenditure in 2000,107 organic products’ cultural and indirect 
economic influence was significant. In the Times, radio presenter Libby Purves 
smugly reflected, “In about 1992, we had John Gummer, then Agriculture 
Minister . . .  laughing charmingly and pooh- poohing our organic attitudes.”108 
Seven years  later,  there  were “signs of a genuine popu lar rebellion against the 
culture of ghastly farming and ghastly food.”109
Consumers’ rebellion was also transforming the conventional sector. 
Shocked by BSE,  under pressure from popu lar green values, and trying to stay 
ahead on the competitive food market, major British supermarkets like Tesco, 
Sainsbury’s, and Asda proactively announced that they  were prohibiting sup-
pliers from using AGPs in April 1998— eight months before the EU formally 
de cided to ban them.110 Other companies followed suit. Prob ably anticipating 
further AGP bans, the Grampian Country Food Group, the United Kingdom’s 
biggest chicken producer, announced that it would stop using AGPs in Sep-
tember 1999. Secret  trials had indicated that AGP withdrawals would not lead 
to any price increases.111 According to the Guardian, Grampian’s initiative 
could “signal the biggest revolution in years in the way that animals are 
reared.”112 Having abandoned its first organic line in the mid-1980s, Marks & 
Spencer announced that it too would now restock “chemical  free” produce and 
ban all poultry products produced with AGPs. Large multinational food con-
glomerates like Mars further strengthened the domestic trend  toward greener 
production methods by developing their own antibiotic- free and organic prod-
uct lines.113
Boosted by EU courts’ rejection of industry lawsuits against the 1998 anti-
biotic bans,114 critics soon began to call for restrictions of the four remaining 
AGPs. Their calls  were strengthened by a series of antibiotic scandals and offi-
cial reports on AMR. In July 1999, British and Irish authorities cracked down 
on illegal Irish drug imports. According to the Sunday Times, price differences 
meant that “Irish pharmacies [ were] being bombarded with requests for anti-
biotics from farmers in Britain.”115 The newspaper also referred to a recent BBC 
CountryFile episode in which an undercover team had purchased therapeutic 
antibiotics over the  counter in Britain and via mail order from Ireland. Accord-
ing to the organic Soil Association, “as many as 10,000 farms in Britain”116 
could be using antibiotics illegally. Reacting to a 1999 antibiotics report by Brit-
ain’s Advisory Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food (chapter 13), 
the Daily Mail attacked the “grotesque irresponsibility” of intensive farming: 
“Many farmers have [reacted to the 1998 bans by switching] to another drug, 
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avilamycin. . . .  The trou ble is that avilamycin is almost identical to a ‘vitally 
impor tant’ drug now on trial in Britain’s hospitals [Synercid]. . . .  The demand 
for cheap meat is one  thing. But if it reduces our ability to fight disease, it may 
yet prove the most ruinously expensive choice we could have made.”117
The new millennium did not alter now entrenched public hostility  toward 
AGP use on British farms. In 2000, the Daily Mail warned that Salmonella 
enteritidis had “effectively become unbeatable.”118 WHO director Gro Harlem 
Brundtland warned about a “pre- antibiotic age,”119 and Times commentators 
reckoned that opinion had turned for good “against destructive industrial farm-
ing.”120 Meanwhile, the popularity of antibiotic- free produce continued to 
grow. While the Soil Association offered “Food for Life” packs to parents con-
cerned about conventional school food, tabloids endorsed organic food and a 
new generation of celebrity chefs like Jamie Oliver advised using organic—if 
pos si ble.121 In politics, Conservative and  Labour MPs showed progressive 
credentials by conspicuously eating antibiotic- free organic produce.122 Unsur-
prisingly,  there was  little protest in 2002 when EU Commissioner for Health 
and Consumer Protection David Bryne announced that he planned to phase 
out remaining AGPs by 2006.123
Higher- Dosed Prob lems
While the phasing- out of low- dosed AGPs between 1998 and 2006 fulfilled a 
major public health demand, reforms of higher- dosed therapeutic antibiotic use 
remained  limited. A significant reason for this was waning public attention. 
Similar to the early 1970s, the seeming success of pioneering EU AGP bans 
made antibiotics lose their status as a common denominator of public protest 
against conventional agriculture. To many commentators, it seemed that the 
gaps of the 1969 Swann report had now been fixed. This was despite evidence 
pointing to similar AMR se lection by higher dosed products and the fluid 
bound aries between antibiotic growth promotion, prophylaxis, and therapy on 
farms (chapter 13).
In a repeat of 1970s Swann patriotism, many British newspapers once again 
asserted that Britain had done its homework and accused other countries of 
antibiotic misuse. Although black market and residue scandals continued to 
occur in Britain,124 observers increasingly focused on weaker standards in other 
parts of the world. In 1999, the conservative Daily Mail allied with British min-
isters and the NFU for a “Just Say Non” campaign. The campaign protested 
French boycotts of British beef and the alleged use of sewage, hormones, and 
antibiotic feeds in continental agriculture. Producers  were encouraged to “stamp 
a Union Jack logo on all home- produced food to help shoppers fly the flag.”125 In 
Parliament, Conservative MPs forgot about their 1996 defense of avoparcin 
feeds and demanded import bans of AGP- fed poultry.126 Throughout the 
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2000s, other reports criticized US AGP use, residues in Chinese honey, and 
resistant bacteria on South American food imports without conducting 
detailed analyses of similar prob lems in Eu rope.127
Media reports on the routine use of higher- dosed therapeutic antibiotics on 
British farms remained rare.128 In 2003, the Daily Mail published a scathing 
review of Grampian’s and Tesco’s return to using “rooster boosters”129 like 
avilamcyin for disease prevention. According to the newspaper, one in five of 
the producers registered with Britain’s Assured Chicken scheme had reverted 
to using growth- promoting antibiotics.  Others attacked rising prophylactic 
antibiotic use. A 2003 Observer article titled, “If Max eats up all his chicken, 
 he’ll grow to be a big, strong boy.  Unless it kills him first.”130 The article recon-
structed Max’s contamination with resistant pathogens: “As the chicken oozes 
unappetisingly on the top shelf of your fridge, . . .  blood drips on to the ched-
dar cheese below . . . .  Making yourself a cheese sandwich next day, you  don’t 
notice the bacteriological accompaniment— but you have inadvertently eaten 
uncooked enterococci.”131 According to the Observer, the 43 tons of AGPs annu-
ally used on British farms  were “only the tip” of a wider 463- ton agricultural 
“antibiotic iceberg.”132 Banning AGPs without reforming therapeutic antibi-
otic use and conventional husbandry systems would have  little effect on over-
all AMR. In a seeming repeat of history,  these warnings and new reports on 
new livestock- associated pathogens like tetracycline- resistant “non- typeable- 
MRSA” (NT- MRSA), however, failed to trigger wider public concern (chap-
ter 13).133 In 2004, a twenty- point Guardian list of ways to “cut out chemicals” 
mentioned antibiotics only in place 16— AMR was not mentioned.134
The renewed lull of British antibiotic risk awareness was only gradually over-
come as a result of dramatic 2013 warnings about a looming post- antibiotic 
apocalypse by the United Kingdom’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO) Sally Davies 
and the publication of the 2016 O’Neill AMR Review (chapter 13). However, 
despite  these warnings, popu lar calls for renewed antibiotic reform remain 
 limited. In 2018, the EU Parliament’s vote to restrict veterinary antibiotic use 
attracted only minimal media attention.135 Historically, this is unsurprising. 
In Britain, national antibiotic protest emerged following moral panics and well- 
publicized health tragedies. It also tended to focus on easily identifiable— and 
vilifiable— practices like AGP use by amorphous farmers. Focusing public 
attention on the complex infrastructures driving and supplying wider antibi-
otic use has proven more difficult. Despite medical warnings about a resistant 
apocalypse,  there is no obvious symbol technology— like AGPs— around which 
to unite public concerns. Industry voluntarism has further fragmented protest 
potential: concerned consumers can now buy antibiotic- free products in all 
major supermarkets, and agricultural organ izations have successfully presented 
routine therapeutic antibiotic use as impor tant for animal welfare (chapter 12). 
Similar to the 1970s,  there has also been a tendency to publicly rest on the 
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laurels of the 2006 AGP bans and recent voluntarist reductions of overall 
usage or blame rising AMR on antibiotic overuse in other parts of the world. 
That current nonhuman antibiotic regulations are not the result of British 
but of Scandinavian and EU leadership is often forgotten. What  will happen 
to transnational stewardship efforts  after Britain’s pending departure from 
the EU is rarely discussed.
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Per sis tent Infrastructures
Antibiotic Reform and 
British Farming
This chapter explores how antibiotic perceptions and use evolved on British 
farms  after the 1969 Swann report. Similar to public commentators, most agri-
cultural observers initially believed that the corporatist report had “fixed” 
AMR prob lems by differentiating between medically relevant and irrelevant 
antibiotics and by entrusting the former to veterinarians. Despite a brief dip 
in the wake of the 1971 AGP bans, wider antibiotic infrastructures remained 
culturally and physically intact. By the mid-1970s, antibiotic consumption had 
recovered as a result of veterinary prescriptions and “nontherapeutic” AGPs. 
Although antibiotic usage remained common, Britain’s corporatist structures 
reduced polarizing conflicts between farmers and public critics once new AMR 
data challenged the Swann compromise. Reacting to the 1980s economic cri-
sis, residue and salmonellosis prob lems, as well as Eu ro pean reform pressure, 
British farmers and veterinarians engaged in a “light- green” restructuring of 
their industry. Similar to the United States, farm organ izations like the NFU 
supported “antibiotic  free” ventures but resisted statutory interventions. Or ga-
nized British re sis tance to EU- led antibiotic restrictions crumbled following 
the 1996 BSE crisis. During the late 1990s, many farmers and agricultural com-
mentators ignored calls by the NFU and the phar ma ceu ti cal industry to 
defend AGPs. However, this did not mean that public and agricultural risk per-
ceptions fully merged. Despite achieving impressive reductions of antibiotic 
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usage following Dame Sally Davies’ 2013 AMR warnings, British veterinari-
ans and farmers have repeatedly opposed statutory restrictions of therapeutic 
antibiotic use.
Business as Usual
The de cade following the 1969 Swann report brought major changes to British 
agriculture. Throughout the 1970s, farmers faced the dual challenge of surviv-
ing lower profit margins and justifying rising subsidies. This situation strained 
postwar corporatist arrangements between farmers and government officials. 
With many smaller farms struggling to survive an ongoing cost- price squeeze, 
the NFU and officials of Britain’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(MAFF) had to reconcile competing interests of larger and smaller producers. 
Prob lems for the NFU  were compounded by challenges to its mono poly on 
agricultural repre sen ta tion from regional farming organ izations and the rele-
gation of national decision- making powers to Brussels following Britain’s 1973 
accession to the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).1 Meanwhile, agri-
cultural surpluses continued to grow: between 1970 and 1980, total meat out-
put from British  cattle, pigs, and sheep increased by over 9.7  percent to 2,305,000 
tons.2 Although British farmers initially profited from CAP membership, the 
saturation of Eu ro pean meat markets gradually depressed farm incomes and 
forced CAP member states to make intervention purchases to shore up com-
modity prices.3 Throughout the EEC, notorious state- acquired “butter and 
meat mountains” grew rapidly. By 1983, Britain alone was storing 177,000 tons 
of intervention butter stocks.4
With farmers trapped in a buyer’s market, risk- minimizing technologies like 
antibiotics remained popu lar. Similar to the United States (chapter 9), 1970s 
British farmers seem to have purchased antibiotics primarily for disease pre-
vention rather than alleged growth- promoting effects. According to a 1970 
NFU survey of 1,200 farmers, less than 50  percent fed antibiotics to pigs and 
poultry for growth promotion alone. However, over 50  percent used antibiot-
ics to promote growth and combat stress. Significantly, surveyed farmers’ pri-
mary source of antibiotic information came from industry commercials 
followed by advice from veterinarians and extension officials.5 Increasing meat 
production led to a rise of antibiotic use. In 1978, a paper by NIRD nutrition-
ist Raphael Braude showed that Britain’s 1971 bans of medically relevant AGPs 
had failed to curb drug consumption. Despite Braude’s background as a vocal 
antibiotic supporter (chapter 7), his findings match wider sales trends.6 Accord-
ing to Braude, AGP bans had actually increased the dosages of still popu lar 
antibiotic feeds: tetracycline AGPs with dosages of 10 to 20 parts per million 
had been replaced by feeds with dosages of 100 to 600 parts per million. 
Although AGP bans had briefly halved the tonnage of agricultural antibiotic 
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sales, sales of restricted “therapeutic” antibiotics had annually increased by 
about 15  percent between 1972 and 1975. The use of allegedly medically irrele-
vant ersatz AGPs (like flavomycin, virginiamycin, and zinc bacitracin) had also 
increased. With the exception of oxytetracycline, pigs received the largest pro-
portion of antibiotics, followed by poultry and calves. Similar to the 1970 NFU 
survey, only a minority of livestock farmers used antibiotics solely for growth 
promotion. All in all,  there had been a slight increase of overall antibiotic use 
since the Swann bans. Braude estimated that in 1975 26,500 kilograms of pen-
icillins and tetracyclines and 55,000 kilograms of other antibiotics had been 
used as feed additives on British farms.7
Braude’s data did not encompass rising illegal antibiotic use. In 1971, the 
Veterinary Rec ord reprinted complaints by the Phar ma ceu ti cal Society’s solicitor 
that the Society’s fourteen inspectors only had the power to conduct farm- level 
inspections in the case of synthetic sulfonamides but not when it came to bio-
logical antibiotics. Offenders could tell inspectors: “You have no power to search 
or make inquiry. . . .  You have only power to institute proceedings. Go away.”8 
Meanwhile, Customs and Excise data indicated “substantial smuggling of 
Dutch and other continental preparations along the Norfolk coast, and of ani-
mal medicines from the Republic of Ireland.”9 A  limited number of prosecu-
tions had occurred when veterinarians had convinced farmers who had obtained 
substandard drugs illegally to make formal complaints. Illegal sales networks 
 were sophisticated and hard to uncover  because the majority of sales occurred 
“from market huts, and more frequently, direct to farms by itinerant sellers.”10 
In 1971, the Society had uncovered that two companies with annual turnovers 
in excess of £100,000 had illegally distributed antibiotics with the help of a full- 
time team of three or four traveling salesmen. Confiscated drugs had been 
produced abroad and  were substandard. The Phar ma ceu ti cal Society also 
admonished British veterinarians for fostering lackluster antibiotic steward-
ship: “A veterinary surgeon . . .  supplying antibiotics for a 250- mile distant 
herd of cows which he has never seen (instances of which have occurred . . . ) 
produces an equally casual attitude  towards antibiotics from the lay public.”11
However, such out spoken criticism of inappropriate therapeutic antibiotic 
use and sales remained rare in Britain’s agricultural and veterinary press. 
Throughout the 1970s, the tenor of agricultural opinion was rather that the 
Swann report had “fixed”  earlier antibiotic prob lems. Although they differed 
from US publications by emphasizing AMR  hazards, British farming manu-
als continued to advocate nontherapeutic and therapeutic antibiotic use.12 From 
the early 1970s onward, the NFU, BVA, and MMB also launched what would 
become a “five- point plan” for mastitis. The plan consisted of teat dipping in 
disinfectant, antibiotic treatment of mastitis, dry cow therapy ahead of calv-
ing (antibiotic prophylaxis), the culling of chronically infected animals, test-
ing of milking machines, and monthly bulk milk cell counts.13 Promoting the 
F IGURE 12.1 Antibiotic infrastructures were hard to reform. Cyanamid advertisement, 
British Farmer, 1969.
F IGURE 12.2  Cyanamid advertisement, British Farmer, 1969.
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five- point plan boosted veterinary antibiotic sales. In 1972, it was estimated that 
over 10 million single- dose antibiotic tubes  were annually prescribed and sold 
for the treatment of around 3 million animals.14 Routine antibiotic prophylaxis 
was also promoted in the farming media. In 1975, Farmers Weekly published 
an educational song titled “Mastitis, yeh, yeh, yeh” [sic]:
Treat all your udders with a dry cow tube
And smile, smile, smile,
Maybe you think the cost is pretty rude,
But it  really is worthwhile.
Bugs can cause mastitis,
They always run so wild,
So treat all your udders with a dry cow tube
And smile, smile, smile.15
Routine antibiotic use also continued to be fostered by phar ma ceu ti cal man-
ufacturers. Reacting to the 1969 Swann report, British companies like Bee-
cham and May & Baker increased advertisements for “safe” nontherapeutic 
AGPs as well as for new therapeutic antibiotic classes to treat and prevent 
disease— often with considerable discounts for bulk  orders.16 Meanwhile, US 
companies like Pfizer and Cyanamid attempted to defend market shares by 
stressing the prophylactic qualities of their now prescription- only tetracycline 
feeds. Ahead of the enactment of Britain’s AGP bans, Cyanamid purchased 
a full- page ad in Farmers Weekly to provide farmers with “an impor tant 
reassurance”:
Many farmers consider that  after 1st March 1971 CYFAC and AUROFAC  will 
no longer be available. This is not the case. CYFAC as CYFAC 25 and new 
CYFAC PELLETS and AUROFAC  will be available on the recommendation 
of your Veterinary Surgeon. If you feel that the condition of your stock or 
poultry is—or is about to be— such that you need the help that  these supple-
ments have given you in the past, ring your veterinary surgeon at once.17
The minimal physical implications of the Swann bans for British agricul-
ture stood in sharp contrast to their symbolic value for warding off foreign com-
petition and critics. Following AGP bans’ enactment in 1971, British farmers 
repeatedly appealed to popu lar Swann patriotism (chapter 11) to ban imports 
produced with therapeutic AGPs. In 1973, the British Poultry Federation pres-
sured supermarkets to reject consignments of Dutch poultry fed therapeutic 
antibiotics.18 One year  later, French AGP use featured prominently in a trade 
war between British and French egg producers.19 AMR concerns  were not at 
the center of  these conflicts. Putting it bluntly, Farmers Weekly commented: 
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“The point at issue is not that French eggs are a health  hazard to consumers. It 
is that the French have a way of shipping unprofitability to Britain in an unfair 
trading package.”20 With emotions  running high, the UK Egg Producers’ Asso-
ciation gathered money for  legal action and farmers or ga nized pickets and 
boycotts against French produce.21 While the increasing harmonization of EEC 
rules eventually cooled Franco- British egg wars (chapter 13), it created new prob-
lems for dairy farmers struggling with high rates of mastitis and antibiotic 
residues.22 In this situation, Swann patriotism re- emerged as a way to under-
mine stricter EEC residue testing plans. Playing AMR concerns off against resi-
due concerns, a 1978 article in Country Life contrasted British Swann rulings 
with “fussy” continental concerns about antibiotic and hormone residues in 
food: “ There is the  great fear, especially in the Latin races, that masculinity 
could be at risk through the careless use of oestrogens.”23 “Swann put Britain 
in the clear” with regard to AMR and British residue rules  were “as good as 
anywhere in the world, if that is any comfort. Which it surely should be.”24
Unfounded claims of stricter British regulations  were paralleled by mostly 
uncritical views of wider post- Swann antibiotic use. Expert contributions to the 
University of Nottingham’s 1977 Easter School highlight widespread agricul-
tural and veterinary confidence in the post- Swann state of affairs. According 
to most agricultural attendees, British antibiotic use was necessary, efficient, 
and safe.25 This assessment also included veterinary antibiotic use despite the 
fact that “fire brigade” approaches to antibiotic prescribing remained common 
on farms and Swann- supported preventive veterinary health ser vices had failed 
to materialize. Mostly called to treat already sick animals, veterinarians seldom 
had time to conduct the sensitivity tests and diagnoses necessary for “rational” 
antibiotic use and continued to rely on drug sales to bolster incomes.26 At the 
1977 Easter School, a Scottish veterinarian noted that farmers still preferred 
con ve nient antibiotics to routine veterinary advice— even if this meant paying 
markup prices for drugs: “Antibiotics, therefore, may remain an indispensable 
means of protecting the productivity and profitability of many a livestock 
enterprise.”27
While many practicing veterinarians remained confident that “rational” 
drug use in the form of sensitivity tests, high doses, and drug combinations 
would check AMR,28 microbiologists disagreed. At the 1977 Easter School, bac-
teriologists Alan Linton and Herbert Williams Smith warned that  limited 
AGP bans had failed to reduce AMR. Linton had analyzed E. coli from ani-
mal,  human, and environmental sources. High levels of re sis tance against 
prescription- only drugs had been detected in all isolates and serotypes of resis-
tant isolates from  humans and animals  were indistinguishable. AMR was often 
plasmid- mediated with plasmids transferring multiple- resistance.29 While 
AMR was more common in the rich and diverse gut flora of animals, which 
had been “penetrated widely”30 by resistance- conferring plasmids, it was likely 
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that AMR in the  human gut flora could have originated in animals. In abat-
toirs, high levels of resistant E. coli had been found on poultry, pig, and beef 
carcasses— prob ably as a result of fecal contamination.  Humans in contact with 
the carcasses had also been colonized. Higher- dosed therapeutic antibiotics 
 were just as good at creating AMR reservoirs as lower- dosed AGPs had been: 
“Any cross- infection ultimately derived from farm animals  will be additive to 
that already cycling by cross- infection in man himself. . . .  The evidence to date 
confirms the views of the Swann Committee prohibiting the use of antibiotics 
of clinical importance for growth promotion . . .  and possibly this prohibition 
should be extended to their use for prophylaxis and generally to reduce their 
use for all nontherapeutic purposes.”31
Herbert Williams Smith also called for further antibiotic reform. Although 
AMR transfer varied between organisms, constant antibiotic exposure made 
it easy for resistant organisms to become dominant and increased chances of 
successful re sis tance transfer.32 The Swann committee had believed that curb-
ing tetracycline use via AGP restrictions would reduce corresponding re sis tance 
in animals’ gut flora. However, studies in British pigs had shown that this was 
not the case. The failure of the Swann bans to reduce AMR could be caused by 
the fact that resistant strains no longer had an evolutionary disadvantage in the 
absence of se lection pressure as well as by higher- dosed veterinary antibiotic use 
and co- selection. Williams Smith ended his paper by warning that restrictions 
of already licensed antibiotics would not easily reverse AMR. New antibiotics 
had to be restricted immediately before widespread re sis tance could develop.33
Bacteriologists’ AMR warnings failed to elicit widespread agricultural con-
cern. Similar to Britain’s public sphere (chapter 11),  there remained a strong 
belief that the Swann report had fixed prob lems. Faced with rapid structural 
change, many also saw antibiotics as an impor tant tool to survive relentless pres-
sure for productivity increases. Trends  toward intensification  were similar 
across British livestock sectors. Between 1967 and 1980, the number of British 
broiler flocks decreased from 3,700 to 2,200 while the average flock size 
increased from 9,800 to 26,500 birds—95  percent of which  were now raised in 
confinement systems.34 Between 1970 and 1980, the average dairy herd size 
increased from 33 to 56 cows, producer numbers fell from 80,265 to 47,169, and 
productivity increased from 825 to 1,037 gallons of milk per cow.35 Although 
US- style feedlots did not become common, overproduction and sinking 
demand triggered the first decline of British beef  cattle in nearly 100 years.36 
Pig production was affected by similar trends. With subsidies declining  after 
Britain’s EEC accession, producers had to rely on feed efficacy and productiv-
ity to beat shrinking profit margins. Although pig farming remained more 
diverse than in the United States, surviving producers tended to concentrate 
in the north and east of the county and tried to cut costs by concentrating ani-
mals and investing in labor- saving technologies and new breeds.37
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As indicated by the parallel rise of 1970s drug usage, antibiotics  were used 
to facilitate herd growth and productivity. On British farms, the Swann bans 
had neither reduced antibiotic access nor changed antibiotic mentalities. Aside 
from the scale of operations and veterinarians’ control over medically relevant 
drugs,  there remained many similarities between antibiotic infrastructures on 
both sides of the Atlantic (chapter 9). While some commentators reflected on 
rising chemical use and small farms’ demise as two sides of the same coin,38  there 
was  little appetite for further antibiotic reform.
Thatcherism, Farming, and  Limited Reforms
The post- Swann status quo of British agricultural antibiotic use began to 
be challenged during the 1980s. Although the agricultural community 
often reacted with hostility to rising public antibiotic criticism (chapter 11), 
diminished po liti cal support, changing EEC policies, economic hardship, and 
scandals led to self- reform. Similar to the United States, this reform was 
light- green.
For many British livestock farmers, the 1980s  were a period of crisis. With 
average real income falling from £12,058 in 1973 to a nadir of £4,894 in 1980,39 
many farmers strug gled to survive. In the farming press, agricultural commen-
tators often displaced blame for British farming’s woes on continental protec-
tionism and foreign overproduction.40 Angry about French import bans in 
1980, British farmers attempted to deliver “a British lamb to the firmly closed 
French embassy” while singing “jingle jangle, Giscard dangle.”41 Generating 
po liti cal support for a further subsidized increase of domestic production 
proved difficult. Whereas previous de cades had been characterized by a rela-
tively insular mode of corporatist decision- making, the 1980s saw ties between 
British farmers and Whitehall fray. The weakening of corporatist bonds was 
caused by rising subsidy costs, neoliberal policy reviews, and an increasingly 
fragmented agricultural policy landscape  shaped by environmentalist and ani-
mal welfare concerns.42 In contrast to the Reagan administration’s reluctant 
expansion of agricultural subsidies (chapter 9), Britain’s new Thatcher govern-
ment did  little to redress farmers’ situation. In 1980, it “axed” school meals43 
and remained committed to overvaluing the “green pound,” one of a number 
of artificial EEC currencies created to determine CAP prices in relation 
to national currencies, despite halving British CAP contributions in 1984. 
While consumer prices  were kept low, CAP payments to British farmers  were 
worth less.44
Dismayed by government inaction, many conventional livestock producers 
tried to survive the cost- price squeeze by expanding production and increas-
ing productivity. Antibiotics facilitated this pro cess. A 1982 article by G. H. 
Yeoman, head of clinical studies at Beecham’s Animal Health Division, 
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illustrates con temporary trends. According to Yeoman, recent years had seen 
substantial shifts of British animal production and antibiotic use. More ani-
mals  were  housed in confined buildings, and new farming systems  were cre-
ating novel disease challenges: “ These are not new pathogens: rather they 
are old pathogens exploiting new ecosystems provided by the new methods 
and thus appearing as modified, if not new, syndromes.”45  Because new hous-
ing systems  were mostly designed for maximum production, veterinarians had 
to “somehow do [their] best to ameliorate the bad effects on animal health and 
to a  great extent this means resorting to medi cation  whether therapeutically 
or pre- emptively. Indeed,  there is a danger . . .  that the use of antibiotics may 
take on the status of a routine input, regarded  little differently from that of 
food, fuel and  water.”46 Vaccines, better animal management, and all- in- all- 
out systems had taken care of many diseases. However, a “short” list of bacte-
rial diseases still generated “the critical battleground where massive exposure 
to antibiotics occurs.”47  These “diseases of intensive farming”48  were caused by 
E. coli, Streptococci, Staphylococci, Salmonella dublin, Salmonella typhimurium, 
the recently discovered Campylobacter, Haemophilus, Pasteurella, and Klebsiella. 
According to Yeoman, it was impor tant to remember that the  factors influ-
encing veterinary antibiotic prescriptions  were fundamentally dif fer ent 
from  human medicine: “The farmer is concerned with cost- effectiveness, the 
vet with providing treatment at a price that  will ensure that his bill is likely to 
be paid.”49 Popu lar antibiotics like penicillins, tetracyclines, macrolides, and 
sulfonamides  were cheap and easy to mass- administer via feed or  water. “The 
managerial pressures of factory farming” could easily bias veterinary prescrip-
tion habits: “[The] veterinary adviser [of a large farmer] may well have pro-
vided prescriptions in advance and his compounder may hold ready- medicated 
rations: thus within hours antibiotic treatment of the  whole  house can be 
implemented and any potential set- back pre- empted. . . .  If his veterinary sur-
geon has reservations about this,  there is fairly ready access to grey- market or 
black- market supplies.”50
While inner- agricultural criticism of antibiotic- intensive production 
remained minimal, British farmers and veterinarians had thin- skinned reac-
tions to reemerging public criticism of animal welfare, AMR, environmental-
ist, and residue issues.51 In 1979, farm organ izations reacted furiously to Brass 
Tacks’s attack on antibiotic use (chapter 11). The NFU considered taking out 
an injunction against the Radio Times and promised to send “hot missiles” to the 
BBC’s chairman and director- general,52 the former of whom was none other 
than Michael Swann. In the same year, the Veterinary Rec ord responded to alle-
gations of indiscriminate veterinary prescriptions. The journal conceded that 
the recent spread of multiple- resistant S. typhimurium 204 through  human and 
 cattle populations had been facilitated by excessive “and sometimes illicit”53 
antibiotic use. However, AMR could not be blamed solely on veterinarians. 
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Phar ma ceu ti cal companies and physicians could equally be accused of facili-
tating antibiotic overuse.54 Reporting on the 1980 BVA congress, BFS noted 
that “despite an attack by the medical profession represented by [PHLS] Dr 
[John] Threlfall,” the “use of antibiotics in agriculture received strong sup-
port”55 from veterinarians. According to veterinarian John Walton, “the med-
icos [ were] wrong.”56 Further bans would not prevent resistant salmonellosis. 
Two years  later, significant opposition from veterinarians, producers, and indus-
try representatives toppled proposed restrictions of oral chloramphenicol 
preparations.57
Controversies about  legal antibiotic use  were paralleled by revelations about 
substantial black and grey markets for antibiotics on farms. During the early 
1980s, significant regulatory gaps continued to enable semi- legal and illegal 
drug access on British farms (chapter 13). In 1983, Britain’s animal health black 
market was estimated to be worth £1 to £2 million per year.58 Corporatist 
attempts to solve prob lems in cooperation with officials proved complicated. 
In 1979, the British government tried to reduce semi- legal drug sales by reform-
ing the Pharmacy and Merchants’ List (PML). Drugs listed as PML, which 
also included certain antibiotics, could be sold by veterinarians, pharmacists, 
and listed agricultural merchants.59 The new PML regulations attempted to 
ban dubious itinerant sales by mandating that only listed “stationary” vendors 
could sell PML products. The goal was to control illegal sales without restricting 
agricultural drug access. However, it soon became clear that many listed mer-
chants  were no better than van salesmen. Of the 1,800 names and 3,000 prem-
ises officially listed in 1981 only 500  were believed to be upright merchants. 
Many listed premises did not keep rec ords or demand to see prescriptions prior 
to selling drugs. In one case, a newspaper agent was fined £1,000  after it emerged 
that he was illegally supplying local farmers with restricted drugs.60 Although 
new rules required a pharmacist to supervise all PML sales and introduced a 
mandatory code of practice in 1984,61 farmers could still legally import foreign 
feeds and milk replacers containing restricted drugs.62
The phar ma ceu ti cal industry was happy to supply rising antibiotic demand. 
Between 1979 and 1983, Britain’s animal health market grew from £71 to £114 
million— making it the sixth- largest in the world. Prescription- only medicines 
accounted for about 44  percent of British sales— with antimicrobials consti-
tuting 35  percent of prescription- only sales (14.5  percent of total market). Despite 
the 1971 AGP bans, antibiotic (9   percent) and coccidiostat feed additives 
(5  percent) made up another 14  percent (£16 million) of total sales. Antibiotic 
consumption varied according to livestock sector. Prescription- only and PML 
antibiotics constituted about 60  percent of the £6 million feed additive mar-
ket for pigs but only 40  percent of the poultry market. PML additives included 
AGPs like virginiamycin (Smith Kline), flavomycin (Hoechst), avoparcin 
(Cyanamid), and monensin (Elanco). Writing in 1984, industry analysts also 
Per sis tent Infrastructures • 243
noted that sinking incomes  were intensifying veterinary competition for farm-
ers’ custom when it came to selling prescription- only drugs with markup 
charges of between 25 and 50  percent. Competition was also increasing between 
veterinarians and registered pharmacists. Charging a 25 to 30  percent markup 
for PMLs, many veterinarians  were trying to outcompete pharmacies by bulk 
buying and storing medicines.63
Residues resulting from  legal, semi- legal, and illegal antibiotic use increas-
ingly caused prob lems. In November 1979, more sensitive MMB penicillin 
monitoring showed that 900 to 1,000 of 47,000 farmers regularly produced 
milk with excessive residues.64 While some blamed the “odd cow” getting 
“milked by  mistake,”65 the NFU’s BFS warned: “What is disturbing about  these 
figures is that the incidence of test failures in the United Kingdom is 20 times 
that in other countries, apart from Eire, despite the fact that most use a more 
sensitive test: And equally most (again excluding Eire) impose more severe pen-
alties.”66 Reacting to prob lems, the MMB increased residue penalties: first- 
time offenders would be fined 5p per liter, second- time offenders 7p per liter, 
and third- time offenders would have to pay a “swingeing rate”67 of 9p per liter. 
However, penalty increases  were unsuccessful. Receiving 11p for  every liter of 
uncontaminated milk, farmers continued to sell contaminated milk  because 
the chance of incurring a fine was less problematic than foregoing earnings com-
pletely.68 Contradicting popu lar claims of higher British standards, British 
milk was found to contain the highest residue levels in Eu rope in 1982. Accord-
ing to the British Veterinary Journal, many farmers believed that antibiotics in 
the milk of one cow could be diluted below detection limits although  trials had 
shown that one cow treated with 200 milligrams of penicillin G could con-
taminate the milk of 8,000 other cows.69 In accordance with new EEC rulings, 
testing sensitivity was raised to 0.01 international units of penicillin per 
milliliter in 1986. This time, better recording, higher penalties, random test-
ing, and awareness campaigns succeeded in reducing violation rates to below 
0.5  percent.70
Mounting prob lems with residues, AMR, and black market drugs coincided 
with a new round of agricultural reform. With overproduction and subsidy 
costs exploding, the Eu ro pean Community introduced dairy quotas (1984), a 
co- responsibility levy for cereals (1986), and forced farmers to let land lie fal-
low (1986). In 1987, EEC Regulation 1760/87 introduced a voluntary scheme 
for farmers to reduce the output of cereals, beef, and wine for three to five years. 
Although mea sures failed to solve overproduction, they marked the beginning 
of a sea- change by weakening postwar interventionist modes of agricultural 
expansion in  favor of diversification and an emphasis on small farmers and the 
environment.71 The sea- change of agricultural policies mirrored an emerging 
change of agricultural attitudes. Worn down by the 1980s economic crisis, pub-
lic criticism, and weakened ties to Whitehall, British farm organ izations 
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became more willing to consider alternative production methods. Following 
its 1984 annual general meeting, the NFU acknowledged: “it seems right to 
conclude that we are now at a watershed and that the era when agricultural 
expansion was widely accepted as a desirable goal has passed.”72
Similar to the United States (chapter 9), solutions proposed by the agricul-
tural community  were mostly voluntary and light- green. For struggling smaller 
producers, organic or “natu ral” forms of agriculture became increasingly attrac-
tive. During the 1970s, members of the still relatively small Soil Association 
and other organic organ izations had published a growing number of manuals 
and advice on how to farm and live sustainably.73 Emphasizing environmen-
talist themes, early publications’ rhe toric had, however, often been aggressively 
anticonventional.74 This changed during the mid-1970s. Although  there was no 
publication comparable to Rodale’s US journals, Britain’s organic community 
began to moderate its rhe toric and cater to the needs of new audiences like con-
ventional farmers looking to transition to organic production or organic 
farmers looking to expand production.75 The ensuing professionalization, com-
mercialization, and integration of Britain’s organic movement coincided with 
a generational shift. Two new producer groups— the Organic Growers Asso-
ciation and British Organic Farmers— were formed in 1981 and 1983. In 1985, 
the Soil Association’s new leadership moved headquarters from the country-
side to Bristol.76 Rejuvenated organ izations  were more media- savvy and com-
mercially oriented. They also profited from new access to UK supermarkets. 
In 1981, Safeway became the first British supermarket to stock organic produce, 
followed by Waitrose, Sainsbury’s, Tesco, and a short- lived experiment by Marks 
and Spencer in the second half of the 1980s.77
Its professionalization and integration into established supply chains made 
organic production more palatable to the wider farming community. Previously 
lambasting organic farming,78 conventional representatives began to attend Soil 
Association conferences while organic methods and profits drew favorable com-
ments in the farming press.79 From the mid-1980s onward, even bastions of 
conventional agriculture like Farmers Weekly began to advise struggling  cattle 
farmers to sell “natu ral” drug- free produce at a premium price.80 Organic pro-
ducers also received official recognition with the creation of the UK Register 
of Organic Food Standards in 1987 and the 1989 organic standards.81 The 
absence of antibiotics remained a central ele ment of organic purity and safety 
claims. According to the 1989 organic standards, livestock producers  were only 
allowed to use antibiotics to save an animal life, prevent suffering, or treat 
conditions with no alternative treatment or management practice— AGPs 
remained taboo.82
Although most British farmers did not transition to organic agriculture, 
their increasing ac cep tance of alternative production methods and acknowl-
edgement of shifting public values led to a gradual “greening” of conventional 
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production and rhe toric. When officials challenged an EEC hormonal growth 
promoter ban in 1986, Britain’s beef industry cautioned that unilateral action 
might provoke import bans and stoke consumer fears: “Privately, they believe 
it might be better to face the ban.”83 According to a 1986 article in Farmers 
Weekly, environmentalism and intensive farming  were not mutually exclusive: 
“ there is no reason why we should not compete in the world’s agricultural 
markets, . . .  and still have a country fit for Robin Hood or Rupert Bear.”84 The 
magazine also printed complaints by “suburban  house wife” Audrey Curran: 
“I am fed up of being told, as a consumer, that it is my fault if animals are being 
reared in  these intensive units to supply me with cheap food. I  don’t want it 
and I  don’t know of anyone who does when made aware of what is involved. 
And, who asked me if it was OK to stuff them with antibiotics?”85
Unwilling to risk profitable production systems, conventional producers 
 were, however, unsure how far “green” reforms could go. In 1987, Farmers 
Weekly commentator Robert Gair described the fundamental dilemma he 
shared with many other farmers: criticizing attacks by “Greenpeacers” and “the 
anti- farming, anti- chemical brigade,” Gair confessed that he too had “no desire 
to see a countryside without birds, mammals, frogs, butterflies, orchids, and 
the rest.”86 In order to arrest “detrimental changes in the environment,” all par-
ties should engage in a “rational examination” of  factors likely to disturb the 
“balance of nature.”87 The “light- green” dilemma described by Gair was simi-
lar regarding agricultural antibiotics and resulted in a curious parallelism of 
antibiotic endorsements and cautious reform initiatives.
On the one hand, many 1980s agricultural commentators and manuals con-
tinued to routinely advocate “rational” therapeutic and nontherapeutic anti-
biotic use alongside other preventive health mea sures.88 Similar to the United 
States (chapter 9), articles in the British farming press defended antibiotics and 
reacted to external criticism by attacking the “inane agitation of the lunatic 
fringe of the animal welfare movement.”89 Hailing the 1987 results of the 
national meat surveillance scheme as proof of safe drug use on farms, Farmers 
Weekly launched a scathing attack on testing systems “hell- bent on proving that 
 wholesome food is positively dangerous” and capable “of sniffing down to parts 
per billion.”90 Farmers had “to spread the gospel [of meat safety] before po liti-
cal pressures remove yet more useful phar ma ceu ti cals from the market and 
restrict research.”91 British veterinarians also attacked “excessive” consumer 
fears. According to John R. Walton,  there was a risk that more sensitive resi-
due testing methods could cause unnecessary alarm about safe drug use. Regard-
ing AMR, it was impor tant not “to confuse the use of antibiotics in agriculture 
with outbreaks of  human disease particularly caused by antibiotic- resistant 
Salmonella organisms.”92 Con temporary salmonellosis outbreaks would be 
solved not by antibiotic regulation but by better hygiene and infection control. 
The BVA similarly condemned rising antibiotic criticism as “emotive”: “ There 
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is  every reason to believe that prob lems of antibiotic re sis tance encountered in 
 human medicine are overwhelmingly due to the way in which they are used in 
man.”93 The British phar ma ceu ti cal industry supported agricultural antibiotic 
defense. In 1986, it founded the National Office of Animal Health— with the 
compelling acronym NOAH. Tasked with “giving a more effective voice”94 to 
the drugs industry and its allies, NOAH would become an agro- industrial bul-
wark defending on- farm antibiotic access.
On the other hand, the 1980s also saw a growing amount of inner- agricultural 
skepticism contradict mostly benign NFU, BVA, and NOAH antibiotic assess-
ments. Although it recommended antibiotics for vari ous diseases, the 1981 
Pigkeeper’s Guide criticized units in which animals  were “continually stuffed 
with antibiotics to keep down some disease or other, when all that is needed is 
a bit of space and fresh air.”95 In the same year, the new edition of The Agri-
cultural Notebook— one of the United Kingdom’s standard agricultural 
textbooks— questioned the efficacy of AGPs and of low- dosed therapeutic anti-
biotic use.96 The Notebook stressed that  there  were alternatives to intensive 
production: “[animal welfare criticism] has forced us to enquire  whether it is 
necessary to  house animals using methods which involve a high degree of 
restriction on their movement.”97 Although critical commentators did not fol-
low organic farmers and completely reject antibiotics, they  were keenly aware 
that AMR, residue scandals, and changing consumer preferences would even-
tually change production systems: “the public  will buy what it wants, and not 
what some scientist thinks it should buy.”98 In Farmers Weekly, articles began 
to advertise “no- additive feed”99 and warned about AMR se lection by feeding 
antibiotic- laden milk to calves.100 In the Veterinary Rec ord, commentaries by 
continental veterinarians also started to question se nior British veterinarians’ 
defense of post- Swann arrangements.101
Meandering between defensiveness and premonition, 1980s controversies 
about antibiotics, welfare, and environmentalism primed early agricultural 
reactions to BSE. In October 1987, MAFF veterinarians announced that BSE 
“is not of epidemic proportions, . . .  and is not very significant when compared 
with losses from other ner vous disorders.”102 Farmers Weekly joked that “BSE 
thrives on rumours”: “Thank goodness witchcraft is out of fashion, other wise 
the old lady who lives in the cottage down the lane with a black cat for com-
pany would be accused and ducked in the village pond.”103 However,  behind 
the façade of prescribed calm,  there was growing awareness that the vortex of 
public insecurity created by BSE, salmonellosis, and residue scares was begin-
ning to pose a substantial challenge to existing agricultural practices (chap-
ter 11). With environmentalist and consumer power rising and trust in food 
safety eroding, conventional British agriculture was about to face systemic 
change.
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A De cade of Crises
The 1990s  were a hard de cade for British farmers. With economic pressure, food 
scares, and subsidy reforms further reducing farm numbers, remaining produc-
ers had the choice of  either expanding production or of diversifying into tour-
ism or “green” market niches.104 In the case of antibiotics, NFU, NOAH, and 
BVA strategies of voluntarist self- regulation  were shattered by the 1996 BSE cri-
sis. BSE not only triggered a reform of post- Swann antibiotic rules but also 
highlighted rifts between large intensive and smaller producers.
The de cade started inauspiciously. At the Eu ro pean level, the 1992 Mac-
Sharry reforms marked the most significant modification of the CAP since its 
inception.105 Instead of subsidizing prices, commissioner Ray MacSharry 
attacked overproduction and subsidy costs with quotas, set- aside schemes, and 
direct payments linked to a farm’s size and animals’ age.106 Together with the 
1992 EU Flora- Fauna- Habitat guidelines, the MacSharry reforms also embed-
ded environmentalist princi ples in EU agricultural policy- making.107 Although 
the reforms benefitted intensive producers by lowering grain prices and pro-
viding greater income security, British farmers  were si mul ta neously hit hard 
by falling consumer trust, lower commodity prices, and a strengthening pound, 
which reduced EU payments. Po liti cally, the Conservative government exac-
erbated the situation by stripping once power ful bastions of corporatist decision- 
making like the MMB of its powers in 1994 and ending annual price reviews 
in 1995.108
Economic pressures, new regulations, and a relative loss of po liti cal influ-
ence had a significant impact on British livestock production. In the pig sec-
tor, decreasing profitability and currency fluctuations led to a decline of animal 
numbers from around eight to  under five million by the end of the 1990s. 
Remaining herds  were usually larger and more concentrated. While the major-
ity of animals  were now  housed in confined intensive settings, lower capital 
and maintenance costs also led to a revival of outdoor systems in the South and 
East of  England.109  Cattle numbers also declined— with the 1996 BSE crisis 
severely impacting the beef sector. Although poultry numbers continued to 
increase, birds  were being produced in larger units on fewer farms. By contrast, 
welfare regulations, salmonellosis scares, and changing consumer preferences 
led to a parallel boost of free- range systems in egg production. In all livestock 
sectors, total  factor productivity  rose as a result of  labor substitution and more 
productive breeds.110 Remaining producers also found themselves exposed to 
an unpre ce dented scale of monitoring. The Salmonella- inspired 1990 Food 
Safety Act and new slaughtering clauses allowed inspections of farm animals 
for forbidden substances, forced farmers to keep detailed medi cation rec ords, 
and created enormous pressure to keep herds disease- free.111
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Weakened by its declining membership and fraying corporatist influence, 
the NFU responded to con temporary food scandals and rising demands for 
reforms of production practices (chapter 11) with a light- green strategy of vol-
untarist change. In addition to intensifying reporting on “green topics” in Brit-
ish Farmer,112 NFU president David Naish announced a new program called 
Farming for the Environment ahead of the 1992 general elections.113 The goal 
was to signal and inspire a gradual shift of agricultural values and practices 
before more radical change was thrust on farmers via statutory mea sures. 
Although some commentators remained hostile  toward “the greenies,”114 major 
magazines like Farmers Weekly also fostered “green values” among farmers and 
their families.115
Light- green image campaigns occurred against a backdrop of steady sales 
increases of antibiotic- free food. In 1992, total organic food sales amounted to 
£92.5 million and sales of meat and dairy products to about £13.9 million. Over 
the next five years, sales of organic meat increased by a further 50  percent.116 
With major supermarkets also establishing premium lines for ethical and 
antibiotic- free conventional produce,117 breaking with standard antibiotic use 
was becoming a sales advantage. This message was propagated by the farming 
press. In 1991, the NFU’s British Farmer announced that East Anglian Dale-
head Foods was looking for “pigs from ‘welfare- conscious’ systems” raised on 
cereal- based feeds with “no antibiotic growth promoters or probiotics.”118 Deliv-
ering “green pig” products to a “southern- based supermarket chain,” Dalehead 
offered suppliers a “generous premium.”119 The magazine also printed an adver-
tisement for Daisy Hill Feeds’ Headstart Challenge. Targeting conventional 
farmers, the com pany claimed that its antibiotic- free feeds  were just as good as 
AGPs, answered consumer criticism, and would help farmers transition to a 
coming antibiotic- free era: “Please your customers and [get] ahead of any min-
istry or EC legislation, . . .  Give the Headstart range of piglet diets a trial against 
your existing supplies— . . .  once you have removed the fear  factor of not using 
antibiotic growth promoters you  will have the confidence to remove them from 
your other pig feed diets. In our opinion you  will not be disappointed and you 
 will be helping dislodge an area of criticism and concern levelled at the British 
Pig Industry.”120 Targeting wealthy urbanites and large land- owners rather than 
small farmers, Country Life also published articles referring to Prince Charles’s 
campaigning for organic farming, homeopathy, and profitable antibiotic- free 
production systems.121
Similar to the United States (chapter 9),  there  were, however, clear limits to 
inner- agricultural reform efforts. Despite supporting “rational” antibiotic use 
and individual farmers’ switch to antibiotic- free production, most 1990s com-
mentators did not endorse statutory restrictions. In con temporary manuals, 
AMR and residue warnings continued to feature alongside instructions for 
routine antibiotic use.122 In 1995, the nineteenth edition of the Agricultural 
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Notebook recommended therapeutic and prophylactic drug use for numer-
ous diseases. The manual also provided lists of AGPs while si mul ta neously cau-
tioning farmers about pressure by “anti- factory- farming lobbies,”123 AMR, 
residues, and potential drug restrictions.
With only a minority of farmers switching to antibiotic- free production, 
green voluntarist rhe toric had  little  actual impact on antibiotic infrastructures 
and usage. According to Britain’s Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD), 
sales of therapeutic antimicrobials in food animals increased by about 
40  percent from 392 to 533 tons between 1993 and 1996. Tetracyclines, sulfon-
amides, and β- lactam antibiotics accounted for 72 to 81  percent of sales. Drugs 
 were usually administered via feeds. Antimicrobial sales  were highest for pigs 
with poultry sales slightly outcompeting  those for  cattle. Similar to the 1970s, 
nontherapeutic AGPs accounted for only 83 tons of total antimicrobial sales 
in 1993 (about 17.5  percent) and 96 tons in 1996 (15.3  percent). Coccidiostat sales 
remained relatively constant.124 The numbers validated Raphael Braude’s 1978 
assessment that the AGP- focused Swann bans had achieved  little— except raise 
the dosage of medically relevant antibiotics in feeds. The moral panic triggered 
by the 1996 BSE crisis (chapter 11) would soon end the post-1969 stasis of Brit-
ish agricultural antibiotic infrastructures.
BSE and AGPs
Throughout the 1990s, the shadow of BSE had loomed ever larger over British 
agriculture. In 1992, British Farmer reported that “a billion pounds [had been] 
wiped off the value of the nation’s  cattle”125 following the BSE- related death 
of a Bristol cat in 1990. However, the journal remained optimistic that the “cre-
scendo” of “unjustified public anxiety”126 would ebb. Four years  later, the offi-
cial announcement of a pos si ble link between BSE and vCJD on March 20, 
1996, dashed hopes for a recovery of public trust. Within 24 hours, several EU 
countries issued unilateral bans on British beef and refused to lift them despite 
diplomatic action by the British government. On March 22, the Consumer 
Association recommended removing beef from personal diets. At this point, 
some voices began calling for a complete cull of the national  cattle herd.127 
Whereas domestic beef consumption fell by 50  percent in the first week  after 
the announcement, it recovered to 25  percent below average in the second week. 
The loss of export markets resulted in a further 30  percent drop of sales.128
Agricultural reactions to the moral panic triggered by BSE ranged from 
shock to anti- European outrage. NFU president Sir David Naish assured farm-
ers that he was “deeply aware of the im mense uncertainties and anx i eties fac-
ing you and your families.”129 According to Naish, “the NFU [would] not rest 
in its efforts to restore our customers’ confidence in our product”130 and attacked 
calls for untargeted mass culls. Agricultural magazines reported that Britain 
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did not have enough incinerators to cope with the proposed cull and advertised 
suicide helplines for struggling farmers.131 Farmers’ reactions  were mixed. 
While John Pidsley from Cheshire blamed “media hysteria” for the unneces-
sary “ wholesale slaughter of complete herds,”132 a “worried farmer from Glouces-
tershire” thought that “feed- makers”  were the real villains: “They included the 
meat and bone meal in the rations. We did not ask for it. Now they must pay 
for the damage suffered. . . .  Just like the oil disasters, Baring Bank, lead in feed 
and thalidomide, the firms involved should be made to pay the price and suf-
fer the consequences.”133 According to Anthony Car ter from West Sussex, “BSE 
must teach us all that current perceptions of safe are wrong.”134 Instead of rely-
ing on technological artifice, farmers should accept that “nature works very 
well on its own.”135 Farmer John Newman predicted that BSE would boost sales 
of “safe” and traceable organic products.136 Meanwhile, members of the Soil 
Association called for an increase in organic subsidies and reduced CAP sup-
port for conventional production methods.137
With consumers turning away from British beef, a win dow for inner- 
agricultural reform opened. Mirroring the attention paid to antibiotics in the 
national press (chapter 11), critical commentators used the BSE crisis to ques-
tion other controversial aspects of conventional production like AGPs. Chang-
ing agricultural attitudes are best exemplified in the context of the EU’s 1997 
avoparcin ban. Up to 1997, avoparcin AGPs had been used by about 80  percent 
of British poultry producers and about 30  percent of pig and  cattle producers.138 
Despite its popularity and attempts by the Conservative government to pre-
vent its ban (chapter 11), farm media protests against EU withdrawal  were sur-
prisingly muted. In 1997, Farmers Weekly not only failed to criticize the pending 
ban but also reassured producers that Swedish farmers had been able to phase 
out AGPs with improved diets, hygiene, and all- in- all- out housing.139 Post- BSE 
manuals like Growth of Farm Animals predicted further welfare- and drug- 
related reforms: “unresponsive farmers may find themselves unable to con-
tinue in stock farming and much as they might regard such mea sures as undue 
interference . . .  , they  will perhaps find very  little sympathy from the general 
public.”140
Phar ma ceu ti cal and feed companies  were concerned about developments. 
Following the 1997 general elections, they attempted to whip up popu lar agri-
cultural protest against further AGP bans. NOAH warned that critics  were 
“confused over the facts  behind farming’s role in foodborne disease, antibiotic 
re sis tance and growth promoters.”141 According to NOAH director Roger 
Cook, antibiotics increased food safety and  were “a major  factor in reducing 
salmonella.”142 Demanding that “all sides of the argument” be “represented 
accurately,”143 NOAH also mobilized counter- expertise. During a press brief-
ing, ex- BVA president Karl Linklater claimed that antibiotics brought “signifi-
cant economic benefits,” made “enormous contributions to animal welfare,” 
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and had been used “for 40 years without difficulty.”144 NOAH chairman Bill 
Hird accused Scandinavian reformers of exporting AGP bans to maintain 
“their own high cost agricultural production.”145 His colleague Roger Cook 
used identical arguments against the Soil Association: “the Soil Association rep-
resents organic farmers who, for years, have sought to justify the high prices 
they demand for their products . . . .  They have a vested interest in maintaining 
public anxiety about British food.”146 At the EU level, the industry- sponsored 
Federation of Animal Health (FEDESA) accused power ful consumer groups 
of displacing blame for AMR from  human medicine onto AGPs.147
Phar ma ceu ti cal lobbying divided Britain’s agricultural community. Favor-
ing the interests of larger intensive producers, organ izations like the NFU, the 
Meat and Livestock Commission, and the British Pig Association joined 
NOAH’s pro- AGP campaigning.148  Others begged to differ. According to Jim 
Reed, director of the UK Agricultural Supply Trade Association, it was time 
to start acknowledging consumer demands: “And if that mean[s] a ban on cer-
tain in- feed antibiotics then so be it.”149 Country Life slammed agricultural anti-
biotics for threatening a return to a “pre antibiotic era.”150 While doctors  were 
also to blame for AMR, it was problematic that “all a farmer needs to collect a 
tonne of ‘growth promoter’ is a fork- lift truck.”151 The NFU was making  things 
worse by “playing for time, and  doing itself no favours with a deeply distrust-
ing public  after the BSE scandal. . . .  Instead of constantly retrenching in defence 
of intensive farming, it must direct its efforts to campaigning for higher- cost, 
higher- value foods, educating the public in the pro cess.”152 In response, NFU 
president Ben Gill asserted that his organ ization was merely demanding a reval-
uation of AGPs on the basis of “good science and good knowledge of on- farm 
practices.”153 According to Gill,  there was “no widespread misuse of antibiot-
ics on our farms.  There is use, and declining use, within the rules imposed by 
the British and Eu ro pean authorities.”154
NFU and NOAH appeals for voluntarist alternatives to AGP bans failed 
to inspire significant agricultural protest. Despite attempts to rebrand AGPs 
as environmentally friendly “digestive enhancers,”155 the majority of British 
farmers and agricultural commentators chose not to emulate con temporary US 
opposition to statutory interventions (chapter 9). Two years  after the BSE 
crisis,  there was  little appetite to defend a small group of substances whose 
efficacy was doubtful and whose use could easily be substituted. With major 
supermarkets like Waitrose and Tesco beginning to demand animals produced 
without any growth promoters, popu lar magazines like Farmers Weekly focused 
on preparing farmers for an AGP- free  future.156
In December 1998, the EU banned virginiamycin, tylosin, zinc bacitracin, 
and spiramycin AGPs. Together, the substances accounted for about 80  percent 
of AGPs used in EU pig and poultry rations.157 In contrast to industry predic-
tions, British farmers adapted quickly. On farms, animal nutritionists estimated 
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that AGP bans would cost between 50p and £1 per pig but hoped “to claw at 
least half of that back”158 with better management. Jasper Renold, pig unit man-
ag er on Farmers Weekly’s experimental farm, questioned the entire economic 
logic  behind AGPs: “I think we see them as necessary to safeguard per for mance, 
particularly in weaners. But if you  were to ask me how much benefit they give, 
I  couldn’t tell you. . . .  I think  we’re continuing to use them  because  they’re seen 
as a relatively cheap form of insurance.”159 Not only did Renold’s statement con-
tradict NOAH claims, it also revealed how credulous many had been regard-
ing AGP efficacy claims. Farmers Weekly veterinarian Richard Potter noted 
that he “ wouldn’t be at all surprised if  there was no dip in grower per for mance 
following AGP removal, given the right management and hygiene.”160 Manage-
ment and hygiene  were not the only ways to replace AGPs. Similar to the 1971 
Swann bans, it was also pos si ble to substitute lower- dosed AGPs with feeds con-
taining higher- dosages of prescribed antibiotics. Between 1998 and 2000, 
British AGP sales dropped from 141 to 44 tons of active ingredient while vet-
erinary sales  rose from 433 to 465 tons of active ingredient— despite a parallel 
drop of pig and  cattle numbers.161
Despite  legal rearguard action by phar ma ceu ti cal companies,162 most agri-
cultural observers freely acknowledged that remaining AGPs would not stay 
on the market for long.163 Speaking at the 1999 Pig and Poultry Fair, Tesco’s 
agricultural man ag er announced: “it’s no longer a question of if  there’s a total 
ban on use of AGPs for pig production but when.”164 Suppliers  were encour-
aged to “remove prophylactic use of AGPs,” “the quicker the better.”165 Tesco’s 
prediction came true. In April 2002, the EU Commission proposed phasing 
out the four remaining AGPs (monensin sodium, salinomycin, avilamycin and 
flavophospholipol)— coccidiostats would remain available.166 In 2003, EU agri-
culture ministers confirmed the phasing- out of remaining AGPs by January 1, 
2006.167 Reflecting on AGPs’ imminent end, the 2002 edition of Growth of 
Farm Animals noted:
The classical antibiotic era produced an almost miraculous facilitation of 
growth. Its corollaries  were equally extraordinary in terms of the intensifica-
tion which it allowed and the improvements in efficiency and productivity. 
However,  there are also  causes for regret in that it seems, with hindsight, that 
other improvements remained undeveloped.  These lost opportunities are once 
again beckoning. We now have improved understanding of the physiology of 
the digestive tract and the role of gut bacteria in health and disease combined 
with the ever inventive mind of the farming world and  those associated with it. 
This  will ensure that the  future for the industry may not be as bleak as some 
have feared, and indeed, in a world without routine antibiotics, the  future 
comfort and well- being of farmed animals may in fact be improved and 
sustained profitability achieved again.168
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Antibiotics Reformed?
In late 2005, the end of AGPs attracted barely any mention in Britain’s farm-
ing press. Most agricultural commentators believed that the trajectory of anti-
biotic reform that had started with the 1962 Netherthorpe and 1969 Swann 
reports had now been fulfilled: prescription- free antibiotic access had been 
restricted and veterinary oversight established. Despite data indicating that 
narrow AGP bans alone might not reduce antibiotic use or AMR, hardly 
anybody thought that further statutory reforms  were necessary.169
Consumption data shows that agricultural antibiotic infrastructures  were 
not severely impacted by the 2006 AGP bans. While the phasing out of AGPs 
reduced overall antibiotic use by about 10  percent, the period between 1998 and 
2013 saw higher- dosed therapeutic antibiotic use in the United Kingdom 
increase by 41  percent. The use of coccidiostats and antiparasitic agents also 
increased by 45  percent  after 2006.170 Similar to the 1990s, tetracyclines, sul-
fonamides, and β- lactams remained the most popu lar antibiotics with macro-
lides also gaining in popularity. Pigs continued to receive the most antibiotics 
(40 to 45  percent), and drugs  were mostly administered via medicated feedstuffs 
or  water.171
Therapeutic and prophylactic antibiotic use continued to be advocated in 
agricultural manuals. Despite also containing chapters on transitioning to 
organic farming, the 2003 version of the Agriculture Notebook provided detailed 
advice on how to maintain the health and productivity of livestock. Accord-
ing to the manual, larger production facilities made preventive infection con-
trol essential. Although alternative mea sures  were described, prophylactic 
antibiotic use remained an impor tant method of disease control.172  Whether 
this use was always “rational” is questionable. In 2004, Farmers Weekly offered 
a glimpse into the real ity of prescription- only therapeutic antibiotic use when 
American veterinarian Sam Leadley comically addressed common  mistakes on 
farms:
Pickup- itis
When  after purchase, antibiotic remains in the pickup and was never 
given to the sick animals.
Too- much- water- itis
Directions for reconstituting a powder  were not followed— allowing 
treatment of three calves instead of two. But each injection then 
carries too  little active drug to do the job.
Store- the- syringe- in- the bottle- itis
You always need a needle handy, so just stab the contaminated needle 
back into the  bottle. . . .
Under- dosing- itis . . .
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Windowsill- itis
Exposure to strong sunlight and heat destroyed much of the antibiotic’s 
potency when it was left on the barn windowsill.
Quit- treating- too- soon- itis . . .  173
Other “itis”- types included “one- drug- fits- all- itis” and “virus-it is,”174 which 
meant using antibiotics against viral infections.
Phar ma ceu ti cal companies did their best to promote antibiotic trust in both 
the veterinary and farming press. In 2001, Schering- Plough sponsored a prize 
quiz in Farmers Weekly. Winners  were awarded £1,250 worth of weighing equip-
ment.175 In its three quiz articles, Schering- Plough stressed that farmers should 
treat calf pneumonia early and “trust an antibiotic that is effective against all 
three main pneumonia- causing bacteria.”176 Schering- Plough’s Nuflor (florfen-
icol) was just such a “proven first- line antibiotic for pneumonia,” “effective against 
all major bacterial  causes of pneumonia,” with “no recorded re sis tance”177 
and “now available in extra- value 250ml  bottles.”178 Winners could use their 
weighing kit to “monitor how well  cattle recover  after treatment with Nuflor.”179 
In 2005, phar ma ceu ti cal companies also sponsored “Farmers Weekly Acad-
emy,” which “educated” about treatments against mastitis, metritis, and other 
conditions. Antibiotics produced by the sponsor  were con ve niently mentioned 
below the article.180 Although the EU forced Britain to restrict direct antibiotic 
commercials to farmers in 2011 (chapter 13), similar advertisements remain 
common in the veterinary press.
The narrow scope of AGP reforms and ongoing popularity of routine higher- 
dosed use of similar antibiotics meant that AMR prob lems continued. Dur-
ing the early 2000s, Veterinary Laboratories Agency surveys revealed static 
AMR among many Salmonella isolates but a sharp post-1980s increase of AMR 
in S. typhimurium against all tested antimicrobials.181 Surveys also revealed 
increasing E. coli re sis tance against tetracyclines, trimethoprim/sulfonamide, 
and fluoroquinolones. In 2004, the agency isolated the first animal strains of 
extended- spectrum beta- lactamase (ESBL) producing E. coli from Welsh calves. 
Another outbreak involving the death of several calves occurred in 2006, and 
the ESBL- encoding gene (CTX- M-15) was detected on affected farms. In 
 humans, ESBL E. coli  were si mul ta neously causing a rise of resistant urinary 
tract infections (UTIs) and blood poisoning. AMR in farm strains likely orig-
inated in  humans but had been selected for and amplified by agricultural anti-
biotic use.182 On farms, ESBL se lection pressure was being exerted by rising use of 
third and fourth generation cephalosporins, which  were listed as critically impor-
tant antibiotics (CIAs) by the WHO in 2007. Between 1999 and 2006, British 
veterinary use of cephalosporins had more than tripled from 220 to 680 kilo-
grams of active ingredient. Prescriptions of other CIAs like fluoroquinolones 
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had increased by more than 50   percent from 1,230 to 1,951 kilograms between 
2000 and 2007.183
The effects of rising reserve antibiotic use  were predictable. By 2012, 
82.8  percent of calves on one UK dairy farm tested positive for ESBL E. coli at 
one day of age. Observers also warned that ESBL proliferation could be driven 
by feeding antibiotic- tainted waste milk to calves.184 This practice had been 
condemned as unacceptable by MAFF researchers in 1990 but had continued 
due to loopholes in EU regulations.185 Contaminated waste milk accrued  after 
routine mastitis treatment. In 2010-11, a survey of 557 British dairy farms 
revealed that 93  percent used antibiotic inframammary tubes to treat mastitis 
and 96  percent used antibiotic tubes to dry off cows: 29  percent of tubes for 
lactating cows contained cefquinome and 43  percent of dry cow tubes con-
tained cefalonium. Both drugs  were cephalosporins. Over 90  percent of farms 
fed resulting waste milk to calves.186
Improved AMR surveillance also showed that agricultural AMR se lection 
could threaten the health of farmers and veterinarians. A 2008 study of 
272 attendees of a Copenhagen pig health conference found that 12.5  percent 
carried strains of community- acquired methicillin resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (ST398 MRSA). Carriage among attending veterinarians and farmers 
was significantly higher than in the average population (about 0.03  percent 
to 3  percent).187 Although it only slowly spread to Britain, livestock-associated 
 MRSA was detected on UK farms and food in 2015.188
More fine- grained AMR surveillance and improved usage data made it 
increasingly difficult to resist further statutory regulations for therapeutic anti-
biotic use in agriculture. Boosted by new government campaigns to curb 
AMR (chapter 13), critical medical, environmentalist, consumer, and agricul-
tural organ izations like the Soil Association have proposed numerous ways to 
curb AMR  hazards.189 While voluntary reform proposals mostly focus on 
farmer and veterinary education, statutory proposals include: banning the use 
of CIAs in agriculture, decoupling veterinary prescription and sales privileges 
as occurred in Denmark in 1994, introducing annual antibiotic allowances as 
occurred in Denmark in 2010, phasing out prophylactic antibiotic use, requir-
ing mandatory reports for metaphylactic antibiotic use, and establishing 
national antibiotic reduction targets. In 2014, the Eu ro pean Consumer Organ-
isation (BEUC) also called for bans of off- label use and the so- called cascade, 
whereby veterinarians can prescribe drugs listed in the  Table of Allowed Sub-
stances in Commission Regulation (EU No37/2010) for unauthorized uses.190
Reacting to  these calls, Britain’s conventional farmers and veterinarians have 
for the most part pursued a strategy of emphasizing voluntarist over statutory 
reform. The Responsible Use of Medicines in Agriculture (RUMA) Alliance 
has played an impor tant role in this strategy. RUMA comprises not only 
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impor tant producer and veterinary organ izations like the NFU and BVA but 
also phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers gathered in NOAH. Similar to industry- 
affiliated think tanks in the US (chapters 8 and 10), RUMA describes itself as 
an in de pen dent “farm to fork” advisory organ ization with a strong focus on 
antibiotic policy.191 Since its foundation in the wake of the 1997 avoparcin ban, 
RUMA has repeatedly called for more research, challenged statutory reform 
initiatives such as bans and reduction targets, and developed guidelines for 
best- practice conventional antibiotic use192— the first of which was published 
in 1999 and immediately accused by the Soil Association and Compassion in 
World Farming of “ ‘putting a gloss’ on Britain’s reluctance to reduce the use of 
drugs.”193
RUMA’s “light green” voluntarism was mirrored by partner organ izations 
like the BVA. Since the late 1990s, the BVA has or ga nized antibiotic awareness 
campaigns, promoted targeted “rational” drug use, issued an eight- point plan 
to limit AMR, and developed biomass- based calculations to limit over- and 
underdosing.194 Referring to  these initiatives, veterinarians reacted angrily to 
ongoing allegations of antibiotic overuse. Similar to the early 1980s, letters in 
the Veterinary Rec ord complained that physicians  were equally complicit regard-
ing antibiotic overuse and justified drug use with references to global popula-
tion growth.195  After the United Kingdom’s CMO Sir Liam Donaldson called 
for a ban of quinolone and cephalosporin use in animals in 2008, RUMA 
asserted that “veterinarians need the full range of antibiotics to help protect 
the health and welfare of Britain’s farm animals, and to help ensure the safety 
of food derived from  those animals.”196 In 2012, RUMA also challenged an EU 
Parliament resolution calling on member states to reduce the “uncontrolled pro-
phylactic use of antimicrobials in animal husbandry.”197 According to RUMA, 
the resolution and a similar one in the House of Commons repeated “some of 
the myths on the use of antibiotics in agriculture and the impact this has on 
antibiotic re sis tance in  humans . . . .  There is, however, a scientific consensus 
that use of antimicrobials in  human medicine rather than antibiotic use in the 
veterinary sector is the driving force for antibiotic- resistant  human infec-
tions.”198 In 2014, antibiotic prophylaxis was again defended by BVA presi-
dent Robin Hargreaves on animal welfare grounds and by NOAH and RUMA 
in front of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee.199 
Similar concerns about “overly restrictive” bans and impacts on animal welfare 
 were also put forward by the National Pig Association in response to the EU 
Parliament’s 2018 decision to ban prophylactic antibiotic use.200
Social sciences research is providing more detailed insight into how veteri-
narians and farmers perceive antibiotics and their risks. In 2014, the BVA found 
that 90  percent of veterinarians  were concerned about AMR. Poor client com-
pliance, ignorance, and pressure for antibiotic prescriptions  were listed as sig-
nificant prob lems.201 A parallel study found that most farmers and veterinarians 
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believed that better housing, vaccinations, biosecurity, and other environmen-
tal improvements could reduce antibiotic use. Similar to the 1970s, antibiot-
ics’ cost was described as a significant  factor influencing prescriptions. While 
veterinarians denied that they prescribed antibiotics for reasons of profitabil-
ity, farmers also denied that that they  were pushing their veterinarians to pre-
scribe drugs. Both sides thought that they used antibiotics prudently, opposed 
statutory restrictions, denied being influenced by industry advertisements, and 
defended antibiotic prophylaxis. While farmers considered veterinarians to 
have overall responsibility for stewardship, veterinarians listed NOAH’s com-
pendium on drugs as their most trusted source of antibiotic information. Many 
farmers and veterinarians also thought that  there was insufficient evidence to 
prove a decisive link between antimicrobial use in food- producing animals and 
AMR prob lems in  humans.202
In Britain, the last five years have seen doubts about agricultural AMR 
 hazards come  under fire. Improved AMR surveillance, antibiotic reduction tar-
gets, and campaigning by CMO Sally Davies have significantly reduced anti-
biotic use (chapter 13). Pressure for British reforms was increased by aggressive 
reduction campaigns in other EU countries like Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Between 2012 and 2017, British antibiotic use in animals (including  horses 
and companion animals) decreased by over 50  percent from 464 to 228 tons— 
extra- label drug use was not mea sured. The EU also introduced more reliable 
mea sure ment units. Antibiotic use is now correlated to the technical population 
correlation unit (PCU), which equals 1 kilogram of animal treated. Between 
2012 and 2016, British antibiotic use almost halved from 66 to 37 milligram 
per PCU. Use of reserve antibiotics like the fluoroquinolones and cephalospo-
rin also decreased from 2015 onward. Overall antibiotic consumption declined 
significantly in both pig and poultry production. Reductions proved more dif-
ficult in the dairy and  cattle sectors.203
This rapid drop of British antibiotic use is impressive. Its semi- voluntarist 
(nonstatutory) nature may also signal an impor tant shift  toward bottom-up 
value- driven antibiotic stewardship in agricultural circles.204 Cynical observ-
ers might, however, note how quick agricultural change occurred once exter-
nal pressure and the likelihood of further statutory interventions  were high 
enough. Historically, what is remarkable about British antibiotic infrastruc-
tures is how physically and culturally robust they have been. Even  after EU 
AGP bans, the proportion of British antibiotics used in animals (about 
45  percent of total use in 2013) remained roughly the same as prior to the 1969 
Swann report (about 40 to 44  percent). Overall agricultural antibiotic use in 
2017 (228 tons) was still 60 tons higher than in 1967 (168 tons).205 Antibiotic 
infrastructures’ resilience has in part been due to producers’ and veterinarians’ 
belief in antibiotics’ safety and in part due to the narrow nature of external and 
internal reforms. Empowered by the Swann report, British veterinarians tended 
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to blame rising AMR on physicians rather than address economic conflicts of 
interest leading to antibiotic overuse and jeopardize prescription rights. Despite 
employing “green” rhe toric and tolerating antibiotic- free market niches, farm 
organ izations repeatedly defended production models in which antibiotics  were 
a routine and— more importantly— cost- effective solution to disease pressure. 
This was despite evidence highlighting the failure of narrow AGP restrictions 
from the late 1970s onward. While changing consumer preferences, fraying 
corporatism, and the 1996 BSE crisis eventually fractured internal support for 
AGPs, voluntarist impulses for systemic reforms of therapeutic antibiotic 
use remained relatively in effec tive  until recent British and EU (semi) statutory 
pressure.
Resulting antibiotic reductions are commendable. The question is how long 
the current semi- voluntarist push for reform  will last.  Until 2013, the biggest 
reduction of British antibiotic use occurred not as a result of voluntarist guide-
lines but as a result of statutory intervention. Interventions occurred within a 
unified Eu ro pean market and  were the result of continental pressure, initiatives 
by individual British governments, and increasingly integrated AMR surveil-
lance. What  will happen to antibiotic standards and industry’s willingness to 
reform should British agriculture become decoupled from the EU’s common 
market is unclear. At the point of writing, Britain has failed to commit to the 
EU Parliament’s path- breaking 2018 decision to limit metaphylactic and 
prophylactic antibiotic use.206
F IGURE 12.3  Total annual sale of active antibiotic ingredients in the UK. Source: “Joint 
Committee on the Use of Antibiotics in Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine” 
(London: HMSO, 1969); “UK Veterinary Antibiotic Re sis tance and Sales Surveillance 




British Antibiotic Policy 
 After 1969
This chapter explores the development of British antibiotic policy  after the 1969 
Swann report. Despite Britain’s role in pioneering precautionary antibiotic 
restrictions, subsequent de cades  were characterized less by British and more by 
Eu ro pean leadership on antibiotic policy. During the 1970s, officials watered 
down many recommendations of the original Swann report. Although Britain 
banned medically relevant AGPs in 1971, bureaucratic rivalries and industry 
pressure led to an abandonment of other recommendations like improved sur-
veillance, advertising bans, and a strong joint committee on all forms of anti-
biotic use. Similar to public Swann patriotism, the Swann report turned into 
an unquestioned official “gospel” to be spread to other nations. It was only dur-
ing the 1980s that EEC pressure and Salmonella scandals forced British 
officials to establish stricter residue and microbial food controls. With 
AMR- oriented reforms stagnating  under the Thatcher and Major governments, 
continental Eu ro pe ans also played a decisive role in pushing for further AGP 
bans. Britain resisted early reforms despite finding itself isolated on relevant 
EU committees. In the end, British support for EU AGP bans resulted from 
the combined pressure of Scandinavian countries, the 1996 BSE crisis, and the 
election of the New  Labour government. While EU bans fulfilled the narrow 
AGP- focused policy trajectories of the 1960s, statutory reforms of prescription- 
only antibiotic use continue to divide British decision- makers. Despite the 
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marked recent success of voluntarist antibiotic reductions, it remains unclear 
 whether post- Brexit Britain  will enact EU bans of prophylactic antibiotic use 
by 2022.
Implementation
On November 20, 1969, public pressure and an upcoming election had forced 
Cledwyn Hughes,  Labour’s minister of agriculture, to publicly commit his 
ministry to the Swann report’s implementation. The initial promise was that 
penicillin and tetracycline AGPs would be banned sooner rather than  later. 
As a consequence, MAFF officials  were surprised when three weeks ahead of 
the 1970 general elections a minute suddenly announced that the original 
plan to ban AGPs by July 1 was “off.”1
MAFF officials had spent the past months negotiating the July deadline 
with all interested parties. Moving speedily, they had authorized the use of 
Eu ro pean “nontherapeutic” antibiotics like Zinc bacitracin (AL Pharma, Nor-
way), virginiamycin (Beecham), and flavomycin (Hoechst) in feeds in 1970.2 
However,  behind closed doors, industry opposition to ele ments of the Swann 
report remained strong. Although most members of the Association of the Brit-
ish Phar ma ceu ti cal Industry (ABPI) eventually accepted the report’s recom-
mendations, the NFU continued to insist on the “need to use [therapeutic] 
antibiotics for stress”3— thereby paving the way for low- dosed prescriptions of 
banned AGPs. American producers also protested the Swann report. As one 
of the companies most affected by bans of medically relevant AGPs, American 
Cyanamid launched a systematic campaign to prevent bans of its broadspec-
trum AGPs. Writing to Parliamentary Secretary John Mackie in May 1970, 
Cyanamid International president Ernest Hesse warned that Britain had taken 
on a “heavy responsibility in introducing legislative controls.”4 Having “pio-
neered”5 agricultural antibiotic use, Cyanamid considered AMR  hazards 
insignificant.
In contrast to other ABPI members, Cyanamid not only lobbied British offi-
cials but also de cided to abandon corporatist etiquette and adopt an antago-
nistic American style of public campaigning. In 1970, Cyanamid sponsored a 
symposium at the Royal Society for Medicine and flew in two ex- employees 
from the United States. Having cut their teeth in campaigns against Rachel 
Carson’s  Silent Spring,6 Thomas Jukes and Rutgers biochemist Robert White- 
Stevens cast doubt on AMR  hazards. White- Stevens claimed to speak for large 
parts of “the scientific community” when he portrayed the Swann report as the 
most recent manifestation of a “tendency to provoke pessimism over scientific 
pro gress” and “loudly [bewail] the usually quite insignificant side- effects of 
technology.”7 Convinced that “scientific agriculture must ‘hold a fin ger in the 
dike’ against starvation,” White- Stevens urged authorities to “maintain meat 
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production at its highest level.”8 Thomas Jukes “flatly rejected”9 Swann. Refer-
ring to “an exploding  human population,” Jukes claimed that the report was 
not based on “facts”:
 1) Antibiotics have retained their effectiveness for the production of 
growth of farm animals  after continuous use for nearly eigh teen years.
 2)  There is no evidence that the use of antibiotics in animal feeds has led 
to an increase in re sis tance  either in animal or  human pathogens.10
Another familiar speaker at Cyanamid’s symposium was Nobel laureate 
Ernst Boris Chain. Having only recently advised Beecham on how to oppose 
antibiotic restrictions (chapter 7), Chain attacked the Swann report: “The 
Swann report has changed nothing. No one has banned the use of antibiotics 
in veterinary praxis. The farmers can get hold of exactly the same antibiotics as 
before, only it is more expensive now  because you need a vet’s prescription. Of 
course, in all probability more antibiotics  will be used, . . . .”11 Chain also noted 
that AMR in animals was less hazardous than claimed: “I thought the main 
point which Dr. [E. S.] Anderson was making was that  there was a danger that 
[S. typhimurium re sis tance] could be transferred to typhoid. . . .  Where is the 
evidence for that? So far that transfer from typhimurium to typhoid has never 
occurred and I do not think it  will occur.”12 Congratulating Chain on his “quite 
devastating contribution on the Swann recommendations,”13 Cyanamid’s W. E. 
McAlister hoped that Chain could also speak at an upcoming NFU meeting. 
Chain replied by noting that many British companies hoped that the Swann 
bans would increase sales of their own products. His personal grievance with 
the Swann report lay in its alleged alarmism: “I am alarmed by the ease with 
which public opinion can be stirred up . . .  and the readiness of the politicians 
to pass legislation  under the pressure of such statements.”14
Cyanamid’s public relations campaign against AGP bans backfired. Trying 
to foment US- style public opposition to regulatory science (chapter 10), the 
com pany and its media advisors underestimated growing British Swann patri-
otism (chapter 11) and Whitehall’s abhorrence of public controversy. Similar 
to E. S. Anderson’s 1960s exclusion from expert consultation (chapter 7), Cyan-
amid representatives soon discovered that they too could be ostracized from 
confidential corporatist decision- making. Having attended Cyanamid’s 1970 
briefing, a MAFF official reported that the “press representatives pre sent” had 
been “surprisingly hostile.”15 Journalists had wanted to know “why they should 
believe what [Jukes and White- Stevens] had said in preference to Swann’s 
report.”16 In the end, “only the Guardian . . .  covered [the] story.”17 MAFF’s 
Animal Health Division was relieved to note that while manufacturers also 
considered the “Swann proposals too sweeping,” they  were “not prepared to use 
the publicity methods  adopted by Cyanamid.”18 Learning from its  mistakes, 
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Cyanamid subsequently  adopted more indirect forms of lobbying. In Novem-
ber 1970, the com pany invited Ernst Boris Chain to comment on plans to invite 
“on an international scale” “a select group of the larger research- based firms 
engaged in  human, animal and plant health work.” “The object is to provide a 
more direct and more effective communications pathway with key govern-
ments. . . .  recent examples of hasty adoption of ill- judged regulations by vari-
ous Western parliaments indicates a  great lack of understanding of the wider 
implications.”19
Despite the failure of Cyanamid’s PR campaign, MAFF’s position remained 
complicated. Without evidence of direct harm resulting from AMR se lection 
by low- dosed AGPs, the precautionary Swann bans remained based on a 
theoretical argument, which was difficult to communicate. MAFF officials 
complained, “It is not pos si ble to produce conclusive scientific evidence to jus-
tify fully  either accepting the proposals or rejecting them.”20 Wary of MAFF’s 
public commitment to the Swann report, an internal memo warned, “In view 
of the uncertainties we cannot afford to wait  until [the debate over  hazards is 
over]—if ever.”21 Meanwhile, officials remained committed to maintaining 
good relations with corporatist partners in farming and industry and tried to 
offer “as smooth a transition as pos si ble”22 even if this led to implementation 
delays. Within nine months of accepting the Swann report, MAFF twice post-
poned deadlines for penicillin and tetracycline bans, first to October  1970 
and then to January 1971.23
Following the Conservatives’ victory in the July 1970 general elections, 
implementing the Labour- commissioned Swann report became even more com-
plicated. The new Conservative minister of agriculture, James Prior, initially 
“agreed that failure to implement the Swann recommendations would be very 
difficult to defend po liti cally.”24 However, despite officials’ warning that “too 
many deadlines had been breached in the past,”25 Prior soon began to waver. 
Six days  after a meeting between Prior and his officials in August 1970, MAFF 
further postponed the implementation date of the Swann bans to March and 
September 1971.26 Three days before the August meeting, Prior had received a 
letter from Cyanamid Britain’s Keith Grainger. The intimate tone of Grainger’s 
letter to Prior is striking.  After congratulating “dear Jim” for “[getting] off to 
a very good start!!”27 Grainger immediately broached the topic of the Swann 
bans: “Obviously, I would be considered to be biased, but  there is  little doubt 
that this report caused considerable comment in scientific circles and some out-
standing figures have taken issue with Professor Swann.”28 Grainger warned 
that the “practical prob lems and the cost of fully implementing ‘Swann’ would 
be im mense.”29 Casting doubt on AMR  hazards, Grainger was sure that Prior 
would not “wish farmers and veterinary surgeons to be made the scapegoats for 
a subject which has much wider implications.”30 While Grainger appreciated 
that “Jim” had “inherited this par tic u lar ‘hot potato’ from [his] pre de ces sor,”31 
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he was  eager to supply “proper” information. Signing with his first name, Keith 
invited MAFF to send representatives to an upcoming symposium on the “The 
Prob lems of Drug Resistant Pathogenic Bacteria”32 at New York’s Waldorf- 
Astoria  Hotel. MAFF de cided to send A. B. Paterson, director of the Central 
Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in Weybridge: “First, and this is as it  were a 
public relations reason, in view of the strong attack which has been made on the 
Swann Committee recommendations we  ought to make it abundantly clear 
that we are prepared to listen to all the views which are being put forward. . . . 
Second, . . .  we  ought in fact make sure that we are in touch with the latest 
developments.”33
Similar to the 1967 NAS meeting on drugs in feeds (chapter 4), the New 
York symposium exposed divisions between Eu ro pean and US attendees. Con-
tradicting Eu ro pean warnings, scientists associated with the US phar ma ceu ti-
cal industry downplayed horizontal AMR risks. While the omnipresent 
Thomas Jukes repeated familiar arguments,34 Harold Jarolmen from Cyana-
mid’s Agricultural Division claimed that R- factor transfer in live animals was 
negligible. In the rare cases that in vivo transfer did occur, bacterial strains sup-
posedly lost their “virulence” and  were put “at a competitive disadvantage.”35 
The symposium also highlighted differing official risk assessments. In his pre-
sen ta tion, FDA BVM director C. D. Van Houweling noted: “ There are impor-
tant differences in the uses of antibiotics in animals in  Great Britain and in 
the United States. We believe that through our new drug approvals . . .  we have 
controls that they do not have in  Great Britain. However, we do recognize that 
the continuous or prolonged use of antibiotics in feed does cause gramnega-
tive organisms to develop re sis tance.”36 Writing to Van Houweling one week 
 later, A.B. Paterson from Britain’s Central Veterinary Laboratory looked for-
ward to reading the upcoming FDA task force report on antibiotics in feeds 
(chapter 10), “which can perhaps be described as the ‘U.S. Swann.’ ”37 Having 
learned “a good deal” in New York, Paterson promised to send British mate-
rial on AMR se lection  under “feedlot conditions.”38 However, Paterson also 
warned Van Houweling that combating AMR entailed more than curbing resi-
dues in milk and meat: “At the Conference itself I felt that quite unwittingly 
we  were talking rather at cross- purposes in that the FDA has concerned itself 
very largely with the prob lem of residues and the pos si ble effect of  these resi-
dues on the  human population, whilst Swann is almost entirely concerned with 
the pos si ble development of antibiotic resistant strains and their significance 
in outbreaks of disease in both animals and  humans.”39
Although the 1970 symposium did not resolve transatlantic differences, 
MAFF was unable to renege on its public commitment to the 1969 Swann 
report. In March 1971, Britain banned penicillin and tetracycline AGPs. In Sep-
tember, further controls of tylosin, sulfonamides, furazolidone, and furalta-
done  were published. While the bans looked tough on paper, MAFF had 
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considerably eased the transition for British farmers. In addition to delaying 
the implementation of AGP bans by over a year, officials provided access to 
numerous alternatives: farmers could now feed zinc bacitracin (at 100 parts per 
million to pigs and poultry and 20 parts per million for calves), virginiamycin 
(at 5 parts per million), flavomycin (at 20 parts per million), and nitrovin. They 
could also still feed sulphaquinoxaline (at up to 125 parts per million) and sul-
phanitrin (at up to 300 parts per million) without veterinary prescriptions.40 
Meanwhile,  legal access to therapeutic antibiotics remained a prescription away. 
With agricultural antibiotic infrastructures remaining unchallenged (chap-
ter 12), Ernst Chain’s prediction of rising antibiotic use soon came true.
Dilution
In contrast to AGP bans,  there was significantly less public pressure on MAFF 
to implement other Swann recommendations like improved AMR surveillance, 
antibiotic advertising bans, and a new expert committee on all forms of anti-
biotic use. Implementation of  these additional proposals was further compli-
cated by bureaucratic rivalries and opposition from corporatist partners in 
farming and the phar ma ceu ti cal industry.
In the case of the proposed expert committee on antibiotics, internal power 
strug gles repeatedly delayed official action. It had already been clear in 1969 
that the new antibiotics committee would sit uncomfortably between the Vet-
erinary Products Committee (VPC) and the Committee on Safety of Medi-
cines (CSM), which had both been established by the 1968 Medicines Act to 
review drug applications.41 Despite pressure from MAFF and the Department 
of Health and Social Ser vices (DHSS),42 internal power strug gles delayed the 
formation of the new antibiotics committee. Following the dissolution of the 
already existing Antibiotics Panel in 1970,43 it took involved parties two years 
to compromise on a joint advisory committee, whose advice would be nonbind-
ing to both the VPC and CSM.44 In the absence of an official body capable of 
assessing industry applications, British veterinary antibiotic licensing ground 
to a halt. Bureaucratic power strug gles  were only fully resolved as a result of 
pressure by phar ma ceu ti cal companies on the VPC.45 In March 1973, a VPC 
official informed the CSM: “ because of the need for expert advice on EEC 
 matters and also  because of the number of antibiotic applications awaiting scru-
tiny . . .  I should be most grateful if every thing pos si ble could be done . . .  to 
save any further embarrassment.”46
The Joint Sub- Committee on Antimicrobial Substances (JSC) fi nally started 
work on July 2, 1973 and was chaired by former PHLS director and Swann 
member James Howie.47 The JSC also included other prominent members: offi-
cially reconciled with MAFF  after his 1960s fallout with the ministry, PHLS 
researcher E. S. Anderson served alongside University of Liverpool veterinarian 
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John  R. Walton and Houghton veterinary bacteriologist Herbert Williams 
Smith.48 Despite their scientific standing, members of the JSC, however, soon 
found that their committee lacked real po liti cal power: phar ma ceu ti cal man-
ufacturers repeatedly refused to provide basic sales data and wider policy deci-
sions on antibiotics  were made without JSC input.49 Relations with the CSM 
and VPC also proved difficult.  Because the CSM preferred to consult its own 
experts, JSC members gradually turned into VPC antibiotic con sul tants with-
out access to confidential licensing information. In September 1979, members 
sent a list of grievances to the VPC and CSM and called for a strengthening 
and reform of their committee. While some distinguished members had sim-
ply  stopped attending JSC meetings, remaining members  were frustrated by 
their inability to properly evaluate often poorly submitted antibiotic licensing 
applications. JSC members “not unreasonably consider[ed] that they are too 
often being invited [to VPC meetings] merely to  hazard a guess about the value 
or safety of the products  under consideration.”50 Referring to parallel reports on 
black market antibiotic sales and “uncritical prescribing” by veterinarians and 
physicians, the JSC noted that its attempts to “secure rational use of anti- 
microbial substances”51 had failed.
For a while, the fate of the dysfunctional JSC hung in the balance. Although 
some officials considered it unwise to disband the committee due to the “emo-
tive area”52 it dealt with, the VPC and CSM  were both unwilling to devolve 
power and  were facing parallel pressure to simplify drug licensing procedures.53 
According to the CSM, “ little would be lost if [the JSC]  were disbanded.”54 
Unwilling to fund the JSC by itself, the VPC agreed to disband the commit-
tee. Although JSC members deplored their dismissal, the JSC was disbanded 
on December 31, 1980, and Britain returned to the pre-1969 separation of offi-
cial responsibilities for agricultural and medical antibiotic use.55
The JSC was not the only Swann recommendation to suffer from lackluster 
official support. MAFF and DHSS  were also reluctant to commit funds to 
AMR monitoring. Although the Central Veterinary Laboratory in Weybridge 
routinely screened Salmonella isolates for re sis tance from 1971 onward,56 this 
passive surveillance was not necessarily representative of overall AMR. Patho-
gen isolates sent to Weybridge came from clinical infections and provided no 
overview of farms’ wider microbial ecol ogy. Meanwhile, routine PHLS surveil-
lance mostly only covered samples received from medical prac ti tion ers.57 To 
gain a better understanding of AMR on farms, food, and the environment, the 
PHLS and CVL wanted to conduct an active “in depth [study] of the drug 
re sis tance in enterobacteria.”58
MAFF officials feared that improved AMR surveillance might lead to incon-
ve nient truths. Responding to protectionist agricultural demands for AMR sur-
veillance of meat imports in 1970,59 officials initially worried that re sis tance 
detections might necessitate the “drastic step”60 of import rejections. According 
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to MAFF, monitoring would surely reveal “major difficulties”61 with continen-
tal and Irish imports. Attempting to avoid a diplomatic incident but appease 
farmers,62 officials proposed a  limited pi lot survey of imports. The AMR survey 
was to be evaluated by an interdepartmental committee and conducted by E. S. 
Anderson, who— with characteristic bluntness— had already stated that it was 
“eyewash.”63 Un perturbed by Anderson’s views, MAFF planned to use the pi lot 
survey and official inquiries to foreign governments to appease domestic farm-
ing organ izations and dissuade the use of banned AGPs for British- bound ani-
mals.64 Britain’s program of “spreading the Swann gospel”65 was, however, soon 
put on hold.66  Because of renewed EEC membership negotiations following the 
1970 general election, MAFF argued that Britain should put its “own  house in 
order”67 instead of antagonizing EEC members.
 Behind the scenes, E. S. Anderson was nonetheless commissioned to go 
ahead with a  limited import survey. Confident in the efficacy of the Swann bans 
and planning ahead to the time following Britain’s EEC accession, MAFF offi-
cials wanted “to confront countries with a vested interest in antibiotics with 
scientific facts but we would prefer to keep quiet  until such data are available.”68 
Although the EEC had agreed to introduce Swann- style restrictions in Novem-
ber 1970, EEC Directive 70 524 allowed the use of some substances that  were 
prohibited in the United Kingdom.69 MAFF’s plan was to use AMR data 
to push for EEC bans of  these substances and “general ac cep tance in the 
Community of the Swann philosophy”70 prior to the end of Britain’s exemption 
from full EEC compliance in 1978.
Reporting in April 1972, Anderson seemingly confirmed MAFF suspicions 
of lax foreign standards. Between February and October 1971, veterinarians had 
collected samples of Irish beef and pork and of US sheep and lamb livers at Brit-
ish ports.71 Twenty- nine of thirty- two US lamb livers and two of seven US 
sheep livers carried resistant E. coli.72 Despite cleansing by high- pressure hos-
ing, 57.8  percent of Irish beef samples and 75.6  percent of Irish pork samples 
 were contaminated with E. coli; 25.2  percent of isolated E. coli from Irish beef 
and 94.9  percent of isolated E. coli from Irish pork  were antibiotic resistant.73 
It was “relatively common” for Irish E. coli to be “resistant to combinations of 
the restricted ‘therapeutic’ drugs ampicillin, chloramphenicol, neomycin- 
kanamycin, streptomycin and sulphonamides.”74 According to Anderson, this 
was unsurprising, “since the Irish farmer has  free access to all therapeutic anti-
biotics.”75 Re sis tance “was transferable or mobilizable”76 from 94.8  percent of 
resistant strains from Irish beef, from 99.5  percent of resistant strains from Irish 
pork, and from 88  percent of resistant strains from US sheep livers. The confi-
dential study was received with interest by British regulators and the Ameri-
can FDA with whom Britain shared the results.77 In May 1972, a MAFF official 
hoped that Anderson’s data would pressure the Republic of Ireland to reform 
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antibiotic regulations and block illegal antibiotic sales into Northern Ireland.78 
One month  later, the Working Group on the Monitoring of Imported Meat 
for Antibiotic Resistant Enterobacteria pressed for further studies of French 
and Dutch imports, as the latter country had “a vested interest in the use of 
antibiotics in animal husbandry.”79
To their dismay, British officials, however, soon found that they  were throw-
ing stones in a glass  house. In January 1973, the planned expansion of AMR 
monitoring was halted when spotlight surveys indicated ongoing prob lems 
within British agriculture. Between 1971 and 1972, streptomycin re sis tance 
among domestic E. coli isolates had risen from 47 to 50  percent, tetracycline re sis-
tance from 44 to 50  percent, and ampicillin re sis tance from 49 to 56  percent.80 
Although AMR levels  were lower than in other EEC countries, the results 
contradicted projected Swann outcomes and undermined Britain’s attempt 
to promote Swann- style AGP restrictions within the EEC. A MAFF official 
warned that previously planned comparative AMR surveys could “only be 
done on the basis of a  free exchange of information”: “this might rob us of 
some of our advantage during the 5- year derogation from EEC practice . . .  in 
the course of which we hope that the [EEC’s antibiotic policy]  will align with 
us.”81 While he was confident that results would not “invalidate the Swann doc-
trine,”82 it might take longer than five years for positive data to emerge. For 
fear of jeopardizing the “Swann gospel,” no new systematic AMR surveys  were 
commissioned. Potential studies would likely have undermined  limited AGP 
restrictions: when British farmers protested against egg imports from French 
hens fed antibiotics in 1975 (chapter 12), a MAFF survey found no difference 
regarding AMR on French and British produce.83
With British officials stopping AMR monitoring rather than endangering 
an ossified gospel of partial restrictions, the Swann report’s broader goal of curb-
ing AMR was effectively forsaken within four years of its publication. Instead 
of critically revaluating and expanding existing regulations, short- term eco-
nomic considerations reduced chances for an effective response to rising 
AMR. The lack of robust British monitoring data also impacted parallel FDA 
attempts to restrict AGPs (chapter 10). In 1974, a joint US/Canadian fact- 
finding mission noted that the  limited Swann bans had not resulted in signifi-
cant economic prob lems for British farmers but also found no evidence with 
which to support plans for North American AGP restrictions.84 In the same 
year, PHLS and CVL representatives warned that passive surveillance of 
British E. coli isolates showed a rise of chloramphenicol resistance— prob ably 
as a result of ongoing veterinary chloramphenicol use against Salmonella. With 
the exception of declining streptomycin re sis tance, AMR levels in British 
Salmonella isolates had remained constant. AMR patterns  were similar to 
 those in Ireland where AGPs had not been banned.85
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In addition to weakening the JSC and stalling AMR monitoring, officials 
also failed to enact the Swann report’s proposed ban of antibiotic advertise-
ments to farmers. In 1972, MAFF’s Animal Health Division noted that the 
BVA, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, and the British Phar ma ceu ti-
cal Society all favored advertising bans: “They argue that [veterinarians’] . . . 
task should not be made more difficult by uninformed pressures from clients 
responding to advertising. Also they think that . . .  there is a danger that some 
clients whose interest has been aroused  will obtain supplies illicitly.”86 Unsur-
prisingly, the ABPI, NFU, and British Poultry Federation opposed bans. The 
latter faction argued that restrictions gave further “control to veterinarians and 
that the Government should not ‘molly- coddle’ them.”87 Following several 
inconclusive meetings, MAFF officials noted that in the absence of a corpo-
ratist compromise between the two factions the “proper course would be to 
accept the logic of the Swann recommendation” and announce “the intention 
to make regulations in the absence of an effective voluntary [restriction] 
scheme.”88 However, similar to his 1971 delay of AGP bans, Conservative min-
ister of agriculture James Prior again failed to heed his officials’ advice. Despite 
appeals by ju nior health minister Lord Aberdare, Prior referred the  matter to 
the still non ex is tent JSC. In a draft letter to Aberdare, Prior stated: “I do not 
subscribe to the view that the veterinary profession is not strong enough to resist 
pressure from its farmer clients; and although the drug manufacturers are obvi-
ously keen to sell I am not sure that advertising necessarily increases overall 
demand.”89
Following Prior’s promotion to leader of the House of Commons, the issue 
of antibiotic advertising bans resurfaced two years  later when both the JSC and 
VPC endorsed restrictions.90 However, Prior’s successor failed to address the 
 matter ahead of the 1974 general election. Following the Conservatives’ defeat, 
MAFF officials duly resubmitted the proposed restrictions to their new  Labour 
ministers.91 A frustrated official noted: “My own view is that, while in  matters 
of this sort  there is often much to be said for leaving well alone [sic], in this case 
we cannot ignore the advice of 3 official committees nor swallow the assertion 
of the manufacturers that they do not seek to enlist the support of the farmer 
in building up an even bigger market in therapeutic antibiotics, regardless of 
true need.”92 Half a de cade  after their initial proposal by the Swann report, the 
opportune moment for advertisement restrictions had, however, passed. Despite 
ministerial approval, proposed restrictions  were quietly dropped  after techni-
calities further delayed official action in 1975.93
By 1980, many impor tant proposals of the 1969 Swann report had thus  either 
failed to materialize or been watered down. Although  limited AGP bans had 
been implemented in 1971,  there was no systematic British AMR monitoring, 
no JSC, and no ban of antibiotic advertising. The absence of  these accompany-
ing mea sures facilitated an increasing stagnation of British antibiotic policy. 
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Leading British experts  were well aware of the problematic state of affairs. 
In 1982, microbiologist Alan Linton gave an overview of British agricultural 
antibiotic use and AMR. On farms, medically relevant antibiotics  were still 
regularly used for growth promotion, prophylaxis, and treatment. Ongoing 
direct agricultural access to tylosin was particularly worrying  because of 
AMR se lection against macrolides. Overall, AMR  hazards remained difficult 
to judge. Whereas studies indicated that AMR in E. coli had surged and plas-
mids  were being exchanged between bacteria in  humans and animals,  there 
was no evidence that resistant E. coli of animal origin had compromised  human 
therapy. Most cases of now notifiable salmonellosis remained relatively antibi-
otic sensitive. However, since 1974  there had been a surge of cattle- associated 
outbreaks of new multiple- resistant S. typhimurium strains.94 Between 1977 
and 1982, 611  human infections— three of them fatal— had been caused by 
S. typhimurium phage types 204, 193, 204a, and 204c. Many more had prob-
ably not been reported.95 Linton nonetheless considered therapeutic antibi-
otic restrictions impractical. Although veterinary antibiotic use was often 
“lax and empiric,” restrictions of therapeutic antibiotics would come too late to 
curb AMR “ unless set at such a level as to make a major [economic] impact, 
which would be unacceptable.”96 According to Linton, Britain’s 1971 AGP 
bans could not have curbed AMR “in the absence of simultaneous restrictions 
on the prophylactic and therapeutic use of antibiotics in both animals and 
man.”97 This bleak assessment was seconded by former Swann member and ex- 
PHLS and JSC director James Howie:
the [Swann] Committee failed to recognize certain  factors which . . .  ensured 
that farmers could get direct access to as much antibiotics as they wanted. . . .  
The [JSC] . . .  soon became aware that the prob lems with S. typhimurium in 
calves  were recurring . . . .  It had no powers to control the black market in 
antibiotics or authority to command information from industry, and it was 
ultimately disbanded. The result is that we now have a free- for- all, and  there is a 
real danger that the usefulness of antibiotics may be compromised by this.98
Residues and Meat Hygiene
The situation was  little better regarding antibiotic residues in food. Established 
following the 1963 milk scandal (chapter 7), Britain’s only formal residue mon-
itoring program had reduced violation rates of penicillin in milk to about 
1  percent in the mid-1970s.99 However, in contrast to the United States (chap-
ter 10), demands for an extension of monitoring to meat fell on deaf ears. Meat 
inspection was comparatively weak, and  there  were no systematic veterinary or 
hygiene controls in many abattoirs.100  There  were also no standardized official 
assays for antibiotic residues in meat.101
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With no monitoring data forcing authorities to act, residue rules remained 
based on the 1955 Food and Drugs Act and the Preservatives in Food Regula-
tions, which prohibited adding antibiotics to food.102 However,  there was no 
legislation outlawing the sale of food in which antibiotic residues  were “pre-
sent” as opposed to deliberately added.103  Until the 1980s, British consumers’ 
main protection from drug residues in food lay in the wording of Section Two 
of the 1955 Food and Drugs Act according to which it was an offence “to sell to 
the prejudice of the purchaser any food which is not of the nature, substance 
or quality demanded.”104 In a few cases, local authorities used Section Two to 
exert pressure on producers and MAFF to reduce residues in culturally sensi-
tive products like eggs.105
From the mid-1970s onward, the rising international emphasis on laboratory- 
based monitoring of food safety placed lax British policies  under pressure.106 
Pushing for a ban of antibiotic residue- tainted EEC shipments,107 West Ger-
mans rejected three consignments of residue- laden British meat in 1975 and 
1976.108 Following further rejections by US, Dutch, and Scandinavian author-
ities, MAFF scrambled to restore trust in £150 million of annual meat exports: 
“If we are to avoid placing our export meat trade in jeopardy, and one could 
argue that it is already on the brink, . . .  it is imperative that a more positive pol-
icy on ‘residues in meat’ be formulated.”109 In March 1976, a Sub- Group on 
Antibiotic Residues was tasked with establishing  limited residue monitoring 
for meat exports.110 Pro gress was slow. Denied statutory access to abattoirs and 
unable to obtain confidential assay information from industry or the VPC,111 
it took  until 1978 for officials to publish a first survey: between July 1977 and 
March 1978, 933 voluntary samples from 23 export abattoirs had been analyzed 
using new EEC bacterial inhibition tests. Although positive test incidence was 
below 0.3  percent, experts warned that results  were compromised by decaying 
samples of both domestic and imported meat and the absence of key test organs. 
In the case of 153 samples from London’s Smithfield abattoir, “many liver and 
a proportion of the kidney and beef samples  were of extremely poor quality . . . . 
Certain livers  were green and strong smelling, and  really should not have been 
tested.”112 MAFF nonetheless used initial results to reassure trade partners. 
Reporting on a meeting with US and Canadian delegates, an official noted: “It 
clearly came as something of a surprise to the American and Canadian dele-
gates to realise the extent to which a combination of administrative and  legal 
provisions could be effective. They had clearly heard . . .  that the so- called loop- 
holes in the law, plugged only by administrative recommendations,  were less 
than effective.”113
Eu ro pean partners like West Germany and Denmark  were more skeptical 
and pressed for unified EEC residue monitoring, which would analyze a fixed 
percentage of the national meat trade.114 Its lack of monitoring capabilities made 
Britain oppose fixed percentages (around 5,200 samples per year) and  favor a 
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US- style system, which used a smaller number of random samples (around 1,800 
per year) to extrapolate overall contamination levels. Should residues be found, 
more intensive local sampling would in theory reveal offenders.115 Britain’s pro-
posal caused conflicts. In 1978, the British delegate to an EEC meeting on resi-
dues noted that random sampling had led to a “good deal of acrimonious 
discussion with the German representative proving the most vocal.”116 Conti-
nental opponents had talked “a good deal of nonsense . . .  about the willingness 
of consumers to pay for extra protection.”117 British re sis tance to percentage- 
based monitoring ultimately weakened proposed EEC rules. Member states 
agreed to trial randomized testing, which would indicate  whether more exten-
sive sampling was necessary. Countries like Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands 
 were, however, allowed to monitor more extensively within their borders.118
Coinciding with media reports about black market antibiotic sales (chap-
ter 11), business- friendly British pi lot testing began in 1980. In 1982, the first 
national residue report claimed with 95  percent certitude that less than 1  percent 
of British  cattle, calf, sheep, and pig products contained antimicrobial agents 
above tolerances. Sulphadimidine was prob ably pre sent in less than 4  percent 
of British meat. Poultry products  were not tested.119 However, once again, offi-
cial data had to be taken with a grain of salt: voluntarily participating 
slaughter houses could theoretically preselect uncontaminated samples, state- 
employed veterinarians threatened to manipulate sampling rather than antag-
onize clients, and the sensitivity of EEC residue tests varied substantially for 
diff er ent antibiotic classes.120 A con temporary survey of more extensively mon-
itored German- bound exports found that 31.2  percent of meat samples tested 
positive for antibiotics.121
British residue sampling programs gradually improved as a result of new 
Eu ro pean directives. By early 1985, the EEC mandated traceable samples, 
follow-up sampling of offenders, maximum residue limits, and outlawing the 
slaughtering of residue- laden animals.122 Although Britain delayed their intro-
duction for four years, the new EEC regulations forced officials to expand sur-
veillance to 28,000 samples in 1989.123 The provision of samples was now 
mandatory, and veterinary surgeons and environmental health officers  were 
empowered to routinely enter and inspect slaughter houses. In 1988, EC Direc-
tive 88/409 also required inspections of domestic slaughter houses to be brought 
in line with stricter ones for export abattoirs.124 Although critics bemoaned its 
financing by industry, a new Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) was 
placed in charge of veterinary drug licensing, enforcement, and residue surveil-
lance in 1989.125 Between 1990 and 1995, salmonellosis outbreaks and BSE 
concerns also led to mandatory ante- and post- mortem hygiene inspections 
across Britain.126 Ending de cades of voluntarist policies, integration into 
Eu rope’s common market had forced officials to address phar ma ceu ti cal and 
microbial food contamination with statutory surveillance and regulations.
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Reform
A similar pro cess of domestic scandals, external Eu ro pean pressure, and ensu-
ing British reforms occurred in the case of AMR. Despite national alarm about 
resistant S. typhimurium (chapter 11), British AMR policies had stagnated 
throughout the 1980s. Economic prob lems and its aim to reduce regulatory bur-
dens made the neoliberal Thatcher government reluctant to consider further 
antibiotic restrictions or a reform of passive Salmonella- focused AMR surveil-
lance.127 A new round of precautionary AMR- oriented antibiotic reform was 
initiated as a result of continental pressure and the 1988 salmonella scandal. 
Whereas a comparative paucity of data had made it easy for British officials to 
downplay prob lems during the 1980s, the 1990s saw improved AMR surveil-
lance increase the po liti cal cost of regulatory inaction: the more one knew, the 
more one had to do. Initially opposing rather than shaping Eu ro pean antibi-
otic reform, British officials found themselves outmaneuvered by more proac-
tive EU countries from 1995 onward.
British officials’ hesitancy to reform antibiotic use was not  because of a lack 
of warnings. Amid BSE and salmonellosis concerns, MAFF had convened an 
Expert Group on Animal Feedingstuffs in February 1991. Headed by Univer-
sity of Nottingham animal physiologist George Eric Lamming, the so- called 
Lamming committee identified “gaps in [feed industry] legislation and its 
enforcement.”128 Regarding residues, the Lamming committee criticized 
insufficient official oversight and lacking assay methods for prescription- only 
medicines.129 The committee also warned about rising AMR. Between 1981 
and 1990, multiple re sis tance among S. typhimurium isolates from British 
 cattle had risen from 15 to 66   percent and from 2 to 8   percent in poultry 
isolates.130 The committee recommended expanding routine AMR monitor-
ing to  human E. coli isolates, discouraging the “prophylactic use of antibiotics 
with cross- resistance to  those used in  human medicine,”131 and changing 
rules allowing manufacturers to send diluted antibiotic substrates to farm-
ers for home- mixing.132
Published in 1992, the Lamming report, however, failed to provoke a rethink-
ing of British antibiotic policy. Similar to con temporary FDA decision- 
making (chapter  10), British officials ignored the Lamming committee’s 
warnings about cross- resistance se lection on farms and approved agricultural 
fluoroquinolone use (Baytril) in 1993.133 The risks of agricultural fluoroquino-
lone use  were well known in Eu rope.  After fluoroquinolones’ introduction 
to German food production in 1988, fluoroquinolone- resistant variants of 
S. typhimurium DT204c reached “a prevalence of 50  percent”134 in calf isolates 
in certain areas. Following Britain’s licensing of the drugs, multiple resistant 
strains of S. typhimurium DT104 with reduced susceptibility to ciprofloxacin 
 were soon isolated from domestic animals.135
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Within the EU, British antibiotic policies caused increasing consternation. 
Bowing to critical member states, the EU had established a commission to assess 
agricultural growth promoters in 1992.136 Two years  later, the EU banned the 
agricultural use of chloramphenicol.137 Reports that avoparcin AGPs selected 
for cross- resistance to the reserve antibiotic vancomycin also caused disquiet. 
While carcinogenicity concerns had prevented their licensing in the United 
States, avoparcin AGPs had been licensed in the EEC in 1976. In 1986, the first 
glycopeptide- resistant strain of Enterococcus faecium, which could resist high 
vancomycin doses, was detected in  humans. Reports that allegedly nonther-
apeutic avoparcin could also select for glycopeptide- resistant enterococci 
appeared in the early 1990s when vancomycin- resistant Enterococcus faecium 
(VRE) was isolated from German, Danish, and British animals. Germany, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands subsequently vetoed a British request to license 
avoparcin in Eu ro pean dairy cow feeds. In 1995, VRE concerns led to a vol-
untary and then statutory Danish ban of avoparcin according to Article 11 
(the safeguard clause) of Directive 70/524/EEC. Germany and other EU 
members followed suit.138 Britain resisted. Unable to lift continental BSE embar-
goes, the Conservative government was reluctant to endorse EU- led antibiotic 
reform ahead of the May 1997 general elections (chapter 11). Although British 
calls for more research  were supported by the EU’s Scientific Committee for 
Animal Nutrition, the EU Committee of Experts on Feed Additives and 
Eu ro pean Commission considered evidence linking avoparcin and VRE suffi-
cient for precautionary bans.139 In a far cry from its 1960s leadership on AMR, 
British re sis tance to bans was overruled 14:1 and the EU restricted avoparcin on 
April 1, 1997.140
Following its 1997 election victory, the New  Labour government tried to 
restore trust in British food regulations. One of its most impor tant decisions 
was to end the institutionalized conflict between business and consumer inter-
ests within MAFF. Responsible to the Department of Health, an in de pen-
dent Food Standards Agency (FSA) started work in April 2000. In 2001, MAFF 
itself was dissolved and turned into the Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). While the VMD retained responsibility for resi-
due monitoring, DEFRA was responsible for the control of microbial threats 
such as food- borne zoonosis.141
Institutional changes occurred parallel to a significant reordering of Brit-
ish antibiotic policies. Between 1997 and 1998, a large number of high- profile 
AMR warnings led to significant pressure on British and Eu ro pean regulators 
to consider further precautionary AGP bans. In 1997, a WHO meeting on “The 
Medical Impact of Antimicrobial Use in Food Animals”142 repeated 1970s calls 
to exclude antibiotics effective against gram- negative pathogens from animal 
nutrition and stressed the need for improved AMR surveillance in Salmonella, 
E. coli, Campylobacter, and Enterococcus. In April 1998, a second WHO meeting 
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expressed general concern about “non- medical uses of antimicrobials.”143 Two 
months  later, a third WHO meeting on agricultural quinolone use admonished 
veterinarians to reduce prescriptions and warned against using quinolones 
“for per for mance enhancement.”144
In Britain, three additional reports strengthened WHO calls for antibiotic 
reform. Published in early 1998, a House of Lords report on AMR explic-
itly referenced “a continuing threat to  human health from imprudent use of 
antibiotics in animals.”145 Sections of the report that discussed agricultural 
antibiotics bore a strong resemblance to the 1969 Swann report. This was no 
coincidence. Veterinarian Lord Soulsby, the committee’s leader, had been a close 
friend of the late Michael Swann.146 According to the Lords, Britain had once 
“led the world in addressing the threat to  human health posed by antibiotic 
use in farming practices.”147 However, impor tant parts of the Swann report had 
been watered down. Criticizing the JSC’s dissolution and inadequate AMR sur-
veillance, the Lords warned, “departmental and agency bound aries must not 
be allowed to prevent the Government from getting a grip on the  whole of this 
issue.”148 The Lords recommended phasing out virginiamycin AGPs  because of 
cross- resistance to the new antibiotic dalfopristin/quinupristin (Synercid) and 
also criticized veterinary antibiotic use: “mass- treatment of herds . . .  and 
flocks . . .  with [antibiotic] agents cannot be best practice.”149 Remaining loyal to 
the Swann report, the Lords, however, urged veterinary “self- regulation in pref-
erence to legislation.”150 Published shortly afterwards, a second report by the 
House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture also recommended “a 
ban on the use of antibiotics in farming as growth promoters, and tighter restric-
tions on their use for subtherapeutic or prophylactic purposes.”151 A third report 
by Britain’s Standing Medical Advisory Committee subsequently reinforced 
parliamentary criticism of AGPs and veterinary “fire brigade” treatments.152
The wave of high- level warnings left  little po liti cal room to resist con-
temporary Scandinavian lobbying for AGP restrictions (chapter 11). At an EU 
conference on ‘The Microbial Threat’ in Copenhagen in September 1998, over 
400 participants— including EU CMOs— stressed the necessity of coordinated 
action and more reliable data on antibiotic consumption and AMR.153 Four-
teen days  after the conference, the EU passed Decision No 2119/98/EC,154 
which established the Eu ro pean Antimicrobial Re sis tance Surveillance System 
(EARSS) for re sis tance in  humans and animals.155 On December 17, 1998— 
three months  after the Copenhagen conference— the EU Commission de cided 
to ban four of the most popu lar AGPs (virginiamycin, zinc bacitracin, spira-
mycin, and tylosin phosphate) with Directive (EC)2821/98. Abandoning three 
de cades of post- Swann complacency, Britain supported the precautionary 
expansion of AGP bans.
With government reports highlighting ongoing stewardship prob lems 
on British farms and Scandinavian countries pressing for additional bans, 
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remaining AGPs would not stay permitted for long.156 In 2000, Denmark 
unilaterally restricted all antibiotics to prescription only status.157 Spearheaded 
by the Irish Commissioner of Health and Consumer Protection, David Byrne, 
the EU de cided to emulate Danish mea sures. On March  25, 2002, the EU 
Commission proposed to ban all AGPs. Nine months  later, regulation (EC) 
No 1831/2003 commenced the phasing out of AGPs but not of coccidiostats like 
ionophores by December 31, 2005.158
For Britain, the 2006 AGP bans fulfilled a fitful regulatory trajectory that 
had begun with the 1962 Netherthorpe call to reserve new antibiotics for ther-
apy and the 1969 Swann recommendation to ban medically relevant AGPs. 
Both reports made impor tant contributions to precautionary drug regulation 
by basing recommendations on “abstract” AMR  hazards. However, their cor-
poratist origins also made them try to “fix” antibiotic infrastructures by redis-
tributing control over drug access. The resulting Swann “gospel” of narrow  legal 
distinctions between relevant and irrelevant drugs as well as between low- and 
high- dosed uses of the same substance failed to reduce antibiotic consumption 
and AMR. Predicted by both E. S. Anderson and Ernst Boris Chain, this fail-
ure was, however, not officially acknowledged. Afraid of jeopardizing trade 
interests, British officials did not support comprehensive AMR studies and held 
fast to popu lar Swann patriotism. A similar tendency to stall surveillance and 
reforms also occurred regarding antibiotic residues in meat. In both cases, Brit-
ish re sis tance to further reforms was only overcome as a result of major food 
safety scandals (salmonellosis, drug detections, and BSE) (chapter 11), fraying 
agricultural re sis tance (chapter 12), and foreign pressure resulting from integra-
tion into the Eu ro pean common market. Although the 1996 BSE crisis and its 
parallel 14:1 defeat over avoparcin arguably left it with no other option, Britain’s 
support of EU AGP bans ended de cades of regulatory stagnation.
 After AGPs
What would happen  after 2006 was not immediately apparent. Consistently 
accounting for less than 20  percent of total use, it was clear that banning AGPs 
would only partially reform British agriculture’s antibiotic infrastructures. In 
this situation, improved surveillance capabilities helped to keep official atten-
tion focused on AMR se lection and prob lems resulting from therapeutic anti-
biotic use.
From the beginning, reinvigorated British surveillance efforts  were closely 
coordinated with Eu ro pean partners and the new EARSS. In 1999, the  Labour 
government founded DEFRA Antimicrobial Re sis tance Coordination (DARC). 
DARC was tasked with encouraging prudent antibiotic use and reviewing 
AMR surveillance in select sentinel pathogens and commensal organisms, 
which Britain had launched following the 1998 Copenhagen conference.159 In 
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2003 and 2007, AMR monitoring of Salmonella and Campylobacter in food 
and animals became mandatory EU- wide. Britain provided additional AMR 
data for E. coli and Enterococci.160 Readdressing antibiotic residues in 2001, the 
British government also installed an in de pen dent Veterinary Residues Com-
mittee (VRC) to advise the VMD and Food Safety Agency. In the same year, 
the EU’s Veterinary Medicinal Products Directive (2001/82/EC) called for 
harmonized controls for the manufacture, authorization, marketing, and dis-
tribution of veterinary medicines. Coming into force in October  2005, the 
resulting British Veterinary Medicines Regulations consolidated the plethora 
of controls previously contained in the 1968 Medicines Act and over fifty 
amending Statutory Instruments.161 The VMD also compiled antibiotic sales 
data. Although Britain had collected this data on a voluntary basis since 1999, 
2005 statutory requirements produced more detailed insight into antibiotic 
consumption on British farms. In 2009, data gathering was further standard-
ized and made comparable at the Eu ro pean level with the creation of the Eu ro-
pean Surveillance of Veterinary Antimicrobial Consumption (ESVAC) by 
the Eu ro pean Medicines Agency.162
By establishing regular and in de pen dent monitoring of AMR, residues, and 
antibiotic usage in coordination with EU partners, the British government has 
fulfilled key demands of antibiotic critics. It is now far easier to identify and 
resolve antibiotic- related prob lems both within agriculture and corresponding 
bureaucracies. Mirroring what Nicolas Fortané and Frédéric Keck have 
described in relation to zoonosis monitoring, current AMR surveillance is also 
indicative of a wider policy shift  toward biosecurity. In the EU, real- time sur-
veillance of emerging microbial threats and sentinel organisms has strength-
ened “ecological” notions of disease and boosted the standing of epidemiologists 
regarding AMR decision- making.163 In the case of agricultural antibiotics, the 
regular publication of national AMR and antibiotic sales data has also been 
crucial to keeping antibiotic reform on the po liti cal agenda. With public con-
cerns ebbing in the de cade  after the 2006 AGP bans (chapter 11), UK gov-
ernments  were initially reluctant to push for further statutory reforms of 
agricultural antibiotic use. In 2011, the EU Commission was forced to criticize 
Britain for infringing Directive 2001/82/EC by continuing to permit direct 
antibiotic advertising to farmers. While the practice has since been banned,164 
British legislators also failed to support CMO Sir Liam Donaldson’s 2008 call 
for statutory bans of CIAs, endorse Eu ro pean calls for statutory restrictions 
of extra- label cascade prescribing, or follow Scandinavian countries and divorce 
veterinary prescription and sales rights (chapter 12). In this situation, neutral 
reports on antibiotic usage and AMR and EU- wide comparisons helped hold 
decision- makers in politics and industry to account.
In recent years, CMO Sally Davies has emerged as a further leading force for 
British antibiotic reform. Appointed in 2011, Davies made national headlines in 
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2013 by stating that AMR was “as big a risk as terrorism”165 and should be 
added to the national register of civil emergencies. In Britain, Davies’s warn-
ings triggered a flood of new AMR research and reports. High- profile initia-
tives  under the Conservative Cameron government subsequently attempted to 
turn antibiotic stewardship into a signature area of British leadership. Since 
2013, mea sures supported by Britain have included the Longitude Prize for 
rapid diagnostics, high- level international commitments to tackling AMR by 
the EU, UN, and G20, and the financing of new antibiotic development via 
public- private initiatives.166
Coinciding with WHO initiatives to standardize international AMR sur-
veillance, the British government also commissioned a major review of AMR by 
Goldman Sachs’s former chairman of asset management Jim O’Neill. Published 
in 2016, the O’Neill report tried to put a number on the global cost of AMR 
($100 trillion by 2050 with 10 million annual deaths) and proposed “cost- 
effective” policies to curb it. The main report’s recommendations include: financ-
ing awareness campaigns; funding the development of new antibiotics and rapid 
diagnostics; promoting better sanitation, hygiene, and infection control; sup-
porting the development and use of vaccines and alternative treatments; improv-
ing global AMR surveillance; and establishing binding goals for antibiotic 
reductions.167 In the case of agriculture, the O’Neill report has called for uniform 
definitions and a phasing- out of CIAs, more transparency about antibiotic use, 
and the establishment of clear reduction targets to an agreed level of antibiotic 
use per kilogram of animal production. It also argues for a new focus on curbing 
antimicrobial waste in the environment.168 Although the full O’Neill report 
stresses that a range of statutory and nonstatutory tools should be considered, its 
special report on agriculture primarily emphasizes fiscal mea sures like taxing 
antibiotics to discourage prophylactic and growth promotional uses.169
As a signature initiative of the Cameron government, the O’Neill report 
highlighted AMR’s economic risks and made UK officials commit to cutting 
agricultural antibiotic use to 50 milligrams per PCU by 2020— something that 
was already achieved in 2016.170 However, following David Cameron’s resigna-
tion in the wake of the June 2016 Brexit referendum, the fate of British reform 
again hangs in the balance. Co- developed by Britain, a new and bold set of stat-
utory interventions into therapeutic antibiotic use was overwhelmingly 
approved by the EU Parliament in October 2018. Breaking with over eighty 
years of voluntarist antibiotic arrangements, mea sures include a statutory ban 
of reserve antibiotic use in veterinary medicine, restrictions on prescribed pro-
phylactic antibiotic use, and improved monitoring of veterinarians’ antibiotic 
use.171 It remains unclear  whether Britain  will continue to adhere to new EU 
standards  after Brexit. Similar to the 1970s,  there is a credible threat that short- 
term trade incentives may make  future British officials decide to weaken anti-
biotic standards.
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Decoupled from the EU, Britain’s self- proclaimed leadership regarding 
AMR remains fragile. Historically, antibiotic reforms have been most success-
ful when they  were supported by a broad co ali tion of actors. Reducing AMR 
requires individual and collective action. The recent upsurge of Anglo- American 
nationalism threatens to undermine both international risk governance and 




Roughly eighty years  after their first use in agriculture, antibiotics have affected 
nearly  every sector of global food production. In the United States and Eu rope, 
no conventional farmer or veterinarian remembers a time when antibiotics  were 
not at hand to treat and prevent disease in animals.
Antibiotic infrastructures are also shaping farming outside of Eu rope and 
the United States. Although American livestock producers pioneered concen-
tration, intensification, and integration, their leadership is now being contested 
by operations in countries like Brazil and China. In the case of Brazil, poultry 
production increased twenty- fold between 1968 and 1990 and amounted to 
12 million tons in 2009. Having overtaken the United States as the world’s 
largest poultry producer, over 90  percent of Brazilian poultry are produced in 
confined and intensive settings with two mega- companies dominating the 
market.1 In China, Western firms  were initially allowed to develop industrial-
ized production systems but  later ceded owner ship to Chinese companies. In 
2008, China produced over 450 billion pigs— nearly eightfold the number pro-
duced in the United States. In 2013, the Chinese WH Group (then known as 
the Shuanghui Group) acquired the American Smithfield Foods com pany and 
is now the largest pork producer in the world.2 Driven by middle- class spend-
ing, the centers of gravity in global animal production are shifting. However, 
the production methods being used are more similar than ever before.
Antibiotics have played an impor tant role in facilitating the global spread 
of standardized animal monocultures. In 2010, global agricultural antibiotic 
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use was estimated conservatively at about 63,151 tons. Average antibiotic use 
amounted to 45 milligrams per kilogram of  cattle, 148 milligrams per kilogram of 
chicken, and 172 milligrams per kilogram of pork. China already accounted for 
23   percent of global agricultural antibiotic use, followed by the United States 
(13   percent), Brazil (9   percent), India (4   percent), and Germany (3   percent). By 
2030, global agricultural antibiotic use is projected to increase to over 100,000 
tons per year (67  percent increase). One- third of increased consumption  will likely 
be due to a further shift  toward intensive and integrated animal production.3
It is clear that this expansion of antibiotic use is not without risks— the past 
seventy- five years have given us ample warning. Although it is not within the 
scope of this book— nor the abilities of its author—to comment on agricultural 
antibiotics’ contribution to global AMR, it is impor tant to stress how unpre-
dictable the dynamics of the planetary “resistome” are— and how difficult it is 
to assess, manage, or reverse any changes to the global burden of AMR.
Recent work by Laura Kahn highlights the complexities of antibiotic stew-
ardship. In Denmark, legislators and industry went to  great lengths to reduce 
agricultural antibiotic use. Denmark’s small size and sophisticated AMR sur-
veillance means that it has received a lot of scientific attention.  After phasing 
out AGPs and separating veterinary prescription and sales rights, Denmark 
introduced a “yellow card” system to further reduce therapeutic antibiotic use 
in 2010. Pig producers are allotted thresholds for average antibiotic consump-
tion over a ten- month period. Should producers exceed thresholds, injunctions 
are issued. Farmers are required to pay a fee for each injunction and resulting 
inspections. However, the effects of Danish leadership on AMR have been dif-
ficult to mea sure. While banning avoparcin in 1995 lowered VRE in livestock, 
it has since emerged that 70 to 90  percent of animal and community- acquired 
VRE strains differ. Rather than farm animals, companion animals seem to act 
as major VRE reservoirs for  humans. On farms, enterococcal re sis tance against 
streptogramins, avilamycin, and erythromycin fell following 1990s AGP bans— 
but tetracycline re sis tance increased. Judging the effects of AGP bans at the 
Eu ro pean level is even more difficult:  after 2006, some forms of AMR seem to 
have declined— but  others increased.4
At the microbial level, whole- genome sequencing is currently also recasting 
the way we understand both the history and current context of AMR se lection 
and proliferation. Recent studies have highlighted that many of the re sis tance 
genes found in current bacteria are not new but ancient  because of millennia 
of inter- bacteria competition.5 In 2014, researchers reported that the first acces-
sioned strain in Britain’s National Collection of Type Cultures— a strain of 
Shigella flexneri isolated from the Western Front during World War One— 
was already resistant to penicillin and erythromycin and also contained a 
complement of chromosomal AMR genes similar to more recent isolates.6 
Other studies have reconstructed the unpredictable effects of the modern era 
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of mass antibiotic use. In 2017, researchers showed that the 1950s use of first 
generation β- lactams drove the evolution of MRSA and of ampicillin re sis-
tance in S. typhimurium— before  either methicillin or ampicillin  were marketed. 
 These remarkable findings challenge long- established linear chronologies of 
se lection pressure and AMR emergence. They also highlight the potential 
fallout of widespread agricultural and medical antibiotic use for existing and 
not yet discovered drugs.7
Over half a  century  after the discovery of horizontal gene transfer, the 
dynamics of the planetary resistome remain bewildering and frequently defy 
linear cause and effect models. This is not only challenging from a judicial point 
of view but also means that final certainty about the costs and benefits of 
diff er ent stewardship models remains elusive. Similar to 1969, the question is 
 whether this inherent uncertainty justifies regulatory inaction or precaution-
ary restrictions? When asked this question by the FDA in 1971, Herbert 
Williams Smith answered by emphasizing the “bewildering” aspect of AMR: 
“It is a danger  because it can happen. . . .  if we  don’t need to have the animal 
reservoir of R- factors we are better off without it.”8 In the United States, Con-
gress thought differently. Forty- seven years  later, opinions on antibiotic restric-
tions remain divided. What seems clear is that once bacterial sensitivity to an 
antibiotic is lost, it is often lost for the foreseeable  future. Defying traditional 
dose- response models, AMR can occur gradually or suddenly. The extent of 
resulting prob lems depends on a  whole host of further ge ne tic and epidemio-
logical  factors. Although AMR se lection in medicine poses more immediate 
threats to  human health, de cades of agricultural antibiotic use have facilitated 
the rise and spread of dangerous resistant organisms and genes ranging from 
S. typhimurium Type 29, S. typhimurium DT 104, LA- MRSA, to mcr-1. Some 
threats dis appeared,  others stayed. The ongoing growth and rising intercon-
nectedness of global antibiotic infrastructures in food production increases the 
likelihood of  future outbreaks.
Four Stories
So, is it antibiotics’ destiny to be pyrrhic?  Will victory over microbes in the pre-
sent negate  future victories? And what can this book contribute to current 
debates? At first glance, the historical perspective gives  little reason for opti-
mism. In Britain and the United States, the history of agricultural antibiotics 
reveals a seemingly repetitive pattern of overenthusiasm, warnings, technical 
fixes, complacency, and a rediscovery of  earlier warnings.  After seventy- five 
years of debate, no ready solution to AMR  hazards seems at hand. However, 
ending the story  here would be too  simple. A second, more nuanced glance 
can also uncover the under lying infrastructures, epistemologies, and path 
dependencies that have contributed to the current situation. This second glance 
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is useful in fostering awareness not only for the complexity of AMR as a bio-
logical but also as a social, economic, and cultural phenomenon. In his history 
of tuberculosis, Christian McMillen notes that appreciating the cyclical 
nature and historical contours of major health challenges is to “learn to be 
 humble:  people to whom prob lems they are just encountering seem new and 
fresh might do well to consider they might not be the first responders . . .  his-
tory does not march progressively onward; we are not always getting better.”9 
Knowing about the rootedness of complex biosocial prob lems is not only a 
prophylactic against rediscovery but also a way of averting a reduction of his-
tory into “ simple moral lessons” about past  mistakes and successes.10 A similar 
approach is useful when thinking about the history of agricultural antibiotics. 
What emerges from this book are four stories about short- termism, epistemic 
fragmentation, infrastructure, and narrow reform.
1. A Story of Short- Termism
The book’s first story is the story of a technology that was hastily introduced 
 because of an emphasis on short- term benefits over long- term  hazards. The 
motivations for initial antibiotic experiments differed on both sides of the 
Atlantic: responding to pressure from industry and the specter of hunger- fueled 
communism, US regulators licensed antibiotics’ mass introduction to agricul-
ture without considering  hazards other than acute toxicity. As a relatively 
unknown group of substances, antibiotics  were rapidly integrated into the well- 
developed but relatively unsupervised supply chains linking phar ma ceu ti cal 
companies to farmers. The ensuing expansion of agricultural antibiotic use was 
market driven in  every sense of the word: phar ma ceu ti cal companies generated 
additional value from existing patents and fermentation waste; farmers used 
antibiotics to insure themselves against disease, enhance efficiency, avoid vet-
erinary fees, and substitute  labor; and consumers drove demand by buying 
increasing amounts of cheap meat. Struggling to keep up with the antibiotic 
boom, US regulators retrospectively licensed many already popu lar practices. 
By contrast, Britain’s antibiotic experiment was initiated from the top down. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, officials responded to supply and currency pres-
sures by boosting therapeutic antibiotic use and by licensing AGPs to reduce 
feedstuff imports. While the British poultry and dairy sectors rapidly  adopted 
antibiotics, Whitehall had to “sell” AGPs to the pig sector. In  doing so, officials 
chose to ignore not only AMR and residue warnings but also inconclusive feed 
 trials. National pride in “British” penicillin and concerns about stagnating mar-
kets for phar ma ceu ti cal companies sweetened licensing decisions.
While the context of antibiotics’ introduction varied, the  factors making 
officials want to see new products in a favorable light  were similar. In both the 
United States and United Kingdom, short- term considerations of immediate 
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strategic and economic interest superseded con temporary concerns about 
 hazards and dubious efficacy. As a consequence, the two main Western pow-
ers of the postwar period licensed agricultural antibiotics in the full knowledge 
that nobody knew what the long- term consequences of their introduction 
would be. Neither country developed surveillance programs with which to 
assess licensed products or provided authorities with adequate statutory pow-
ers to withdraw substances should they prove problematic. Once established 
for the sulfonamides, penicillin, and the tetracyclines, the short- termist anti-
biotic licensing matrix was reapplied again and again to substances ranging 
from chloramphenicol to ampicillin. Avoparcin and the fluoroquinolones  were 
licensed for agricultural use even  after AMR assessments became mandatory 
components of drug applications. While precautionary AMR concerns 
prompted the restriction of entire antibiotic classes in Eu rope in the 1970s and 
1990s, US regulators remain hamstrung by complicated withdrawal procedures 
for licensed drugs. Both Britain and the United States have also strug gled to 
systematically address veterinary antibiotic use.
The tendency to focus on short- term benefits at the expense of long- term 
 hazards is by no means  limited to antibiotics and has been explored for numer-
ous other substances ranging from DES to BPA.11 Ultimately,  every licensing 
decision is an experiment based on imperfect information: no technology is 
without its risk and some risks like horizontal AMR transfer  will only become 
apparent de cades  after original licensing decisions. What the first story of short- 
termism highlights is the need for a resilient mode of substance regulation 
that  factors flexibility into  every licensing decision. In the case of antibiotics, 
the past seventy- five years have shown that licensing should never be consid-
ered a one- off decision. Regulatory gatekeeping has to be complemented by sur-
veillance mechanisms capable of studying substances’ often unpredictable 
long- term effects and by statutory instruments power ful enough to guarantee 
speedy withdrawal once risks have been identified.
2. A Story of Epistemic Fragmentation
The second story of this book is one of epistemic fragmentation in which one 
group of substances was viewed through diff er ent cultural lenses and acquired 
varying meanings on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite recent attempts to 
rationalize antibiotic policies by “putting a number” on the costs and benefits 
of regulatory action, cultural interpretations of risk continue to differ not only 
between but within socie ties. Effective antibiotic stewardship thus not only 
depends on sound technocratic decision- making but also on the successful stag-
ing of risk in diff er ent cultural, social, and national milieus.
In the United States, antibiotics  were immediately integrated into a deep- 
seated risk episteme prioritizing potential drug residues in food over AMR or 
284 • Conclusion
animal welfare concerns. Both the public and regulators engaged in heated dis-
cussions about  whether to tolerate or ban antibiotic residues. Toleration 
depended in part on the cultural valence attached to diff er ent foodstuffs. 
Whereas antibiotics in milk  were taboo, this was not the case for residues in 
meat, poultry, fish, and on plants. Deemed noncarcinogenic, most antibiotics 
also escaped regulation  under the 1958 Delaney Clause. Whereas public resi-
due concerns eventually resulted in pioneering US monitoring, British regula-
tors  were  under far less pressure to tackle residues despite similar evidence of 
antibiotics in food and milk. While a Briton’s meat could be an American’s poi-
son, concerns about AMR and animal welfare  were markedly stronger in Brit-
ain. It was during moments when health and moral concerns fused that 
power ful British reform movements emerged. Driven by Animal Machines and 
E. S. Anderson’s AMR warnings, a first fusion of diverse antibiotic concerns 
occurred around the cultural crucible of barbaric “factory farms” around 1965. 
In 1996, the moral panic triggered by BSE again turned antibiotics into a com-
mon denominator of anx i eties about intensive farming. In both cases, uncon-
trolled antibiotic use by farmers rather than veterinarians became the target 
of public reform demands. A similar fusion of antibiotic concerns around AMR 
or animal welfare never occurred in the United States.
Evaluations of antibiotics’ risks and benefits also differed within socie ties. 
In the United States, opinions varied strongly between the public and agricul-
tural spheres. Following an initial phase of general optimism about progres-
sive antibiotic use, 1960s environmentalist and consumer criticism fostered an 
agricultural fortress mentality. Conventional producers reacted to criticism and 
economic pressure by reaffirming their commitment to the interwar gospel 
of efficiency. Ideologically opposed to statutory intervention, most farmers 
continued to view antibiotics as impor tant components of “progressive” farm-
ing. Although agricultural commentators  were aware of residue and AMR 
prob lems, they tended to pre sent them as “fixable” management and efficiency 
challenges rather than as systemic risks. Ironically, perceptions of antibiotics 
as “rational” components of the neo- Malthusian US fight for plenty pre-
vented critical evaluations not only of resulting health  hazards but also of AGPs’ 
 actual economic efficacy. From the 1970s onward, the vast majority of agri-
cultural commentators and experts endorsed the polarizing public defense 
of AGPs mounted by the US phar ma ceu ti cal industry and the Farm Bureau. 
Although  actual AGP use was less common than publicly presented,  there was 
also no popu lar rebellion by conventional producers against agro- industrial 
campaigning.
A similar divorce of public and agricultural risk perceptions occurred 
in Britain. Although corporatist decision- making prevented a US- style 
public polarization of conflicts, British agricultural commentators also 
 em phasized the “manageability” of antibiotic prob lems. Trusting in Britain’s 
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compromise- oriented system to produce palatable “antibiotic fixes,” the agricul-
tural community saw no need to resist partial AGP bans in 1971 and defended 
the narrow Swann- compromise  until the 1990s. The inner- agricultural consen-
sus on nontherapeutic antibiotic use only broke down in the wake of the 1996 
BSE crisis. While AGPs have been nominally phased out on both sides of the 
Atlantic, British and US commentators continue to defend routine therapeutic 
antibiotic use by presenting AMR as manageable via “rational” and “efficient” 
drug use. Voluntarist reform remains preferable to statutory intervention.
Since the 1960s, the widening gap between public perceptions of uncontain-
able antibiotic risks and the agricultural emphasis on manageable risks has 
created lucrative opportunities for selling safety. Although definitions varied, 
popu lar residue concerns gradually turned antibiotics’ absence into a power-
ful common denominator of most organic and “natu ral” food. The higher prices 
paid for “pure” produce not only drove the rapid expansion of the organic sec-
tor but have also triggered a diversification of conventional production. Now-
adays, companies like McDonalds and Tyson Foods are marketing antibiotic- free 
produce in an attempt to profit from health and environmental concerns that 
their production methods helped create. Still mostly driven by residue rather 
than abstract AMR fears, antibiotic- free sales have been praised for reducing 
antibiotic use but have also helped displace po liti cal responsibility for anti-
biotic stewardship onto the marketplace.12 This marketplace is not a level 
playing field. Antibiotic- free sales follow the rules of class- based risk distri-
bution predicted by Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: while wealthy consumers 
can afford to purchase culturally prized and priced “pure,” “ethical,” and 
“safe” food, poorer consumers buy riskier food— and are subsequently blamed 
for contributing to AMR, obesity, and climate change. Commoditized risk 
does not make equals.
So what does this Babel of fragmented risk perceptions and markets mean 
for antibiotic stewardship? A central message of this book is that  there is no 
one universal way to regulate or communicate antibiotic risks. Since the 1940s, 
divergent risk cultures have emphasized  either the residue, the AMR, or the 
welfare aspect of the “antibiotic prob lem.” On both sides of the Atlantic, anti-
biotics’ cultural connotations often had a stronger influence on national drug 
policies and markets than “objective” expert evaluations. Fragmented risk 
understandings are not  limited to the Anglo- American context and pose a 
major challenge for international antibiotic stewardship. Creating a common 
AMR- focused risk episteme is not straightforward and  will require more than 
top- down appeals for “rational” antibiotic use or cyclical warnings about a 
pending apocalypse.  Because it has never been “natu ral” to be more concerned 
about AMR than about residues or animal welfare, stewardship policies have 
to take into account stakeholders’ distinct risk epistemologies. Once we aban-
don the premise that  there is a single compelling rational logic for international 
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action against AMR, we  will be more attuned to the many negotiations, trans-
lations, trade- offs, and financial commitments that  will have to accompany 
any effective collective action to preserve antibiotics’ efficacy.
3. A Story of Infrastructure
The third story of this book is the story of the power ful and salient effects of 
antibiotic infrastructures. Although it is impor tant to remember that antibi-
otics alone did not drive the expansion and intensification of twentieth- century 
livestock production, their use created significant cultural and material path 
dependencies within global agriculture. From the 1950s onward, easy access to 
therapeutic and nontherapeutic forms of antibiotic use facilitated the concentra-
tion of livestock, aided the adoption of confined housing, and changed relations 
between farmers, veterinarians, and animals. Once an antibiotic infrastructure 
had become established, it was difficult to dissolve.
In the United States, booming antibiotic sales cemented already close ties 
between phar ma ceu ti cal manufacturers and farmers. On farms, easy antibiotic 
access and commercial encouragement to self- diagnose and medicate livestock 
undercut veterinarians’ traditional role and facilitated a shift from labor- 
intensive individual health care to performance- oriented mass animal health 
management. By the early 1960s, widespread antibiotic use had begun to cre-
ate cultural and material path dependencies: increasing production seemed to 
naturally entail more antibiotic use to curb disease and maintain productivity. 
Farmers  were expected to routinely make “rational” decisions on which drug 
to use at which concentration to maintain animal health, cost- effective produc-
tion, and consumer safety. Low antibiotic costs also led to a relative neglect of 
alternative disease management. Caught in an escalating cost- price squeeze, 
most producers soon considered abandoning antibiotic infrastructures as too 
risky and equated external criticism with an attack on their rationality and free-
dom of choice.
In Britain, antibiotic infrastructures developed in a more fragmented 
fashion. Whereas poultry and dairy producers rapidly  adopted antibiotics, pig 
producers  were slow to embrace AGPs. This hesitancy was in part caused by 
mixed feed  trials, farmer concerns, the less concentrated nature of British ani-
mal production, and alternative methods of disease control. It was only gradu-
ally overcome by promotional efforts and pressure to increase postwar food 
production. By the 1960s, most livestock sectors had embraced antibiotics as 
an impor tant means to combat and prevent disease, reduce  labor, and enhance 
productivity. Similar to the United States, an ongoing cost- price squeeze 
entrenched antibiotic infrastructures and fostered resentment against critics. 
Farmers’ increasing reliance on antibiotics also triggered inner- agricultural con-
flicts over drug access. Whereas US veterinarians effectively lost control over 
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antibiotics following the 1951 Durham Humphrey’s Amendment, Britain had 
maintained prescription requirements for a large number of antibiotic prod-
ucts. During the 1960s, British veterinarians tried to consolidate control over 
the animal health market by calling for drug restrictions and advisory health 
schemes while the NFU pressed for more antibiotic access. Both sides fought 
over control rather than antibiotic use per se. Despite its focus on AMR, the 
resulting 1969 Swann compromise on partial AGP bans redistributed control 
over medically relevant antibiotics but did not seriously challenge existing anti-
biotic infrastructures.
Resulting antibiotic infrastructures proved remarkably resilient. On both 
sides of the Atlantic, they have survived de cades of public criticism, organic 
competition, and several rounds of FDA and EU reforms. Recent work by Clare 
Chandler, Eleanor Hutchinson, and Coll Hutchinson highlights the impor-
tance of paying attention to the deeper societal, economic, and relational pil-
lars that support international antibiotic infrastructures. Seeing  these relational 
pillars allows us to appreciate the “scale at which shifts would be required to 
make a substantial difference to antimicrobial use.”13 What emerges in the case 
of agricultural antibiotics is a global entanglement of: farming practices; vary-
ing agricultural, phar ma ceu ti cal, and veterinary interests; dependencies created 
by the physical design of production systems; an agricultural knowledge sys-
tem which has relied on antibiotics to fix microbial prob lems for over seventy- 
five years; cultural hostility to external interference; and an ongoing arms race 
between resistant microbes and antibiotic- wielding producers. A holistic view 
of the many branches of this antibiotic entanglement challenges simplistic nar-
ratives of irresponsible “pharmers” and reveals a complicated story of physical 
path dependencies, cultural blind spots, lacking incentives for change, and a 
vicious circle of global hunger for cheap protein and rising antibiotic use. 
Realizing the scale and breadth of reforms necessary to address antibiotic 
infrastructures is a crucial requirement for effective responses to rising AMR.
4. A Story of Narrow Reform
The last story of this book is one of narrow reform. While short- termism and 
fragmented epistemologies facilitated antibiotics’ spread, narrow visions of 
reform played an impor tant role in leaving wider antibiotic infrastructures 
intact. Narrow reform visions  were the result of inter- professional rivalries over 
antibiotic control and the attempt to manage amorphous risks like “infective” 
AMR within traditional regulatory frameworks based on linear cause- and- 
effect models of harm, cost- benefit calculations, and corporatist compromise. 
The patchwork of narrow reforms emerging from this constellation of compet-
ing interests and traditional risk regulation unsystematically targeted indi-
vidual aspects of antibiotic use and rarely complemented each other. Despite 
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the divergent evolution of national risk epistemes and regulatory interventions, 
Anglo- American antibiotic infrastructures thus remained remarkably similar 
 until the late 1990s.
Similar to Scott Podolsky’s periodization of US medical antibiotic regula-
tions,14 transatlantic reforms of agricultural antibiotic use can be divided into 
distinct phases. Following an initial phase of mass licensing and deregulation, 
the mid-1950s saw officials and public campaigners emphasize “rational” anti-
biotic use as a way to curb emerging AMR and residue  hazards. Stressing cog-
nitive reform was not enough to curb  either prob lem. From the late 1950s 
onward, residue detections forced officials to abandon voluntary mea sures and 
establish statutory residue controls for milk and meat in the United States and 
for milk in the United Kingdom. In Britain, AMR concerns also made offi-
cials increase veterinary power over antibiotic access. In both countries, 1960s 
reforms  were designed to “fix” antibiotic use. They  were also the smallest com-
mon denominator between conflicting consumer, medical, veterinary, and agri-
cultural demands: physicians wanted to reduce AMR se lection on farms but 
resisted calls for reviews of medical antibiotic use; consumers  were concerned 
about residues, factory farms, and AMR but continued to demand cheap meat; 
veterinarians wanted to limit farmers’ antibiotic access but feared that wider 
reforms might restrict their own drug access and compromise their standing 
within the medical community; farmers  were concerned about a loss of con-
sumer trust but equally feared jeopardizing antibiotic infrastructures.
The narrow 1960s compromises on antibiotic reform would shape the next 
thirty years of regulatory intervention. Foreshadowed by the 1962 Netherthorpe 
report and targeting only a  limited number of AGPs, Britain’s 1969 Swann 
report reinforced  legal distinctions between subtherapeutic and therapeutic 
dosages and between medically relevant and irrelevant antibiotics. The Swann 
compromise proved so popu lar  because it focused precautionary AMR- oriented 
reforms on a small number of low- dosed antibiotics while leaving wider anti-
biotic infrastructures unchallenged. Its palatable nature also meant that Brit-
ish officials, farmers, and veterinarians continued to defend the Swann 
compromise even  after data indicated that it had failed to reduce  either antibi-
otic use or AMR. Although the ossified “Swann gospel” was abandoned in the 
wake of the 1996 BSE crisis, British and EU officials continued to follow nar-
row 1960s precepts by initially limiting renewed statutory interventions to 
AGPs. Ahead of the EU’s 2018 decision to regulate veterinary antibiotic use, 
officials reacted to fierce agricultural and veterinary re sis tance by relying on vol-
untarist mea sures to reform the remaining 80  percent of antibiotic use.
Narrow reforms also hampered US responses to AMR. Limiting AMR con-
cerns to antibiotic residues’ presence in food, FDA regulators and NAS 
experts initially created the impression that “infective” AMR was containable. 
When FDA regulators  later pressed for Swann- inspired AGP restrictions, their 
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efforts failed not only  because of fragmented risk epistemologies, regulation 
wariness, and well- financed industrial opposition but also  because of the US 
 legal system’s insistence on proof of harm. Forced to engage in lengthy formal 
drug withdrawal procedures, officials found it impossible to prove harm result-
ing from AGPs’ se lection for AMR as opposed to harm resulting from AMR 
se lection by therapeutic antibiotic use in agricultural and medical settings. 
1970s regulators’ inability to provide evidence of harm or imminent harm was 
not  because AGPs  were not selecting for dangerous AMR but  because it was 
technologically and judicially impossible—as confirmed by the 1980 NAS 
report. Ironically, even if the FDA had been able to prove imminent harm, 
implementing narrow Swann- style AGP bans would likely not have reduced 
wider AMR. Their narrow focus on nontherapeutic antibiotic use also threat-
ens the long- term success of the most recent 2017 voluntary AGP restrictions.
On both sides of the Atlantic, policies targeting only individual aspects of 
antibiotic use have failed to reform wider antibiotic infrastructures or AMR. 
Often representing the smallest common denominator of competing interests, 
narrow reforms promised quick fixes by blending out the complexities of exist-
ing antibiotic infrastructures and the interconnection of environmental, 
medical, and agricultural AMR se lection. More uncomfortable reforms  were 
often avoided by  either displacing stewardship decisions onto the “green” mar-
ketplace or by relying on industry voluntarism. Globally, the countries that have 
been most successful in reducing their antibiotic footprint have done so 
by acknowledging entanglements and interlayering dif fer ent regulatory 
approaches. In Denmark, antibiotic reductions  were achieved with the help of 
educational campaigns, detailed surveillance, vaccines, a divorce of veterinary 
prescription and sales rights, antibiotic quotas, and injections of taxpayer money 
to help farmers develop alternative production systems.15 Change was neither 
cheap nor achieved overnight. In the long term, reducing global antibiotic 
infrastructures  will require broad reforms of all aspects of antibiotic use, cre-
ating microbially resilient animal production systems, and winning con-
ventional producers over to a sustained value- driven16 push for antibiotic- free 
farming.
 Toward Long- Term Resilience
The four stories of short- termism, epistemic fragmentation, infrastructure, and 
narrow reform highlight the need for sustained, multipronged, global collec-
tive action to preserve antibiotics’ efficacy.17 Even the best- intentioned national 
reforms  will not contain the global proliferation of re sis tance genes and 
resistant bacteria. While the current resurgence of nationalist politics is not 
helpful, waiting for new legislators or new antibiotics is unlikely to resolve 
prob lems— nor is ongoing interprofessional and international finger- pointing.
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In this situation, it is productive to think of antibiotics in analogy to 
climate change. Driven by global middle- class consumption, carbon dioxide 
and AMR levels  will likely continue to rise in the short to medium term. Any 
po liti cal interventions  will only see payoffs in the medium to long term. Suc-
cessful antibiotic stewardship therefore depends less on short- termist warnings 
about a pending apocalypse than on (a) long- term commitments to sustained 
antibiotic reduction with integrated and in de pen dent feedback mechanisms, 
(b) new efforts to communicate AMR risks to stakeholders, (c) and factoring 
microbial resilience into agricultural and health care planning. The latter 
point is particularly impor tant. As mentioned in the introduction, AMR is 
an ancient biological phenomenon that becomes a risk only within antibiotic 
dependent systems. Over the next de cades, rising se lection pressure means 
that bacterial susceptibility to some of our antibiotic work  horses may well be 
lost. Although other antibiotics  will remain effective and new drugs may well 
enter the market, fostering microbial resilience in health care and food pro-
duction systems minimizes the fallout of resistant disruptions to antibiotic 
infrastructures.
Improved management of our microbial commons seems the most promis-
ing way of moving forward. Since  every antimicrobial intervention  will even-
tually produce a microbial reaction, money spent on reopening the antibiotic 
pipeline  will only ever generate  limited returns. In the long run, managing and 
accepting the inevitable presence of microbes seems a more sustainable— and 
cheaper— option than constantly waging antimicrobial war in hospitals and on 
farms. In agriculture, options for reducing antibiotic use and increasing 
microbial resilience are manifold and range from designing environments that 
foster the competitive inhibition of pathogens, reducing herd densities, improv-
ing animal welfare, promoting vaccinations, investing in alternative therapies 
and preventive health care, taxing unsustainable forms of production, banning 
drugs, introducing antibiotic quotas, subsidizing antibiotic- free production, 
enhancing surveillance of antibiotic use and AMR, and so on.18 Back among 
his coughing pigs, the central question for the pig producer featured in the first 
chapter is not so much  whether access to antibiotics  will be banned but how 
not to rely on them in the first place.
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